Search This Blog


This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Tuesday, August 2, 2011

FDIC TAKES OVER VIRGINIA BUSINESS BANK

The following excerpt is from an e-mail sent out by the FDIC: Virginia Business Bank, Richmond, Virginia, was closed today by the Virginia State Corporation Commission. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed as receiver. To protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption agreement with Xenith Bank, Richmond, Virginia, to assume all of the deposits of Virginia Business Bank. The sole branch of Virginia Business Bank will reopen on Monday as a branch of Xenith Bank. Depositors of Virginia Business Bank will automatically become depositors of Xenith Bank. Deposits will continue to be insured by the FDIC, so there is no need for customers to change their banking relationship in order to retain their deposit insurance coverage up to applicable limits. Customers of Virginia Business Bank should continue to use their existing branch until they receive notice from Xenith Bank that it has completed systems changes to allow other Xenith Bank branches to process their accounts as well. This evening and over the weekend, depositors of Virginia Business Bank can access their money by writing checks or using ATM or debit cards. Checks drawn on the bank will continue to be processed. Loan customers should continue to make their payments as usual. As of March 31, 2011, Virginia Business Bank had approximately $95.8 million in total assets and $85.0 million in total deposits. In addition to assuming all of the deposits of the failed bank, Xenith Bank agreed to purchase essentially all of the assets. Customers with questions about today's transaction should call the FDIC toll-free at 1-800-837-0215. The phone number will be operational this evening until 9:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time (EDT); on Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., EDT; on Sunday from noon to 6:00 p.m., EDT; and thereafter from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., EDT. Interested parties also can visit the FDIC's Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/vbb.html. The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $17.3 million. Compared to other alternatives, Xenith Bank's acquisition was the least costly resolution for the FDIC's DIF. Virginia Business Bank is the 59th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the first in Virginia. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was Imperial Savings and Loan Association, Martinsville, on August 20, 2010."

Monday, August 1, 2011

FORMER WASTE MANAGEMENT CFO ORDERED TO PAY $25 MLLION

Te folowing excerpt is fromthe SEC website: July 29, 2011 Former CFO of Waste Management Ordered to Pay $2.5 Million The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that on July 28, 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered an Amended Final Judgment against James E. Koenig, the former Chief Financial Officer of Waste Management Corporation, ordering that he pay $2.5 million in SEC v. James E. Koenig, 02 C 2180 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 26, 2002). Koenig was ordered to make an upfront payment of $1.25 million and to pay the remaining $1.25 million in regular installments over the next two years. The Commission’s complaint alleged that beginning in 1992 and continuing into 1997, Koenig and others engaged in a systematic scheme to falsify and misrepresent Waste Management’s financial results with profits being overstated by $1.7 billion. In June 2006, after an 11-week trial, a jury returned a verdict in the Commission’s favor against Koenig on all 60 violations charged, including securities fraud, falsifying company books and records, making false statements in filings with the Commission, lying to auditors, and aiding and abetting the company’s violations. On December 21, 2007, following a two-day bench trial on remedies, the district court entered a Final Judgment against Koenig that permanently barred him from acting as an officer or director of a public company, and enjoined him from violating, or aiding and abetting violations of, Sections 10(b), 13(a), and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 13b2-1, and 13b2-2 thereunder; and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The judgment also required Koenig to pay disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. On February 26, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed all issues of liability and trial procedure, but remanded for further proceedings with respect to the monetary amount of the judgment. On November 23, 2009, the district court on remand reaffirmed its prior Final Judgment, and Koenig appealed. The Amended Final Judgment represents a compromise reached through mediation before the Seventh Circuit’s Settlement Conference Office while the case was on appeal. The permanent officer and director bar and injunction remain unchanged and in full force and effect."

5 GO TO PRISON FOR A@O RESOURSE MANAGEMENT LTD. FRAUD SCHEME

The following case is an excerpt from the Department of Justice website: July 22, 2011 "WASHINGTON – Five employees for A&O Resource Management Ltd. and various related entities – including two executives – were sentenced today for their roles in a $100 million fraud scheme with more than 800 victims across the United States and Canada. The sentences were announced by U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Neil H. MacBride and Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division. The five individuals were sentenced by U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne. Russell E. Mackert, 52, general counsel for A&O, was sentenced to 188 months in prison; Brent Oncale, 36, former owner and founder of A&O, was sentenced to 120 months in prison; David White, 41, the former president of A&O, was sentenced to 60 months in prison; Eric M. Kurz, 47, a wholesaler of A&O investment products, was sentenced to 60 months in prison; and Tomme Bromseth, 69, an A&O sales agent in the Richmond area, was sentenced to 36 months in prison. “The impact of this massive fraud on many of A&O’s investor victims has been disastrous,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Hundreds of elderly investors invested their life savings with A&O and saw it all vanish in an instant. These investors were not looking for quick cash, just a safe alternative to invest their retirement funds. The safety, security, and no-risk nature of the investment was critical to the sales pitch, and it was all a big fat lie.” “Brent Oncale and his co-conspirators operated a sham investment company that turned fraud and deceit into a business model,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. “They stole millions from hundreds of unsuspecting investors, pocketing huge sums for themselves. Today’s sentences reflect the severity of these cowardly and costly crimes.” All five men pleaded guilty in the fall of 2010 and early 2011 for their roles in the fraud scheme at A&O, which falsely marketed life settlement products to investors, many of whom were elderly. The conspirators at A&O defrauded investors by making misrepresentations about A&O’s prior success, its size and office locations, its number of employees, the risks of its investment offerings, and its safekeeping and use of investor funds. When state regulators began to scrutinize A&O’s investment products, conspirators manufactured a sham sales transaction to “sell” A&O to an offshore shell corporate entity named Blue Dymond and later to another offshore shell corporate entity named Physician’s Trust. However, A&O and Physician’s Trust was still secretly controlled by A&O principals and their conspirators. On June 6, 2011, the hedge fund manager of A&O, Adley H. Abdulwahab, 35, of Houston, was convicted by a jury in Richmond, Va., of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, five counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, five counts of money laundering and three counts of securities fraud. A founder of A&O, Christian Allmendinger, 39, was convicted by a jury on March 23, 2011, of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, two counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, two counts of money laundering and one count of securities fraud. Abdulwahab is scheduled to be sentenced on Sept. 28, 2011, and Allmendinger is scheduled to be sentenced on Aug. 14, 2011. They face up to 20 years in prison on each count except the securities fraud counts, on which they face up to five years in prison. This investigation was conducted by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Internal Revenue Service, and FBI, with significant assistance from the Texas State Securities Board and the Virginia Corporation Commission. These cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael S. Dry and Jessica Aber Brumberg from the Eastern District of Virginia and Trial Attorney Albert B. Stieglitz Jr., of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section. The investigation has been coordinated by the Virginia Financial and Securities Fraud Task Force, an unprecedented partnership between criminal investigators and civil regulators to investigate and prosecute complex financial fraud cases in the nation and in Virginia. The task force is an investigative arm of the President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, an interagency national task force."

FORMER HEDGE FUND MANAGER TO PAY $1 MILLION PENALTY

The following case is an excerpt from the CFTC website: “Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an order filing and simultaneously settling charges that Christopher Louis Pia of North Castle, N.Y., while employed as portfolio manager for Moore Capital Management, LLC (Moore Capital), attempted to manipulate the settlement prices of palladium and platinum futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Moore Capital is a predecessor of Moore Capital Management, LP. The CFTC order requires Pia to pay $1 million civil monetary penalty. It also permanently bans Pia from trading CFTC-regulated products during the closing period of the markets and from trading CFTC-regulated products in platinum and palladium. The order further requires Pia to distribute a copy of the CFTC order to current investors and to current and future employees, principals, and officers and to provide a disclosure document setting out the CFTC action to existing and prospective clients. The CFTC order finds that, from at least November 2007 until May 2008 (relevant period), Pia attempted to manipulate the settlement prices of palladium and platinum futures contracts by engaging in a trading practice known as “banging the close.” Specifically, Pia caused to be entered market-on-close buy orders that were executed in the last ten seconds of the closing period for both contracts in an attempt to exert upward pressure on the settlement prices of the futures contracts. Pia engaged in this trading strategy at Moore Capital frequently throughout the relevant period, the order finds. According to CFTC Division of Enforcement Director David Meister: “To protect market participants and promote market integrity, individuals who attempt to manipulate commodity prices must and will be held personally accountable. As demonstrated by today's action, the Commission will not hesitate to impose significant sanctions on such traders.” The CFTC order further requires that a monitor ensures Pia’s compliance with the order for a five-year period and establishes undertakings related to any entity Pia owns or controls. The order also imposes registration conditions if Pia or any of his entities become registered with the CFTC for a period of five years from the date of the order. Within 120 days of the issuance of the order, Pia must submit a report to the Commission on his compliance with the undertakings required in the order. On April 29, 2010, the CFTC issued an order filing and settling similar charges of attempted manipulation of platinum and palladium futures settlement prices in 2007 – 2008 and supervisory violations against Moore Capital Management, LP (MCM), Moore Capital Advisors, LLC (MCA), both based in New York, N.Y., and Moore Advisors, Ltd. (MA), a Bahamian entity. The CFTC order required MCM, MCA, and MA jointly and severally to pay a $25 million civil monetary penalty and placed restrictions on their CFTC registrations, including a two-year restriction on trading during the closing periods of the palladium and platinum futures and options markets (see CFTC Press Release 5815-10, April 29, 2010). The CFTC thanks the CME Group, the parent company of the NYMEX, for its assistance.”

Sunday, July 31, 2011

CFTC CHAIRMAN TESTIFIES BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTRE

"Testimony Before the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, Washington, DC Chairman Gary Gensler June 21, 2011 Good afternoon Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Peterson and members of the Committee. I thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). I am pleased to testify on behalf of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). I also thank my fellow Commissioners and CFTC staff for their hard work and commitment on implementing the legislation. Financial Crisis One year ago, the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law. And on this anniversary, it is important to remember why the law’s derivatives reforms are necessary. The 2008 financial crisis occurred because the financial system failed the American public. The financial regulatory system failed as well. When AIG and Lehman Brothers faltered, we all paid the price. The effects of the crisis remain, and there continues to be significant uncertainty in the economy. Though the crisis had many causes, it is clear that the derivatives or swaps market played a central role. Swaps added leverage to the financial system with more risk being backed by less capital. They contributed, particularly through credit default swaps, to the bubble in the housing market and helped to accelerate the financial crisis. They contributed to a system where large financial institutions were thought to be not only too big to fail, but too interconnected to fail. Swaps – developed to help manage and lower risk for end-users – also concentrated and heightened risk in the financial system and to the public. Derivatives Markets Each part of our nation’s economy relies on a well-functioning derivatives marketplace. The derivatives market – including both the historically regulated futures market and the heretofore unregulated swaps market – is essential so that producers, merchants and end-users can manage their risks and lock in prices for the future. Derivatives help these entities focus on what they know best – innovation, investment and producing goods and selling and services – while finding others in a marketplace willing to bear the uncertain risks of changes in prices or rates. With notional values of more than $300 trillion in the United States – that’s more than $20 of swaps for every dollar of goods and services produced in the U.S. economy – derivatives markets must work for the benefit of the American public. Members of the public keep their savings with banks and pension funds that use swaps to manage interest rate risks. The public buys gasoline and groceries from companies that rely upon futures and swaps to hedge swings in commodity prices. That’s why oversight must ensure that these markets function with integrity, transparency, openness and competition, free from fraud, manipulation and other abuses. Though the CFTC is not a price-setting agency, recent volatility in prices for basic commodities – agricultural and energy – are very real reminders of the need for common sense rules in all of the derivatives markets. The Dodd-Frank Act To address the real weaknesses in swaps market oversight exposed by the financial crisis, the CFTC is working to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s swaps oversight reforms. Broadening the Scope Foremost, the Dodd-Frank Act broadened the scope of oversight. The CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will, for the first time, have oversight of the swaps and security-based swaps markets. Promoting Transparency Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act brings transparency to the swaps marketplace. Economists and policymakers for decades have recognized that market transparency benefits the public. The more transparent a marketplace is, the more liquid it is, the more competitive it is and the lower the costs for hedgers, which ultimately leads to lower costs for borrowers and the public. The Dodd-Frank Act brings transparency to the three phases of a transaction. First, it brings pre-trade transparency by requiring standardized swaps – those that are cleared, made available for trading and not blocks – to be traded on exchanges or swap execution facilities. Second, it brings real-time post-trade transparency to the swaps markets. This provides all market participants with important pricing information as they consider their investments and whether to lower their risk through similar transactions. Third, it brings transparency to swaps over the lifetime of the contracts. If the contract is cleared, the clearinghouse will be required to publicly disclose the pricing of the swap. If the contract is bilateral, swap dealers will be required to share mid-market pricing with their counterparties. The Dodd-Frank Act also includes robust recordkeeping and reporting requirements for all swaps transactions so that regulators can have a window into the risks posed to the system and can police the markets for fraud, manipulation and other abuses. On July 7, the Commission voted for a significant final rule establishing that clearinghouses and swaps dealers must report to the CFTC information about the swaps activities of large traders in the commodity swaps markets. For decades, the American public has benefited from the Commission’s gathering of large trader data in the futures market, and now will benefit from this additional information to police the commodity swaps markets. Lowering Risk Other key reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act will lower the risk of the swaps marketplace to the overall economy by directly regulating dealers for their swaps activities and by moving standardized swaps into central clearing. Oversight of swap dealers, including capital and margin requirements, business conduct standards and recordkeeping and reporting requirements will reduce the risk these dealers pose to the economy. The Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing requirement directly lowers interconnectedness in the swaps markets by requiring standardized swaps between financial institutions to be brought to central clearing. This week, the Commission voted for a final rule establishing a process for the review by the Commission of swaps for mandatory clearing. The process provides an opportunity for public input before the Commission issues a determination that a swap is subject to mandatory clearing. The Commission will start with those swaps currently being cleared and submitted to us for review by a derivatives clearing organization. Enforcement Effective regulation requires an effective enforcement program. The Dodd-Frank Act enhances the Commission's enforcement authorities in the futures markets and expands them to the swaps markets. The Act also provides the Commission with important new anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority. This month, the Commission voted for a final rule giving the CFTC authority to police against fraud and fraud-based manipulative schemes, based upon similar authority that the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Federal Trade Commission have for securities and certain energy commodities. Under the new rule, the Commission’s anti-manipulation reach is extended to prohibit the reckless use of fraud-based manipulative schemes. It closes a significant gap as it will broaden the types of cases we can pursue and improve the chances of prevailing over wrongdoers. Dodd-Frank expands the CFTC's arsenal of enforcement tools. We will use these tools to be a more effective cop on the beat, to promote market integrity and to protect market participants. Position Limits Another critical reform of the Dodd-Frank Act relates to position limits. Position limits have been in place since the Commodity Exchange Act passed in 1936 to curb or prevent excessive speculation that may burden interstate commerce. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress mandated that the CFTC set aggregate position limits for certain physical commodity derivatives. The law broadened the CFTC’s position limits authority to include aggregate position limits on certain swaps and certain linked contracts traded on foreign boards of trade, in addition to U.S. futures and options on futures. Congress also narrowed the exemptions for position limits by modifying the definition of a bona fide hedge transaction. When the CFTC set position limits in the past, the purpose was to ensure that the markets were made up of a broad group of market participants with a diversity of views. Market integrity is enhanced when participation is broad and the market is not overly concentrated. Commercial End-User Exceptions The Dodd-Frank Act included specific exceptions for commercial end-users, and the CFTC is writing rules that are consistent with this congressional intent. First, the Act does not require non-financial end-users that are using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk to bring their swaps into central clearing. The Act leaves that decision up to the individual end-users. Second, there was a related question about whether corporate end-users would be required to post margin for their uncleared swaps. The CFTC has published proposed rules that do not require such margin. And third, the Dodd-Frank Act maintains the ability of non-financial end-users to enter into bilateral swap contracts with swap dealers. Companies can still hedge their particularized risk through customized transactions. Rule-Writing Process The CFTC is working deliberatively, efficiently and transparently to write rules to implement the Dodd-Frank Act. Our goal has been to provide the public with opportunities to inform the Commission on rulemakings, even before official public comment periods. We began soliciting views from the public immediately after the Act was signed into law and during the development of proposed rulemakings. We sought and received input before the pens hit the paper. We have hosted 13 public roundtables to hear ideas from the public prior to considering rulemakings. On August 1, we will host another public roundtable to gather input on international issues related to the implementation of the law. Staff and commissioners have held more than 900 meetings with the public, and information on these meetings is available at cftc.gov. We have engaged in significant outreach with other regulators – both foreign and domestic – to seek input on each rulemaking, including sharing many of our memos, term sheets and draft work product. CFTC staff has had about 600 meetings with other regulators on Dodd-Frank implementation. The Commission holds public meetings, which are also webcast live and open to the press, to consider rulemakings. For the vast majority of proposed rulemakings, we have solicited public comments for 60 days. In April, we approved extending the comment periods for most of our proposed rules for an additional 30 days, giving the public more opportunity to review the whole mosaic of rules at once. We also set up a rulemaking team tasked with developing conforming rules to update the CFTC’s existing regulations to take into account the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. This is consistent with a requirement included in the President’s January executive order. In addition, we will be examining the remainder of our rulebook consistent with the executive order’s principles to review existing regulations. The public has been invited to comment by August 29 on the CFTC’s plan to evaluate our existing rules. This spring, we substantially completed the proposal phase of rule-writing. Now, the staff and commissioners have turned toward finalizing these rules. To date, we held two public commission meetings this month and approved eight final rules. In the coming months, we will hold additional public meetings to continue to consider finalizing rules, a number of which I will highlight. In August, we hope to consider a final rule on swap data repository registration. In the early fall, we are likely to take up rules relating to clearinghouse core principles, position limits, business conduct and entity definition. Later in the fall, we hope to consider rules relating to trading, real-time reporting, data reporting and the end-user exemption. We will consider most of the rules with comment periods that have yet to close, including capital and margin requirements for swap dealers and segregation for cleared swaps, sometime in subsequent Commission meetings. The comment period for product definitions closes tomorrow, and working with the SEC, we will take them up as soon as it is practical. As the Commission continues with its rulemaking process, the Commission is taking great care to adhere to the requirement that the public be provided meaningful notice and opportunity to comment on a proposed rule before it becomes final. Therefore, depending on the circumstance -- such as when the Commission may be considering whether to adopt a particular aspect of a final rule that might not be considered to be the logical outgrowth of the proposed rule -- the Commission may determine that it would be appropriate to seek further notice and comment with respect to certain aspects of proposed rules. For example, in response to comments received on a proposed rule regarding the processing of cleared swaps, the Commission this week re-proposed aspects of this rule regarding the prompt, efficient and accurate processing of trades. The Dodd-Frank Act set a deadline of 360 days for the CFTC to complete the bulk of our rulemakings, which was July 16, 2011. Last week, the Commission granted temporary relief from certain provisions that would otherwise apply to swaps or swap dealers on July 16. This order provides time for the Commission to continue its progress in finalizing rules. Phasing of Implementation The Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFTC flexibility to set effective dates and a schedule for compliance with rules implementing Title VII of the Act, consistent with the overall deadlines in the Act. The order in which the Commission finalizes the rules does not determine the order of the rules’ effective dates or applicable compliance dates. Phasing the effective dates of the Act’s provisions will give market participants time to develop policies, procedures, systems and the infrastructure needed to comply with the new regulatory requirements. In May, CFTC and SEC staff held a roundtable to hear directly from the public about the timing of implementation dates of Dodd-Frank rulemakings. Prior to the roundtable, CFTC staff released a document that set forth concepts that the Commission may consider with regard to the effective dates of final rules for swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act. We also offered a 60-day public comment file to hear specifically on this issue. The roundtable and resulting public comment letters will help inform the Commission as to what requirements can be met sooner and which ones will take a bit more time. This public input has been very helpful to staff as we move forward in considering final rules. We are planning to request additional public comment on a critical aspect of phasing implementation – requirements related to swap transactions that affect the broad array of market participants. Market participants that are not swap dealers or major swap participants may require more time for the new regulatory requirements that apply to their transactions. There may be different characteristics amongst market participants that would suggest phasing transaction compliance by type of market participant. In particular, such phasing compliance may relate to: the clearing mandate; the trading requirement; and compliance with documentation standards, confirmation and margining of swaps. Our international counterparts also are working to implement needed reform. We are actively consulting and coordinating with international regulators to promote robust and consistent standards and to attempt to avoid conflicting requirements in swaps oversight. Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the provisions of the Act relating to swaps shall not apply to activities outside the U.S. unless those activities have “a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce” of the U.S. We are developing a plan for application of 722(d) and will seek public input on that plan in the fall. Conclusion Only with reform can the public get the benefit of transparent, open and competitive swaps markets. Only with reform can we reduce risk in the swaps market – risk that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. Only with reform can users of derivatives and the broader public be confident in the integrity of futures and swaps markets. The CFTC is taking on a significantly expanded scope and mission. By way of analogy, it is as if the agency previously had the role to oversee the markets in the state of Louisiana and was just mandated by Congress to extend oversight to Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee – we now have seven times the population to police. Without sufficient funds, there will be fewer cops on the beat. The agency must be adequately resourced to assure our nation that new rules in the swaps market will be strictly enforced -- rules that promote transparency, lower risk and protect against another crisis. Until the CFTC completes its rule-writing process and implements and enforces those new rules, the public remains unprotected. Thank you, and I’d be happy to take questions."

Saturday, July 30, 2011

SEC CHAIRMAN SPEAKS ON SHELF-ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ASET-BACKE SECURITIES

The following is an excerpt from the SEC website: "Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 3 — Shelf-Eligibility Requirements for Asset-Backed Securities by Chairman Mary Schapiro U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Washington, D.C. July 26, 2011 Next, we will consider re-proposing rules outlining the requirements for an issuer of asset-backed securities to be able to use shelf registration. Today’s actions partially re-propose a set of rules the Commission proposed in April 2010 that would significantly revise the regulatory regime for asset backed securities. Among other things, the 2010 proposals were designed to increase transparency and to improve the quality of securities that are offered through the shelf registration process. Subsequent to our proposal, Congress — through the Dodd-Frank Act — sought to address some of the same concerns and we have reevaluated the proposals in light of those provisions. The proposals today also take into consideration suggestions from commenters on the April proposal. Today the staff is recommending that we re-propose shelf eligibility requirements for ABS issuers and seek additional comment on certain parts of our April 2010 proposal. As we consider a final set of rules, we will look to the rules we proposed in 2010 as well as the revisions to those proposals we are considering today. The proposals include three shelf eligibility requirements: First, the proposal would require an executive officer of the issuer to certify that the securitization is designed to produce cash flows at times and in amounts sufficient to service expected payments on the asset-backed securities being offered and sold. In addition, the executive officer would certify to the accuracy of the disclosure. This is similar to our 2010 proposal. However, to address comments we received, the re-proposed rules would offer an alternative signatory to the certification and revise the text of the certification. Second, the proposal would require the issuer to adopt a dispute resolution procedure outlining the way in which to resolve disputes over requests to repurchase assets in the pool under the terms of the transaction agreements. Also, to address concerns about the enforceability of representations and warranties, the proposal would require that an independent party in certain specified situations must confirm compliance of the assets with the representation and warranty provisions in the underlying agreements. We continue to believe that a mechanism to better enforce representations and warranties is needed to address the failures that plagued this market. Third, the proposal would require that the issuer agree to make it possible for investors to communicate with each other. This would address comments we received that some ABS investors have had difficulty locating other investors. Subsequent to the Commission’s 2010 proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act required rules that would direct sponsors to retain some of the risk associated with the ABS. The Act also eliminated the ability of ABS issuers to avail themselves of an automatic suspension from ongoing reporting. As such, this proposal at this time does not include the risk retention or continuous reporting conditions to shelf we originally included in the April 2010 proposal. Additionally, in the April proposal we proposed that ABS issuers must file standardized information about the specific loans in the pool, allowing investors to have better, more timely and usable information. Because we received many helpful and detailed suggestions in this area, the release requests additional comment about possible alternatives. I am aware that commentators have expressed concerns about certain aspects of the informational requirements for our safe harbor provisions included in the April proposal. Today’s release requests additional comment in this area as well. Finally, the release requests comment on whether the April proposal effectively implements a Dodd-Frank requirement that the Commission adopt rules requiring disclosure of the assets that back a security. I believe it is very important that we move forward to finalize our new registration and reporting rules for the ABS market. But I also want to make sure we get it right. I’m very pleased that the staff has recommended that we publish this re-proposal so that we can solicit the input we need to make these decisions. I very much look forward to receiving the public’s constructive comments on this release and moving to closure on this critically important project."