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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Thursday, April 19, 2012

SEC GETS JUDGMENTS ON CONSENT AGAINST DIAMONDBACK CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC

FROM:  SEC 
April 10, 2012
SEC v. Spyridon Adondakis et al., Civil Action 12-CV-0409 (SDNY)(HB)
SEC Obtains Final Judgments on Consent against Diamondback Capital Management LLC
The SEC announced that the Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered a Final Judgment on Consent as to Diamondback Capital Management LLC (“Diamondback”) on April 6, 2012, in the SEC’s insider trading case, SEC v. Spyridon Adondakis et al., Civil Action 12-CV-0409 (SDNY) (HB).

The SEC filed its complaint on January 18, 2012, charging two multi-billion dollar hedge fund advisory firms – including Diamondback – as well as seven fund managers and analysts involved in a $78 million insider trading scheme based on nonpublic information about Dell’s quarterly earnings and other similar inside information about Nvidia Corporation.

The SEC’s complaint alleged that in 2008 and 2009, Jesse Tortora, an analyst at Diamondback, obtained inside information about quarterly earnings reports of both Dell and Nvidia and passed that information to Todd Newman, a Diamondback portfolio manager, who used the information to execute trades on behalf of hedge funds managed by Diamondback. These illegal trades in Dell and Nvidia securities resulted in millions of dollars in illicit gains for Diamondback.

The Final Judgment against Diamondback: (1) permanently enjoins the firm from violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; and (2) orders it to pay disgorgement of $5,173,000 plus pre-judgment interest of $832,751.35, for a total of $6,005,751.35, provided that the amount Diamondback owes would be credited, dollar for dollar, by amounts paid pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement between Diamondback and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York; and (c) orders it to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $3,000,000.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

U.S. TREASURY OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON WALL STREET REFORM

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Wall Street Reform for U.S. Department of the Treasury
As prepared for delivery
NEW YORK – Good afternoon.  It is a privilege to address the International Section of the American Bar Association, and to be speaking about international regulatory reform. The subject matter is particularly timely given that the world’s finance ministers will gather in Washington, D.C. for the G-20 this weekend.

We have learned from recent events, including the financial crisis, that financial systems and markets around the world are more integrated than ever.  Therefore, financial reforms around the globe must be consistent and convergent.

I will touch on three key priorities that were agreed upon by the G-20 – capital, resolution, and OTC derivatives – as well as insurance regulation.
We are transitioning now from regulatory design to implementation.  We must acknowledge that the task is both difficult and complex. We must work together through the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board to make the new rules effective. We all share a common interest in a global financial system that is safe and resilient, and that supports growth.

The Importance of Reform
Let me begin by retreading familiar ground: the financial crisis revealed that the risks facing our system can be correlated and crosscutting, and that they can affect multiple firms, markets, and countries simultaneously. The crisis laid bare the fundamental weaknesses of the previous financial regulatory infrastructure.
To preserve financial stability, it became essential to establish a regulatory structure that could properly assess the financial system as a whole, not simply its component parts – a regulatory structure in which the failure of one firm, or problems in one corner of the system, would not risk bringing down the entire financial system.  It was important to establish a modern regulatory framework that could keep pace with financial sector innovations, restore market discipline, and safeguard financial stability in both the United States and abroad.  The United States has played a leading role in this global financial reform by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.

Some have argued that these new rules and standards put U.S. financial firms at a competitive disadvantage.  While we must always work towards having a level competitive playing field, I believe such arguments are misplaced.
First, by moving quickly, we in the United States have been able to lead from a position of strength in setting the international reform agenda.

Second, there is already evidence that our actions – both the immediate response to the crisis and permanent reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act – have bolstered the recovery of the U.S. financial system.  Bank balance sheets are stronger. Tier 1 common equity at large bank holding companies has increased by more than 70 percent or by $560 billion since the first quarter of 2009. Additionally, at the four largest bank holding companies, for example, reliance on short-term wholesale financial debt has decreased from a peak of 36 percent of total assets in 2007 to 20 percent at the end of 2011. The firms’ liquidity positions are more robust and their funding sources are more reliable. Firms have significantly reduced leverage. Recent stress tests showed that the bank holding companies are better able to withstand significant shocks.

Third, I believe that consumers, investors, and businesses feel more secure when they deal with financial institutions that are well-regulated and transparent, because these attributes engender trust. Trust is essential for the financial system to perform its most basic functions, including credit intermediation. For many years, investors from all over the world have trusted the U.S. financial system. Regulation that is both strong and sensible is essential to continue that trust.

Over the past three years, we have made substantial progress in restoring this trust to our financial system and thereby improving financial stability. Long-term economic growth and credit intermediation are only sustainable under a model in which there is confidence in financial stability.

International Coordination
All of this being said, it is nevertheless important to remember that financial systems are interconnected and that risks both transcend and migrate across national borders. Therefore, we must work towards building a system where there is broad global agreement on the basic rules of the road.

Global coordination is important not only for maintaining a level playing field, but also for promoting financial stability.  We can ill afford the risk of regulatory arbitrage.  If riskier activities migrate unchecked to jurisdictions with inadequate rules and supervision, the threats that will emerge will have implications not just for the host country, but for the global financial system. The financial crisis exposed the failure of weak regulation.

Europe has taken important steps toward reform.  The EU is working through its most extensive financial services reform.   It has proposed or adopted around thirty reform measures, including almost all of the key measures agreed to by the G-20.  The United States and the EU are aligned on the fundamental goals of regulatory reform, and are united by a shared view that it is necessary to complete at an international level the work that is underway.  Treasury and U.S. regulatory agencies have worked closely with our counterparts in the European Commission and the European Supervisory Agencies to align our regulations more closely.

It is unlikely that we and our European counterparts will attain perfect alignment.  But most of the differences between us are technical, not matters of principle.  While we must work diligently to resolve our technical differences, we should not let them overshadow our shared commitment to reform. We must also see to it that other regions follow through on implementing reforms, particularly Asia, given the importance of financial centers like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo. The global financial system will continue to strengthen as a result of our efforts. Backtracking on reforms is not an option.

G-20 and the Joint Reform Agenda
The G-20 has been, and will continue to be, a key vehicle for coordinating our reform efforts. Since the first meetings of the G-20, and especially since the Pittsburgh meetings during the height of the financial crisis in 2009, the Group has worked to increase the strength and effectiveness of the international regulatory framework through a comprehensive agenda for reform. This agenda has been reaffirmed and further developed at each subsequent Summit.  The Financial Stability Forum, which was expanded and strengthened as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009, has also played a key role in this process, with support from the global standard-setting bodies.

This year in the G-20, the United States is emphasizing progress on implementation in three key areas: capital, resolution, and OTC derivatives.  Let me now turn to discussing these three priorities as well as international coordination around insurance, which will also be an area of focus in the coming year.

Capital
The crisis showed that financial institutions were not sufficiently capitalized to withstand significant market pressures.  To maintain financial stability, taxpayers in countries across the globe had to provide capital support to financial institutions in order to prevent their failure.  There was little question that, going forward, banks needed to be more resilient, with better quality capital buffers.  

The international regulatory community acted with dispatch and urgency to achieve consensus on Basel 2.5 and Basel III capital standards.  The new Basel capital standards provide a uniform definition of capital across jurisdictions, and it requires banks to hold significantly more and higher-quality capital.  The reforms to the Basel Capital Standards also establish a mandatory leverage ratio and a liquidity coverage ratio.
More work remains with respect to the Basel Capital Standards.  International agreement on standards must be followed with implementation by G-20 members.  Moreover, important debates continue around issues such as liquidity run-off ratios and measurement of capital deductions. The Basel Committee is now working toward more consistent measurement of risk-weighted assets across jurisdictions.

While these points are relatively technical, it is important that the new rules be consistent not only in principle, but also in practice. Consistent cross-border application of capital standards is important to maintaining a level playing field.

Resolution
Strengthening cross-border resolution regimes is complicated.  But it is a critically important topic.

The U.S. experience with Lehman Brothers showed the potentially devastating consequences to financial stability of the disorderly bankruptcy of a financial firm. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for orderly resolution of financial companies, including non-bank financial institutions. The FDIC and Federal Reserve have already adopted a number of rules pursuant to these new authorities, including a “living wills” rule that requires large bank holding companies and designated nonbank financial companies to prepare resolution plans.  The largest bank holding companies will submit the first living wills in July.
The goal of international convergence was furthered this year when the G-20 endorsed the “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.”   This new international standard addresses such critical issues as the scope and independence of the resolution authority, the essential powers and authorities that a resolution authority must possess, and how jurisdictions can facilitate cross-border cooperation in resolutions of significant financial institutions. The Key Attributes provide guidelines for how jurisdictions should develop recovery and resolution plans for specific institutions and for assessing the resolvability of their institutions.  This new international standard also sets forth the elements that countries should include in their resolution regimes while avoiding severe systemic consequences or taxpayer loss.

Therefore, much progress has already been made and even more will be completed by the end of this year: cross-border crisis management groups for the largest firms have been established, additional cross-border cooperation agreements will be put in place, and recovery and resolution plans are being developed.

Derivatives
The crisis also showed that we did not have a sufficient understanding of derivatives, which are an important means of interconnection between firms.  The flaws attendant to this area of financial transactions were many: poor access to useful data such that, at critical times, neither supervisors nor counterparties knew who owed what to whom; poor risk management such that firms were not able to satisfy their contractual obligations with respect to collateral; and a generally fragmented and opaque market. It is common ground that the lack of oversight in the derivatives markets exacerbated the financial crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a comprehensive framework of regulation for the OTC derivatives markets.  The elements of this framework include regulation of dealers, mandatory clearing, trading, and transparency.  The framework established under the Dodd-Frank Act is consistent with that of the G-20.  The CFTC and SEC are well into their rule-making process.  Once again, the United States and the EU have closely cooperated in this area, and have adopted parallel approaches to important issues such as central clearing, trading platforms, and reporting to trade repositories.

While the reforms set forth a framework for on-exchange-traded derivatives, it is also important for us to make progress on establishing a global regime for margin for bespoke, un-cleared derivatives transactions.  Both the United States and the EU support international work on global margin standards for trades that are not cleared through a central counterparty. Margin requirements are critical to promoting the safety and soundness of the dealers, and thereby lower risk in the financial system.
While we have made some progress, there is still much work to be done on derivatives, including completing the implementation efforts and meeting agreed G-20 timetables.

Insurance
Finally, I would like to turn to insurance regulation.  Important strides have been made in this area. The Dodd-Frank Act created and placed within the Treasury Department the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). While FIO is not a regulator, it has broad responsibilities to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and is the first federal office in this sector. Among its duties, FIO is charged with coordinating federal efforts and developing federal policy on prudential aspects of international insurance matters, including representing the United States in the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, or IAIS. Notably, FIO recently joined the Executive Committee of the IAIS.

FIO’s establishment coincides with the rapid internationalization of the insurance sector and work ongoing in various international regulatory bodies that will affect U.S.-based companies operating around the world. FIO’s international priorities include the IAIS initiative to create a common framework for the supervision of internationally active insurance groups, or ComFrame. FIO is also engaged in the IAIS work stream to develop a methodology that will identify globally significant insurance institutions, an assignment given to the IAIS by the Financial Stability Board. Finally, FIO is leading an insurance dialogue between the United States and the EU that aims to establish a platform for insurers based on both sides of the Atlantic to compete fairly and on a level playing field.

Conclusion
We must continue to work with our partners in the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board to ensure a consistent international financial reform agenda.  It is not enough to mitigate risk within the United States.  Reform must be global in nature.

But, financial reform cannot just respond to events of the past.  It must be forward-looking and it must help lay the foundations for sustainable growth.  Financial reform, embodied by responsible and robust regulation, is critical to establishing and maintaining confidence.  Confidence is critical for long-term financial stability and growth.
Our past experience confirms our current judgment.  In the decades following the Great Depression, the United States set the highest standards for disclosure and investor protection, the strongest protections for depositors, and sophisticated market rules. We did not lower our standards even when others might have.  Financial regulation became a source of strength for our financial system and led to a period of significant growth and prosperity.

Today, as our predecessors did in the wake of the Great Depression, we also have the opportunity to restore trust in the global financial system through a smart regulatory framework that could support sustainable economic expansion.
Thank you.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DAVID E. HOWARD II, FLATIRON CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, AND FLATIRON SYSTEMS, LLC

FROM:  SEC
April 11, 2012
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spyglass Equity Systems, Inc., et al, Case No.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DAVID E. HOWARD II, FLATIRON CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, AND FLATIRON SYSTEMS, LLC
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on April 6, 2012, the United States District Court for the Central District of California entered a Final Judgment against David E. Howard II, Flatiron Capital Partners, LLC (FCP), and Flatiron Systems, LLC (FS). Between December 2007 and March 2009, FCP and FS operated as investment companies that purported to trade securities using an automated trading system. Howard, a resident of New York City, was a co-managing member of FCP and the sole managing member of FS. The Commission’s complaint alleged, among other things, that, between December 2007 and January 2009, approximately 192 investors, located in at least 38 states, purchased LLC membership interests in FCP and FS. Investors were persuaded through false and misleading statements made by Howard and others to invest approximately $2.15 million in FCP and FS, and in addition, paid approximately $1.1 million in purported license fees for access to the trading systems. Thereafter, Howard misused and/or misappropriated almost $500,000 of the investor money and he and other principals lost the majority of the remaining funds through unsuccessful trading. Investors lost over $3 million in the scheme.

Howard, FCP and FS did not respond to the SEC’s allegations and the court therefore ordered default judgment against them. Howard, FCP and FS have each been enjoined from committing future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. In addition, Howard has been enjoined from future violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder, and FCP and FS have each been enjoined from future violations of Section 7(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Judgment also found Howard and FCP jointly and severally liable to pay disgorgement of $487,028 plus prejudgment interest of $79,838.69 on that disgorgement for a total of $566,866.69 and Howard and FS jointly and severally liable to pay disgorgement of $1,124,218.95 plus prejudgment interest of $127,192.86 on that disgorgement for a total of $1,251,411.81. Finally, Howard was ordered to pay a penalty of $390,000.

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

MULTIMILLION DOLLAR PONZI FRAUDSTER GETS 33 YEARS IN PRISON

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

April 11, 2012

Robert Stinson, Jr. Sentenced to 33 Years in Prison and Ordered to Pay $14 Million in Restitution for Orchestrating Multimillion Dollar Ponzi SchemeThe Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on April 10, 2012, Robert Stinson, Jr., of Berwyn, Pennsylvania, was sentenced in a parallel criminal action for orchestrating a Ponzi scheme that defrauded at least 263 investors of more than $17 million. Judge Michael M. Baylson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Stinson to 33 years in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay more than $14 million in restitution. On August 15, 2011, Stinson pleaded guilty to five counts of wire fraud, four counts of mail fraud, nine counts of money laundering, one count of bank fraud, three counts of filing false tax returns, two counts of obstruction of justice, and two counts of making false statements to federal agents.

On June 29, 2010, the Commission filed a civil injunctive action against Stinson and related persons and entities based on the same conduct, and sought and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order and Order Freezing Assets and the appointment of a receiver. According to the Commission’s complaint, from 2004 through June 2010, Stinson, primarily through Life’s Good, Inc. and Keystone State Capital Corporation, two companies he controlled, sold purported “units” in four Life’s Good private real estate hedge funds. Stinson falsely claimed that the Life’s Good funds generated annual returns of 10 to 16 percent by originating more than $30 million in commercial mortgage loans, and other investment income gained on the sale of foreclosure and investment properties. The Commission’s complaint alleges that Stinson stole investor funds for his personal use, transferred money to family members and others, and used new investor proceeds to pay existing investors as part of a Ponzi scheme. On June 20, 2011, the United States District Court entered partial summary judgment against Stinson and his co-defendants, finding violations of the federal securities laws and ordering permanent injunctive relief. The court deferred the determination of the amount of disgorgement and prejudgment interest, as well as the imposition of any civil penalties.

Monday, April 16, 2012

SEC CHARGES OPTIONSXPRESS WITH FAILURE TO SATISFY CLOSE-OUT OBLICATIONS

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged an online brokerage and clearing agency specializing in options and futures as well as four officials at the firm and a customer involved in an abusive naked short selling scheme.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that Chicago-based optionsXpress failed to satisfy its close-out obligations under Regulation SHO by repeatedly engaging in a series of sham “reset” transactions designed to give the illusion that the firm had purchased securities of like kind and quantity. The firm and customer Jonathan I. Feldman engaged in these sham reset transactions in a number of securities, resulting in continuous failures to deliver. Regulation SHO requires the delivery of equity securities to a registered clearing agency when delivery is due, generally three days after the trade date (T+3). If no delivery is made by that time, the firm must purchase or borrow the securities to close out the failure-to-deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the next day (T+4).

The former chief financial officer at optionsXpress – Thomas E. Stern of Chicago – was named in the SEC’s administrative proceeding along with optionsXpress and Feldman. Three other optionsXpress officials – head of trading and customer service Peter J. Bottini and compliance officers Phillip J. Hoeh and Kevin E. Strine – were named in a separate administrative proceeding and settled the charges against them for their roles in the scheme.

“OptionsXpress used sham reset transactions to avoid, sometimes for months, its obligation to comply with Reg. SHO’s stock delivery requirements,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement. “Illegally extending its naked short positions put optionsXpress in plain violation of the law and undermined Reg. SHO’s intent to reduce fails to deliver.”

Daniel M. Hawke, Chief of the Division of Enforcement’s Market Abuse Unit, added, “Reg. SHO compliance continues to be a high enforcement priority. Broker-dealers, their employees, and their customers must ensure that they comply with the close-out requirements of the short sale rules and regulations.”

According to the SEC’s order, the misconduct occurred from at least October 2008 to March 2010. In September 2011, optionsXpress became a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Charles Schwab Corporation.

The SEC’s Enforcement Division alleges that the sham reset transactions impacted the market for the issuers. For example, from Jan. 1, 2010 to Jan. 31, 2010, optionsXpress customers including Feldman accounted for an average of 47.9 percent of the daily trading volume in one of the securities. In 2009 alone, the optionsXpress customer accounts engaging in the activity purchased approximately $5.7 billion worth of securities and sold short approximately $4 billion of options. In 2009, Feldman himself purchased at least $2.9 billion of securities and sold short at least $1.7 billion of options through his account at optionsXpress.

According to the SEC’s order, by engaging in the alleged misconduct, optionsXpress violated Rules 204 and 204T of Regulation SHO; Feldman willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-21 thereunder; optionsXpress and Stern caused and willfully aided and abetted Feldman’s violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-21 thereunder; and Stern caused and willfully aided and abetted optionsXpress’s violations of Rules 204 and 204T.

In the separate settled administrative proceeding, Bottini, Hoeh, and Strine consented to a cease-and-desist order finding that they caused optionsXpress’s violations of Rules 204 and 204T of Regulation SHO and ordering them to cease-and-desist from committing or causing violations of Rule 204. They neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s findings.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Deborah Tarasevich, Jill Henderson, and Paul Kim. Market Surveillance Specialist Brian Shute, Market Abuse Unit Trading Specialist Ainsley Fuhr, and Financial Economist Michael P. Barnes provided assistance with the investigation. The litigation will be led by Frederick Block.

SPEECH FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DANIEL M. GALLAGHER

    Photo credit:  Tom Lianza 
FROM:  SEC
Denver, Colorado
April 13, 2012 
Thanks George [Curtis], for your generous introduction and years of good counsel – to say nothing of your hospitality. And thank you too, Don [Hoerl], for a great visit to the SEC’s dynamic Denver office yesterday. It’s good to be here among friends this morning – and, as for the rest of you, I’m happy to share my Friday-the-thirteenth with you.

Before I begin, I must tell you that my remarks today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.  It is especially nice to be here with you in Denver because, in addition to enabling my participation in this important conference, it gave me a perfect opportunity to make my first official visit as an SEC Commissioner to a regional office. In meeting yesterday with the staff of our Denver office, I was quickly reminded of the excellent talent that the SEC is able to attract in our regional offices.

Having a regional presence is of key importance to the Commission. Thank heavens, American business and the entrepreneurial energy that drives it are not confined to our financial capitals. Sadly, neither are the misfeasance and outright fraud that we are charged with rooting out in order to promote the vitality of our capital markets and their attractiveness to investors of all sorts.

Our regional presence literally extends our physical reach across the country, making it far more efficient to have Enforcement and OCIE staffers on-site in far-flung places. And history has demonstrated that our well-placed regional offices and our expert staff in each of those locations are wise investments, significantly enhancing our ability to protect investors in a timely and effective manner.
***
In the five months that I’ve been back at the SEC, I have enjoyed the special vantage point afforded to Commissioners. Upon my return, I brought with me an awareness of how things were when I last served at the Commission as Deputy Director of the Division of Trading and Markets until early 2010. During my previous stint at the SEC, I had the opportunity to work directly with each of the SEC’s two most recent Chairmen. So I thought I would share with you some perspectives on where we are, in the context of where we’ve been, as an agency, with a special focus on the Division of Enforcement.

The financial crisis that took hold in 2008 had a major impact on the SEC. In fact, that’s a pretty big understatement. Not only did it call into question the role of the agency with respect to oversight of market participants, but it was the “low tide” that exposed the fraudulent schemes of many scoundrels, Madoff and Stanford in particular. It was into this firestorm that our Chairman, Mary Schapiro, arrived in 2009. Her willingness to return to the federal government at such a time is a terrific example of the strength of her commitment to public service.

One of the Chairman’s immediate tasks was to address perceived shortcomings in the agency’s Division of Enforcement. This task was assigned in large part to one man, Rob Khuzami, who came to us as Enforcement division director in 2009. Like the Chairman, Rob is a committed public servant, having been a federal prosecutor in New York who handled many of the most important cases of the day, including the trial and conviction of the infamous “blind sheik.” Rob has a long and exemplary record of public service – if you don’t believe me, just ask him, he’ll tell you!—and it was this commitment that brought him to the SEC.

I want, in particular, to commend Chairman Schapiro and Rob Khuzami for restructuring the Division into specialty groups and for eliminating what they found to be a redundant layer of management. The securities laws and many of their interconnected implementing rules are far too complex for us to have persisted in pretending that some degree of substantive specialization and knowledge-capture weren’t necessary. The Chairman and Rob [Khuzami] realized that and made the change, despite the reservations of many who preferred things as they had been. We move a bit slowly at times, but, as University of Maryland Terrapin fans back home insist, “fear the turtle!”

Don’t get me wrong; Enforcement already worked pretty well. I do not believe it was “broken,” in any ordinary sense, and so it did not need “fixing.” It didn’t need to be restructured in order to bring good cases, or to attract good lawyers. Many of you are living testaments to that incontrovertible fact. So, making full allowance for the ways of Washington, where a convenient bit of press coverage can be reason enough to do just about anything, the “whys” behind the restructuring are important. But it is hard to disagree with the idea that a change – a new way of approaching problems both old and new – was necessary, and in light of that I believe the restructuring was a success.

Many inside and outside the building asked “why restructure Enforcement?” The answer is, it seems to me, because we need to do more – faster – with the resources, both human and material, that we already have. You may, like me, have noticed over the past few years an SEC refrain that is very Washington – that we need more “resources.” That means money and, derivatively, people and neat, new technology – in that order.

The problem is that the “give me more and I will do more for you” argument is ultimately circular. In practice, it can be translated something like this – “I can’t do better until you give me more” – and in that form, particularly as applied to the Division of Enforcement, this should not be the case. We cando more with – and without overburdening – the very fine staff we have by increasing our efficiency, for example, by choosing our cases carefully, terminating unfruitful investigations quickly, and harnessing the full benefits of technology. Although my mind is still open as to whether we captured all of the appropriate areas with our selection of specialty groups, I find that the Division’s restructuring itself is a good example of positioning ourselves to do more, better, with the expertise and technology we already have.

I assume that, as markets, market participants, and market practices change, so too will the composition and focus of our specialty groups. Indeed, the recent restructuring builds on the successful records of earlier working groups like the “Hedge Fund Task Force” and the “Microcap Fraud Task Force.” In fact, back when I worked for Chairman Cox, I served as his liaison to an interdivisional “Subprime Working Group” he established. I am proud to see that many cases started in that working group are coming to fruition today.
All of these were creative responses to the need to foster, in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement and throughout the SEC, not only greater expertise, but also efficiency. The positive results of these earlier experiments in interdisciplinary analysis were a solid foundation on which to build the recent full-blown specialty group restructuring in Enforcement. The need to increase our efficiency is a way to make our requests for additional resources more credible. The familiar plea for more “boots on the ground” is a good deal more persuasive amidst the competing demands and vagaries of the budget process when we can show that we are using our staff expertise and technology as effectively as possible – even when that may require us to change our longstanding work habits.

Ultimately, of course, our financial condition is out of our control. So, we should focus on what is under our control -- enhancing our Enforcement staff’s expertise and efficiency. Again, organizing the Division into specialist groups is an important step in the direction of enhancing both expertise and efficiency, for obvious reasons.

On the technological side, I want to commend another very worthwhile innovation, creation of a computer-based “tips, complaints, and referrals” system, inevitably nicknamed “TCR.” The primary idea was to get tips and complaints to the desks of those who might need and could evaluate them, quickly and across all internal frontiers. I gather that we’re almost there, with the significant caveat that having a large volume of unevaluated tips hit your electronic desk every day is not a gift in any ordinary sense – especially when, from experience, we know that many of them, for various reasons, will not yield fruit. However, that one tip, that proverbial needle in the haystack, might just lead you to the next major Ponzi scheme.

A secondary purpose of the TCR system is, frankly, not yet realized. TCR has not yielded any useful dataset for analysis. It remains, for us, the ultimate unstructured database. What we hope will someday be a stream of timely information on suspected market misfeasance, prompting not only fruitful investigations, but also guiding our market inspection and market surveillance efforts cannot now be mined. For an apt analogy, that is the difference between a few million sticky-notes and Google. So as to TCR, well begun, but not yet done. I look forward to the day when our experts in the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation will have brought that system up to its full potential as an interdivisional analytic resource.
* * *
As many of you know, the Division of Enforcement turns 40 this year. Although today’s Division is very different from the group that former Commissioner Irv Pollack led in 1972, some things remain exactly the same. One of those things is the Division’s role in giving effect to the Commission’s commitment to due process.

It was, in fact, just before Chairman Casey established the Division of Enforcement that the “Wells Committee” issued its report – one of whose 43 recommendations endorsed what we now refer to as “Wells notices” and “Wells submissions,” the pre-litigation procedural hallmark of SEC practice. And, although the Wells Committee’s endorsement was the news, what the Wells Committee really did was to underscore the importance of a procedural norm that Chairman Hamer Budge had announced in a memorandum to division and office heads two years earlier – two years before a stand-alone Division of Enforcement came into existence.

Chairman Budge, and later the Wells Committee, simply said that a prospective respondent should be given advance notice of the likely charges and have an opportunity to respond to them in a writing that would accompany any recommendation the staff might make for Commission action. Our “Wells process” is, in other words, a matter of procedural decency and fairness – of “due process” – and, for us, a very good last minute check on investigative enthusiasm. Wells submissions help us decide whether to go forward as recommended, and so assist us in deploying our always scarce staff resources in productive directions.
Now – full disclosure, here – I play for the SEC. That’s my team, and I want us to win. None of us has any other objective when we take the field. But, to extend the metaphor, the game isn’t solitaire and you can’t win it by yourself. There’s no game without, rules, a referee, and – not least – an opponent. And the rules I’m talking about are not SEC rules implementing the Securities, Exchange, and Investment Company Acts – or even Dodd-Frank and, soon, the JOBS Act. I’m talking about the procedural rules that guide and constrain our conduct in the enforcement arena.

The most important of those are administered by the courts; we did not create them and we are not the arbiters of whether we – or others – have met their requirements. The constitutionally assured right to due process is preeminent among such procedural norms. Now, no one would begin to pretend that the Wells Committee invented either due process, or our adversarial legal system. Still, lurking within that obvious point lies, it seems to me, a more subtle point, one that sometimes goes unacknowledged. Procedural due process was already an explicit part of the Commission’s enforcement practices when the Division of Enforcement was brought into being. It is, in a sense, the mark of legitimacy of our enforcement system. Our commitment to it in all we do must be unequivocal. But, we must also recognize that, for most of those who find themselves defendants in SEC proceedings, the assurance of due process would mean very little if it were only observed in the courts, or if they were left to themselves to try to respond effectively to our Wells notices.

I am, of course, alluding to the indispensable role of defense counsel in SEC enforcement proceedings. Without their expert and active assistance to their clients, the SEC’s longstanding commitment to due process for those involved in our proceedings would ring hollow. We expect and encourage defense counsel to act zealously on behalf of their clients – during our investigations, no less than in court. Expert opposition, moreover, contributes indirectly to our own efficiency, encouraging, for example, a client’s cooperation to engender a mutually advantageous settlement and by knowing, in the context of the facts, what would be productive to contest in furtherance of the client’s interests, while avoiding time consuming skirmishes over the tangential and non-germane.

Make no mistake, there is a limit, and last year Rob Khuzami reminded everyone publicly of how counsel have occasionally crossed that line. But in the majority of our investigations, that’s not what we see. Time and again, the careful and creative analyses of defense counsel compel us to examine both how we apply our rules and the limits of their elasticity. Put another way, there is a point beyond which our rules must not be stretched in our effort to enforce the securities laws. The upshot is that we should have to consider and adopt new, closer-fitting rules for truly novel situations. That seems to me implicit, at least, in the SEC’s commitment to procedural fairness.

Let me take a simple, but currently very common example. The Commission is regularly asked to approve sanctions based on the Dodd-Frank Act that would preclude defendants from future participation, temporary or permanent, in the financial services industry – the collateral bars authorized in section 925 of Dodd-Frank. Many cases that are brought to our attention for Commission action still relate to conduct that occurred before Dodd-Frank’s enactment. Where the new sanctions would apply to pre-enactment conduct, we face a question of basic fairness. With that in mind, I believe we should reject as inappropriate a reading of section 925 that would permit us to apply these collateral bars to pre-enactment conduct. In showing such restraint, we would demonstrate that our purpose is not only to deter bad conduct and to safeguard markets and investors, but to afford procedural fairness to those whose conduct subjects them to legitimate SEC enforcement action.

Let’s stipulate, in other words, that a great many of the defendants against whom the Commission authorizes enforcement action richly deserve whatever sanction we can levy on them. Even so, there is a limit. Their due process interests and our commitment to procedural fairness should be vindicated in our imposition of sanctions. Just as defendants should not be held accountable by reference to a standard that makes unlawful conduct that was lawful when it occurred, defendants should not be subjected to sanctions that didn’t exist at the time of their conduct. I want my team to win, and most days I’m pretty sure my team deserves to win, but I want my team to win fair-and-square.
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Let me close with a somewhat more general thought. It is critically important that our enforcement program be extremely efficient. Each time the Division opens an investigation, which it is free to do without Commission approval, it has made at least a tacit decision to devote scarce resources to it, rather than some other investigation or case. So, recognizing that it is unrealistic to imagine we will ever achieve a one-to-one correspondence between incidents of misfeasance and SEC Enforcement staff, we’d better plan to do everything we can to increase our hit-rate per investigation opened, and should commit our staff resources carefully, which is to say, consciously.

That’s not a question merely of shunning low-percentage investigations, much less low-gain cases. Experience teaches us, for example, that fraud tends to proliferate in smaller entities that may lack highly developed compliance programs. It also means thinking carefully about what we might, borrowing again from the world of sports, call “shot selection.” It can be tempting to tangle with prominent institutions. But chasing headlines and solving problems are two different things. The question is what will do most good – where our focus should be. And the record seems to suggest that we can do most to protect smaller, unsophisticated investors by focusing more attention on smaller entities, where Ponzi schemes and microcap fraud have seemed to flourish unimpeded.

With that in mind, the SEC’s Microcap Fraud Working Group is a promising initiative. It is a creative effort to focus expertise from across the agency to pool knowledge and resources in an effort to detect, investigate, and deter fraud in the microcap market. That’s a practical way to leverage what we have in the fight against fraud in the service of markets and investors alike. I applaud the work of the group, and I am encouraged that such a talented team is on the front lines fighting for investors.

And, finally, while we’re talking about putting more heft in key areas, it is important to note the role played by the Division’s trial unit. Our trial unit has developed into one of the top groups of litigators in the country, and –in addition to their courtroom duties – they are key advisors to the Commission as we consider litigation risk and related strategy issues in our enforcement proceedings. As such, I am glad to see that their ranks have grown in number and expertise over the years, and I hope that trend continues. I will note that we just announced last night the addition of Matt Solomon as the Deputy Chief Litigation Counsel in Enforcement. Matt will report to another Matt – Matt Martens. Go look up their resumes and tell me I am wrong about our expertise in that group!

Our willingness to negotiate settlements must be matched by an explicit willingness to take our cases to trial in order to maximize results for investors. The extreme form of that argument, is that the Commission should not approve any settlement recommendation if the staff would not also be able and willing to proceed to trial. On the contrary, a trial-ready posture would alter defendants’ operating assumptions and actually increase the likelihood of prompt and advantageous settlements.
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I want, in closing, to return to first things – our heritage of procedural fairness and the need to vindicate it in all that we do. What the vision of Chairman Budge and the Wells Committee began forty years ago, our expert Enforcement staff has since fostered. We, on the Commission, derive great benefit from the Wells submissions so carefully prepared by so many defendants’ counsels. They enhance significantly our ability to evaluate facts and the complexities of the law applicable to them in the fair and balanced manner the public has a right to expect, by virtue of both our oath and inclination. We all have complementary roles to play in promoting strong, fair, and effective enforcement to help keep our markets strong and our investors confident in participating in them.

Once again, thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts with you – and I wish you an interesting and enjoyable conference.