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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Saturday, July 16, 2011

STOCK PROMOTER CHARGED WITH WIRE FRAUD


The following is an excerpt from the SEC website:

"July 11, 2011
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Presto Telecommunications, Inc. and Alfred Louis Vassallo, Jr., United States District Court, Southern District of California, Case No. 04CV00162IEG (filed Jan. 24, 2004).
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STOCK PROMOTER ALFRED LOUIS “BOBBY” VASSALLO, JR. INDICTED FOR WIRE FRAUD
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that, at the request of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, a federal grand jury in Santa Ana, California, returned an indictment against Alfred Louis “Bobby” Vassallo, Jr. on July 6, 2011 charging him with three felony counts of wire fraud. Vassallo, age 61, is a resident of La Jolla, California.

The indictment charges Vassallo with making false representations to an investor in connection with an investment in a wireless communication venture including failing to disclose that he had been sued by the Commission and that a permanent injunction and monetary judgment had been entered against him in the Commission’s action. United States of America v. Alfred Louis Vassallo, Jr. aka “Bobby Vassallo,” U. S. District Court, Central District of California, case no. 8:11-CR-00150 (filed July 6, 2011).

The Commission filed a civil complaint against Vassallo and his former company, Presto Telecommunications, Inc., in the U. S. District Court, Southern District of California, on January 27, 2004 that charged Vassallo with violating the securities registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws for his role in perpetrating a fraudulent scheme through Presto, which raised approximately $26 million from more than 500 investors. The Court entered a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction and Other Relief against Vassallo on August 24, 2005 that permanently enjoined him from violating the securities registration and antifraud provisions and ordered him to pay a total of $2,009,082 in disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, civil penalties, and the costs and expenses of the permanent receiver for Presto.

The Commission filed an application for an order to show cause re civil contempt against Vassallo on September 21, 2010 which alleged that Vassallo violated the Final Judgment by offering and selling unregistered securities of wireless ventures and telecommunications companies, by committing fraud in connection with the offer and sale of those securities, and by failing to pay any of the monetary relief he was ordered to pay. The Court issued an order to show cause on September 24, 2010 why Vassallo should not be held in civil contempt of the Final Judgment. The Court issued an order on October 26, 2011 referring Vassallo’s alleged violations of the permanent injunction to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California for prosecution for criminal contempt. The Court subsequently stayed the civil contempt proceeding. "

FLORIDA BANK CLOSED BY REGULATORS



The following is an excerpt from an e-mail sent out as a press release by the FDIC:

July 15, 2011
"First Peoples Bank, Port Saint Lucie, Florida, was closed today by the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. To protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption agreement with Premier American Bank, National Association, Miami, Florida, to assume all of the deposits of First Peoples Bank.

The six branches of First Peoples Bank will reopen during their normal business hours beginning Saturday as branches of Premier American Bank. Depositors of First Peoples Bank will automatically become depositors of Premier American Bank. Deposits will continue to be insured by the FDIC, so there is no need for customers to change their banking relationship in order to retain their deposit insurance coverage up to applicable limits. Customers of First Peoples Bank should continue to use their existing branch until they receive notice from Premier American Bank that it has completed systems changes to allow other Premier American Bank branches to process their accounts as well.

This evening and over the weekend, depositors of First Peoples Bank can access their money by writing checks or using ATM or debit cards. Checks drawn on the bank will continue to be processed. Loan customers should continue to make their payments as usual.

As of March 31, 2011, First Peoples Bank had approximately $228.3 million in total assets and $209.7 million in total deposits. In addition to assuming all of the deposits of the failed bank, Premier American Bank agreed to purchase essentially all of the assets.

Customers with questions about today's transaction should call the FDIC toll-free at 1-800-895-3212. The phone number will be operational this evening until 9:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time (EDT); on Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., EDT; on Sunday from noon to 6:00 p.m., EDT; and thereafter from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., EDT. Interested parties also can visit the FDIC's Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/firstpeoples.html.

As part of this transaction, the FDIC will acquire a value appreciation instrument. This instrument serves as additional consideration for the transaction.

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $7.4 million. Compared to other alternatives, Premier American Bank's acquisition was the least costly resolution for the FDIC's DIF. First Peoples Bank is the 54th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the seventh in Florida. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was First Commerce Bank of Tampa Bay, Tampa, on June 17, 2011."

CFTC COMMISIONER SPEAKS



"Opening Statement: First Open Meeting to Consider Final Rules Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act
Commissioner Jill E. Sommers
Thursday July 7, 2011

Good Morning. Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you to the five teams who have final rules before us today. Over the past year you have all been under an incredible amount of pressure to complete drafts by certain deadlines. We are all aware that you have worked late nights and weekends to meet those deadlines and we are very grateful to all of you for your dedication to your work and to this agency. Obviously we could not do this without you.

We are starting the process of finalizing rules today with a group of rules that do not relate to the structural and broader issues of trading and clearing swap transactions. Nonetheless, we are beginning without a plan. There have been no Commission decisions regarding the internal process or the implementation schedule for this very important and complicated task we have in front of us to finalize the rules and regulations required by the Dodd Frank Act. We have been discussing the appropriate sequencing of final rules as well as an implementation plan for many months and at this point I am still hopeful that the Commission will move forward to adopt a reasonable phased-in approach supported by market participants. A tentative calendar for consideration of final rules has been provided to Commissioners. That schedule would require the Commission to vote on no less than 17 rules during July and August, 20 rules in September and October, and nine rules in November and December. While a few of these rules will be relatively straightforward and noncontroversial, the vast majority are based on extremely complex proposals for which staff has yet to even complete a comment summary. If we stick to such a schedule, I foresee a process that haphazardly requires votes to be taken when the Commission has not had time to sufficiently consider all of the implications of the final rules. This schedule would also make it very difficult to coordinate with fellow regulators domestically or internationally.

As I have said on a number of occasions, while we were proposing rules last fall there was room for error. When we finalize rules this fall, we do not have that luxury. I reiterate, yet again, that we should adopt a plan that starts with finalizing the entity and product definitions, and builds from there, driven by a logical progression rather than an arbitrary deadline.

I believe another issue that we as a Commission need to address is the consideration of material changes to our proposed rules. I am comfortable admitting that we probably did not get everything right in our proposals. That is why the notice and comment period required by the Administrative Procedures Act is so critical to the rulemaking process. Through that process we have received many excellent and very helpful comment letters that go a long way toward helping us get it right. It is apparent to us that market participants, trade associations and law firms have spent many long hours developing detailed comments and alternative solutions to our proposals. In my view, if we truly consider and take into account the merits of these excellent comment letters, we will have no choice but to re-propose a number of the rules from last fall. And I believe it is important for us to do just that. We need to plan for this inevitability and start discussing internally which rules need to be re-proposed. I have no indication that we are doing that yet, and it concerns me. Our goal should be to promulgate the best final rule possible, without regard to whether that requires us to re-propose. Our objective should never be to reject valid comments in order to avoid re-proposing a rule.

I support all of the rules we are voting on today, but I have lingering concerns and questions about the anti-manipulation rules. Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the Commission had broad anti-fraud, false reporting, and anti-manipulation authority. Section 753 expands that authority by amending CEA Section 6(c) to, among other things; include the concept of a fraud-based manipulation. This fraud-based manipulation has a lower scienter standard than manipulation under Section 9(a)(2), and does not require an artificial price or an effect on prices to be proven. This aspect of Section 753’s amendments to Section 6(c) is clear.

Where the amendments to Section 6(c) are not clear, and where the final rules shed no additional light, is when we will prosecute false reporting under Section 9(a)(2), as opposed to the new “manipulation by false reporting” prohibition under new Section 6(c)(1)(A) and Regulation 180.1(a)(4), or what set of circumstances will give rise to a charge under the existing manipulation prohibition under Section 9(a)(2), as opposed to the new manipulation prohibition under new Section 6(c)(3) and Regulation 180.2.

In the end, we are left with Section 753 as it is written. The final rules are true to the language of Section 753. For that reason, I support them. However, as the Commission begins to exercise this new authority, I want to make sure that they are applied in a reasonable manner that seeks to address activity that affects or threatens the integrity of our markets and does not result in unfair surprise to market participants. Using this new authority in areas with little to no connection to our markets would not be a good use of our resources.

Thank you again to all the teams. I look forward to the discussion of these rules."

Friday, July 15, 2011

PRIVATE EQUITY ASSOCIATE ALLEGEDLY USED EMPLOYERS PRIVATE INFORMATION TO MAKE TRADES



July 15, 2011
The following is an excerpt from the SEC website:

“The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that The Honorable Susan Illston of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on July 14, 2011 ordered former TPG Capital, L.P. (“TPG”) private equity associate Vinayak S. Gowrish to pay in excess of $112,000, consisting of $12,000 in disgorgement (with interest to be calculated thereon) and a $100,000 civil penalty, for his role in a serial insider trading ring. Judge Illston also issued a permanent injunction against Gowrish enjoining him from future violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder). A federal jury on February 3, 2011 found Gowrish liable for illegally tipping material, nonpublic information that TPG was in negotiations to acquire three separate publicly traded companies: Sabre Holdings Corp. (“Sabre”), TXU Corp. (“TXU”), and Alliance Data Systems Corp. (“ADS”).
The Commission’s complaint alleged – and the jury found – that Gowrish, a former associate at multi-billion dollar private equity firm TPG, misappropriated material nonpublic information from his employer in connection with TPG’s negotiations to acquire Sabre, TXU, and ADS. Gowrish tipped the confidential acquisition information to his long-time friend, Adnan Zaman, a former investment banker at Lazard Frères & Co. LLC. Zaman, in turn, tipped the information to their two friends, Pascal S. Vaghar and Sameer N. Khoury. On the basis of the information provided by Gowrish through Zaman, Vaghar and Khoury then traded Sabre, TXU, and ADS securities, realizing approximately $375,000 in illicit profits. The Commission’s complaint alleged that, in exchange for the confidential information, Vaghar provided cash kickbacks to both Gowrish and Zaman. The jury found that Gowrish violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
Zaman, Vaghar, and Khoury previously consented to the entry of final judgments permanently enjoining them from violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Zaman and Vaghar were also enjoined from violations of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3 thereunder. Zaman is currently serving a 26-month federal prison sentence for his role in the scheme.”

SEC CHARGED RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES INC. WITH MAKING INACCURATE STATEMENTS


The following excerpt comes from the SEC website:

“Washington, D.C., June 29, 2011 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Raymond James & Associates Inc. and Raymond James Financial Services Inc. for making inaccurate statements when selling auction rate securities (ARS) to customers.

Raymond James agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and provide its customers the opportunity to sell back to the firm any ARS that they bought prior to the collapse of the ARS market in February 2008.
According to the SEC’s administrative order, some registered representatives and financial advisers at Raymond James told customers that ARS were safe, liquid alternatives to money market funds and other cash-like investments. In fact, ARS were very different types of investments. Among other things, representatives at Raymond James did not provide customers with adequate and complete disclosures regarding the complexity and risks of ARS, including their dependence on successful auctions for liquidity.
“Raymond James improperly marketed and sold ARS to customers as safe and highly liquid alternatives to money market accounts and other short-term investments,” said Eric I. Bustillo, Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office. “Harmed investors who are covered by this settlement will have the opportunity to get full payment for their illiquid ARS.”
The SEC previously announced ARS settlements with Citigroup and UBS, Wachovia, Bank of America, RBC Capital Markets, Deutsche Bank, and TD Ameritrade. As a result of these settlements, more than $67 billion has been returned to ARS customers following the SEC’s investigation into the ARS market collapse of February 2008 that left tens of thousands of investors holding ARS they could not sell.
The SEC’s order against Raymond James finds that the firm willfully violated Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. The Commission censured Raymond James, ordered it to cease and desist from future violations, and reserved the right to seek a financial penalty against the firm.
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Raymond James consented to the SEC’s order and agreed to:
Offer to purchase eligible ARS from its eligible current and former customers.
Use its best efforts to provide liquidity solutions to customers who acted as institutional money managers who are not otherwise eligible customers.
Reimburse excess interest costs to eligible ARS customers who took out loans from Raymond James after Feb. 13, 2008.
Compensate eligible customers who sold their ARS below par by paying the difference between par and the sale price of the ARS, plus reasonable interest.
At the customer’s election, participate in a special arbitration process with those eligible customers who claim additional damages.
Establish a toll-free telephone assistance line and a public Internet page to respond to questions concerning the terms of the settlement.
Investors should be alerted that, in most instances, they will receive correspondence from Raymond James. Investors must then advise Raymond James that they elect to participate in the settlement. If they do not do so, they could lose their rights to sell their ARS to Raymond James. Investors should review the full text of the SEC’s order, which includes the terms of the settlement.
The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the State of Florida Office of Financial Regulation, the Texas State Securities Board, and the North American Securities Administrators Association.”

Although financial penalties are becoming more common in cases like the one above criminal penalties are not really increasing. The problem is that it is hard to link upper levels of management with a business decision to commit a crime. A word used like “puffery” when selling a product is often confused with the word “fraud” by over zealous salespeople who are trying to earn a commission or large bonus check and pay their bills. Commission sales by definition; means that Salespeople are paid by their employers to talk up their products and overcome objections. This is a slippery slope and top management is responsible for making sure those directly offering the products to the public do not slip off the “slippery slope” and say things that might earn a nice check now but in the long run will seriously harm the reputation of the firm they are working for."

Thursday, July 14, 2011

CFTC COMMISSIONER SPEECH ON "CAGING THE FINANCIAL CHEETAHS"



The following speech by CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton addresses those who rapidly trade commodities and the affect such trading has on the prices of commodities. The speech is an excerpt from the CFTC website:

“Caging the Financial Cheetahs”
Speech by Commissioner Bart Chilton to American Soybean Association Legislative Forum, Washington, DC
July 12, 2011

Introduction

It’s good to be with you today. I especially want to thank John Gordley for the kind invitation to be here. John and I have kicked around this town for a long time and I’ve always admired him. So too, the ASA. You always make your positions clearly known and you are recognized here. I worked with you when I was on the Hill and at USDA and more often than not we agreed and I always respected your views and the way you presented them.

Morphing Markets

Today, I want to talk primarily with you about how rapidly commodities markets are changing and whether they still play the same role they were intended to play—that is for commercial hedgers, like some of you, to use and for price discovery. The reason I bring it up is because of new species in the markets.

If you have time while you’re in town, if you haven’t been, a great place to go is the National Zoo. They have a couple of thousand animals from about 400 species. It was started by an act of Congress in 1889. At that time, right outside of USDA, bison used to roam the National Mall. They were moved to the zoo in 1891 and became its first residents. The zoo gets new species all the time. Likewise, in markets, we’re getting new species all the time, too. Let me talk about a couple.

Massive Passives

One big market morphing area that we need to be thinking about is the traders themselves, a new species of traders, if you will, the “Massive Passives.” They are the likes of pension funds, index funds, hedge funds and mutual funds. These are instruments that attract investors who could care less what a pork belly is used for or what a soybean field looks like. These funds are very large—massive—and have a fairly price-insensitive, passive trading strategy.

From 2005 to 2008, roughly $200 billion in new speculative massive passive money came into the commodity markets in the U.S. alone. At the time, consumers were outraged about gas prices and food prices. So, should we be worried that maybe that’s what’s going on today? Is that at least part of the reason gas is historically high in the U.S.? Consumers are certainly outraged again. Many producers are outraged at input prices. But, is speculation at the root or part of the problem? Here’s some food for thought: There are now even more speculative positions in commodity markets than in 2008—in fact, more than ever before. The number of futures equivalent contracts held by Massive Passives increased 64 percent in energy contracts between June of 2008 and January of 2011. In metals and agricultural contracts, those positions increased roughly 20 percent or more.

I think there’s good evidence that excessive speculation is heating up the market and prices have gotten out of line as a result. Rather than help to fairly discover and “make the price,” these speculators “shake and bake the price”—up or down, depending on which side of the market they’re in.

For years, we’ve heard oil companies, banks and politicians sing the same old song: that speculation in markets didn't have any effect whatsoever on the prices consumers pay. These days, though, some folks are singing a different tune. For example, the head of a major oil company recently acknowledged that speculators were “gunning” prices. In March, Goldman Sachs issued a little-noticed report linking speculation to rising oil prices. And, President Obama correctly spoke about speculators’ impact on consumers and established a high-level working group headed by our Attorney General to check into it.

You don’t have to take it from me or any of those folks, though. Researchers at Oxford, Princeton, and many other private researchers say that speculators have had an impact on prices—oil prices and food prices most notably.

Still, some exchange officials deny there is any evidence whatsoever that speculators impacted prices. Some even deny that anybody’s saying so. They don’t call the people who did these studies whack jobs or crazy. They deny the studies exist. Well, they are just wrong. I’ve put more than fifty studies, analyses and comments about this on the CFTC website. There was yet another study two weeks ago from the University of Massachusetts. There’s even a study that was done in 1957 linking speculators and price.

The point though, is that, if those studies have even the possibility of being credible—if they are right—what do we do to protect markets and consumers? The new U.S. financial reform law addresses this by requiring mandatory speculative position limits—to ensure that too much concentration doesn’t exist. We are now in the process of trying to get these limits in place. As far as I’m concerned, the sooner the better on that front.

Caging the Cheetahs

Technology is the other area where changes are occurring at breakneck speed. In financial markets, folks screaming at each other in trading pits have quickly become mostly a thing of the past. Instead, computers are screaming at each other all day and all night—most times regardless of time zones around the world.

In the animal kingdom, cheetahs are the fastest, racing from zero to 60 miles per hour in a few seconds. (By the way, there are four adult cheetahs and two six-month-old cubs, Maggie and Nick at the National Zoo). In financial markets today, we also have cheetahs—otherwise known as high-frequency traders or HFTs. This new species of trader, due to the advent of high-speed computing technology and sensitive algorithmic programs, races in and out of markets trying to scoop up micro dollars in milliseconds. They aren't like traditional financial speculators because they are in markets fleetingly. At the end of every trading day, the cheetah's goal is to be flat, or neutral. They don't want to hold risk for very long, most of the time for only seconds. Are any of you interested in hedging your risk for five seconds? Not only are cheetahs new, but this highly sophisticated trading strategy is new, too. It is a different strategy and the cheetahs are a different trading species than producers are used to seeing in markets.

We recall that cheetahs were part and parcel to the infamous Flash Crash on May 6, 2010 where markets tumbled and the Dow lost nearly 1,000 points before recovering. But, mini flash crashes are taking place often. Here too, cheetahs seem like a likely place to look for potential problems. For example, on May 1st, a Sunday, in 12 minutes the silver market plunged 13 percent. Then, on June 9, in the evening’s electronic trading, the natural gas market free fell 7 percent in 14 short seconds!

If markets are going to be efficient and effective and less volatile, we need to cage the cheetahs. I'm not saying they should be extinct, and overly burdensome regulations shouldn't endanger them as a species, but they need to be confined. After all, financial markets impact all of us in one way or another. Prices for everything from milk to mortgages are set in these markets. Markets need to operate without the influence of traders merely trying to prey upon infinitesimal market movements in order to survive and thrive in the trading kingdom.

We all know technology can be a great equalizer, bridging people across oceans, between rural and urban and rich and poor. However, there will be a steep price to pay if regulators and exchanges around the globe don't effectively manage the change taking place as a result of computerized trading by cheetahs.

A range of policy reforms are needed, including: testing of algorithmic programs before they go live; some type of pre-approval or accreditation process to ensure the cheetahs are who they say they are and not those interested in financial terrorism; kill switches to stop programs that go feral; and, accountability for the cheetahs who do damage to markets and cost people money.

Exchanges welcome the cheetahs. But even the exchanges themselves may be part of their prey. Allocation algorithms that some exchanges use to direct which trades get placed where may be adding to the problem by not necessarily accepting the first or best bid or offer but weighing the size of the trade, too. From an exchange business purpose, I get it. More volume equals more money, and they want deep, liquid markets. However, cheetahs may be gaming the system by bidding or offering more contracts than they believe will be filled simply to cut in line ahead of other traders. They may receive an advantage and then have their order partially filled. There is every reason to believe cheetah programs determine the size of the order that would allow them to get in first and understand they won’t get a full fill.

Regulators have simply accepted that all is well with how market technology is working. That needs to stop. We need to be more inquisitive and think about these kinds of things before they reach trouble points manifested in market anomalies.

The market morphing cheetah technology has moved so fast that even the financial reform law approved a year ago in the U.S. did not address it in any way.

Simply put, regulators need to do a better job of keeping up with the cheetahs and the ramifications of technology in trading that effect consumers and investors.

Technology does add access. Where do you think the third largest trader by volume on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) is based? In Prague. Now, that’s access that wasn’t there ten years ago. I’d think we want to ensure that these market participants actually register with the agency. We need to know who they are. Without registration of cheetahs, there is no way of actually regulating these cats and the results could be horrendous. We also want to guard against financial terrorism. After all, we’ve seen a lot of hacking of entities, like Citi and the U.S. Senate and others, that is at the very least a warning for us to be careful.

Just a few days ago, a CME employee was arrested for stealing source code from the exchange. The FBI picked him up before he boarded a plane for China. Was this industrial espionage? It is too early to tell. The bottom line is that we need to be careful and have some basic accreditation of who is trading and from where in safeguarding sensitive exchange information.

High speed trading has become all about latency—how fast you can place an order given your technology. It’s not just the speed of the computer. It’s how fast you can get your order in from Prague or Chicago. I toured CME’s new data center last fall. It’s the size of four football fields and it’s where traders will be leasing space so they can be as close as possible to CME’s computers. They will have virtually no latency. Just like the zoo, where species are kept in close confines, the space exchanges lease in buildings like CME’s are called cages. Many of them are in cages already, but we need policy confines for the cheetahs, too.

It is amazing how quickly these markets morphed. In the U.S., well over 90 percent of the trading is done electronically. HFTs alone account for roughly 50 percent of the trades in Europe and roughly a third of the trades in the U.S.

With such a significant part of the trading being done electronically, it would be naïve to think there won’t be glitches. That’s why I think additional safeguards are needed after there’s been a problem. When a plane crashes, for example, the airlines reprogram their simulators to create the exact circumstances that led to the crash so that pilots can train to avoid a future problem. They call this upset recovery training. In markets, we need to improve our upset recovery training with regard to cheetahs. Finally, we need the enforcement tools to go after cheaters (with a Boston accent). The cheater cheetahs.

For example, just last Thursday, we finalized rules regarding anti-fraud and anti-manipulation practices—for all types of traders—not just cheetahs. They are sorely needed. In the CFTC’s thirty-five year existence, how many market manipulation cases do you think we have successfully prosecuted? Go ahead and guess. Here’s how many: one. One. Now, we’ve settled dozens but only won one that’s gone all the way through court and the appeals process. It’s not because our lawyers are for crap. We have great lawyers. It’s because the standard of proof was so high, we could never prove it. We had to prove intent, a false price and that manipulation actually caused that false price, among other things. The new rule lowers the bar so we can get the bad guys, Batman. It gives us new ammo in our enforcement arsenal and we will use it. Specifically, pocketing profits from the misappropriation of privileged information may now be prosecuted. Also, this new regulation moves us toward a recklessness standard similar to that under securities laws as defined by the courts, and the law specifically gives us a reckless standard for false reporting.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

Why do we need to be careful to monitor the markets and especially the new species? Earlier this year, in the U.S., the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) issued a report. FCIC was established by Congress to examine the economic fiasco that started in ’07 and ‘08. Anyway, the FCIC website asks the question: “How did it come to pass that in 2008 our nation was forced to choose between two stark and painful alternatives—either risk the collapse of our financial system and economy, or commit trillions of taxpayer dollars to rescue major corporations and our financial markets, as millions of Americans still lost their jobs, their savings and their homes?”

That’s a good question. FCIC concluded that the entire mess never had to take place. They concluded that the financial crisis was avoidable. They noted widespread failures in financial regulation, excessive risk-taking on Wall Street, policymakers who were ill-prepared for the crisis, and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels. The bulk of the blame went to regulators and the captains of Wall Street.

We changed course a little over a decade ago and let the free markets go. Some of it worked out, but there were some major trouble spots. Instead of a great system of checks and balances, we temporarily became a system of just checks. In fact, as a result of lax regulation, the U.S. Government wrote a lot of checks. In fact, hundreds of billions to bail out troubled financial players in an effort to stabilize the economy. However, just because a mess was made, and is still being cleaned up, that doesn’t mean we aren’t on the road to fix the problems.

Financial Reform

We now have the most sweeping set of financial reforms in our history—the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. It was necessary if we were ever going to protect ourselves from the kind of financial meltdown that occurred in 2008. We regulators are trying to do the right thing as we write all the new rules associated with the law. Among the various options is how we go about constructing regulations in light of similar reforms taking place the European Union and, for that matter, the rest of the world.

Conclusion: We Can Do Better

I want to leave you with one last thought. I’m optimistic that we can get through all of these different policy options. However, we need to do more than is common for regulators. We need to work cooperatively and try to look around the corner and see what may or may not need to be done.

In regulation, we need to look ahead, scope things out, and do our best to predict the market ramifications of new products, new exchanges, cheetah traders, massive passives and whatever other new trading elements come our way.

The new law goes a long way toward doing many of those things, but it took a market meltdown before government acted, and as we have discussed, there are still folks who may not see the need for reform.

If we can do better, be better public servants, it can help ensure more efficient and effective markets and economies and it will help keep markets devoid of fraud, abuse and manipulation. That’s good for commercial traders, for the cheetahs, for traditional investors, and especially for the consumers who depend on these markets for the price discovery of just about everything they purchase.

Thank you for your attention. Oh, and if you go to the zoo, don’t feed the cheetahs!"