FDIC TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES REGARDING SUPERVISION AND RISK MANAGEMENT

FROM:  FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
Speeches & Testimony
Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on "Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Management In Light of JPMorgan Chase's Trading Loss" Before the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives; 2128 Rayburn House Office Building
June 19, 2012
Chairman Bachus, Representative Frank and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on bank supervision and risk management as it concerns recent trading losses at JPMorgan Chase.

The recent losses at JPMorgan Chase revealed certain risks that reside within large, complex financial institutions. They also highlighted the significance of effective risk controls and governance at these institutions.

The four FDIC-insured subsidiaries of JPMorgan Chase firm have nearly $2 trillion in assets and $842 billion in domestic deposits. As the deposit insurer and backup supervisor of JPMorgan Chase, the FDIC staff works through the primary federal regulators, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve System, to obtain information necessary to monitor the risk within the institution.

The FDIC maintains an onsite presence at the firm, which currently consists of a permanent staff of four professionals. The FDIC staff engages in risk monitoring of the firm through cooperation with the primary federal regulators. Following the disclosure of JPMorgan Chase’s losses, the FDIC has added temporary staff to assist in our current review. The team is working with the institution’s primary federal regulators to investigate both the circumstances that led to the losses and the institution’s ongoing efforts to manage the risks at the firm. The agencies are conducting an in-depth review of both the risk measurement tools used by the firm and the governance and limit structures in place within the Chief Investment Office (CIO) unit where the losses occurred.  Following this review, we will work with the primary regulators to address any inadequate risk management practices that are identified.

Following the announcement of these losses in May, the FDIC joined the OCC and the New York Federal Reserve Bank in daily meetings with the firm. Initially, these meetings focused on gaining an understanding of the events leading up to the escalating losses in the CIO synthetic credit portfolio. The FDIC has continued to participate in these daily meetings between the firm and its primary regulators. We are looking at the strength of CIO’s risk management, governance and control frameworks, including the setting and monitoring of risk limits. The FDIC is also reviewing the quality of CIO risk reporting that has historically been made available to firm management and the regulators. Our discussions have also focused on the quality and consistency of the models used in the CIO as well as the approval and validation processes surrounding them. Although the focus of this review is on the circumstances that led to the losses, the FDIC is also working with JPMorgan Chase’s primary federal regulators to assess any other potential gaps within the firm’s overall risk management practices.

As a general matter, and apart from the specifics of this situation, evaluating the quality of financial institutions’ risk management practices, internal controls and governance is an important focus of safety-and-soundness examinations conducted by the federal banking agencies. Onsite examinations provide an opportunity for supervisors to evaluate the quality of the loan and securities portfolios, underwriting practices, credit review and administration, establishment of and adherence to risk limits, and other matters pertinent to the risk profile of an institution. One important element of risk management is that senior management and the board receives accurate and timely information about the risks to which a firm is exposed. Timely risk-related information is needed by institution management to support decision making and to satisfy disclosure requirements -- and it is an important element of supervisory review.

Without speaking to the specifics of the case for which a review is underway, the recent losses attest to the speed with which risks can materialize in a large, complex derivatives portfolio. The recent losses also highlight that it is important for financial regulatory agencies to have access to timely risk-related information about derivatives and other market-sensitive exposures, to analyze the data effectively, and to regularly share findings and observations.

DISTRICT COURT ENTERS FINAL JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS JAMES CLEMENTS AND ZEINA SMIDI.

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
June 18, 2012
DIMITROULEAS/SNOW
The Commission announced that on May 21, 2012, a District Judge in the Southern District of Florida entered Final Judgments Ordering Disgorgement, Prejudgment Interest and a Civil Penalty against Defendants James Clements and Zeina Smidi. Pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), District Court Judge William P. Dimitrouleas ordered Defendant Clements to pay disgorgement of $339,451, prejudgment interest of $88,975.66, and a civil penalty of $339,451, and ordered Defendant Smidi to pay disgorgement of $2,492,000, prejudgment interest of $611,837.60, and a civil penalty of $2,492,000.

The District Court previously entered by consent permanent injunctions against Clements and Smidi on February 6 and 17, 2012. The permanent injunctions enjoined Clements from future violations of Securities Act Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a), and Exchange Act Sections 10(b), 15(a), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and enjoined Smidi from future violations of Exchange Act Section 10(b), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Clements and Smidi neither admitted nor denied the allegations of the complaint in their consents.
The Commission filed a complaint against Clements and Smidi on March 30, 2011, alleging they operated a Ponzi scheme that offered investors guaranteed monthly returns. The Defendants first told investors they would use investor proceeds to trade in foreign currencies and later stated they would use proceeds to invest in Swiss high-yield, fixed-rate savings accounts. In reality, however, Clements and Smidi siphoned approximately $3 million of investors’ money to their personal bank accounts, and paid out approximately $3 million for travel, expenses, and luxury items.

DERIVATIVES AND THE CROSS-BORDER APPLICATION OF DODD-FRANK SWAP MARKET REFORMS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Remarks on Derivatives and the Cross-Border Application of Dodd-Frank Swap Market Reforms at the Institute of International Bankers’ Membership Luncheon
Chairman Gary Gensler
June 14, 2012
Good afternoon, Rich, thank you for that kind introduction and for inviting me to speak about the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) efforts to bring much-needed reform to the swaps market.

With just the click of a mouse, swap market risk can spread around the globe.
AIG’s subsidiary, AIG Financial Products, brought down the company and nearly toppled the U.S. economy. How was it organized? It was run out of London – actually as a branch of a French-registered bank – though technically organized in the United States.
It was sobering evidence of how overseas risk can come crashing back to our shores to affect middle-class taxpayers, many of whom had never heard of swaps.

Swaps – developed to help manage and lower risk for commercial companies – also concentrate and heighten risk in international financial institutions. When these entities fail, as they have and surely will again, swaps can quickly spread risk across borders.
Following the crisis, when President Obama gathered together the G-20 leaders in Pittsburgh in 2009, a new consensus formed internationally. Swaps, which were basically not regulated in the United States, Japan or Europe, should now be brought into the light of regulation.

Despite different cultures, political systems and financial systems, we've made significant progress on a coordinated and harmonized international approach to reform.
In 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the historic Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). To date, the CFTC has completed 33 swaps market reforms. We are on track to finish the nearly 20 remaining reforms this year.
Japan, Europe and the largest provinces in Canada have also made substantial legislative progress on reform.

I would like to highlight the progress we're making together on transparency, clearing and margin.

Promoting transparency to the public in the swaps market is critical to both lowering the risk of the financial system, as well as to reducing costs to end users.

The CFTC has completed key transparency rules. Starting as early as September, real-time reporting to the public and to regulators will become a reality. We are nearing consideration of the final swap execution facility rule, which will bring pre-trade transparency to the marketplace.

The G-20 leaders recognized reporting to regulators is not enough. Public market transparency is critical to promoting competition and lowering risk. The Japanese and Europeans have public transparency proposals in front of their legislative bodies that would further align international reform efforts.

Clearinghouses also significantly benefit from public market transparency, as they need to mark their positions to market daily, as well as rely on liquid markets when a clearing member defaults.

While our approaches are not identical, there is a great deal of consistency among the major market jurisdictions in lowering risk by bringing standardized swaps into central clearing. We are collaborating internationally on clearinghouse rules, as well as on determinations as to which swaps must be cleared. It is my hope that the CFTC’s first clearing determinations will be put out for public comment this summer and completed this fall.

The CFTC’s determinations are likely to begin with standard interest rate swaps in U.S. dollars, Euros, British pounds and Japanese yen, as well as a number of credit default swap indices.

The CFTC is working with the Federal Reserve, the other U.S. banking regulators, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and international regulators and policymakers to align margin requirements for uncleared swaps. I think it is essential that we align these requirements globally, particularly between the major market jurisdictions. An international release on margin requirements will be put out for public comment shortly. The approach will be consistent with the approach the CFTC laid out in its margin proposal last year. We anticipate, in addition, formally reopening the comment period on our initial proposal so that we can hear further from market participants in light of the international release.

Cross-border Application of Swaps Market Reforms
Though what I've reviewed so far may have been of interest, I guess that Rich and Sally Miller invited me here today mostly to tell you how reforms will affect those of you in the international banking community.

Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, states that swaps reforms shall not apply to activities outside the United States unless those activities have “a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.”
The CFTC plans to soon put out to public comment our interpretation and related guidance on this provision to get public feedback, including from your members.
Let me touch upon how it relates to U.S. financial institutions, and then discuss how it relates to international institutions.

Recent events at JPMorgan Chase are a stark reminder of how swaps traded overseas can quickly reverberate with losses coming back into the United States.

We've seen this movie before. Financial institutions set up hundreds, if not thousands of legal entities around the globe. During a default or crisis, risk of overseas' branches and affiliates inevitably flows back into the United States.
We saw this with AIG.

We saw this with Lehman Brothers. Among Lehman Brothers’ complex web of affiliates was Lehman Brothers International (Europe) in London. When Lehman failed, this London affiliate, with more than 130,000 outstanding swaps contracts, failed as well. Who stood behind these swaps contracts? The U.S. mother ship, Lehman Brothers Holdings, had guaranteed many of them.

We saw this with Citigroup. It set up numerous structured investment vehicles (SIVs) to move positions off its balance sheet for accounting purposes, as well as to lower its regulatory capital requirements. Yet, Citigroup had guaranteed the funding of these SIVs through a mechanism called a liquidity put. When the SIVs were about to fail, Citigroup in the United States assumed the huge debt, and taxpayers later bore the brunt with two multi-billion dollar infusions. And where were these SIVs set up? They were launched out of London and incorporated in the Cayman Islands.

We saw this with Bear Stearns. Its two sinking hedge funds it bailed out in 2007 were incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Yet again, the public assumed part of the burden when Bear Stearns itself collapsed nine months later.

And remember Long-Term Capital Management? When this hedge fund failed in 1998, its swaps book totaled in excess of $1.2 trillion notional. The vast majority were booked in its affiliated partnership… in the Cayman Islands.

There are some in the financial community who want us to ignore these hard lessons of past financial institution failures.

They might tell you that swap trades booked in London branches of U.S. entities shouldn't be brought under Dodd-Frank reform.

They might tell you that affiliates, even when guaranteed by the mother ship back here in the United States, shouldn't come under Dodd-Frank reform.

They might tell you that affiliates acting as conduits for swaps activity back here shouldn't be brought under Dodd-Frank reform.

If we follow their comments, the result would be that American jobs and markets would move offshore, but, particularly in times of crisis, risk would come back to affect our economy.

So what has the CFTC staff recommended to the Commission?
First, when a foreign entity transacts in more than a de minimis level of U.S. swap dealing activity, the entity would register under the CFTC’s swap dealer registration rules.
Second, the staff recommendation includes a tiered approach for overseas swap dealer requirements. This is largely consistent with comments received from major international swap dealers. Some requirements would be considered entity-level, such as for capital, risk management, recordkeeping and reporting to swap data repositories (SDRs). Some requirements would be considered transaction-level, such as clearing, margin, real-time public reporting, trade execution and sales practices.

Third, entity-level requirements would apply to all registered swap dealers, but in certain circumstances, overseas swap dealers could meet these requirements by complying with comparable and comprehensive foreign regulatory requirements, or what we call “substituted compliance.”

Fourth, transaction-level requirements would apply to all U.S. facing transactions. For these requirements, U.S. facing transactions would include not only transactions with persons or entities operating or incorporated in the United States, but also transactions with their overseas branches. Likewise, this would include transactions with overseas affiliates that are guaranteed by a U.S. entity, as well as the overseas affiliates operating as conduits for a U.S. entity’s swap activity.
Fifth, for certain transactions between an overseas swap dealer (including a foreign swap dealer that is an affiliate of a U.S. person) and counterparties not guaranteed by or operating as conduits for U.S. entities, Dodd-Frank transaction-level requirements may not apply. For example, this would be the case for a transaction between a foreign swap dealer and a foreign insurance company not guaranteed by a U.S. person.

What does this mean for your membership?

So it means that if a legal entity has over $8 billion in market making swaps activity with U.S. market participants, it should be preparing to register as a swap dealer. For foreign financial institutions, swaps with U.S. persons or their overseas branches would count toward the de minimis threshold. In the midst of a default or a crisis, there is no satisfactory way to really separate the risk posed to a branch from being transmitted to its parent bank.

Swap dealer registration will be required two months after we finalize with the SEC the joint rule further defining the term "swap." The further definition rule is now before Commissioners at both agencies.

It means the entity would have to comply with the various Dodd-Frank provisions applicable to swap dealers, though in certain cases, this may be done through substituted compliance.

In addition to the interpretive guidance, the CFTC also is considering a release on phased compliance for foreign swap dealers. The separate release addresses comments from international and U.S. market participants. For overseas swap dealers that register with the CFTC, the release provides for phased compliance in the following manner:
Compliance with transaction-level requirements with U.S. persons and branches of U.S. persons would be required;
Entity-level requirements (other than reporting to SDRs) that might come under substituted compliance may be delayed for up to one year. During that time, the CFTC would be moving to complete the cross-border interpretive guidance and would work with market participants and foreign regulators on plans for substituted compliance; and
For overseas swap dealers, swap transactions with U.S. persons and branches of U.S. persons would be required to be reported to a SDR (or the CFTC).
The CFTC has had a long history of recognizing comparable regulations of foreign regimes. We have entered into numerous memoranda of understanding on both information sharing and supervisory coordination with our international counterparts with regard to foreign clearinghouses, exchanges and intermediaries.
Conclusion

The 2008 crisis – caused in part by swaps – was the worst financial and economic crisis Americans have experienced since the Great Depression. Eight million Americans lost their jobs, and millions of families lost their homes.

The crisis was a failure of the financial system and of financial regulation. The high levels of debt and excessive risk that contributed to the crisis continue to reverberate in Europe and the United States.

The CFTC is well over halfway to finishing critical swaps market reforms bringing transparency to this market and lowering its risk to the public. We’ve taken into account more than 30,000 comment letters, held 1,600 meetings with the public and hosted 18 roundtables. But now it's time to finish the job.

Some in the financial community have suggested that we retreat from these critical reforms. But the ever-growing financial storm clouds hanging over Europe and the lessons from the U.S. financial crisis should guide us that now is not the time to retreat from reform. Now is the time to promote transparency and protect the public.

MORTGAGE COMPANY CFO GETS 60 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR PAR TIN $2.9 BILLION FRAUD

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Friday, June 15, 2012
Former Chief Financial Officer of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Sentenced to 60 Months in Prison for Fraud Scheme
WASHINGTON – Delton de Armas, a former chief financial officer (CFO) of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (TBW), was sentenced today to 60 months in prison for his role in a more than $2.9 billion fraud scheme that contributed to the failure of TBW
.
De Armas was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia.  The sentence was announced today by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Neil H. MacBride for the Eastern District of Virginia; Christy Romero, Special Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); Assistant Director in Charge James W. McJunkin of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; David A. Montoya, Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD-OIG); Jon T. Rymer, Inspector General of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC-OIG); Steve A. Linick, Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA-OIG); and Richard Weber, Chief of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).

De Armas, 41, of Carrollton, Texas, pleaded guilty in March to one count of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud and one count of making false statements.

“For years, Mr. de Armas, the CFO of one of the country’s largest private mortgage companies, helped defraud financial institutions by concealing from them billions of dollars in losses,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer.  “His lies and deceits contributed to the devastating losses suffered by major institutional investors.  As a consequence for his crimes, he will now spend the next five years of his life behind bars.”

“As CFO, Mr. de Armas could have – and should have – put a stop to the massive fraud at TBW the moment he discovered it,” said U.S. Attorney MacBride. “Instead, he and others lied for years on end to investors, banks, regulators and auditors and caused more than $2.4 billion in losses to major financial institutions.”

“Rather than blow the whistle on billions of dollars in fraud, de Armas chose to help conceal it,” said Special Inspector General Romero.  “This CFO lied to investors, banks, regulators and auditors to cover up the massive fraud scheme which resulted in the failure of both TBW and Colonial Bank.  The court’s decision to sentence de Armas to five years in prison reflects the seriousness of his role as a gatekeeper within TBW and the contribution of his crime to our nation’s financial crisis.”

“The actions of Mr. De Armas and others resulted in the loss of billions of dollars to major financial institutions,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin.  “Today’s sentence serves as a warning to anyone who attempts to take advantage of investors and our banking system.  Together with our law enforcement partners, the FBI will pursue justice for anyone involved in such fraudulent schemes.”

According to court documents, de Armas joined TBW in 2000 as its CFO and reported directly to its chairman, Lee Bentley Farkas, and later to its CEO, Paul Allen.  He previously admitted in court that from 2005 through August 2009, he and other co-conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud financial institutions that had invested in a wholly-owned lending facility called Ocala Funding.  Ocala Funding obtained funds for mortgage lending for TBW from the sale of asset-backed commercial paper to financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas. The facility was managed by TBW and had no employees of its own.

According to court records, shortly after Ocala Funding was established, de Armas learned there were inadequate assets backing its commercial paper, a deficiency referred to internally at TBW as a “hole” in Ocala Funding.  De Armas knew that the hole grew over time to more than $700 million.  He learned from the CEO that the hole was more than $1.5 billion at the time of TBW’s collapse.  De Armas admitted he was aware that, in an effort to cover up the hole and mislead investors, a subordinate who reported to him had falsified Ocala Funding collateral reports and periodically sent the falsified reports to financial institution investors in Ocala Funding and to other third parties.  De Armas acknowledged that he and the CEO also deceived investors by providing them with a false explanation for the hole in Ocala Funding.

De Armas also previously admitted in court that he directed a subordinate to inflate an account receivable balance for loan participations in TBW’s financial statements.  De Armas acknowledged that he knew that the falsified financial statements were subsequently provided to Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac for their determination on the renewal of TBW’s authority to sell and service securities issued by them.

In addition, de Armas admitted in court to aiding and abetting false statements in a letter the CEO sent to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, through Ginnie Mae, regarding TBW’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year ending on March 31, 2009.  De Armas reviewed and edited the letter, knowing it contained material omissions.  The letter omitted that the delay in submitting the financial data was caused by concerns its independent auditor had raised about the financing relationship between TBW and Colonial Bank and its request that TBW retain a law firm to conduct an internal investigation.  Instead, the letter falsely attributed the delay to a new acquisition and TBW’s switch to a compressed 11-month fiscal year.

“We are pleased to have joined our law enforcement colleagues in bringing Mr. de Armas to justice,” said Inspector General Rymer.  “The former Chief Financial Officer’s actions contributed to one of the largest bank frauds in the country and led to the demise of TBW.  His punishment, along with the earlier sentencings of other co-conspirators involved in the Colonial Bank and TBW scheme, sends a clear message that those who abuse their positions of trust and seek to undermine the integrity of the financial services industry will be held accountable.  We will continue to pursue such cases in the interest of ensuring the safety and soundness of our Nation’s banks and the strength of the financial services industry as a whole.”

“Delton de Armas was a key player in the TBW fraud; the significant sentence of 60 months handed down today appropriately takes that role into account,” said Inspector General Linick.

In April 2011, a jury in the Eastern District of Virginia found Lee Bentley Farkas, the chairman of TBW, guilty of 14 counts of conspiracy, bank, securities and wire fraud.  On June 30, 2011, Judge Brinkema sentenced Farkas to 30 years in prison.  In addition, six individuals have pleaded guilty for their roles in the fraud scheme, including: Paul Allen, former chief executive officer of TBW, who was sentenced to 40 months in prison; Raymond Bowman, former president of TBW, who was sentenced to 30 months in prison; Desiree Brown, former treasurer of TBW, who was sentenced to six years in prison; Catherine Kissick, former senior vice president of Colonial Bank and head of its Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division (MWLD), who was sentenced to eight years in prison; Teresa Kelly, former operations supervisor for Colonial Bank’s MWLD, who was sentenced to three months in prison; and Sean Ragland, a former senior financial analyst at TBW, who was sentenced to three months in prison.

The case is being prosecuted by Deputy Chief Patrick Stokes and Trial Attorney Robert Zink of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles Connolly and Paul Nathanson of the Eastern District of Virginia.  This case was investigated by SIGTARP, FBI’s Washington Field Office, FDIC OIG, HUD OIG, FHFA OIG and the IRS Criminal Investigation.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of the Treasury also provided support in the investigation.  The Department would also like to acknowledge the substantial assistance of the SEC in the investigation of the fraud scheme.

This prosecution was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

PONZI SCHEME PROMOTERS ORDERED TO PAY $20 MILLION IN DISGORGEMENT AND PENALTIES

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
June 13, 2012
Promoters of Convicted Ponzi Scheme Operator Jeffrey L. Mowen Ordered to Pay Over $20 Million in Disgorgement and Civil Penalties
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that on June 11, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted its motion for entry of final judgment against Thomas R. Fry, Bevan J. Wilde, Gary W. Hansen, Michael G. Butcher, James B. Mooring, and Michael W. Averett ordering disgorgement and civil penalties totaling over $20 million. Previously, pursuant to stipulation, the court entered permanent injunctions against these defendants enjoining them from future violations of the federal securities laws. The SEC Complaint alleged that these defendants acted as promoters for a Ponzi scheme operated by Jeffrey L. Mowen, who is currently serving a 10-year prison term for his actions. The Complaint alleged that the promoters raised millions of dollars through the unregistered offer and sale of high-yield promissory notes to over 150 investors in several states. The funds raised were then funneled to Mowen through Thomas Fry, who used the funds for his personal benefit, misappropriating over $8 million.

The Court ordered that the defendants disgorge the following amounts of ill-gotten gains and civil penalties, respectively: Thomas Fry - $16,751,439.94 and $250,000; Bevan Wilde - $1,326,241.77 and $130,000; James Mooring - $505,521.84 and $130,000; Michael Averett - $774,936.02 and $130,000; Gary Hansen - $349,481.33 and $130,000; Michael Butcher - $201,278.11 and $130,000.

The Court also granted, in part, the Commission's motion for summary judgment against defendant and promoter David G. Bartholomew. The Court granted summary judgment against Bartholomew for violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 for the offer and sale of unregistered securities and of Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for acting as an unregistered broker-dealer. The Court found issues of material fact concerning materiality and scienter as to misrepresentations Bartholomew made to investors and thus denied summary judgment for violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Those claims should be scheduled for trial later this year.

SOMETIMES WE GET WHAT WE NEED. ALLEN STANFORD NEEDS 110 YEARS IN PRISON

FROM:  U.S. DEPARMENT OF JUSTICE
 Thursday, June 14, 2012
Allen Stanford Sentenced to 110 Years in Prison for Orchestrating $7 Billion Investment Fraud Scheme
WASHINGTON – R. Allen Stanford, the former board of directors chairman of Stanford International Bank (SIB), was sentenced today in Houston to a total of 110 years in prison for orchestrating a 20-year investment fraud scheme in which he misappropriated $7 billion from SIB to finance his personal businesses.

The sentencing was announced by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Kenneth Magidson of the Southern District of Texas; FBI Assistant Director Kevin Perkins of the Criminal Investigative Division; Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Employee Benefits Security Administration Phyllis C. Borzi; Chief Postal Inspector Guy J. Cottrell; and Richard Weber, Chief of Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).

On March 6, 2012, Stanford, 62, was convicted on 13 of 14 counts by a federal jury following a six-week trial and approximately three days of deliberation.  The jury also found that 29 financial accounts located abroad and worth approximately $330 million were proceeds of Stanford’s fraud and should be forfeited.

Stanford was sentenced by U.S. District Judge David Hittner.  After considering all the evidence, including more than 350 victim impact letters that were sent to the court, Judge Hittner sentenced Stanford to 20 years for conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, 20 years on each of the four counts of wire fraud as well as five years for conspiring to obstruct a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation and five years for obstruction of an SEC investigation.  Those sentences will all run consecutively.  He also received 20 years for each of the five counts of mail fraud and 20 years for conspiracy to commit money laundering which will run concurrent to the other sentences imposed today for a total sentence of 110 years.

As part of Stanford’s sentence, the court also imposed a personal money judgment of $5.9 billion, which is an ongoing obligation for Stanford to pay back the criminal proceeds.  The court found that it would be impracticable to issue a restitution order at this time.  However, all forfeited funds recovered by the United States will be returned to the fraud victims and credited against Stanford’s money judgment.

According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, the vehicle for Stanford’s fraud was SIB, an offshore bank owned by Stanford and based in Antigua and Barbuda that sold certificates of deposit (CDs) to depositors.  Stanford began operating the bank in 1985 in Montserrat, the British West Indies, under the name Guardian International Bank.  He moved the bank to Antigua in 1990 and changed its name to Stanford International Bank in 1994.  SIB issued CDs that typically paid a premium over interest rates on CDs issued by U.S. banks.  By 2008, the bank owed its CD depositors more than $8 billion.
According to SIB’s annual reports and marketing brochures, the bank purportedly invested CD proceeds in highly conservative, marketable securities that were also highly liquid, meaning the bank could sell its assets and repay depositors very quickly.  The bank also represented that all of its assets were globally diversified and overseen by money managers at top-tier financial institutions, with an additional level of oversight by SIB analysts based in Memphis, Tenn.

As shown at trial, this purported investment strategy and management of the bank’s assets was followed for only about 10-15 percent of the bank’s assets.  Stanford diverted billions in depositor funds into various companies that he owned personally, in the form of undisclosed “loans.”  Stanford was thus able to continue the operations of his personal businesses, which ran at a net loss each year totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, at the expense of depositors.  These businesses were concentrated primarily in the Caribbean and included restaurants, a cricket tournament and various real estate projects.  Evidence at trial established Stanford also used the misappropriated CD money to finance a lavish lifestyle, which included a 112-foot yacht and support vessels, six private planes and gambling trips to Las Vegas.

According to evidence presented at trial, Stanford continued the scheme by using sales from new CDs to pay existing depositors who redeemed their CDs.  In 2008, when the financial crisis caused a slump in new CD sales and record redemptions, Stanford lied about personally investing $741 million in additional funds into the bank to strengthen its capital base.  To support that false announcement, Stanford’s internal accountants inflated on paper the value of a piece of real estate SIB had purchased for $63.5 million earlier in 2008 by 5,000 percent to $3.1 billion, despite the fact there were no independent appraisals or improvements to the property.  
           
The trial evidence also showed that Stanford perpetuated his fraud by paying bribes from a Swiss slush fund at Societe Generale to C.A.S. Hewlett, SIB’s auditor (now deceased), and Leroy King, the then-head of the Antiguan Financial Services Regulatory Commission.
           
In addition to Stanford, a grand jury in the Southern District of Texas previously indicted several of his alleged co-conspirators, including: James Davis, the former chief financial officer; Laura Holt, the former chief investment officer; Gil Lopez, the former chief accounting officer; Mark Kuhrt, the former controller; and King.  Davis has pleaded guilty and faces up to 30 years in prison under the terms of his plea agreement.  The trial of Holt, Kuhrt and Lopez, which was severed from Stanford’s trial, is scheduled to begin before Judge Hittner on Sept. 10, 2012.  They are presumed innocent unless and until convicted through due process of law.

The investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Houston Field Office, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, IRS-CI and the U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration.  The case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief William Stellmach and Trial Attorney Andrew Warren of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and former Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Gregg Costa of the Southern District of Texas.  AUSA Kristine Rollinson of the Southern District of Texas and Trial Attorney Kondi Kleinman of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division assisted with the forfeiture proceeding, and AUSA Jason Varnado and Fraud Section Deputy Chief Jeffrey Goldberg assisted with the sentencing proceeding.

The Justice Department also wishes to thank several countries for their ongoing cooperation during the investigation and prosecution of Stanford and his co-conspirators, including the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Switzerland, the Cook Islands, the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man.