SEC CHARGES PAIR OF HEDGE FUND MANAGERS WITH LYING

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Oct. 3, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission separately charged a pair of hedge fund managers and their firms with lying to investors about how they were handling the money invested in their respective hedge funds. The charges are the latest in a series of actions taken by the SEC Enforcement Division and its Asset Management Unit against hedge fund-related misconduct in the markets.

In one case, the SEC alleges that San Francisco-based hedge fund manager Hausmann-Alain Banet and his firm Lion Capital Management stole more than a half-million dollars from a retired schoolteacher who thought she was investing her retirement savings in Banet’s hedge fund. In the other case, the SEC charged Chicago-based hedge fund managers Norman Goldstein and Laurie Gatherum and their firm GEI Financial Services with fraudulently siphoning at least $147,000 in excessive fees and capital withdrawals from a hedge fund they managed.

Since the beginning of 2010, the SEC has filed more than 100 cases involving hedge fund malfeasance such as misusing investor assets, lying about investment strategy or performance, charging excessive fees, or hiding conflicts of interest. The SEC issued an investor bulletin detailing some of those cases as examples of why investors must rigorously evaluate a hedge fund investment before making one.

"These hedge fund frauds have lured even the most sophisticated investors using the siren song of outsized returns or secured and guaranteed investments," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "As fraudsters increasingly capitalize on the cachet of hedge funds, we will maintain our strong presence in policing this industry."

In the past few weeks alone, the SEC has charged an Atlanta-based private fund manager and his firm with defrauding investors in a purported "fund-of-funds" and then trying to hide trading losses, charged a hedge fund adviser in Oregon with running a $37 million Ponzi scheme through several hedge funds he managed, and charged a New York-based hedge fund manager who touted a diversified and controlled-risk investment strategy for his fund while in reality misusing investor assets to prop up a failing private company. The New York-based fund manager also failed to disclose conflicts of interest, and he falsely overstated his firm’s assets under management in various magazine articles he authored.

"The most serious hedge fund frauds involve advisers who play fast and loose with investor money," said Bruce Karpati, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. "Investors can complement the SEC’s vigilant enforcement against hedge fund misconduct by becoming increasingly wary of hedge fund managers who boast extreme performance measures and asking well-informed questions about investment strategy, fees, and potential conflicts of interest."

According to the SEC’s complaint filed against Banet and Lion Capital Management in federal court in San Francisco, Banet led the teacher to believe that his hedge fund would invest in the stock market using a long/short equity investing strategy. Instead, Banet brazenly took the teacher’s investment totaling $550,000 and used it to pay unauthorized personal and business expenses, including his home mortgage, office rent, and staff salaries. Banet also provided phony account statements showing non-existent investment gains and listing an independent administrator that performed no actual work for the fund.

In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California today announced criminal charges against Banet. The SEC acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

According to the SEC’s complaint against Goldstein, Gatherum, and GEI Financial Services filed in federal court in Chicago, investors in the hedge fund were not told that its adviser removed various performance hurdles when calculating fees. Furthermore, inappropriate capital withdrawals were made from the fund. Goldstein, Gatherum, and their firm never told their advisory clients that Illinois regulators had stripped Goldstein of his securities registrations in 2011, barring him from providing investment advisory services in the state. But even after losing his registration status, Goldstein continued to make all investment decisions on behalf of clients, and he and Gatherum caused GEI Financial Services to violate compliance rules applicable to SEC-registered investment advisers.

The SEC’s investigation of Lion Capital Management was conducted by Sahil Desai and Robert Leach of the Asset Management Unit in the San Francisco Regional Office. John Yun is leading the SEC’s litigation. The SEC’s investigation of GEI Financial Services – which stemmed from an Asset Management Unit initiative to detect misconduct by pursuing registered investment advisers with repeated compliance examination deficiencies – was conducted by Andrew Shoenthal, Jeson Patel, Malinda Pileggi, Vanessa Horton, and Paul Montoya of the Chicago Regional Office. John E. Birkenheier is leading the litigation.

The SEC’s investor bulletin on hedge funds was prepared by the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy. It recommends that investors understand a hedge fund’s investment strategy and its use of leverage and speculative techniques before making the investment. It also explains the need to evaluate a hedge fund manager’s potential conflicts of interest and take other steps to research those managing the fund.

"Hedge fund investments generally perform differently, involve higher fees and less liquidity, and may carry greater investment and fraud risk than the mutual funds that investors are accustomed to," said Lori J. Schock, Director of the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy. "This investor bulletin describes the rigorous due diligence steps that financially-qualified investors should consider before making any hedge fund investment."

SEC REPORT ON BROKER-DEALER HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, DC, Sept. 27, 2012 –The Securities and Exchange Commission today issued a staff report intended to help broker-dealers safeguard confidential information from misuse, such as insider trading. The report by the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) describes strengths and weaknesses identified in examinations into how broker-dealers keep material nonpublic information from being misused.

This report should help broker-dealers assess the effectiveness of their controls over sensitive information," said OCIE Director Carlo di Florio. "The report illustrates the types of conflicts of interest that may arise between a broker-dealer’s obligations to clients that provide confidential information for business purposes and the potential misuse of such information for insider trading or other improper ends. It also describes various methods that broker-dealers use to identify and effectively manage such conflicts, including information barriers that limit the flow of sensitive information."

Conflicts of interest and other issues of concern raised by the report include:
A significant amount of informal, undocumented interaction occurred between groups that have material nonpublic information and internal and external groups with sales and trading responsibilities that might profit from the misuse of such material nonpublic information
At some broker-dealers, a senior executive might have access to material nonpublic information from one business unit while overseeing a different unit that could potentially profit from misuse of that information, with few if any restrictions or monitoring to prevent such misuse
Some broker-dealers did not have risk controls to address certain business units that possess material nonpublic information such as sales, trading or research personnel who receive confidential information for business purposes; institutional and retail customers or asset management affiliates with access to material nonpublic information, or firm personnel who receive information through business activities outside of investment banking, such as participation in bankruptcy committees or through employees serving on the boards of directors of public companies.
The report also highlights effective practices that examiners observed at some broker-dealers, such as:
Broker-dealers sometimes adopted processes that differentiate between types of material nonpublic information based on the nature of the information or where it originated. In some cases, broker-dealers create tailored "exception" reports that take into account the different characteristics of the information
Some broker-dealers expanded reviews for potential misuse of confidential information to include trading in credit default swaps, equity or total return swaps, loans, components of pooled securities such as unit investment trusts and exchange traded funds, warrants, and bond options
Broker-dealers often considered electronic sources of confidential information and instituted monitoring to identify which employees had accessed the information
Broker-dealers often monitored access rights for key cards and computer networks to confirm that only authorized personnel had access to sensitive areas.
The types of issues identified in this report may be helpful to firms as they review their conflict of interest risk management programs. In particular, in any review of information barriers control programs, broker-dealers should be alert to changes in business practices and available compliance tools.

FOUR CHARGED BY SEC WITH USING HIDDEN MARKUPS AND MARKDOWNS

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Washington, D.C., Oct. 5, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged four brokers who formerly worked on the cash desk at a New York-based broker-dealer with illegally overcharging customers $18.7 million by using hidden markups and markdowns and secretly keeping portions of profitable customer trades.

The SEC alleges that the brokers purported to charge customers very low commission fees that were typically pennies or fractions of pennies per transaction, but in reality they were reporting false prices when executing the orders to purchase and sell securities on behalf of their customers. The brokers made their scheme especially difficult to detect because they deceptively charged the markups and markdowns during times of market volatility in order to conceal the fraudulent nature of the prices they were reporting to their customers. The surreptitiously embedded markups and markdowns ranged from a few dollars to $228,000 and involved more than 36,000 transactions during a four-year period. Some fees were altered by more than 1000 percent of what was being told to customers.

The SEC further alleges that when a customer placed a limit order seeking to purchase shares at a specified maximum price, the brokers filled the order at the customer’s limit price but used opportune times to sell a portion of that order back to the market to obtain a secret profit for the firm. They falsely reported back to the customer that they could not fill the order at the limit price. Meanwhile, the brokers made millions of dollars in illicit performance bonuses based on the fraudulent earnings they were generating on the cash desk.

The brokers charged in the SEC’s complaint are Marek Leszczynski, Benjamin Chouchane, Gregory Reyftmann, and Henry Condron.

"These brokers stole millions of dollars by overcharging customers for trades involving stocks with high trading volumes and price volatility, which are characteristics they wrongly thought would conceal their illicit pricing scheme," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "They underestimated the SEC’s ability and resolve to pursue such illegal schemes."
In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Leszczynski and Chouchane. Condron has pled guilty to criminal charges.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, the brokers were employed at an interdealer broker firm. Interdealer brokers typically operate only as agents and execute large volumes of securities trades on behalf of customers for low commissions. The cash desk where these brokers worked executed trades in U.S. and Canadian stocks, and customers were primarily large foreign institutions and foreign banks. The firm’s internal records show that customers were to be charged flat commission rates between $0.005 and $0.02 per share.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that the scheme spanned from 2005 to 2009. Reyftmann, Chouchane, and Leszczynski were sales brokers on the cash desk who were responsible for finding customers, developing relationships, and taking orders from customers. Reyftmann supervised the cash desk. Condron was a sales trader and middle-office assistant on the cash desk who entered orders received from the sales brokers and ensured the orders were executed.

The SEC alleges that the fraudulent scheme worked as follows:
Leszczynski, Chouchane, or Reyftmann received a customer order by phone, instant message, or e-mail and gave the order to Condron, who executed the trade.
Condron recorded the actual execution price on the trade blotter and informed the sales brokers of the execution.
Shortly after the trade was executed, Leszczynski, Chouchane, or Reyftmann examined other market executions around the time of the actual execution to determine whether the stock price fluctuated.
If the stock price’s fluctuation was favorable to the firm and sufficient to conceal the fraud from customers, the sales brokers instructed Condron to record a false execution price in the gross price field on their internal trade blotter.
Leszczynski, Chouchane, Reyftmann, or Condron then reported the false execution price and the commission to the customers.
The SEC alleges that the brokers further defrauded customers by stealing portions of their profitable trades and keeping them for the firm:
After receiving and executing a customer’s limit order to buy shares, Reyftmann, Chouchane, or Leszczynski looked for an opportunity to sell that same stock at a higher price than the price at which the customer’s trade was executed.
Leszczynski, Chouchane, or Reyftmann then instructed Condron to sell a portion of that customer execution back at the higher price.
Rather than properly recording the actual price and quantity of the order fill, Condron entered a partial fill into the trade blotter, keeping the secret profits for the firm.
Leszczynski, Chouchane, Reyftmann, or Condron then reported a partial fill to the customer, falsely stating that they were unable to fully execute the customer’s limit order.
Meanwhile, the SEC alleges that the brokers’ scheme enriched not only the firm but themselves as well. The four brokers received substantial performance bonuses totaling more than $15.6 million based, in part, on the fraudulent earnings generated by the cash desk.

The SEC alleges that Leszczynski, Chouchane, Reyftmann, and Condron violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The SEC is seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, financial penalties, and a permanent injunction against the brokers.

The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Mary P. Hansen (Assistant Director in the Market Abuse Unit in the Philadelphia Regional Office), A. Kristina Littman (Senior Counsel in the Philadelphia office) and Darren Boerner (Specialist in the Market Abuse Unit in the Chicago Regional Office). G. Jeffrey Boujoukos (Regional Trial Counsel) and John V. Donnelly (Senior Trial Counsel) in the Philadelphia office are handling the litigation.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

TIPS ON SELECTING FINANCIAL PROFESSIONAL

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Investor Bulletin: Top Tips for Selecting a Financial Professional


Choosing a financial professional-whether a stockbroker, a financial planner, or an investment adviser-is an important decision. Consider the tips below as you make your choice. Also the third page of this document has a list of questions you can ask a financial professional whose services you are considering.

Tip 1. Do your homework and ask questions.

A lot of the information you’ll need to make a choice will be in the documents the financial professional can provide you about opening an account or starting a relationship. You should read them carefully. If you don’t understand something, ask questions until you do. It’s your money and you should feel comfortable asking about it.

Tip 2. Find out whether the products and services available are right for you.

Financial professionals offer a range of financial and investment services such as:
Financial planning
Ongoing money management
Advice on choosing securities
Tax and retirement planning
Insurance advice
Just like a grocery store offers more products than a convenience store, some financial professionals offer a wide range of products or services, while others offer a more limited selection. Think about what you might need, and ask about what would be available to you. For example, do you want or need:

Access to a broad range of securities, such as stocks, options and bonds, or will you mostly want a few types such as mutual funds, exchange traded funds, or insurance products?
A one-time review or financial plan?
To do your own research, but use the financial professional to make your trades or to provide a second opinion occasionally?
A recommendation each time you think about changing or making an investment?
Ongoing investment management, with the financial professional getting your permission before any purchase or sale is made?
Ongoing investment management, where the financial professional decides what purchases or sales are made, and you are told about it afterwards?
Tip 3. Understand how you’ll pay for services and products, and how your financial professional gets paid as well.

Many firms offer more than one type of account. You may be able to pay for services differently depending on the type of account you choose. For example, you might pay:
An hourly fee for advisory services;
A flat fee, such as $500 per year, for an annual portfolio review or $2,000 for a financial plan;
A commission on the securities bought or sold, such as $12 per trade;
A fee (sometimes called a "load") based on the amount you invest in a mutual fund or variable annuity
A "mark-up" when you buy "house" products (such as bonds that the broker holds in inventory), or a "mark-down" when you sell them
Depending on what services you want, one type of account may cost you less than another. Ask about what alternatives make sense for you.
And remember: even if you don’t pay the financial professional directly, such as through an annual fee, that person is still getting paid. For example, someone else may be paying the financial professional for selling specific products. However, those payments may be built into the costs you ultimately pay, such as the expenses associated with buying or holding a financial product.

While some of these fees may seem small, it is important to keep in mind that they can add up, and in the end take away from the profits you otherwise could be making from your investments.

Tip 4. Ask about the financial professional’s experience and credentials.

Financial professionals hold different licenses. For example, financial professionals who are broker-dealers must take an exam to hold a license, while state regulators often require investment advisers to hold certain licenses. Financial professionals also have a wide range of educational and professional backgrounds. They may also have certain designations after their names, which are titles given by industry groups that themselves are not regulated or subject to standards other than their own. If a financial professional has an industry designation, like "CFA," you can look up what it stands for at the "Understanding Investment Professional Designations" page on FINRA’s website at www.finra.org. Don’t accept a professional designation as a badge of knowledge without knowing what it means.

Tip 5. Ask the financial professional if he or she has had a disciplinary history with a government regulator or had customer complaints.
Even if a close friend or relative has recommended a financial professional, you should check the person’s background for signs of any potential problems, such as a disciplinary history by a regulator or customer complaints. The SEC, FINRA, and state securities regulators keep records on the disciplinary history of many of the financial professionals they regulate.
Check the background of your financial professional to learn more or to help confirm what he or she has told you:
For financial professionals who are brokers: you can find background information on the person and his/her firm at FINRA’s BrokerCheck website.
For financial professionals who are investment advisers registered with the SEC: you can find background information on the person and his/her firm at the SEC’s Investment Adviser Public Disclosure database.
State securities regulators also have background information on brokers as well as certain investment advisers. You can find your state regulator at www.nasaa.org.

Investor Checklist
Some Key Questions for Hiring a Financial Professional

Expectations of the Relationship
How often should I expect to hear from you?
How often will you review my account or make recommendations to me?
If my investments aren’t doing well, will you call me and recommend something else?
If I invest with you, how can I keep track of how well my investments are doing?
Experience and Background
What experience do you have, especially with people like me? What percentage of your time would you estimate that you spend on people with situations and goals that are similar to mine?
What education have you had that relates to your work?
What professional licenses do you hold?
Are you registered with the SEC, a state securities regulator, or FINRA?
How long have you done this type of work?
Have you ever been disciplined by a regulator? If yes, what was the problem and how was it resolved?
Have you had customer complaints? If yes, how many, what were they about, and how were they resolved?
Products
What type of products do you offer?
How many different products do you offer?
Do you offer "house" products? If so, what types of products are they, and do you receive any incentives for selling these products, or for maintaining them in a customer’s account? What kind of incentives are they?
Payments and Fees
Given my situation and what I’m looking for, what is the [best / most cost effective] way for me to pay for financial services? Why?
What are the fees that I will pay for products and services?
How and when will I see the fees I pay?
Which of those fees will I pay directly (such as a commission on a stock trade) and which are taken directly from the products I own (such as some mutual fund expenses)
How do you get paid?
If I invested $1000 with you today, approximately how much would you get paid during the following year, based on my investment?
Does someone else (such as a fund company) pay you for offering or selling these products or services?

PONZI FRAUD FOR SENIORS

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SEC Brings Charges in $42 Million Offering Fraud Targeting Seniors

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced charges against Bradley A. Holcom, of Welches, Oregon, and Jose L. Pinedo, of San Diego, California, in connection with a fraudulent scheme that sold $42 million of promissory notes to more than 150 investors located across the United States, many of whom are senior citizens.

According to the complaint against Holcom, he lured investors by offering them guaranteed monthly interest payments on purportedly safe deals. He promised that their funds would be used to finance the development of specific pieces of real estate, and that each investment would be fully secured. In reality, the investments were unsecured, and the same piece of underlying property was often pledged as purported collateral on numerous investors’ promissory notes.

In addition to his misrepresentations, the complaint alleges that Holcom was also running a classic Ponzi scheme. While Holcom used some of the investors’ money to develop real estate, he also relied on those funds to make interest and principal payments on promissory notes as they came due. Holcom also used investor funds for personal use and on unrelated business ventures. By 2008, as the real estate market declined, Holcom’s scheme collapsed. Investors lost principal in excess of $25 million.

The Commission also alleges that Pinedo, who served as Holcom’s bookkeeper and as an officer or manager of Holcom’s numerous corporate entities, routinely signed promissory notes and other false and misleading documents that were sent to investors.

The Commission alleges that Holcom violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The Commission is seeking a permanent injunction, disgorgement plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and civil penalties against Holcom. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission’s complaint against him, Pinedo has agreed to settle the matter, and consented to a final judgment enjoining him from violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act.

DARK POOL OPERATOR AGREES TO PAY $800,000 PENALTY

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Oct. 3, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Boston-based dark pool operator eBX LLC with failing to protect the confidential trading information of its subscribers and failing to disclose to all subscribers that it allowed an outside firm to use their confidential trading information.

According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding, eBX operates the alternative trading system LeveL ATS, which it calls a "dark pool" trading program. Dark pools do not display quotations to the public, meaning that investors who subscribe to a dark pool have access to potential trade opportunities that other investors using public markets do not. eBX inaccurately informed its subscribers that their flow of orders to buy or sell securities would be kept confidential and not shared outside of LeveL. eBX instead allowed an outside technology firm to use information about LeveL subscribers’ unexecuted orders for its own business purposes. The outside firm’s separate order routing business therefore received an information advantage over other LeveL subscribers because it was able to use its knowledge of their orders to make routing decisions for its own customers’ orders and increase its execution rate. eBX had insufficient safeguards and procedures to protect subscribers’ confidential trading information.

eBX agreed to pay an $800,000 penalty to settle the charges.

"Dark pools are dark for a reason: buyers and sellers expect confidentiality of their trading information," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "Many eBX subscribers didn’t get the benefit of that bargain – they were unaware that another order routing system was given exclusive access to trading information that it used for its own benefit."

According to the SEC’s order, eBX and the outside firm it hired to run LeveL signed a subscription agreement in February 2008, after which the outside firm’s separate order routing business began to use certain LeveL subscribers’ confidential trading data. In November 2008, eBX signed a new agreement with the outside firm that allowed its order routing business to remember and use all LeveL subscribers’ unexecuted order information. As a result of the agreements, the outside firm’s order routing business began to fill far more of its orders than other LeveL users did. Its order router also knew how other eBX subscribers’ orders in LeveL were priced and could use that information to determine whether to route orders to LeveL or another venue based on where it knew it might get a better price for its own customers’ orders.

According to the SEC’s order, eBX failed to disclose in required SEC filings that it allowed LeveL subscribers’ unexecuted order information to be shared outside of LeveL.

In addition to the $800,000 penalty, eBX was censured and ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing further violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws regulating alternative trading systems.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Mark Gera, James Goldman, Kathleen Shields, and Dawn Edick in the SEC’s Boston Regional Office. Mr. Gera led the related examination with assistance from Paul D’Amico and Rhonda Wilson under the supervision of Associate Regional Director Lucile Corkery.