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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

CFTC COMMISSIONER O'MALIA SPEAKS ON ACCOUNTABILITY



The statement below by Commissioner Scott O’Malia and is excerpted from the CFTC website:

“The Importance of Being Accountable”
Opening Statement by Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia
July 19, 2011
Public Hearing:
Consideration of Proposed Rules: Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for Clearing and Clearing Member Risk Management
Consideration of Final Rules: Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing; Part 40, Provisions Common to Registered Entities; and Removing Any Referance to or Reliance on Credit Ratings in Commission Regulations, Proposing Alternatives to the Use of Credit Ratings
Today, the Commission will consider three final rules and two proposed rules. I support the final rules as they are noncontroversial process rules. However, I have serious concerns with both proposed rules as they rely on weak statutory authority, poorly articulate a necessity for either rule and are neither justified nor required under the Dodd-Frank Act. Today’s draft rules regarding client documentation and clearing member risk standards were never mentioned previously during these months of intense rulemaking and seem to be fabricated from whole cloth. This is unacceptable.
I have grown increasingly frustrated with the rulemaking process because there appears to be no specific plan or strategy for implementing these rules, nor do we appear to be following President Obama’s direction to ensure that the federal rulemaking process be done in the most transparent, responsible and accountable fashion.
I have requested specific reforms to improve the rulemaking process, but each request has been met with silence. I fear that we are running astray of the President’s executive orders by eschewing transparency and accountability in favor of opacity and expediency. As we push forward, we are running out of time to make a correction. To be clear, the failure to produce a final rule schedule and implementation plan the next time the Commission meets on August 4th will render public input irrelevant as the Commission barrels through with final rules this fall.
Creating a More Open Government
In his inaugural address, President Obama gave us the directive; he told us to enter a new era of responsibility. To those of us who manage the public’s dollars, President Obama warned that we will be held accountable. Through spending wisely, reforming bad habits, and doing our business in the light of day, the President said that we can restore the trust between the American people and their government. Two days later, the President issued a memorandum to the heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies titled “Transparency in Open Government” in which he further laid out his implementation plan for an administration committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in government.1 This plan offers the public increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide the benefits of their expertise. It is about utilizing technology to communicate, collaborate, and improve opportunities to make the entire process more efficient and effective.
Executive Order #13,563 – Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
This past January, President Obama grabbed our attention with a Wall Street Journal opinion piece2 to accompany his signing of Executive Order 13,563 “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”3 He put the administration on this mission: “[T]o root out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, or that are just plain dumb.” Yes, he did say that.
Executive Order #13,579 – Application to Independent Agencies
Six months later, the President signed another Executive Order (Executive Order 13,579) titled “Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies.”4 If the January directive wasn’t clear, this new order should eliminate any doubt that Independent Agencies like the CFTC must go out of their way to ensure responsible rulemaking by, among other things, undertaking a thorough cost benefit analysis, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to ensure that new rules do not impose unreasonable costs. We also must make our process more accountable through increased transparency and openness, which our current process lacks.
Reforms to Our Rulemaking Process
In an effort to respond to the concerns of the many citizens who have walked through my door and submitted comment after comment in the more than fifty rulemakings to date, I have put forward two proposals to squarely address the need for greater openness, transparency and accountability.
First, I have called for a detailed plan that reveals the order, timing, and substance of the Commission’s rules implementing and effectuating the Dodd-Frank Act. This proposal should have the benefit of public comment as well.
Second, I have requested that all proposed and final rules that the Commission will be voting on be published for seven-days prior to each public meeting. Today, the public must wait days, if not weeks for the Federal Register to publish proposed and final rules that the Commission has already voted on. My proposal will give the public a clear picture of the end result of the rulemaking process prior to our final vote.
The Commission has responded with silence, cementing in my mind that the current process is inadequate.
The Commission is tentatively scheduled to next meet on August 4th. I ask again that we make the final rule proposals publicly available seven days prior to that meeting. At that meeting, I propose that we first and foremost vote to put forward a clear rulemaking order and implementation schedule for public comment. This will allow the public to comment on the draft schedule during August before too many more final rules are passed this fall. If we continue to delay development of an implementation schedule and continue to adopt rules without the benefit of meaningful final comment, then we are being downright insubordinate. To ignore our President not once, but twice, and to respond to Congressional recommendations such as the letter we received Thursday, July 14th from Chairman Lucas and Subcommittee Chairman Conaway, which again implored us to adhere to what amounts to notions of honest dealing and fair play and to not make speed more important than substance, is arrogant and shameful. We can do better, and we should.
The Rules Before Us
The Removal of References to Credit Rating Agencies
I’d like to recognize Ward Griffin and his team for their work on the final rule before us regarding the removal of references to credit rating agencies from the Commission’s regulations.
Part 40 Rule Certification
I commend Bella Rosenberg, and her team for their work on this rule that provides an improved process for the evaluation of designated contract markets (DCMs), swap execution facilities (SEFs) and swap data repositories (SDRs) against the core principles outlined in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The team has given thoughtful consideration to comments from both the public and from my office, and I believe their willingness to hear concerns and seek practical solutions that work has resulted in a final rule that is an improvement from the rule proposal.
Part 39 Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing
I also commend Eileen Donovan and her team on their work to establish a new process for reviewing swaps for mandatory clearing. I support the final regulation today, because the regulation sets forth a reasonable process for a clearing organization: (1) to request, if necessary, that the Commission determine whether the clearing organization is eligible to clear swaps; and (2) to submit a swap to the Commission for review.
In addition, the regulation sets forth a reasonable process for a swap counterparty to request that the Commission stay a clearing requirement pending review. However, it is not enough for the Commission to simply establish a process for clearing organizations and swap counterparties to request or contest clearing determinations. In their comments to the Commission, market participants, as well as international regulators, have requested more transparency and clarity on substance. For example, they have requested greater certainty on the criteria that the Commission will use to determine whether mandatory clearing is appropriate for a swap.
I recognize that such specificity will not be provided in this rule. Instead, I have drafted a letter that I will be sending to clearing organizations and market participants seeking their input on further defining the various thresholds and standards that the Commission should consider in determining whether a swap should be subject to mandatory clearing. (See Attachment). I hope to receive comments during the 60 days prior to the effective date of this rule, and I hope that such comments will inform staff discussions going forward. Given our emphasis on clearing to manage systemic risk, to move forward on mandatory clearing without written guidance is irresponsible. It is also arguably an abrogation of our responsibilities under Section 2(h)(3)(D) of the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act.5 I also hope that such comments will inform a roundtable discussion, as well as written guidance, on these important questions.
Another concern that I have with this rule is that it overreaches in interpreting Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and in Regulation 39.5(c)(3)(iii). Basically, the final regulation leaves open the possibility that the Commission could impose capital and margin requirements directly on end-users exempt from the clearing requirement. This interpretation contradicts the letter from Senator Christopher Dodd and Senator Blanche Lincoln, which states, among other things, that “Congress clearly stated in this bill that the margin and capital requirements are not to be imposed on end users.” Further, the final regulation permits the Commission to impose capital and margin requirements on bank swap dealers and bank major swap participants. Understandably, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, our fellow regulator, disagrees.
Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for Clearing, and Clearing Member Risk Management
I oppose the two proposed rulemakings on (i) Client Clearing Documentation and Timing of Acceptance for Clearing and (ii) Clearing Member Risk Management. Both proposals fail to conform to the type of responsible rulemaking that I have tried to persuade the Commission to endorse. The two proposed rules before us today put the cart ahead of the horse. Neither rule is mandated under Dodd-Frank, nor are they well grounded in statutory authority. Further it is unclear as to what resources the Commission will utilize to administer these two new optional rules.
Without statutory direction and given the massive number of rules already under consideration, I imagined the Commission would have developed a justification for the policy recommendations before us today. Unfortunately, neither the Commission nor the staff held a single hearing to understand whether or not we have a serious problem, or we are drafting rules in search of a problem.
Setting aside the flawed process in the development of these rules, this first proposal regarding client clearing documentation may be attempting to solve a problem that no longer exists. The proposal alleges that a voluntary annex to a voluntary model agreement from two industry associations6 may restrict open access to clearing and harm competitive trading. I understand that more than 60 market participants, on both the buy- and sell-sides, discussed the voluntary model agreement over a period of several months. The final agreement reflected an accommodation – even if imperfect – of their respective interests.7
I am very supportive of maximizing the effectiveness of clearing. I do not want any artificial barriers to clearing, such as needless credit or position sub-limits. Based on the practices in the futures market, I am also quite certain that technology is available to ensure timely acceptance of trades. However, as the second part of this rulemaking (i.e., the Timing of Acceptance for Clearing) makes evident, the industry must still resolve a number of operational issues. Therefore, there may be a role for certain types of documentation. Ideally, the buy-side, sell-side, and clearing organizations will continue their dialogue on such documentation. Before substituting Commission judgment for private consensus, I hope the Commission will host a public roundtable and a Commission meeting to see if the restrictions and anticompetitive effects alleged in this rulemaking exist, and, if so, how to resolve these issues to everyone’s satisfaction.
The second proposal regarding clearing member risk management fails to justify its costs in light of its benefits. First, as I mentioned previously, the proposal is neither mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act nor any provision in the CEA. Second, the proposal would require the Commission to ascertain whether clearing members are following certain risk management procedures. However, under another rulemaking, the Commission assigns the same responsibility to clearing organizations.8 Given our resource constraints, the Commission should focus on supervising clearing organizations – the main bulwarks against systemic risk. The Commission should ensure that clearing organizations are fulfilling their self-regulatory responsibilities, and adequately evaluating the risk management of its members. The Commission should not divert its resources to directly auditing clearing members, the failure of any one of which may be non-systemic.
Frankly, I would rather see the Commission dedicate resources towards developing real-time trade surveillance capabilities, rather than developing a redundant oversight function that will require additional resources we don’t possess. As our President has advised, we will be held accountable.
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the hard work of the staff and I sincerely hope you will provide an answer as to whether or not the Commission will publish a rule making schedule and an implementation timetable that includes dates to give the market and its participants an unambiguous strategy for implementing the Dodd-Frank rules. I also hope you will commit to publishing our draft rules when you publish the notice regarding all commission meetings.”

SEC CHARGES MAN AND FIRMS WITH MISAPPROPRIATING $8.7 MILLION DOLLARS



The following is an excerpt from the SEC website:

July 12, 2011
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Sam Otto Folin (Folin), his Philadelphia-based registered investment adviser, Benchmark Asset Managers LLC (Benchmark) and its parent company, Harvest Managers LLC (Harvest) with misappropriating approximately $8.7 million from advisory clients, friends and family through material misrepresentations and omissions.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, from approximately 2002 through October 2010, Folin, Benchmark and Harvest offered and sold securities in Harvest, Benchmark, and Safe Haven Portfolios LLC (Safe Haven), a pooled investment vehicle, promising investors that their funds would be invested in public and private companies with “socially responsible” goals and purposes. Instead, the complaint alleges that Folin, Benchmark and Harvest diverted a portion of the invested funds to pay previous investors as well as to sustain Benchmark’s and Harvest’s expenses which included paying Folin’s salary.
More specifically, the complaint alleges that Benchmark and Harvest issued various “notes” to advisory clients, friends and family promising guaranteed above-market interest rates. Folin, Benchmark and Harvest assured investors that such notes were conservative and safe. According to the complaint, Folin, Benchmark and Harvest failed to disclose the true uses of those funds and continually misrepresented the value of the notes on quarterly statements.
In addition, the complaint alleges that in August 2004 Folin and Benchmark formed Safe Haven which purported to offer investments in several different portfolios, including the Private Fixed Income Portfolio, the Hedged Equity Portfolio, the Green Real Estate Portfolio and the Sustainable Enhanced Cash Portfolio. The complaint also alleges that Folin and Benchmark caused Benchmark’s advisory clients to invest in Safe Haven and that Folin and Benchmark also acted as investment advisers to Safe Haven. From 2006 through 2009, the complaint alleges that Folin and Benchmark caused Safe Haven to pay over $1.7 million to Benchmark and Harvest under the guise of “development costs.” The complaint alleges that these “development costs” did not relate to any actual expenses incurred by Harvest or Benchmark in connection with the formation or offering of Safe Haven securities. Rather, the complaint alleges, the payments coincided with Harvest’s and Benchmark’s need for funds to pay previous investors, expenses and Folin’s salary. Moreover, the complaint alleges that Folin and Benchmark improperly amortized the development costs rather than expensing them as incurred in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) thereby causing the reported net asset values of the Safe Haven portfolio to be overstated on statements provided to advisory clients and investors.
The complaint also alleges that Folin and Benchmark caused Safe Haven to make loans to Harvest and Benchmark in excess of $3.9 million. The complaint further alleges that Folin and Benchmark did not disclose these loans. Moreover, the complaint alleges that these loans violated several provisions of Safe Haven’s investment criteria including, among other things, that: (1) they were not supported by adequate collateral, (2) they violated the 5% net exposure requirement, and (3) they caused the portfolios to violate the “no leverage” provision. In addition, the complaint alleges that the financial statements provided by Folin and Benchmark to investors did not comply with GAAP. More specifically, the complaint alleges that the financial statements improperly valued the Safe Haven loans to Harvest and Benchmark at face value, rather than fair value or net realizable value. Finally, the complaint alleges that Folin and Benchmark failed to disclose to their advisory clients Benchmark’s dire financial situation and inability to sustain itself but for the monies it received under the guise of “development costs” and the loans from Safe Haven.
Without admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC’s complaint, Folin and Benchmark have consented to the entry of a final judgment enjoining them from future violations of Sections 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and Sections 206(1), 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder. Harvest has consented to the entry of a final judgment enjoining it from future violations of Sections 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Folin, Benchmark and Harvest have also consented to pay, jointly and severally, disgorgement of $8,706,620 plus prejudgment interest of $1,454,177. In addition, Folin has consented to pay a civil penalty of $150,000 and Harvest and Benchmark have consented to pay civil penalties of $750,000 each. The settlements are subject to court approval.
Without admitting or denying the Commission's findings, Folin also consented to the issuance of an Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions which bars him from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, transfer agent, municipal advisor, or nationally recognized statistical ratings organization based upon the entry of the final judgment. Similarly, without admitting or denying the Commission’s findings, Benchmark consented to the issuance of an Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203(e) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions which revokes its investment adviser registration based upon the entry of the final judgment.”

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST MAN WHO SOLD UNREGISTERED SECURITIES TO ELDERLY


JULY 15, 2011
“The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on July 12, 2011, the Honorable Leonard D. Wexler of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a final judgment on consent against Defendant Glenn R. Harris, a former registered representative of Advanced Planning Securities, Inc., a former registered broker-dealer. The judgment (i) permanently enjoins Harris from violating Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and (ii) finds Harris liable for disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $673,989, but waives payment of that amount and imposes no civil penalty based on Harris’s bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, sworn bankruptcy schedules, and other documents. Harris consented to the entry of the judgment without admitting or denying any of the allegations of the Commission’s complaint.
The Commission’s complaint, filed on October 22, 2009, alleges that from 2004 through 2006, Harris violated the registration provisions of the securities laws by selling securities for which there was no registration statement in effect. Among other things, the complaint alleges that Harris sold securities to elderly, unsophisticated investors who could not have been expected to understand the risks associated with the investments.
In addition to the relief described above, Harris consented to the entry of an order in a separate Commission administrative proceeding barring him from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating agency, and from participating in any offering of a penny stock, with the right to apply for reentry after eighteen months.”

ETHIOPIA'S DIRECTOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SPEAKS



The following is an excerpt from the SEC website:

Risk Taking -- Banks & Markets
by
Ethiopis Tafara
Director
Office of International Affairs
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
G20 NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE WORKSHOP
Measures to Promote Competition, Efficiency and Innovation
7 July 2011
Paris, France
Thank you, Malcolm (Edey) for that kind introduction.

First, permit me to give the SEC's standard disclaimer- what I say represents my own views and not necessarily the views of the Commission or other members of the Commission staff.

The topic for this panel is measures to promote competition, efficiency and innovation. I'd like to focus my remarks on innovation, because I think it is the most likely of these three to suffer from our current regulatory trends. More particularly, I'd like to focus on real as opposed to financial innovation.

What are the prerequisites of real innovation? First and foremost, it requires the presence of entrepreneurs, who can bring together technology and resources in new ways, to meet evolving needs and wants, in the form of a viable business model. This, in turn, requires a rare combination of technical savvy, extraordinary boldness and risk taking. After all, it is something new that is being generated here. There are no studies to show you how to do it. There is no metric that can tell you these are risks worth taking. No one has done it before this way. That is the point. It is innovation.

Of all these ingredients to innovation, perhaps the most important is boldness.

The philosopher of science, Karl Popper, argued that there was a dynamic "logic" to scientific discovery, which entailed an interactive series of bold conjectures, criticism, response to criticism and further conjecturing. The "logic" of innovation is much the same. Entrepreneurs put forth the bold conjectures-in the form of their innovative vision. The market, of course, provides the criticism; the product or service is purchased only if it effectively fulfills needs or wants, and the enterprise is only profitable if it delivers this product or service with efficiency. If the market rejects the entrepreneur's vision, she can adjust and perfect it in light of the market's "criticism". Alternatively, if the entrepreneur fails to adjust her model, her enterprise will fail and other businesses will fill the void. The possibility-and even the likelihood-of failure is an intrinsic part of the process. Just as science evolves through conjectures and refutations, real innovation is driven by an interactive dance of bold ideas and the market's tough, pointed criticism.

And innovation, whether in the form of green or biotechnology, is critical to our future prosperity. As you may have noticed, I have failed to mention one of the key ingredients to innovation, and that is, of course, finance. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, our regulatory reform efforts have-quite properly-focused upon the reduction of systemic risk. Among the regulatory challenges here, I believe, is the grave danger that our efforts to reduce systemic risk may result in a reduction of the kind of risk taking that drives real innovation. This could result in substantially reduced economic growth-foregone economic growth that might, in fact, serve to address current economic straits.

Our policy challenge is the following: how do we ensure that finance continues to find its way to the kind of productive risk taking that I have described, while at the same time we effectively address the instabilities identified in the recent financial crisis? More specifically, we must ask ourselves: what is the right blend of regulatory tools to meet this challenge?

Traditionally, banking regulators have focused on prudential regulation, while securities regulators have focused on disclosure, transparency and enforcement. Where should we extend the traditional tools of the banking regulator and where should we extend those of the securities regulator?

There is little denying that the recent financial crisis, while involving all types of market participants, was essentially a banking crisis. Although unusual perhaps in the number of non-banks that undertook bank-like activities and certainly unique in that securitized financial products were the instigators, the pattern of the crisis differed from other banking crises only in its depth. Financial firms- closely linked to each other through leverage and counterparty arrangements-exposed themselves to too much risk. And when that risk became apparent, there was a "run" on these financial institutions.

As the heart of the problem is the maturity mismatch that characterizes traditional banking. The dangers of a maturity mismatch were amplified, however, by the potential for increased volatility on the asset side of the balance sheet attributable to the "embedded leverage" inherent in certain securitized products. Potential volatility was further increased through derivative products.

Now, clearly, it is important that we understand why these widely varying financial firms were acting like traditional banks. Moreover, I think most of us would agree that when systemically risky financial firms take on the role of banks, they should face the same kind of prudential regulation as do banks. But we must pause here and ask ourselves: if all major sources of financing today are to be treated as banks - with more or less one-size-fits-all capital requirements and conservative risk measurement mandates - where is the financing to come from for the next wave of high-risk/high-payoff innovations? Who will finance the next great development in transportation, or medicine, or artificial intelligence?

If we look back at the many fundamental economic innovations of the 20th century-Aircraft, antibiotics, the Internet, the transistor and semiconductor, the mass produced automobile and the plastics that Mr. McGuire told us to invest in the movie, "The Graduate"-we see relatively little bank financing, at least not at the inception of each innovation's lifecycle. This is unsurprising because, as we know, banks are the archetype of systemically risky financial entities. Consequently, banking regulation, when it is done properly, imposes a certain degree of financial conservatism.

But we must ask: as we reform our markets in light of the recent crisis, where will the financing come from for the truly risky enterprises of the 21st century? This is where the traditional tools of the securities regulator come into play. While banking regulation is designed to control and, to a certain extent, suppress risk taking, securities regulation is, in stark contrast, designed to facilitate it. In the financing of economic pursuits that entail substantial risk, the traditional tools of securities regulators-that is, disclosure, transparency and rigorous enforcement efforts to police fraud and abuse-have a substantial comparative advantage over banking regulatory tools. As mentioned above, failure is an essential part of the innovative process. But that's precisely what the banks should try to avoid.

In our collective efforts to reform our markets in light of the systemic crisis, the danger is that the tools of the banking regulator come to dominate the regulation of capital markets and thereby unintentionally suppress needed real innovation. As regulators, we must look at what capital needs to do to support economic growth. We must be careful to recognize why different avenues for financing exist. We need to recognize why securities regulation has historically differed from banking regulation. As legendary venture capitalist William Draper recently put it in an interview: "Facebook couldn't go to a bank and get a commercial loan to start up a company."

There is much at stake here. If we want to encourage innovation and realize its benefits, financial regulation has to make a space for risk-taking. Only by recognizing the inherent functional differences between capital markets and banking can we succeed in both addressing systemic risk while at the same time spurring economic growth through innovation. Those economies that recognize these differences, and which regulate and supervise accordingly, will grow and prosper and become the leaders in the 21st Century.

Thank you.

U.S. BODY ARMOR COMPANY ARMOR HOLDINGS SETTLES SEC CHARGES IN FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES CASE



The following is an excerpt from the SEC website:

“Washington, D.C., July 13, 2011 – The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Armor Holdings, Inc. with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by participating in a bribery scheme from 2001 through 2006 to obtain contracts to supply body armor for use in United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions. The SEC also charged Armor Holdings, a Florida-based manufacturer of military and law enforcement safety equipment, with failing to properly account for more than $4 million in commissions from 2001 through 2007 in violation of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws.

Armor Holdings agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying nearly $5.7 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and penalties. Armor Holdings also agreed to pay a $10.29 million fine to settle a parallel criminal investigation announced by the U.S. Department of Justice today. Since 2010, the SEC has filed 32 FCPA cases, including the case against Armor Holdings, and obtained more than $600 million in penalties, disgorgement and interest.
“Illicit payments to U.N. officials are no less reprehensible than bribes to foreign government officials,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “The important process of selecting body armor for peace keepers should not be affected by which company pays the best bribes.”
Gerald W. Hodgkins, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, “Armor failed to maintain adequate internal controls to prevent its subsidiary from making illegal payments to win U.N. supply contracts. Just as troubling, Armor improperly accounted for sales commissions for several years even after being warned that the accounting treatment was wrong.”
The SEC’s complaint alleges that certain agents of Armor Holdings caused its U.K. subsidiary to wire at least 92 payments, totaling approximately $222,750 to a third-party intermediary, with the understanding that part of these payments would be offered to a U.N. official who could help steer business to Armor Holdings’ U.K. subsidiary. The complaint alleges that agents of Armor Holdings caused its U.K. subsidiary to enter into a sham consulting agreement with the intermediary for purportedly providing legitimate services in connection with the sale of goods to the U.N. The complaint alleges that, through this bribery scheme, Armor Holdings derived gross revenues of $7,121,237, and net profits of $1,552,306.
The SEC alleges that another Armor Holdings subsidiary disguised in its books and records commissions paid to intermediaries who brokered the sale of goods to foreign governments. Even after being warned by internal and external accountants that this practice violated U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, Armor Holdings’ subsidiary continued the improper accounting practice. As a result, approximately $4 million in commissions was not properly disclosed in the books and records of the company.
On July 31, 2007, after the conduct alleged in the SEC’s complaint had occurred, Armor Holdings was acquired by BAE Systems, Inc., an indirect wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of Britain’s BAE Systems PLC. Accordingly, Armor Holdings is no longer an issuer of securities.
The SEC’s complaint charges Armor Holdings with violating Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Armor Holdings consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against further violations and agreed to pay $1,552,306 in disgorgement, $458,438 in prejudgment interest, and a civil money penalty of $3,680,000. Armor Holdings also agreed to comply with certain undertakings regarding its FCPA compliance program. The settlement is subject to court approval. Armor Holdings conducted a thorough investigation to determine the scope of the improper payments and cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry.
Richard J. Kutchey and Gregory G. Faragasso conducted the SEC’s investigation. The Commission acknowledges the assistance of the Fraud Section of DOJ’s Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The SEC’s investigation is continuing.”

Monday, July 18, 2011

FEDERAL COURT ORDERS CONVICTED COMMODITY POOL FRAUDSTER TO PAY $2.1 MILLION PENALTY



A lot of millionaires make their money the old fashion way: they steal it. The following is an excerpt from the CFTC website:

"July 13, 2011

Federal Court in Illinois Orders Joseph A. Dawson to Pay $2.1 Million Penalty for Commodity Pool Fraud and Misappropriation
Dawson sentenced to 54 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $3.3 million in restitution in criminal proceeding for the same scheme.
Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that on July 5, 2011, Judge Virginia M. Kendall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered a supplemental consent order imposing a $2.1 million civil monetary penalty on Joseph A. Dawson of Fox Lake, Ill. The CFTC charged Dawson and his company, Dawson Trading LLC (Dawson Trading) of McHenry, Ill., with fraudulent solicitation and misappropriation of customer funds in a commodity pool scheme (see CFTC Press Release 5860-10, July 26, 2010).

Previously, on April 26, 2011, the court entered a consent order of permanent injunction against Dawson finding that he violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), as charged. The consent order found that, between at least February 2005 and December 2009, Dawson and his company misappropriated approximately $2.1 million of Dawson Trading participant funds. The order found that Dawson used the misappropriated funds for personal purchases and expenses, including a down payment on a personal residence, mortgage payments, an in-ground swimming pool, landscaping, furniture, restaurant bills, movie tickets, and car payments. The order permanently barred Dawson from any commodity-related activity, including trading and registering or seeking exemption from CFTC registration, and from violating the CEA’s anti-fraud provisions. The order left the issues of any restitution and a civil monetary penalty to be resolved later.

On July 11, 2011, Judge Kendall entered a default judgment and permanent injunction order against Dawson Trading, finding that the company violated the same CEA anti-fraud provisions as Dawson, was liable for Dawson’s violations as his principal, failed to register as a commodity pool operator as required by CFTC regulations, and unlawfully permitted Dawson to act as its agent without being lawfully registered as an associated person of the company. The order requires Dawson Trading to pay a $2.1 million civil monetary penalty and permanently prohibits it from engaging in any commodity-related activity, including trading and registering with the CFTC.

In a related criminal proceeding in March 2011, Dawson was sentenced to 54 months imprisonment and required to pay $3.3 million in restitution to pool participants (U.S. v. Dawson, 09-cr-1037-1 (N.D. Ill.)).

The CFTC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Securities and Exchange Commission for their assistance.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this action are Stephanie Reinhart, William Janulis, Ken Hampton, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner."

After reading the above story I'll be wondering about how every neighbor made the money they used to put in their new pool.