The following excerpt from the SEC web site detaisl the settlement by several companies accused of bribing foreign officials:
"SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2010-214
Washington, D.C., Nov. 4, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced sweeping settlements with global freight forwarding company Panalpina, Inc. and six other companies in the oil services industry that violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by paying millions of dollars in bribes to foreign officials to receive preferential treatment and improper benefits during the customs process.
SEC Complaints:
Panalpina, Inc.
Pride International, Inc.
Tidewater Inc.
Transocean, Inc.
GlobalSantaFe Corp.
Noble Corporation
SEC Administrative Proceeding:
Royal Dutch Shell plc
The SEC alleges that the companies bribed customs officials in more than 10 countries in exchange for such perks as avoiding applicable customs duties on imported goods, expediting the importation of goods and equipment, extending drilling contracts, and lowering tax assessments. The companies also paid bribes to obtain false documentation related to temporary import permits for oil drilling rigs, and enable the release of drilling rigs and other equipment from customs officials.
The SEC's cases were coordinated with the U.S. Department of Justice's Fraud Section, and the sanctions to be paid by the companies under the settlements total $236.5 million. This is the first sweep of a particular industrial sector in order to crack down on public companies and third parties who are paying bribes abroad.
"Bribing customs officials is not only illegal but also bad for business, as the coordinated efforts of law enforcement increase the risk of detection every day," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "These companies resorted to lucrative arrangements behind the scenes to obtain phony paperwork and special favors, and they landed themselves squarely in investigators' crosshairs."
Cheryl J. Scarboro, Chief of the SEC's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit, added, "This investigation was the culmination of proactive work by the SEC and DOJ after detecting widespread corruption in the oil services industry. The FCPA Unit will continue to focus on industry-wide sweeps, and no industry is immune from investigation."
Without admitting or denying the allegations, the companies agreed to settle the SEC's charges against them by paying approximately $80 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties. The companies agreed to pay fines of $156.5 million to settle the criminal proceedings with DOJ.
SEC charges against six companies were filed in federal court, and one company was charged in an SEC administrative proceeding. Among the SEC's allegations:
Panalpina, Inc. — A U.S. subsidiary of the Swiss freight forwarding giant Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd. (PWT), Panalpina is charged with paying bribes to customs officials around the world from 2002 to 2007 on behalf of its customers, some of whom are included in these settlements. Panalpina bribed customs officials in Nigeria, Angola, Brazil, Russia and Kazakhstan to enable importation of goods into those countries and the provision of logistics services. The bribes were often authorized by Panalpina's customers and then inaccurately described in customer invoices as "local processing" or "special intervention" or "special handling" fees.
Panalpina agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement of $11,329,369 in the SEC case.
PWT and Panalpina agreed to pay a criminal fine of $70.56 million.
Pride International, Inc. — One of the world's largest offshore drilling companies, Pride and its subsidiaries paid approximately $2 million to foreign officials in eight countries from 2001 to 2006 in exchange for various benefits related to oil services. For example, Pride's former country manager in Venezuela authorized bribes of approximately $384,000 to a state-owned oil company official to secure extensions of drilling contracts, and a French subsidiary of Pride paid $500,000 in bribes intended for a judge to influence customs litigation relating to the importation of a drilling rig.
Pride agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $23,529,718 in the SEC case.
Pride and subsidiary Pride Forasol agreed to pay a criminal fine of $32.625 million.
Tidewater Inc. — The New Orleans-based shipping company through a subsidiary reimbursed approximately $1.6 million to its customs broker in Nigeria from 2002 to 2007 so the broker could make improper payments to Nigerian customs officials and induce them to disregard regulatory requirements related to the importation of Tidewater's vessels.
Tidewater agreed to an injunction and will pay $8,104,362 in disgorgement and a $217,000 penalty.
Tidewater Marine International agreed to pay a criminal fine of $7.35 million.
Transocean, Inc. — An international provider of offshore drilling services to oil companies throughout the world, Transocean made illicit payments from at least 2002 to 2007 through its customs agents to Nigerian government officials in order to extend the temporary importation status of its drilling rigs. Bribes also were paid to obtain false paperwork associated with its drilling rigs and obtain inward clearance authorizations for its rigs and a bond registration.
Transocean agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $7,265,080.
Transocean Ltd. and Transocean Inc. agreed to pay a criminal fine of $13.44 million.
GlobalSantaFe Corp. (GSF) A provider of offshore drilling services GSF made illegal payments through its customs brokers from approximately 2002 to 2007 to officials of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) to secure documentation showing that its rigs had left Nigerian waters. The rigs had in fact never moved. GSF also made other payments to government officials in Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea.
GSF agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement of $3,758,165 and a penalty of $2.1 million.
Noble Corporation — An offshore drilling services provider, Noble authorized payments by its Nigerian subsidiary to its custom agent to obtain false documentation from NCS officials to show export and re-import of its drilling rigs into Nigerian waters. From 2003 to 2007, Noble obtained eight temporary import permits with false documentation.
Noble agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $5,576,998.
Noble agreed to pay a criminal fine of $2.59 million.
Royal Dutch Shell plc — An oil company headquartered in the Netherlands, Shell and its indirect subsidiary called Shell International Exploration and Production, Inc. (SIEP) violated the FCPA by using a customs broker to make payments from 2002 to 2005 to officials at NCS to obtain preferential customs treatment related to a project in Nigeria.
SIEP and Shell agreed to a cease-and-desist order and will pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $18,149,459.
Shell Nigerian Exploration and Production Co. Ltd. will pay a criminal fine of $30 million. "
It should be noted that the SEC acknowledged that the Department of Justice and the FBI helped with the investigation.
The bribing of government officials and politicians is a problem in many countries of the world including the United States. It is hard to say whether the people in government or the people in business should be given the worse punishments. In America prosecuting for giving or receiving bribes in this country is rare because so many laws have been passed and court cases decided which pretty much legalizes bribery. Our politicians might be corrupt but they are not stupid. Bribery is looked upon as a victimless crime in the United States.
Of course the victims of bribery are obvious. First of all the citizens do not have a government operating in their best interest. Secondly, businesses that give bribes undermine the businesses of honest entrepreneurs who refuse to give payola to people in government. Bribery simply undermines the workings of capitalism and should simply be treated as a crime.
This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063
Sunday, December 5, 2010
Thursday, December 2, 2010
FDIC CHAIRMAN CALLS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Although the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) is theoretically geared more to the banking system than the SEC (Security and Exchange Commission) the businesses of banking and securitization has been merged within many institutions over the last couple of decades. In short, what affects the securities industry affects the banking industry and vice verse. The following excerpt from the FDIC web page are remarks given by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair to the Boston Club:
"Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to The Boston Club, Boston, MA
December 2, 2010
Thank you for that kind introduction. It is wonderful to be back in Massachusetts and an honor to talk to this distinguished group.
The past few years have been the most eventful for U.S. economic policy since the 1930s. And that, of course, is because our nation has suffered its most serious economic setback since the Great Depression. We knew that the crisis posed a grave threat to the U.S. economy. Our response has been historic in scope, and it has sparked a sorely needed debate over the appropriate roles for government and business in regulating and leading the economy.
What I would like to do this morning is outline the rationale for the new reforms, and explain how they intersect with the fundamental need for much greater responsibility and accountability on the part of government and corporate leaders. The following are remarks given by
Warren Buffett has said: “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently.”
What we need are leaders who are willing to do things differently; leaders who are willing to do the hard work necessary to move our country forward. Leaders who aren’t interested in promoting their short term personal gains, but rather want to build their organizations for the long term for the benefit of this and future generations.
Accountability and responsibility
The financial crisis has revealed critical flaws in how our financial system operated and was regulated, as well as in our leadership culture. If there is an overarching theme of this crisis, it is a lack of accountability by managers, by regulators, by lenders, by borrowers -- by everyone. We see that at the failed banks – both large ones that the government bailed-out and smaller ones the FDIC has had to resolve.
We’ve seen disengaged managers; managers who were not hands-on, who would not take responsibility or find out what was going on inside of their organization. We’ve seen managers who didn’t look beyond their next quarter’s financial statements and who rewarded short term profit generation through high risk activities which sowed the seeds of their ultimate demise. They didn't do their homework, they didn't understand the risks their companies were taking, and they didn't work hard enough. Some were arrogant.
It's an important lesson for investors, shareholders and, of course boards, who ultimately are responsible for hiring the CEO, and making sure that the CEO and other senior managers are up to the job, and doing their job. At larger institutions, some managers assumed that their size protected them from regulatory or market sanctions – that they were so systemically important and interconnected that they were Too Big To Fail. And some of them proved to be right. Especially at the height of the financial crisis, we saw these large, systemically important institutions exempted from the type of supervisory sanctions that community banks face every day.
That is one of the reasons why we fought so hard to end Too Big To Fail. We now have a resolution process that will impose discipline on large institutions as well as the smaller ones. If they get into trouble, there will be accountability. There will be consequences for management, for corporate boards, for investors, and for creditors.
Too Big To Fail & Resolution Authority
The new Dodd-Frank financial reform act establishes a credible resolution authority for giant banks and non-bank financial institutions. It gives the FDIC, for the first time, a set of receivership powers to close and liquidate systemically-important financial firms that are failing. These new powers are similar to the existing FDIC receivership process for insured banks and thrifts.
Let me briefly describe the practical significance of these new powers. In the old world of Too Big To Fail, risk taking was subsidized. Systemically-important companies took on too much risk because the gains were private while the losses were socialized. Market discipline failed to rein in the excesses at these institutions because equity and debt holders -- who should rightly be at risk if things go wrong -- enjoyed an implicit government backstop.
This skewing of financial incentives inevitably led to a misallocation of capital and credit flows, which ultimately was harmful to the broader public good, as we have seen with the recent devastating losses of livelihoods, homes, and life savings. It was these poor incentives in place under Too Big To Fail that helped push risk out into the so-called shadow banking system, where regulation was the lightest. That’s where you saw most of the excesses in subprime and nontraditional mortgage lending, as well as holdings of mortgage-related derivative instruments.
So implementing the new resolution authority and ending Too Big To Fail is a game changer. It corrects the economic incentives, and protects the broader public good:
Market discipline will be restored,
Financial incentives will be better aligned,
Capital and credit will be allocated more efficiently, and
Taxpayers will no longer be on the hook when financial companies get it wrong.
Executive compensation
Another example of lack of accountability can be found in the misaligned compensation incentives, which were among the root causes of the financial crisis. Compensation was too-often based on deal volume or current earnings, and not enough attention was paid to risks that eventually caused problems down the road.
It is not appropriate for regulators to set or limit compensation. But it is very appropriate to undertake regulatory initiatives that encourage companies to structure compensation so that excessive risk taking is discouraged, long term profitability is rewarded, and most importantly, that meaningful financial penalties are imposed on employees whose risk taking ends up causing losses later on.
Fiscal responsibility
In Washington, we also need more accountability for our increasingly dire fiscal situation. We must mend our ways if we are to preserve financial stability in the years ahead. Excessive government borrowing poses a clear danger to our long-term financial stability, and assuaging it requires fiscal responsibility and leadership. Total U.S. public debt has doubled in just the past seven years to almost $14 trillion, or more than $100,000 for every U.S. household.
This explosive growth in federal borrowing is not only the result of the financial crisis, but also the unwillingness of our government over many years to make the hard choices necessary to rein in our long-term structural deficit. If it is not checked soon, this borrowing will at some point directly threaten financial stability by undermining the confidence that investors have in U.S. government obligations.
Actually fixing these problems will require a bipartisan national commitment to a comprehensive package of spending cuts and tax increases over many years. The plan released yesterday by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform offers such a plan. It proposes a combination of spending cuts, revenue-enhancing tax reforms, and cost containment in health care and entitlement programs that would produce nearly $4 trillion in deficit reduction over the next ten years.
While opinions differ as to exactly what combination of spending cuts and revenue increase will be necessary we can be sure that most of the needed changes will be unpopular, and will likely affect every interest group in some way or another. We will want to phase in these changes over time as the economy continues to recover from the effects of the financial crisis.
But only with a comprehensive package can we truly achieve the long-term budget discipline needed to preserve our nation’s credibility in global financial markets, and maintain a stable banking system to support the real economy. We must look beyond our narrow partisan interests, and show the world that we are prepared to act boldly to secure our economic future.
Leadership
I am very proud of the stability that the FDIC has provided throughout the crisis. No one lost a penny of insured deposits. And in fact, no one has ever lost a penny of insured deposits in the 77 years since the FDIC was created in 1933. As the crisis unfolded and other financial sectors were destabilizing, insured deposits remained stable and there were no disruptions.
As the leader of an organization, I always try to keep a focus on mission. Protecting insured deposits is a very important, tangible mission. It's one that the public understands and appreciates.
If you look at other organizations – whether private or public -- that have high morale, they have a clearly defined mission. The leadership at those organizations has to ensure that people stay focused on the mission and help them understand how their individual jobs relate to the mission. You need accountability. You need responsibility. You need people to take ownership of their jobs and connect that to the organization’s broader mission.
One challenge I have is to tell our people how good they are. That their judgment is as good as that of the banks they are examining, and that it is their job to speak up about any concerns they have. That they have the right and the obligation to question and tell a bank’s management about those concerns, whether they're not reserving enough against their loans, or that they're moving into a new line of business or a new geographic area in which they are unfamiliar.
Conclusion
We all know there are no easy shortcuts to rebuilding our financial infrastructure and reining in our long-term structural deficit. And it is always appealing to try to go back to old and familiar ways. But in American finance, those are the practices that pushed our economy to the brink of ruin.
Instead, we must move forward, make the tough choices, and accept that preserving stability is a prerequisite to making the financial system more efficient and more profitable. In the end, leadership means showing the resolve to identify emerging risks and taking concerted action to head them off.
In concluding, I don’t want to leave you with the impression that all leadership in the financial sector should be faulted. There are several examples of senior management at financial institutions, large and small, who avoided the excessive risk taking that led to the crisis. So let us celebrate those who led their organizations effectively and resolve to foster a culture which rewards managers who are willing to forego short term profits in favor of long term stability and prosperity.
And as part of building that culture, let’s hope that we see a lot more women in the upper echelons of financial institution management, including – at long last – at the very top.
Thank you."
The FDIC believes there has to be reform in order to improve our overall economy. With reforms supported by the FDIC along with legal sanctions taken by the SEC perhaps we might have a light at the end of this long dark tunnel our economy in which our economy has been stuck. We can only hope someone sprays for poisonous spiders before financial oversight authorities signal that it is O.K. to move through the tunnel to the light.
"Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to The Boston Club, Boston, MA
December 2, 2010
Thank you for that kind introduction. It is wonderful to be back in Massachusetts and an honor to talk to this distinguished group.
The past few years have been the most eventful for U.S. economic policy since the 1930s. And that, of course, is because our nation has suffered its most serious economic setback since the Great Depression. We knew that the crisis posed a grave threat to the U.S. economy. Our response has been historic in scope, and it has sparked a sorely needed debate over the appropriate roles for government and business in regulating and leading the economy.
What I would like to do this morning is outline the rationale for the new reforms, and explain how they intersect with the fundamental need for much greater responsibility and accountability on the part of government and corporate leaders. The following are remarks given by
Warren Buffett has said: “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently.”
What we need are leaders who are willing to do things differently; leaders who are willing to do the hard work necessary to move our country forward. Leaders who aren’t interested in promoting their short term personal gains, but rather want to build their organizations for the long term for the benefit of this and future generations.
Accountability and responsibility
The financial crisis has revealed critical flaws in how our financial system operated and was regulated, as well as in our leadership culture. If there is an overarching theme of this crisis, it is a lack of accountability by managers, by regulators, by lenders, by borrowers -- by everyone. We see that at the failed banks – both large ones that the government bailed-out and smaller ones the FDIC has had to resolve.
We’ve seen disengaged managers; managers who were not hands-on, who would not take responsibility or find out what was going on inside of their organization. We’ve seen managers who didn’t look beyond their next quarter’s financial statements and who rewarded short term profit generation through high risk activities which sowed the seeds of their ultimate demise. They didn't do their homework, they didn't understand the risks their companies were taking, and they didn't work hard enough. Some were arrogant.
It's an important lesson for investors, shareholders and, of course boards, who ultimately are responsible for hiring the CEO, and making sure that the CEO and other senior managers are up to the job, and doing their job. At larger institutions, some managers assumed that their size protected them from regulatory or market sanctions – that they were so systemically important and interconnected that they were Too Big To Fail. And some of them proved to be right. Especially at the height of the financial crisis, we saw these large, systemically important institutions exempted from the type of supervisory sanctions that community banks face every day.
That is one of the reasons why we fought so hard to end Too Big To Fail. We now have a resolution process that will impose discipline on large institutions as well as the smaller ones. If they get into trouble, there will be accountability. There will be consequences for management, for corporate boards, for investors, and for creditors.
Too Big To Fail & Resolution Authority
The new Dodd-Frank financial reform act establishes a credible resolution authority for giant banks and non-bank financial institutions. It gives the FDIC, for the first time, a set of receivership powers to close and liquidate systemically-important financial firms that are failing. These new powers are similar to the existing FDIC receivership process for insured banks and thrifts.
Let me briefly describe the practical significance of these new powers. In the old world of Too Big To Fail, risk taking was subsidized. Systemically-important companies took on too much risk because the gains were private while the losses were socialized. Market discipline failed to rein in the excesses at these institutions because equity and debt holders -- who should rightly be at risk if things go wrong -- enjoyed an implicit government backstop.
This skewing of financial incentives inevitably led to a misallocation of capital and credit flows, which ultimately was harmful to the broader public good, as we have seen with the recent devastating losses of livelihoods, homes, and life savings. It was these poor incentives in place under Too Big To Fail that helped push risk out into the so-called shadow banking system, where regulation was the lightest. That’s where you saw most of the excesses in subprime and nontraditional mortgage lending, as well as holdings of mortgage-related derivative instruments.
So implementing the new resolution authority and ending Too Big To Fail is a game changer. It corrects the economic incentives, and protects the broader public good:
Market discipline will be restored,
Financial incentives will be better aligned,
Capital and credit will be allocated more efficiently, and
Taxpayers will no longer be on the hook when financial companies get it wrong.
Executive compensation
Another example of lack of accountability can be found in the misaligned compensation incentives, which were among the root causes of the financial crisis. Compensation was too-often based on deal volume or current earnings, and not enough attention was paid to risks that eventually caused problems down the road.
It is not appropriate for regulators to set or limit compensation. But it is very appropriate to undertake regulatory initiatives that encourage companies to structure compensation so that excessive risk taking is discouraged, long term profitability is rewarded, and most importantly, that meaningful financial penalties are imposed on employees whose risk taking ends up causing losses later on.
Fiscal responsibility
In Washington, we also need more accountability for our increasingly dire fiscal situation. We must mend our ways if we are to preserve financial stability in the years ahead. Excessive government borrowing poses a clear danger to our long-term financial stability, and assuaging it requires fiscal responsibility and leadership. Total U.S. public debt has doubled in just the past seven years to almost $14 trillion, or more than $100,000 for every U.S. household.
This explosive growth in federal borrowing is not only the result of the financial crisis, but also the unwillingness of our government over many years to make the hard choices necessary to rein in our long-term structural deficit. If it is not checked soon, this borrowing will at some point directly threaten financial stability by undermining the confidence that investors have in U.S. government obligations.
Actually fixing these problems will require a bipartisan national commitment to a comprehensive package of spending cuts and tax increases over many years. The plan released yesterday by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform offers such a plan. It proposes a combination of spending cuts, revenue-enhancing tax reforms, and cost containment in health care and entitlement programs that would produce nearly $4 trillion in deficit reduction over the next ten years.
While opinions differ as to exactly what combination of spending cuts and revenue increase will be necessary we can be sure that most of the needed changes will be unpopular, and will likely affect every interest group in some way or another. We will want to phase in these changes over time as the economy continues to recover from the effects of the financial crisis.
But only with a comprehensive package can we truly achieve the long-term budget discipline needed to preserve our nation’s credibility in global financial markets, and maintain a stable banking system to support the real economy. We must look beyond our narrow partisan interests, and show the world that we are prepared to act boldly to secure our economic future.
Leadership
I am very proud of the stability that the FDIC has provided throughout the crisis. No one lost a penny of insured deposits. And in fact, no one has ever lost a penny of insured deposits in the 77 years since the FDIC was created in 1933. As the crisis unfolded and other financial sectors were destabilizing, insured deposits remained stable and there were no disruptions.
As the leader of an organization, I always try to keep a focus on mission. Protecting insured deposits is a very important, tangible mission. It's one that the public understands and appreciates.
If you look at other organizations – whether private or public -- that have high morale, they have a clearly defined mission. The leadership at those organizations has to ensure that people stay focused on the mission and help them understand how their individual jobs relate to the mission. You need accountability. You need responsibility. You need people to take ownership of their jobs and connect that to the organization’s broader mission.
One challenge I have is to tell our people how good they are. That their judgment is as good as that of the banks they are examining, and that it is their job to speak up about any concerns they have. That they have the right and the obligation to question and tell a bank’s management about those concerns, whether they're not reserving enough against their loans, or that they're moving into a new line of business or a new geographic area in which they are unfamiliar.
Conclusion
We all know there are no easy shortcuts to rebuilding our financial infrastructure and reining in our long-term structural deficit. And it is always appealing to try to go back to old and familiar ways. But in American finance, those are the practices that pushed our economy to the brink of ruin.
Instead, we must move forward, make the tough choices, and accept that preserving stability is a prerequisite to making the financial system more efficient and more profitable. In the end, leadership means showing the resolve to identify emerging risks and taking concerted action to head them off.
In concluding, I don’t want to leave you with the impression that all leadership in the financial sector should be faulted. There are several examples of senior management at financial institutions, large and small, who avoided the excessive risk taking that led to the crisis. So let us celebrate those who led their organizations effectively and resolve to foster a culture which rewards managers who are willing to forego short term profits in favor of long term stability and prosperity.
And as part of building that culture, let’s hope that we see a lot more women in the upper echelons of financial institution management, including – at long last – at the very top.
Thank you."
The FDIC believes there has to be reform in order to improve our overall economy. With reforms supported by the FDIC along with legal sanctions taken by the SEC perhaps we might have a light at the end of this long dark tunnel our economy in which our economy has been stuck. We can only hope someone sprays for poisonous spiders before financial oversight authorities signal that it is O.K. to move through the tunnel to the light.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
SEC CHARGES DELOITTE TAX LLP PARTNER IN INSIDER TRADING SCHEME
Too often people have the misconception that those who are extremely rich made their fortunes by building “a better mouse trap”. In fact, after watching all these fantastical frauds which are only now being exposed by the SEC it might seem that most people who make vast fortunes make their money through some sort of fraudulent scheme. The following release from the SEC goes into depth regarding a family of alleged fraudsters who use a legitimate position in a legitimate company to swindle honest investors out of their hard earned savings. The following is an excerpt from the SEC web page:
“SEC Charges Deloitte Partner and Wife in International Insider Trading Scheme
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2010-234
Nov. 30, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a former Deloitte Tax LLP partner and his wife with repeatedly leaking confidential merger and acquisition information to family members overseas in a multi-million dollar insider trading scheme.
The SEC alleges that Arnold McClellan and his wife Annabel, who live in San Francisco, provided advance notice of at least seven confidential acquisitions planned by Deloitte's clients to Annabel's sister and brother-in-law in London. After receiving the illegal tips, the brother-in-law took financial positions in U.S. companies that were targets of acquisitions by Arnold McClellan's clients. His subsequent trades were closely timed with telephone calls between Annabel McClellan and her sister, and with in-person visits with the McClellans. Their insider trading reaped illegal profits of approximately $3 million in U.S. dollars, half of which was to be funneled back to Annabel McClellan.
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has announced charges against the two relatives — James and Miranda Sanders of London. The FSA also charged colleagues of James Sanders whom he tipped with the nonpublic information in the course of his work at his London-based derivatives firm. Sanders's tippees and clients made approximately $20 million in U.S. dollars by trading on the inside information.
"The McClellans might have thought that they could conceal their illegal scheme by having close relatives make illegal trades offshore. They were wrong," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "In this day and age, whether it's across oceans or across markets, the SEC and its domestic and foreign law enforcement partners are committed to identifying and prosecuting illegal insider trading."
Marc J. Fagel, Director of the SEC's San Francisco Regional Office, added, "Deloitte and its clients entrusted Arnold McClellan with highly confidential information. Along with his wife, he abused that trust and used high-placed access to corporate secrets for the couple's own benefit and their family's enrichment."
According to the SEC's complaint, Arnold McClellan had access to highly confidential information while serving as the head of one of Deloitte's regional mergers and acquisitions teams. He provided tax and other advice to Deloitte's clients that were considering corporate acquisitions.
The SEC alleges that between 2006 and 2008, James Sanders used the non-public information obtained from the McClellans to purchase derivative financial instruments known as "spread bets" that are pegged to the price of the underlying U.S. stock. The trading started modestly, with James Sanders buying the equivalent of 1,000 shares of stock in a company that Arnold McClellan's client was attempting to acquire. Subsequent deals netted significant trading profits, and eventually James Sanders was taking large positions and passing along information about Arnold McClellan's deals to colleagues and clients at his trading firm as well as to his father.
Among the confidential impending transactions allegedly revealed by McClellan:
Kronos Inc., a Massachusetts-based data collection and payroll software company acquired by a private equity firm in 2007.
aQuantive Inc., a Seattle-based digital advertising and marketing company acquired by Microsoft in 2007.
Getty Images Inc., a Seattle-based licenser of photographs and other visual content acquired by a private equity firm in 2008.
The SEC's complaint alleges the following chronology involving insider trading around the Kronos transaction:
November 2006: Arnold McClellan begins advising Deloitte client on planned Kronos acquisition.
Jan. 29, 2007: McClellan signs confidentiality agreement.
Jan. 31, 2007: Following call from Annabel's cell phone, James Sanders begins buying Kronos spread bets in his wife's account.
March 11, 2007: Arnold McClellan has two-hour cell phone call with client to discuss acquisition. Less than an hour later, call from same cell phone to Annabel's family.
March 12-14, 2007: James Sanders increases size of Kronos bets.
March 16, 2007: James Sanders informs another family member that Annabel is the source of his tips; describes his agreement to split profits with her 50/50.
March 23, 2007: Deloitte client publicly announces Kronos acquisition. Kronos stock price increases 14 percent; James Sanders and other tippees reap approximately $4.9 million in U.S. dollars.
The SEC's complaint charges Arnold and Annabel McClellan with violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of illicit profits with prejudgment interest, and financial penalties.
The SEC's case was investigated by Victor W. Hong, Monique C. Winkler, Alice L. Jensen, and Jina L. Choi of the San Francisco Regional Office. The Commission would like to thank the UK Financial Services Authority, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their assistance in this matter.”
The above case shows how manipulated our securities markets have become over the last several years. At one time the SEC and others would pounce on people who did anything that was remotely inappropriate. However, over the years market manipulation was looked upon as a good business practice by at least the last two presidential administrations (One democrat and one republican). The SEC under this current administration is at least trying to control the use of fraud as a legitmate part of finance.
“SEC Charges Deloitte Partner and Wife in International Insider Trading Scheme
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2010-234
Nov. 30, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a former Deloitte Tax LLP partner and his wife with repeatedly leaking confidential merger and acquisition information to family members overseas in a multi-million dollar insider trading scheme.
The SEC alleges that Arnold McClellan and his wife Annabel, who live in San Francisco, provided advance notice of at least seven confidential acquisitions planned by Deloitte's clients to Annabel's sister and brother-in-law in London. After receiving the illegal tips, the brother-in-law took financial positions in U.S. companies that were targets of acquisitions by Arnold McClellan's clients. His subsequent trades were closely timed with telephone calls between Annabel McClellan and her sister, and with in-person visits with the McClellans. Their insider trading reaped illegal profits of approximately $3 million in U.S. dollars, half of which was to be funneled back to Annabel McClellan.
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has announced charges against the two relatives — James and Miranda Sanders of London. The FSA also charged colleagues of James Sanders whom he tipped with the nonpublic information in the course of his work at his London-based derivatives firm. Sanders's tippees and clients made approximately $20 million in U.S. dollars by trading on the inside information.
"The McClellans might have thought that they could conceal their illegal scheme by having close relatives make illegal trades offshore. They were wrong," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "In this day and age, whether it's across oceans or across markets, the SEC and its domestic and foreign law enforcement partners are committed to identifying and prosecuting illegal insider trading."
Marc J. Fagel, Director of the SEC's San Francisco Regional Office, added, "Deloitte and its clients entrusted Arnold McClellan with highly confidential information. Along with his wife, he abused that trust and used high-placed access to corporate secrets for the couple's own benefit and their family's enrichment."
According to the SEC's complaint, Arnold McClellan had access to highly confidential information while serving as the head of one of Deloitte's regional mergers and acquisitions teams. He provided tax and other advice to Deloitte's clients that were considering corporate acquisitions.
The SEC alleges that between 2006 and 2008, James Sanders used the non-public information obtained from the McClellans to purchase derivative financial instruments known as "spread bets" that are pegged to the price of the underlying U.S. stock. The trading started modestly, with James Sanders buying the equivalent of 1,000 shares of stock in a company that Arnold McClellan's client was attempting to acquire. Subsequent deals netted significant trading profits, and eventually James Sanders was taking large positions and passing along information about Arnold McClellan's deals to colleagues and clients at his trading firm as well as to his father.
Among the confidential impending transactions allegedly revealed by McClellan:
Kronos Inc., a Massachusetts-based data collection and payroll software company acquired by a private equity firm in 2007.
aQuantive Inc., a Seattle-based digital advertising and marketing company acquired by Microsoft in 2007.
Getty Images Inc., a Seattle-based licenser of photographs and other visual content acquired by a private equity firm in 2008.
The SEC's complaint alleges the following chronology involving insider trading around the Kronos transaction:
November 2006: Arnold McClellan begins advising Deloitte client on planned Kronos acquisition.
Jan. 29, 2007: McClellan signs confidentiality agreement.
Jan. 31, 2007: Following call from Annabel's cell phone, James Sanders begins buying Kronos spread bets in his wife's account.
March 11, 2007: Arnold McClellan has two-hour cell phone call with client to discuss acquisition. Less than an hour later, call from same cell phone to Annabel's family.
March 12-14, 2007: James Sanders increases size of Kronos bets.
March 16, 2007: James Sanders informs another family member that Annabel is the source of his tips; describes his agreement to split profits with her 50/50.
March 23, 2007: Deloitte client publicly announces Kronos acquisition. Kronos stock price increases 14 percent; James Sanders and other tippees reap approximately $4.9 million in U.S. dollars.
The SEC's complaint charges Arnold and Annabel McClellan with violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of illicit profits with prejudgment interest, and financial penalties.
The SEC's case was investigated by Victor W. Hong, Monique C. Winkler, Alice L. Jensen, and Jina L. Choi of the San Francisco Regional Office. The Commission would like to thank the UK Financial Services Authority, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their assistance in this matter.”
The above case shows how manipulated our securities markets have become over the last several years. At one time the SEC and others would pounce on people who did anything that was remotely inappropriate. However, over the years market manipulation was looked upon as a good business practice by at least the last two presidential administrations (One democrat and one republican). The SEC under this current administration is at least trying to control the use of fraud as a legitmate part of finance.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
SEC REPORTED ON WORK PLAN FOR GLOBAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The SEC has published their first report on their quest to develop global accounting standards. The following is an excerpt from the SEC web site:
Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of the Chief Accountant and Division of Corporation Finance today published their first progress report on the Work Plan related to global accounting standards.
The Commission directed agency staff earlier this year to execute the Work Plan to provide the information needed to evaluate the implications of incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers. The Commission indicated that following successful completion of the Work Plan and the convergence projects of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it will be in a position in 2011 to determine whether to incorporate IFRS into the U.S. financial reporting system.
"The staff has invested significant time and effort in executing the Work Plan, and we've made great progress to date," said SEC Chief Accountant Jim Kroeker. "This progress report emphasizes the importance of transparency in the staff's activities, and can help the public's understanding of the magnitude of this project and the staff's progress."
The Work Plan addresses six key areas:
Sufficient development and application of IFRS for the U.S. domestic reporting system.
The independence of standard setting for the benefit of investors.
Investor understanding and education regarding IFRS.
Examination of the U.S. regulatory environment that would be affected by a change in accounting standards.
The impact on issuers both large and small, including changes to accounting systems, changes to contractual arrangements, corporate governance considerations, and litigation contingencies.
Human capital readiness.
The SEC staff expects to continue to report periodically on the status of the Work Plan in 2011."
Global Accounting Standards seems like something every would agree is needed in a global economy. The establishment of enforced Global Accounting Standards would in theory save governments and businesses a tremendous amount of money. Getting some nations to sign on to such standards might be a problem since every nation thinks that their way at doing anything is the best way. Changing accounting practices in the U.S. to reflect the practices in other nations might in fact be difficult since we have such a huge economy.
Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of the Chief Accountant and Division of Corporation Finance today published their first progress report on the Work Plan related to global accounting standards.
The Commission directed agency staff earlier this year to execute the Work Plan to provide the information needed to evaluate the implications of incorporating International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers. The Commission indicated that following successful completion of the Work Plan and the convergence projects of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it will be in a position in 2011 to determine whether to incorporate IFRS into the U.S. financial reporting system.
"The staff has invested significant time and effort in executing the Work Plan, and we've made great progress to date," said SEC Chief Accountant Jim Kroeker. "This progress report emphasizes the importance of transparency in the staff's activities, and can help the public's understanding of the magnitude of this project and the staff's progress."
The Work Plan addresses six key areas:
Sufficient development and application of IFRS for the U.S. domestic reporting system.
The independence of standard setting for the benefit of investors.
Investor understanding and education regarding IFRS.
Examination of the U.S. regulatory environment that would be affected by a change in accounting standards.
The impact on issuers both large and small, including changes to accounting systems, changes to contractual arrangements, corporate governance considerations, and litigation contingencies.
Human capital readiness.
The SEC staff expects to continue to report periodically on the status of the Work Plan in 2011."
Global Accounting Standards seems like something every would agree is needed in a global economy. The establishment of enforced Global Accounting Standards would in theory save governments and businesses a tremendous amount of money. Getting some nations to sign on to such standards might be a problem since every nation thinks that their way at doing anything is the best way. Changing accounting practices in the U.S. to reflect the practices in other nations might in fact be difficult since we have such a huge economy.
THREE LOCATIONS RAIDED FOR INSIDER TRADING EVIDENCE
This week the FBI raided at least three corporate locations where evidence of insider trading might be located. It was widely circulated amongst news agencies that the locations were addresses for Level Global Investors LP, Diamondback Capital Management LLC and, Loch Capital Management LLC. The FBI has an ongoing investigation therefor, they will not give specifics.
If the companies mentioned above are under investigation then this is important news. The SEC has been investigating and prosecuting several companies for various crimes however, the SEC can only fine criminals but, the FBI can put them in jail.
There arm many on Wall Street that believe that insider trading should be just another money making tool for wealthy individuals and companies. The problem with insider trading can best be illustrated with companies that seem healthy according to all available information but, suddenly the company is shorted over the course of a few trading days into having a nearly worthless stock. Then the bad news known only by a lucky few becomes public and the honest investor has lost and the inside trader walks away with all the money. In short, insider trading is anything but a victimless crime.
If the companies mentioned above are under investigation then this is important news. The SEC has been investigating and prosecuting several companies for various crimes however, the SEC can only fine criminals but, the FBI can put them in jail.
There arm many on Wall Street that believe that insider trading should be just another money making tool for wealthy individuals and companies. The problem with insider trading can best be illustrated with companies that seem healthy according to all available information but, suddenly the company is shorted over the course of a few trading days into having a nearly worthless stock. Then the bad news known only by a lucky few becomes public and the honest investor has lost and the inside trader walks away with all the money. In short, insider trading is anything but a victimless crime.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
NEW SEC RULES TARGET POLITICAL PAYOFFS
Mary Shapirro and the SEC has made perhaps the boldest move yet in trying to impliment reforms to get some of the corruption out of our government. The following is an excerpt from the SEC meeting held on June 30, 2010:
Good Morning. This is an open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2010.
Today we consider adopting rules that would significantly curtail the corrupting influence of "pay to play." Pay to play is the practice of making campaign contributions and related payments to elected officials in order to influence the awarding of lucrative contracts for the management of public pension plan assets and similar government investment accounts.
Pay to play distorts municipal investment priorities as well as the process by which investment managers are selected. It can mean that public plans and their beneficiaries receive sub-par advisory performance at a premium price.
The cost of this practice is borne by retired teachers, firefighters and other government employees relying on expected pension benefits, or by parents and students counting on a state-sponsored college savings account. And, ultimately, this cost can be borne by taxpayers, who may have to make up shortfalls when vested obligations cannot be met.
An unspoken, but entrenched and well-understood practice, pay to play can also favor large advisers over smaller competitors, reward political connections rather than management skill, and — as a number of recent enforcement cases have shown — pave the way to outright fraud and corruption.
There should be no place for such practices in an investment advisory industry subject to high fiduciary standards. The selection of investment advisers to manage public plans should be based on the best interests of the plans and their beneficiaries, not kickbacks and favors.
The rules we consider today will help level the playing field, allowing advisers of all sizes to compete for government contracts based on investment skill and quality of service.
Background
When the Commission first considered a proposal to curb adviser pay to play practices in 1999, it was, in part, motivated by widespread media accounts of dubious arrangements between fund managers and municipal officials.
In the years since, the amount of money at stake — and the incentive for inappropriate conduct — has ballooned. Public pension plans now represent one-third of all U.S. pension assets, with more than $2.6 trillion in assets under management.
Additionally, state-sponsored higher education savings plans — commonly known as "529s" — now hold approximately $100 billion in assets. These plans were in their infancy when the Commission first took up this issue in 1999.
The SEC has brought a series of enforcement actions charging investment advisers with participating in pay to play schemes. Most recently, we brought a civil action involving allegations of unlawful kickbacks paid in connection with investments by the New York State Common Retirement Fund.
In recent years, civil and criminal authorities also have brought cases in California, New York, New Mexico, Illinois, Ohio, Connecticut, and Florida, charging the same or similar conduct.
Our recent cases may represent just the tip of the iceberg. I fear that many other efforts to influence the selection of advisers to manage government plans pass unnoticed or — though highly suspect — cannot be proven to have crossed the line into actionable behavior.
Not surprisingly, parties to these suspect transactions take care to blur their motives, to hide their actions and to conceal their connections, making it difficult to prove a direct quid-pro-quo or an intent to curry favor in a specific case. The prophylactic rules we consider today are designed to eliminate this legal and ethical gray area.
Elements of the Rule
The rule we consider today has three key elements:
First, it would prohibit an adviser from providing advisory services for compensation — either directly or through a pooled investment vehicle — for two years, if the adviser or certain of its executives or employees make a political contribution to an elected official who is in a position to influence the selection of the adviser.
Second, the rule would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from soliciting or coordinating campaign contributions from others — a practice referred to as "bundling" — for an elected official who is in a position to influence the selection of the adviser. It also would prohibit solicitation and coordination of payments to political parties, when the adviser is pursuing business from public entities.
Finally, and very importantly, the rule would prohibit an adviser from paying third-party solicitors who are not "regulated persons" subject to prohibitions against making contributions. Such "regulated persons" would be limited to registered investment advisers and to broker-dealers subject to pay to play restrictions.
Third party placement agents have been involved in some of the most egregious pay to play activities in recent years, and their activities should not continue unabated. The approach we are taking is a strong step toward eliminating the corruptive influence that can result from the use of third party placement agents.
It will greatly improve the status quo by banning payments to third parties who solicit government clients, unless they are "regulated persons" subject to pay to play restrictions comparable to the rule we are considering for adoption today.
This approach provides far greater protection of public pension plans and their beneficiaries than is currently the case, as third party placement agents come under the regulatory umbrella and, for the first time, become subject to meaningful federal pay to play restrictions.
This approach should effectively eliminate the opportunity for abuse that currently exists from third party placement agents. However, if the Commission determines that third party placement agents continue to inappropriately influence the selection of investment advisers for government clients — even under our enhanced rules — I expect that we would consider the imposition of a full ban on the use of these third parties.
Let me end by underscoring once again why we are here today. Pay to play practices are corrupt and corrupting. They run counter to the fiduciary principles by which funds held in trust should be managed. They harm beneficiaries, municipalities and honest advisers. And they breed criminal behavior. I hope my colleagues will join me today in striking a blow against a practice that has no legitimate place in our markets.
Before we hear more details about the rules we are considering for adoption, let me first offer my thanks to the individuals — representing a cross-section of four divisions and numerous offices — for their help in bringing to the table today a truly thoughtful, impressive and potent example of rulewriting."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good Morning. This is an open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2010.
Today we consider adopting rules that would significantly curtail the corrupting influence of "pay to play." Pay to play is the practice of making campaign contributions and related payments to elected officials in order to influence the awarding of lucrative contracts for the management of public pension plan assets and similar government investment accounts.
Pay to play distorts municipal investment priorities as well as the process by which investment managers are selected. It can mean that public plans and their beneficiaries receive sub-par advisory performance at a premium price.
The cost of this practice is borne by retired teachers, firefighters and other government employees relying on expected pension benefits, or by parents and students counting on a state-sponsored college savings account. And, ultimately, this cost can be borne by taxpayers, who may have to make up shortfalls when vested obligations cannot be met.
An unspoken, but entrenched and well-understood practice, pay to play can also favor large advisers over smaller competitors, reward political connections rather than management skill, and — as a number of recent enforcement cases have shown — pave the way to outright fraud and corruption.
There should be no place for such practices in an investment advisory industry subject to high fiduciary standards. The selection of investment advisers to manage public plans should be based on the best interests of the plans and their beneficiaries, not kickbacks and favors.
The rules we consider today will help level the playing field, allowing advisers of all sizes to compete for government contracts based on investment skill and quality of service.
Background
When the Commission first considered a proposal to curb adviser pay to play practices in 1999, it was, in part, motivated by widespread media accounts of dubious arrangements between fund managers and municipal officials.
In the years since, the amount of money at stake — and the incentive for inappropriate conduct — has ballooned. Public pension plans now represent one-third of all U.S. pension assets, with more than $2.6 trillion in assets under management.
Additionally, state-sponsored higher education savings plans — commonly known as "529s" — now hold approximately $100 billion in assets. These plans were in their infancy when the Commission first took up this issue in 1999.
The SEC has brought a series of enforcement actions charging investment advisers with participating in pay to play schemes. Most recently, we brought a civil action involving allegations of unlawful kickbacks paid in connection with investments by the New York State Common Retirement Fund.
In recent years, civil and criminal authorities also have brought cases in California, New York, New Mexico, Illinois, Ohio, Connecticut, and Florida, charging the same or similar conduct.
Our recent cases may represent just the tip of the iceberg. I fear that many other efforts to influence the selection of advisers to manage government plans pass unnoticed or — though highly suspect — cannot be proven to have crossed the line into actionable behavior.
Not surprisingly, parties to these suspect transactions take care to blur their motives, to hide their actions and to conceal their connections, making it difficult to prove a direct quid-pro-quo or an intent to curry favor in a specific case. The prophylactic rules we consider today are designed to eliminate this legal and ethical gray area.
Elements of the Rule
The rule we consider today has three key elements:
First, it would prohibit an adviser from providing advisory services for compensation — either directly or through a pooled investment vehicle — for two years, if the adviser or certain of its executives or employees make a political contribution to an elected official who is in a position to influence the selection of the adviser.
Second, the rule would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from soliciting or coordinating campaign contributions from others — a practice referred to as "bundling" — for an elected official who is in a position to influence the selection of the adviser. It also would prohibit solicitation and coordination of payments to political parties, when the adviser is pursuing business from public entities.
Finally, and very importantly, the rule would prohibit an adviser from paying third-party solicitors who are not "regulated persons" subject to prohibitions against making contributions. Such "regulated persons" would be limited to registered investment advisers and to broker-dealers subject to pay to play restrictions.
Third party placement agents have been involved in some of the most egregious pay to play activities in recent years, and their activities should not continue unabated. The approach we are taking is a strong step toward eliminating the corruptive influence that can result from the use of third party placement agents.
It will greatly improve the status quo by banning payments to third parties who solicit government clients, unless they are "regulated persons" subject to pay to play restrictions comparable to the rule we are considering for adoption today.
This approach provides far greater protection of public pension plans and their beneficiaries than is currently the case, as third party placement agents come under the regulatory umbrella and, for the first time, become subject to meaningful federal pay to play restrictions.
This approach should effectively eliminate the opportunity for abuse that currently exists from third party placement agents. However, if the Commission determines that third party placement agents continue to inappropriately influence the selection of investment advisers for government clients — even under our enhanced rules — I expect that we would consider the imposition of a full ban on the use of these third parties.
Let me end by underscoring once again why we are here today. Pay to play practices are corrupt and corrupting. They run counter to the fiduciary principles by which funds held in trust should be managed. They harm beneficiaries, municipalities and honest advisers. And they breed criminal behavior. I hope my colleagues will join me today in striking a blow against a practice that has no legitimate place in our markets.
Before we hear more details about the rules we are considering for adoption, let me first offer my thanks to the individuals — representing a cross-section of four divisions and numerous offices — for their help in bringing to the table today a truly thoughtful, impressive and potent example of rulewriting."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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