THE INSIDE TRADER FRIENDS

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three health care company employees and four others in a New Jersey-based insider trading ring of various high school friends generating $1.7 million in illegal profits and kickbacks by trading in advance of 11 public announcements involving mergers, a drug approval application, and quarterly earnings of pharmaceutical companies and medical technology firms.

The SEC alleges that Celgene Corporation's director of financial reporting John Lazorchak, Sanofi S.A.'s director of accounting and reporting Mark S. Cupo, and Stryker Corporation's marketing employee Mark D. Foldy each illegally tipped confidential information about their companies for the purpose of insider trading. Typically the nonpublic information involved upcoming mergers or acquisitions, but Lazorchak also tipped confidential details about Celgene's quarterly earnings and the status of a Celgene application to expand the use of its drug Revlimid. The trading was carefully orchestrated so there was usually someone acting solely as a non-trading middleman who received the nonpublic information from the insider and tipped others. They hoped to avoid detection with no direct connection between the insiders and the traders, and the insiders were later compensated for the inside information with cash payments made in installments to avoid any scrutiny of large cash withdrawals.

The SEC alleges that Cupo's friend Michael Castelli along with Lawrence Grum, who attended high school with Castelli, were the primary traders in the scheme. Among the ways that Castelli and Grum tried to hide their illegal conduct was by compiling binders of research to serve as a false basis for their trading. They actively traded in Celgene securities to create a pattern of long-standing positions in the stock. Grum reassured Cupo that discovery of the scheme and consequent legal action was unlikely due to limited government resources to police insider trading activity. Grum said, "At the end of the day, the SEC's got to pick their battle because they have a limited number of people and a huge number of investors to go after."

Daniel M. Hawke, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division's Market Abuse Unit and Director of the Philadelphia Regional Office, said, "This is yet another case where wrongdoers believed they could outsmart investigators by creating an elaborate smokescreen to hide their insider trading. Such tactics as using middlemen to pass inside information and compiling research to falsely justify illegal trades will not prevent lawbreakers from getting caught."

The other two traders charged are Lazorchak's high school friends Michael T. Pendolino and James N. Deprado, who now live in New Hampshire and Virginia respectively. The others live in New Jersey. In a parallel criminal action, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey today announced criminal charges against Lazorchak, Cupo, Foldy, Castelli, Grum, and Pendolino.

According to the SEC's complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, the scheme began in late 2007 when Lazorchak and Cupo, who were friends and colleagues at Sanofi, discussed Lazorchak's new position at Celgene where he'd have access to nonpublic information about mergers and acquisitions. Lazorchak told Cupo that he was initially working on Celgene's possible acquisition of another pharmaceutical company, Pharmion. Cupo discussed Lazorchak's position with Castelli, a friend with whom he attends winemaking club meetings. Castelli brought in Grum, who he considered a sophisticated trader with knowledge of the securities industry. Castelli and Grum devised the scheme in which Lazorchak tipped Cupo with nonpublic Celgene-related information. Cupo, as the middleman, tipped Castelli and Grum so they could illegally trade. Castelli and Grum paid Cupo for his tips, and gave Cupo money to pass along to Lazorchak for the initial tips. Lazorchak never knew the identities of Castelli or Grum, but was aware that Cupo was passing confidential Celgene information to other traders.

The SEC alleges that Lazorchak's high school friend Foldy entered the scheme in 2007, when Lazorchak tipped him with confidential details about the impending merger between Celgene and Pharmion, and Foldy illegally traded on the information prior to the public announcement of the deal. Lazorchak and Foldy devised and used code phrases while conversing to identify instances when Lazorchak was passing inside information or Foldy was seeking more details. After the illegal trading occurred and Foldy obtained illicit profits of $14,500, Lazorchak repeatedly demanded that Foldy compensate him for the inside information. Foldy ultimately paid Lazorchak at least $500 and later returned the favor with illegal tips of confidential information about a tender offer involving his employer, Stryker Corp. Lazorchak acted as a middleman and did not trade, instead tipping Pendolino so he could trade on the nonpublic information. Pendolino in turn tipped Deprado, who also traded. Lazorchak additionally tipped Cupo, who did not trade but acted as a middleman and tipped Castelli and Grum, who both traded.

The SEC alleges that Cupo began tipping inside information about his employer in late 2009, when he learned that Sanofi was planning to announce a tender offer to acquire another pharmaceutical company, Chattem Inc. Cupo learned of the imminent tender offer a few days prior to the public announcement, he tipped Castelli and Grum with the confidential details, and they both traded on the nonpublic information.

The SEC alleges that each of the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 thereunder and that Castelli and Grum violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC is seeking permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, financial penalties, and officer and director bars for Lazorchak, Cupo, and Foldy.

The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Colleen K. Lynch, David W. Snyder and John S. Rymas, who are members of the Market Abuse Unit in the SEC's Philadelphia office. G. Jeffrey Boujoukos and Catherine E. Pappas are handling the litigation.

The SEC brought this enforcement action in coordination with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey. The SEC also appreciates the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and the Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority.

THE 3000: WHISTLEBLOWER TIPS TO THE U.S. SEC

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2012 — Over the past year, the Securities and Exchange Commission received more than 3,000 whistleblower tips from all 50 states and from 49 countries, according to the agency's 2012 Annual Report on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program released today.

The report, which is required by the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, summarizes the activities of the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower.

"In just its first year, the whistleblower program already has proven to be a valuable tool in helping us ferret out financial fraud," said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. "When insiders provide us with high-quality road maps of fraudulent wrongdoing, it reduces the length of time we spend investigating and saves the agency substantial resources."

Among other things, the report notes:

The SEC made its first award under the new program to a whistleblower who helped the SEC stop an ongoing multi-million dollar fraud. The whistleblower received an award of 30 percent of the amount collected in the SEC's enforcement action, which is the maximum percentage payout allowed by law.
The SEC received 3,001 tips, complaints, and referrals from whistleblowers from individuals in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico as well as 49 countries outside of the United States.
The most common complaints related to corporate disclosures and financials (18.2 percent), offering fraud (15.5 percent), and manipulation (15.2 percent).
There were 143 enforcement judgments and orders issued during fiscal year 2012 that potentially qualify as eligible for a whistleblower award. The Office of the Whistleblower provided the public with notice of these actions because they involved sanctions exceeding the statutory threshold of more than $1 million.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can pay financial awards to whistleblowers who provide high-quality, original information about a possible securities law violation that leads to a successful SEC enforcement action with more than $1 million in monetary sanctions. The SEC is authorized to pay the whistleblower 10 to 30 percent of the sanctions collected. Awards are paid from the Investor Protection Fund established by Congress to fund payments.

Information on eligibility requirements, directions on how to submit a tip or complaint, instructions on how to apply for an award, and answers to frequently asked questions are available at: www.sec.gov/whistleblower.

SEC CHARGES MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY WITH SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS

FROM: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company with securities law violations for failing to sufficiently disclose the potential negative impact of a "cap" it placed on a complex investment product that investors were planning to use for retirement.

The SEC's investigation found that MassMutual included a cap feature in certain optional riders offered to investors, and the cap potentially affected $2.5 billion worth of MassMutual variable annuities. Neither the prospectuses nor the sales literature sufficiently explained that if the cap was reached, the guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMIB) value would no longer earn interest. MassMutual's disclosures instead implied that interest would continue to accrue after the GMIB value reached the cap, and dollar-for-dollar withdrawals would remain available to investors. A number of MassMutual's own sales agents were confused by the language in the disclosures, and investors were not sufficiently informed of the potential negative effect of taking withdrawals if they reached the cap approximately a decade from now.

MassMutual, which removed the cap after the SEC's investigation to ensure that no investors will be harmed, has agreed to settle the charges and pay a $1.625 million penalty.

"Investors shouldn't have their retirement nest eggs at risk because of undisclosed investment complexities," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Through our proactive investigative efforts, we exposed a problem with a complex variable annuity investment at least a decade before it could have harmed investors."

According to the SEC's order instituting settled administrative proceedings, MassMutual offered GMIB 5 and 6 riders from 2007 to 2009 as an optional feature on certain variable annuity products. The GMIB rider sets a minimum floor for a future amount that can be applied to an annuity option, known as the "GMIB value." Unlike the contract value of the annuity that fluctuates with the performance of the underlying investment, the GMIB value increases by a compound annual interest rate of either 5 or 6 percent and allows investors to make withdrawals any time during the annuity's accumulation phase.

According to the SEC's order, MassMutual advertised its GMIB riders as providing "Income Now" if investors elected to make withdrawals during the accumulation phase or "Income Later" if they elected to receive annuity payments. MassMutual's sales literature highlighted the guarantee provided by the riders by stating, "Even if your contract value drops to zero, you can apply your GMIB value to a fixed or variable annuity." The riders included a maximum GMIB value, and investors could not reach this cap until 2022. If the GMIB value reached the cap, every dollar withdrawn would reduce the GMIB value by a pro-rata amount tied to the percentage decrease on the contract value. After a number of such withdrawals, depending on market conditions, both the contract value and the GMIB value could decline and adversely affect the amount a customer could apply to an annuity and the future income stream.

The SEC's investigation found that a number of MassMutual sales agents and others did not understand that all withdrawals taken after the GMIB value reached the cap would result in such pro-rata reductions. After reviewing MassMutual's prospectuses and other disclosures, they believed that if the GMIB value reached the cap, investors could take withdrawals and the GMIB value would remain at the cap. Some sales agents mistakenly believed that investors could maximize their benefits by waiting until the GMIB value reaches the cap, taking annual 5 or 6 percent withdrawals, and annuitizing their contracts in order to receive an income stream tied to the maximum GMIB value. But in reality, following such an investment strategy could have had severe adverse consequences for investors. By taking withdrawals annually after the cap is reached, investors would proportionately reduce their GMIB values and in turn potentially decrease their future income streams. In a worst-case scenario, they would withdraw all of their contract value, the GMIB value would decline to zero, and they would be left with nothing to annuitize and, consequently, no future income stream.

According to the SEC's order, while MassMutual was offering GMIB riders, there were indications that sales agents and others did not understand the effect of post-cap withdrawals on the GMIB value, which should have alerted the company to the fact that its disclosures were inadequate. Beginning May 1, 2009, after it stopped offering the riders, MassMutual revised its prospectuses to better explain the consequences of taking withdrawals after the GMIB value reaches the cap. Following the SEC's investigation, MassMutual undertook the remedial step of removing the cap entirely from these riders in order to guarantee that no investor will ever reach the cap. This action contributed to the determination of the penalty amount. MassMutual consented to the SEC's order without admitting or denying the findings. In addition to the $1.625 million penalty, MassMutual agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act.

The SEC's investigation was conducted by Attorney-Advisor Daniel H. Rubenstein and supervised by Associate Director Stephen L. Cohen and Assistant Director C. Joshua Felker.

BP SETTLES SEC CHARGES FOR $525 MILLION

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged BP p.l.c. with misleading investors while its Deepwater Horizon oil rig was gushing into the Gulf of Mexico by significantly understating the flow rate in multiple reports filed with the SEC.

The SEC alleges that the global oil and gas company headquartered in London made fraudulent public statements indicating a flow rate estimate of 5,000 barrels of oil per day. BP reported this figure despite its own internal data indicating that potential flow rates could be as high as 146,000 barrels of oil per day. BP executives also made numerous public statements after the filings were made in which they stood behind the flow rate estimate of 5,000 barrels of oil per day even though they had internal data indicating otherwise. In fact, they criticized other much higher estimates by third parties as scaremongering. Months later, a government task force determined the flow rate estimate was actually more than 10 times higher at 52,700 to 62,200 barrels of oil per day, yet BP never corrected or updated the misrepresentations and omissions it made in SEC filings for investors.

BP agreed to settle the SEC's charges by paying the third-largest penalty in agency history at $525 million. The SEC plans to establish a Fair Fund with the BP penalty to provide harmed investors with compensation for losses they sustained in the fraud. The SEC announced the case today along with the Attorney General and other senior officials at the Justice Department, which brought a criminal action against BP.

"The oil spill was catastrophic for the environment, but by hiding its severity BP also harmed another constituency – its own shareholders and the investing public who are entitled to transparency, accuracy, and completeness of company information, particularly in times of crisis," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Good corporate citizenship and responsible crisis management means that a company can't hide critical information simply because it fears the backlash."

Daniel M. Hawke, Director of the SEC's Philadelphia Regional Office and Chief of the Enforcement Division's Market Abuse Unit, said, "Without accurate critical flow rate data known only to BP, the company denied its shareholders and investors the opportunity to fairly assess BP's potential liabilities and true financial condition."

According to the SEC's complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, BP stated that the flow rate was estimated to be 5,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in three separate Forms 6-K filed with the SEC following the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion on April 20, 2010. In a 6-K filed on April 29, BP stated in part, "[e]fforts continue to stem the flow of oil from the well, currently estimated at up to 5,000 bopd[.]" BP filed another report the next day similarly referencing "[e]fforts to stem the flow from the well, currently estimated at up to 5,000 barrels a day are continuing[.]"

The SEC alleges that when the company made those statements, BP possessed at least five different flow rate calculations, estimates, or data indicating a much higher flow rate. BP did not possess or generate any piece of data suggesting that 5,000 bopd represented a ceiling for the rate of oil flowing into the Gulf of Mexico or was the best estimate. The failure to disclose the existence of these higher estimates rendered BP's statements in its Reports on Form 6-K materially false and misleading.

According to the SEC's complaint, BP issued another 6-K on May 4 that stated, "Accurate estimation of the rate of flow is difficult, but current estimates by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) suggest that some 5,000 barrels (210,000 US gallons) of oil per day are escaping from the well."

The SEC alleges that BP omitted from its disclosure the material fact that, by this date, it possessed at least six estimates, calculations and data indicating that the oil flow rate far exceeded 5,000 bopd. Therefore, it was no longer accurate to suggest that 5,000 bopd was the best estimate or that the NOAA estimate was the current estimate.

The SEC's complaint further alleges that BP executives made numerous public statements in May 2010 supporting the 5,000 bopd flow rate estimate and criticizing other estimates despite internal evidence showing that flow rates were likely well in excess of 5,000 bopd. Eventually on August 2, the Flow Rate Technical Group consisting of government and academic experts tasked with reaching a final official flow rate estimate announced that the flow rate estimate was 52,700 to 62,200 bopd. BP never corrected or updated its material misrepresentations and omissions about the flow rate.

BP has consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay the $525 million penalty and permanently restraining and enjoining the company from violating Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20 and 13a-16. The proposed final judgment is subject to court approval.

The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Brian P. Thomas, Matthew S. Raalf, Kelly L. Gibson, Michael F. McGraw, John S. Rymas, Colleen K. Lynch, Jeffrey Boujoukos, Michael J. Rinaldi, and Elaine C. Greenberg in the Philadelphia Regional Office. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Department of Justice's Deepwater Horizon Task Force and the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority.

THE SOUTH FLORIDA MAN AND HIS ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SEC Charges South Florida Man with Recruiting Victims of Ponzi Scheme

he Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a South Florida man with defrauding at least 14 investors by soliciting them to invest in a Ponzi scheme. A significant number of the victims were members of the gay community in Wilton Manors, Florida and included inexperienced, unaccredited investors.

In the complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the SEC alleges that James F. Ellis, 69, a resident of Wilton Manors, Florida, fraudulently solicited investors for George Elia from 2004 to 2011. Elia operated pooled investment vehicles under the names Investor Funding Club and Vision Equities Funds. Elia purported to trade in stocks and earn annual returns as high as 26 percent, but was actually running a Ponzi scheme and paying returns to existing investors from new investor funds. In April 2012, the Commission charged Elia with securities fraud. See Litigation Release No. 22319 (April 6, 2012).

According to the Commission's complaint against Ellis, Ellis persuaded prospective investors by falsely telling them that he had personally invested with Elia at least $5 million that he had inherited from his parents. Ellis variously told investors that he earned 16% to 20% annual returns on his investment with Elia or that he earned $20,000 to $24,000 per month. Elia and his entities did in fact pay Ellis over $2.1 million over seven years. However, those payments were not investment returns because, as Ellis knew, he had not made an investment with Elia that would have returned such large sums of money. According to the complaint, Ellis also reassured prospective investors of the safety of the investment by falsely telling them that he had tested Elia by depositing a large amount of money with Elia, then asking for and receiving it back.

According to the complaint, Ellis bolstered his deceptive claims about the success of his investment with Elia with ostentatious displays of wealth, including expensive real estate, luxury cars, jewelry, opulent entertaining of his friends, and expensive cruises. Though Ellis claimed that his investments with Elia made his luxurious lifestyle possible, he failed to disclose to investors that his wealth derived not from legitimate investment returns but from the money that Elia paid him for fraudulently touting Elia's investment vehicles.

The Commission's complaint charges Ellis with securities fraud in violation of Section 17(a)(1), (2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The complaint also alleges that Ellis violated the registration provisions of Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act. The Commission is seeking permanent injunctions against Ellis for violating the above provisions of the securities laws, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus pre-judgment interest, and civil penalties.

Separately, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida today announced criminal charges against Ellis for his conduct in the scheme.

The Commission thanks the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their assistance in this matter.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANNOUNCES $220 MILLION BENEFITS SETTLEMENT IN BERNIE MADOFF PONZI SCHEME

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NEW YORK — The U.S. Department of Labor today announced a settlement that includes the payment of nearly $220 million to compensate employee benefit plans and other investors that suffered losses through investments in Bernard L. Madoff's Ponzi scheme. The settlement is pending approval by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and resolves department litigation, actions brought by New York's attorney general, and several private lawsuits and class actions brought on behalf of plans and other investors that invested with Madoff. The settlement was reached with Ivy Asset Management LLC, J.P. Jeanneret Associates Inc., Beacon Associates Management Corp., Andover Associates Management Corp., and their current and former owners and officers.

"The settlement agreement we're announcing today provides a measure of justice for those Americans who worked hard to prepare for their retirement and then saw hoped-for stability disappear," said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. "My department is committed to ensuring that workers and retirees receive the benefits they've earned and deserve. If approved by the court, this settlement, combined with expected payments from the Madoff bankruptcy estate, will allow worker benefit plans impacted by Bernard Madoff's illegal and reprehensible scheme to recover all, or nearly all, of the money they invested with him."

"Today's settlement brings accountability for one of the greatest financial frauds in American history and justice to defrauded investors. We have recovered over $210 million for the victims who were harmed as a result of the world's most notorious Ponzi scheme," said New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. "Ivy Asset Management violated its fundamental responsibility as an investment adviser by putting its own pecuniary interests ahead of the interests of its clients. An investment adviser should apprise its clients of risks, but Ivy deliberately concealed negative facts it uncovered in its due diligence of Madoff in order to keep earning millions of dollars in fees. As a result, its clients suffered massive and avoidable losses."

The department sued Ivy, Jeanneret, Beacon, Andover and their owners and officers Oct. 21, 2010, for alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The suit alleged that they breached their fiduciary duties to a number of benefit plans by recommending, making and maintaining investments with Madoff, thus losing hundreds of millions of dollars in assets needed for the pension and health benefits of thousands of workers.

"Nothing can make up for the years-long agony that plan administrators and participants, and individual investors were put through by these defendants and Madoff," said Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employee Benefits Security Phyllis C. Borzi. "But this settlement should go a long way toward making victims financially whole and, hopefully, closing a painful chapter for many workers and families."

Ivy served as the investment adviser for Jeanneret, Beacon and Andover, and introduced those parties to Madoff. The suit alleged that Ivy misrepresented and concealed doubts and suspicions about Madoff, including the belief that no investment with Madoff was justified. The suit further alleged that Ivy concealed its suspicions because the investments made by Jeanneret, Beacon, and their plan clients and other investors generated enormous fees for Ivy and contributed significantly to the assets under Ivy's management. The department alleged that Ivy made the decision not to sacrifice those financial benefits by disclosing the true nature of its doubts about Madoff, especially because management did not think the company could escape legal liability for those investments.

Jeanneret served as the investment manager for more than 70 plans that invested with Madoff through several methods, including its own fund of funds, starting in 1991. The department's suit alleged that the company and its principals made material misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts to their ERISA-covered plan clients that invested with Madoff. These included failing to disclose that Ivy had informed Jeanneret that it was unable to perform due diligence on Madoff. Jeanneret also allegedly failed to disclose to its clients that it had entered into a new agreement with Ivy in 2007 that eliminated Madoff from Ivy's due diligence responsibilities, and failed to disclose that Ivy recommended Jeanneret reduce plan client and investor exposure to Madoff.

Additionally, the suit alleged that Jeanneret largely ignored Ivy's recommendations to reduce its clients' Madoff investments and failed to take prudent steps to investigate irregularities about Madoff and his purported trading, while taking substantial amounts in fees as the investment manager for the plans. Finally, Jeanneret and its owners and officers allegedly violated ERISA based on their fee arrangement, which provided for higher fees for Madoff investments than for other types of investments. This arrangement gave them the ability to set their own compensation by exercising their discretion to recommend and make Madoff investments for plans.

Beacon and Andover were the investment managers for the Beacon and Andover funds, which invested heavily with Madoff starting in the early 1990s. Many employee benefit plans, including Jeanneret's clients, invested in the Beacon and Andover funds. Like Jeanneret, the department alleged that the two fund companies and their owners and officers largely ignored Ivy's recommendations to reduce their Madoff investments and failed to take prudent steps to investigate Madoff, while still taking substantial amounts in fees as the investment managers for the Beacon and Andover funds. The suit also charged Beacon, Andover and their principals with making misrepresentations and failing to disclose to their plan investors that Ivy had informed them it was unable to perform due diligence on Madoff, and that Beacon and Andover had entered into agreements with Ivy that eliminated Madoff from Ivy's due diligence responsibilities.

Under the settlement agreement, Ivy and its principals have agreed to pay a total of $210 million. Jeanneret and its owners, John P. Jeanneret and Paul Perry, have agreed to pay $3 million. Beacon and Andover and their owners, Joel Danziger and Harris Markhoff, have agreed to pay $3.5 million and relinquish a claim of more than $3.3 million for management fees.

The settlements resulted from investigations conducted by the New York and Boston regional offices of the Employee Benefits Security Administration, an agency of the Labor Department. Litigation was conducted by the Plan Benefits Security Division of the department's Office of the Solicitor in Washington, D.C.

Workers in employer-sponsored health and retirement benefit plans who feel that they have been denied a benefit inappropriately, or have questions about benefits laws, can contact an EBSA benefits adviser by visiting http://www.askebsa.dol.gov or calling 866-444-EBSA (3272).