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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Thursday, April 19, 2012

MORE TROUBLE AT optionsXpress

FROM:  SEC 
Washington, D.C., April 19, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Chicago-based securities dealer affiliated with online brokerage firm optionsXpress with violating the registration provisions of the securities laws when it continued trading operations after delisting from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and deregistering with the SEC, apparently to avoid an audit.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement instituted administrative proceedings against OX Trading LLC, optionsXpress, and their former CFO Thomas E. Stern, alleging that OX Trading operated as an unregistered dealer from October 2009 to November 2010 and illegally transacted in securities while not a member of a national securities association or national exchange from March 2009 to November 2010.

According to the SEC’s order, Stern terminated OX Trading’s membership with the CBOE and ended the firm’s broker-dealer registration with the SEC. Meanwhile, OX Trading quietly continued to conduct trading through a customer account at optionsXpress. Stern, who also was OX Trading’s chief compliance officer, later fabricated and backdated an allegedly exculpatory letter purporting to demonstrate that he had properly informed CBOE that OX Trading would deregister and become a customer of optionsXpress.

Earlier this week, the SEC charged optionsXpress and Stern for their roles in a naked short selling scheme.

“OptionsXpress, OX Trading, and Stern have displayed a profound disregard for regulators, compliance obligations, and the regulatory requirements that dealers must satisfy for the privilege of operating in our markets,” said Daniel M. Hawke, Chief of the SEC’s Market Abuse Unit. “Registration of brokers and dealers is a fundamental part of the regulatory structure and provides the foundation upon which many other investor protections are built.”

According to the SEC’s order, OX Trading and optionsXpress became wholly-owned subsidiaries of The Charles Schwab Corporation in September 2011. OX Trading, which originally registered with the SEC in 2008, was created to provide price improvement on orders from optionsXpress customers and to profit from those trades. OX Trading received electronic requests for quotes (RFQs) from optionsXpress. These RFQs allowed OX Trading to determine whether it wanted to be the counterparty to an optionsXpress customer’s order. OX Trading allegedly made money when it traded as a counterparty to optionsXpress customer orders and hedged the positions created by those trades.

According to the SEC’s order, a CBOE examiner conveyed to Stern in early 2009 that OX Trading was required to have an annual audit based on its CBOE membership status. Despite CBOE’s request, Stern refused to pay for an audit and subsequently terminated OX Trading’s CBOE membership on March 2, 2009. Nonetheless, OX Trading continued to conduct the same trading through a customer portfolio margin account at optionsXpress. Stern did not inform the CBOE that OX Trading would continue its operations as a customer of optionsXpress. He later attempted to furnish the fabricated and backdated letter to SEC investigators in a phony attempt to prove otherwise.

According to the SEC’s order, after Stern was contacted by the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, Stern filed a form with the SEC on Aug. 18, 2009, to deregister OX Trading as a broker-dealer. The deregistration became effective on Oct. 17, 2009. According to an internal e-mail sent by Stern, OX Trading “stalled as long as we could” in deregistering. OX Trading continued to trade through the customer portfolio margin account at optionsXpress.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that CBOE identified the OX Trading customer account during an exam of optionsXpress in late 2009. CBOE requested an explanation about why OX Trading was not registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer. In an internal e-mail about CBOE’s request, Stern stated, “I am happy to spin this however it needs to be.” Stern then sent CBOE a letter containing numerous factual inaccuracies and no legal opinion or analysis about OX Trading’s registration status. CBOE sent Stern another letter in June 2010 informing him that it believed OX Trading was functioning as a dealer and needed to either cease operations or obtain a written opinion from the SEC confirming that OX Trading was not required to register. OX Trading did neither.

According to the SEC’s order, OX Trading eventually acquired a CBOE trading permit and registered again with the SEC effective Nov. 16, 2010.

As alleged in the SEC’s order, OX Trading violated Sections 15(a) and 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act, and Stern and optionsXpress caused and willfully aided and abetted OX Trading’s violations.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Deborah Tarasevich, Jill Henderson, and Paul Kim. Market Surveillance Specialist Brian Shute and Market Abuse Trading Specialist Ainsley Fuhr provided assistance with the investigation. The SEC’s litigation will be led by Frederick Block.

SEC GETS JUDGMENTS ON CONSENT AGAINST DIAMONDBACK CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC

FROM:  SEC 
April 10, 2012
SEC v. Spyridon Adondakis et al., Civil Action 12-CV-0409 (SDNY)(HB)
SEC Obtains Final Judgments on Consent against Diamondback Capital Management LLC
The SEC announced that the Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered a Final Judgment on Consent as to Diamondback Capital Management LLC (“Diamondback”) on April 6, 2012, in the SEC’s insider trading case, SEC v. Spyridon Adondakis et al., Civil Action 12-CV-0409 (SDNY) (HB).

The SEC filed its complaint on January 18, 2012, charging two multi-billion dollar hedge fund advisory firms – including Diamondback – as well as seven fund managers and analysts involved in a $78 million insider trading scheme based on nonpublic information about Dell’s quarterly earnings and other similar inside information about Nvidia Corporation.

The SEC’s complaint alleged that in 2008 and 2009, Jesse Tortora, an analyst at Diamondback, obtained inside information about quarterly earnings reports of both Dell and Nvidia and passed that information to Todd Newman, a Diamondback portfolio manager, who used the information to execute trades on behalf of hedge funds managed by Diamondback. These illegal trades in Dell and Nvidia securities resulted in millions of dollars in illicit gains for Diamondback.

The Final Judgment against Diamondback: (1) permanently enjoins the firm from violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; and (2) orders it to pay disgorgement of $5,173,000 plus pre-judgment interest of $832,751.35, for a total of $6,005,751.35, provided that the amount Diamondback owes would be credited, dollar for dollar, by amounts paid pursuant to a non-prosecution agreement between Diamondback and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York; and (c) orders it to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $3,000,000.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

U.S. TREASURY OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON WALL STREET REFORM

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Wall Street Reform for U.S. Department of the Treasury
As prepared for delivery
NEW YORK – Good afternoon.  It is a privilege to address the International Section of the American Bar Association, and to be speaking about international regulatory reform. The subject matter is particularly timely given that the world’s finance ministers will gather in Washington, D.C. for the G-20 this weekend.

We have learned from recent events, including the financial crisis, that financial systems and markets around the world are more integrated than ever.  Therefore, financial reforms around the globe must be consistent and convergent.

I will touch on three key priorities that were agreed upon by the G-20 – capital, resolution, and OTC derivatives – as well as insurance regulation.
We are transitioning now from regulatory design to implementation.  We must acknowledge that the task is both difficult and complex. We must work together through the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board to make the new rules effective. We all share a common interest in a global financial system that is safe and resilient, and that supports growth.

The Importance of Reform
Let me begin by retreading familiar ground: the financial crisis revealed that the risks facing our system can be correlated and crosscutting, and that they can affect multiple firms, markets, and countries simultaneously. The crisis laid bare the fundamental weaknesses of the previous financial regulatory infrastructure.
To preserve financial stability, it became essential to establish a regulatory structure that could properly assess the financial system as a whole, not simply its component parts – a regulatory structure in which the failure of one firm, or problems in one corner of the system, would not risk bringing down the entire financial system.  It was important to establish a modern regulatory framework that could keep pace with financial sector innovations, restore market discipline, and safeguard financial stability in both the United States and abroad.  The United States has played a leading role in this global financial reform by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.

Some have argued that these new rules and standards put U.S. financial firms at a competitive disadvantage.  While we must always work towards having a level competitive playing field, I believe such arguments are misplaced.
First, by moving quickly, we in the United States have been able to lead from a position of strength in setting the international reform agenda.

Second, there is already evidence that our actions – both the immediate response to the crisis and permanent reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act – have bolstered the recovery of the U.S. financial system.  Bank balance sheets are stronger. Tier 1 common equity at large bank holding companies has increased by more than 70 percent or by $560 billion since the first quarter of 2009. Additionally, at the four largest bank holding companies, for example, reliance on short-term wholesale financial debt has decreased from a peak of 36 percent of total assets in 2007 to 20 percent at the end of 2011. The firms’ liquidity positions are more robust and their funding sources are more reliable. Firms have significantly reduced leverage. Recent stress tests showed that the bank holding companies are better able to withstand significant shocks.

Third, I believe that consumers, investors, and businesses feel more secure when they deal with financial institutions that are well-regulated and transparent, because these attributes engender trust. Trust is essential for the financial system to perform its most basic functions, including credit intermediation. For many years, investors from all over the world have trusted the U.S. financial system. Regulation that is both strong and sensible is essential to continue that trust.

Over the past three years, we have made substantial progress in restoring this trust to our financial system and thereby improving financial stability. Long-term economic growth and credit intermediation are only sustainable under a model in which there is confidence in financial stability.

International Coordination
All of this being said, it is nevertheless important to remember that financial systems are interconnected and that risks both transcend and migrate across national borders. Therefore, we must work towards building a system where there is broad global agreement on the basic rules of the road.

Global coordination is important not only for maintaining a level playing field, but also for promoting financial stability.  We can ill afford the risk of regulatory arbitrage.  If riskier activities migrate unchecked to jurisdictions with inadequate rules and supervision, the threats that will emerge will have implications not just for the host country, but for the global financial system. The financial crisis exposed the failure of weak regulation.

Europe has taken important steps toward reform.  The EU is working through its most extensive financial services reform.   It has proposed or adopted around thirty reform measures, including almost all of the key measures agreed to by the G-20.  The United States and the EU are aligned on the fundamental goals of regulatory reform, and are united by a shared view that it is necessary to complete at an international level the work that is underway.  Treasury and U.S. regulatory agencies have worked closely with our counterparts in the European Commission and the European Supervisory Agencies to align our regulations more closely.

It is unlikely that we and our European counterparts will attain perfect alignment.  But most of the differences between us are technical, not matters of principle.  While we must work diligently to resolve our technical differences, we should not let them overshadow our shared commitment to reform. We must also see to it that other regions follow through on implementing reforms, particularly Asia, given the importance of financial centers like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo. The global financial system will continue to strengthen as a result of our efforts. Backtracking on reforms is not an option.

G-20 and the Joint Reform Agenda
The G-20 has been, and will continue to be, a key vehicle for coordinating our reform efforts. Since the first meetings of the G-20, and especially since the Pittsburgh meetings during the height of the financial crisis in 2009, the Group has worked to increase the strength and effectiveness of the international regulatory framework through a comprehensive agenda for reform. This agenda has been reaffirmed and further developed at each subsequent Summit.  The Financial Stability Forum, which was expanded and strengthened as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009, has also played a key role in this process, with support from the global standard-setting bodies.

This year in the G-20, the United States is emphasizing progress on implementation in three key areas: capital, resolution, and OTC derivatives.  Let me now turn to discussing these three priorities as well as international coordination around insurance, which will also be an area of focus in the coming year.

Capital
The crisis showed that financial institutions were not sufficiently capitalized to withstand significant market pressures.  To maintain financial stability, taxpayers in countries across the globe had to provide capital support to financial institutions in order to prevent their failure.  There was little question that, going forward, banks needed to be more resilient, with better quality capital buffers.  

The international regulatory community acted with dispatch and urgency to achieve consensus on Basel 2.5 and Basel III capital standards.  The new Basel capital standards provide a uniform definition of capital across jurisdictions, and it requires banks to hold significantly more and higher-quality capital.  The reforms to the Basel Capital Standards also establish a mandatory leverage ratio and a liquidity coverage ratio.
More work remains with respect to the Basel Capital Standards.  International agreement on standards must be followed with implementation by G-20 members.  Moreover, important debates continue around issues such as liquidity run-off ratios and measurement of capital deductions. The Basel Committee is now working toward more consistent measurement of risk-weighted assets across jurisdictions.

While these points are relatively technical, it is important that the new rules be consistent not only in principle, but also in practice. Consistent cross-border application of capital standards is important to maintaining a level playing field.

Resolution
Strengthening cross-border resolution regimes is complicated.  But it is a critically important topic.

The U.S. experience with Lehman Brothers showed the potentially devastating consequences to financial stability of the disorderly bankruptcy of a financial firm. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act provides for orderly resolution of financial companies, including non-bank financial institutions. The FDIC and Federal Reserve have already adopted a number of rules pursuant to these new authorities, including a “living wills” rule that requires large bank holding companies and designated nonbank financial companies to prepare resolution plans.  The largest bank holding companies will submit the first living wills in July.
The goal of international convergence was furthered this year when the G-20 endorsed the “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.”   This new international standard addresses such critical issues as the scope and independence of the resolution authority, the essential powers and authorities that a resolution authority must possess, and how jurisdictions can facilitate cross-border cooperation in resolutions of significant financial institutions. The Key Attributes provide guidelines for how jurisdictions should develop recovery and resolution plans for specific institutions and for assessing the resolvability of their institutions.  This new international standard also sets forth the elements that countries should include in their resolution regimes while avoiding severe systemic consequences or taxpayer loss.

Therefore, much progress has already been made and even more will be completed by the end of this year: cross-border crisis management groups for the largest firms have been established, additional cross-border cooperation agreements will be put in place, and recovery and resolution plans are being developed.

Derivatives
The crisis also showed that we did not have a sufficient understanding of derivatives, which are an important means of interconnection between firms.  The flaws attendant to this area of financial transactions were many: poor access to useful data such that, at critical times, neither supervisors nor counterparties knew who owed what to whom; poor risk management such that firms were not able to satisfy their contractual obligations with respect to collateral; and a generally fragmented and opaque market. It is common ground that the lack of oversight in the derivatives markets exacerbated the financial crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a comprehensive framework of regulation for the OTC derivatives markets.  The elements of this framework include regulation of dealers, mandatory clearing, trading, and transparency.  The framework established under the Dodd-Frank Act is consistent with that of the G-20.  The CFTC and SEC are well into their rule-making process.  Once again, the United States and the EU have closely cooperated in this area, and have adopted parallel approaches to important issues such as central clearing, trading platforms, and reporting to trade repositories.

While the reforms set forth a framework for on-exchange-traded derivatives, it is also important for us to make progress on establishing a global regime for margin for bespoke, un-cleared derivatives transactions.  Both the United States and the EU support international work on global margin standards for trades that are not cleared through a central counterparty. Margin requirements are critical to promoting the safety and soundness of the dealers, and thereby lower risk in the financial system.
While we have made some progress, there is still much work to be done on derivatives, including completing the implementation efforts and meeting agreed G-20 timetables.

Insurance
Finally, I would like to turn to insurance regulation.  Important strides have been made in this area. The Dodd-Frank Act created and placed within the Treasury Department the Federal Insurance Office (FIO). While FIO is not a regulator, it has broad responsibilities to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry and is the first federal office in this sector. Among its duties, FIO is charged with coordinating federal efforts and developing federal policy on prudential aspects of international insurance matters, including representing the United States in the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, or IAIS. Notably, FIO recently joined the Executive Committee of the IAIS.

FIO’s establishment coincides with the rapid internationalization of the insurance sector and work ongoing in various international regulatory bodies that will affect U.S.-based companies operating around the world. FIO’s international priorities include the IAIS initiative to create a common framework for the supervision of internationally active insurance groups, or ComFrame. FIO is also engaged in the IAIS work stream to develop a methodology that will identify globally significant insurance institutions, an assignment given to the IAIS by the Financial Stability Board. Finally, FIO is leading an insurance dialogue between the United States and the EU that aims to establish a platform for insurers based on both sides of the Atlantic to compete fairly and on a level playing field.

Conclusion
We must continue to work with our partners in the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board to ensure a consistent international financial reform agenda.  It is not enough to mitigate risk within the United States.  Reform must be global in nature.

But, financial reform cannot just respond to events of the past.  It must be forward-looking and it must help lay the foundations for sustainable growth.  Financial reform, embodied by responsible and robust regulation, is critical to establishing and maintaining confidence.  Confidence is critical for long-term financial stability and growth.
Our past experience confirms our current judgment.  In the decades following the Great Depression, the United States set the highest standards for disclosure and investor protection, the strongest protections for depositors, and sophisticated market rules. We did not lower our standards even when others might have.  Financial regulation became a source of strength for our financial system and led to a period of significant growth and prosperity.

Today, as our predecessors did in the wake of the Great Depression, we also have the opportunity to restore trust in the global financial system through a smart regulatory framework that could support sustainable economic expansion.
Thank you.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DAVID E. HOWARD II, FLATIRON CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, AND FLATIRON SYSTEMS, LLC

FROM:  SEC
April 11, 2012
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spyglass Equity Systems, Inc., et al, Case No.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DAVID E. HOWARD II, FLATIRON CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, AND FLATIRON SYSTEMS, LLC
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on April 6, 2012, the United States District Court for the Central District of California entered a Final Judgment against David E. Howard II, Flatiron Capital Partners, LLC (FCP), and Flatiron Systems, LLC (FS). Between December 2007 and March 2009, FCP and FS operated as investment companies that purported to trade securities using an automated trading system. Howard, a resident of New York City, was a co-managing member of FCP and the sole managing member of FS. The Commission’s complaint alleged, among other things, that, between December 2007 and January 2009, approximately 192 investors, located in at least 38 states, purchased LLC membership interests in FCP and FS. Investors were persuaded through false and misleading statements made by Howard and others to invest approximately $2.15 million in FCP and FS, and in addition, paid approximately $1.1 million in purported license fees for access to the trading systems. Thereafter, Howard misused and/or misappropriated almost $500,000 of the investor money and he and other principals lost the majority of the remaining funds through unsuccessful trading. Investors lost over $3 million in the scheme.

Howard, FCP and FS did not respond to the SEC’s allegations and the court therefore ordered default judgment against them. Howard, FCP and FS have each been enjoined from committing future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. In addition, Howard has been enjoined from future violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder, and FCP and FS have each been enjoined from future violations of Section 7(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Judgment also found Howard and FCP jointly and severally liable to pay disgorgement of $487,028 plus prejudgment interest of $79,838.69 on that disgorgement for a total of $566,866.69 and Howard and FS jointly and severally liable to pay disgorgement of $1,124,218.95 plus prejudgment interest of $127,192.86 on that disgorgement for a total of $1,251,411.81. Finally, Howard was ordered to pay a penalty of $390,000.

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

MULTIMILLION DOLLAR PONZI FRAUDSTER GETS 33 YEARS IN PRISON

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

April 11, 2012

Robert Stinson, Jr. Sentenced to 33 Years in Prison and Ordered to Pay $14 Million in Restitution for Orchestrating Multimillion Dollar Ponzi SchemeThe Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on April 10, 2012, Robert Stinson, Jr., of Berwyn, Pennsylvania, was sentenced in a parallel criminal action for orchestrating a Ponzi scheme that defrauded at least 263 investors of more than $17 million. Judge Michael M. Baylson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Stinson to 33 years in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay more than $14 million in restitution. On August 15, 2011, Stinson pleaded guilty to five counts of wire fraud, four counts of mail fraud, nine counts of money laundering, one count of bank fraud, three counts of filing false tax returns, two counts of obstruction of justice, and two counts of making false statements to federal agents.

On June 29, 2010, the Commission filed a civil injunctive action against Stinson and related persons and entities based on the same conduct, and sought and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order and Order Freezing Assets and the appointment of a receiver. According to the Commission’s complaint, from 2004 through June 2010, Stinson, primarily through Life’s Good, Inc. and Keystone State Capital Corporation, two companies he controlled, sold purported “units” in four Life’s Good private real estate hedge funds. Stinson falsely claimed that the Life’s Good funds generated annual returns of 10 to 16 percent by originating more than $30 million in commercial mortgage loans, and other investment income gained on the sale of foreclosure and investment properties. The Commission’s complaint alleges that Stinson stole investor funds for his personal use, transferred money to family members and others, and used new investor proceeds to pay existing investors as part of a Ponzi scheme. On June 20, 2011, the United States District Court entered partial summary judgment against Stinson and his co-defendants, finding violations of the federal securities laws and ordering permanent injunctive relief. The court deferred the determination of the amount of disgorgement and prejudgment interest, as well as the imposition of any civil penalties.

Monday, April 16, 2012

SEC CHARGES OPTIONSXPRESS WITH FAILURE TO SATISFY CLOSE-OUT OBLICATIONS

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged an online brokerage and clearing agency specializing in options and futures as well as four officials at the firm and a customer involved in an abusive naked short selling scheme.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that Chicago-based optionsXpress failed to satisfy its close-out obligations under Regulation SHO by repeatedly engaging in a series of sham “reset” transactions designed to give the illusion that the firm had purchased securities of like kind and quantity. The firm and customer Jonathan I. Feldman engaged in these sham reset transactions in a number of securities, resulting in continuous failures to deliver. Regulation SHO requires the delivery of equity securities to a registered clearing agency when delivery is due, generally three days after the trade date (T+3). If no delivery is made by that time, the firm must purchase or borrow the securities to close out the failure-to-deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the next day (T+4).

The former chief financial officer at optionsXpress – Thomas E. Stern of Chicago – was named in the SEC’s administrative proceeding along with optionsXpress and Feldman. Three other optionsXpress officials – head of trading and customer service Peter J. Bottini and compliance officers Phillip J. Hoeh and Kevin E. Strine – were named in a separate administrative proceeding and settled the charges against them for their roles in the scheme.

“OptionsXpress used sham reset transactions to avoid, sometimes for months, its obligation to comply with Reg. SHO’s stock delivery requirements,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement. “Illegally extending its naked short positions put optionsXpress in plain violation of the law and undermined Reg. SHO’s intent to reduce fails to deliver.”

Daniel M. Hawke, Chief of the Division of Enforcement’s Market Abuse Unit, added, “Reg. SHO compliance continues to be a high enforcement priority. Broker-dealers, their employees, and their customers must ensure that they comply with the close-out requirements of the short sale rules and regulations.”

According to the SEC’s order, the misconduct occurred from at least October 2008 to March 2010. In September 2011, optionsXpress became a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Charles Schwab Corporation.

The SEC’s Enforcement Division alleges that the sham reset transactions impacted the market for the issuers. For example, from Jan. 1, 2010 to Jan. 31, 2010, optionsXpress customers including Feldman accounted for an average of 47.9 percent of the daily trading volume in one of the securities. In 2009 alone, the optionsXpress customer accounts engaging in the activity purchased approximately $5.7 billion worth of securities and sold short approximately $4 billion of options. In 2009, Feldman himself purchased at least $2.9 billion of securities and sold short at least $1.7 billion of options through his account at optionsXpress.

According to the SEC’s order, by engaging in the alleged misconduct, optionsXpress violated Rules 204 and 204T of Regulation SHO; Feldman willfully violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-21 thereunder; optionsXpress and Stern caused and willfully aided and abetted Feldman’s violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-21 thereunder; and Stern caused and willfully aided and abetted optionsXpress’s violations of Rules 204 and 204T.

In the separate settled administrative proceeding, Bottini, Hoeh, and Strine consented to a cease-and-desist order finding that they caused optionsXpress’s violations of Rules 204 and 204T of Regulation SHO and ordering them to cease-and-desist from committing or causing violations of Rule 204. They neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s findings.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Deborah Tarasevich, Jill Henderson, and Paul Kim. Market Surveillance Specialist Brian Shute, Market Abuse Unit Trading Specialist Ainsley Fuhr, and Financial Economist Michael P. Barnes provided assistance with the investigation. The litigation will be led by Frederick Block.