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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Thursday, August 22, 2013

SPEECH BY SEC COMMISSIONER ELISSE B. WALTER AT STANFORD DIRECTORS COLLEGE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Corporate Disclosure: The Stage, the Audience and the Players

Commissioner Elisse B. Walter
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Stanford Directors College, Palo Alto, CA

June 25, 2013

Thank you, [Joe], for your kind introduction. Joe and I have much in common — the same alma mater and a working relationship at the SEC more years ago than either of us would like to admit. That adds to my pleasure at being here today at the 19th annual Stanford Directors College.

As many of you know, I am nearing the end of my tenure as a Commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission. As a Commissioner, as Chair and as an SEC staffer, jobs spanning over two decades, I have delved into every aspect of the agency’s mission. And, looking back, it was my years in the Division of Corporation Finance that may have taught me the most important lesson: the cornerstone of securities regulation and investor protection is the timely disclosure to investors of accurate and complete information.

And by disclosure, I mean more than the numbers in the financial statements. I mean the information investors need to put those numbers into context — not just the “what?” and “how much?” but the “why?” And so today, in what may be one of the last speeches of my public career, I’d like to return to a subject that is an old favorite of mine: Management’s Discussion and Analysis, or MD&A. And I want to do that because I believe that you, as directors, need to take an active role in the company’s disclosure, and particularly the MD&A, and are in a special position to do so.

But before I get started, I do need to remind you that the views I express today are my own, and not those of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners or the Commission’s staff.1

Comprehensive corporate disclosure is critical to maintaining and improving investor confidence in the markets. And investor confidence in the quality of financial disclosures is what makes our markets work.

As directors of public companies, you serve a critical function as stewards of the robust, transparent communication with your company’s shareholders that builds this confidence. This is not only a responsibility, but also an opportunity. As I’ve said many times, you should not view disclosure as an obligation; instead, view it as a chance to tell your story.

“Mend your speech a little, lest it may mar your fortunes.”2 William Shakespeare wrote that sometime between 1603 and 1606 in his famous work, King Lear. Unfortunately, that approach to disclosure about affections didn’t work out so well for King Lear or his daughter Cordelia. And I certainly don’t mean for you to take King Lear’s approach in order for your considerations about corporate disclosure to be respected. Rather, my strongest desire is that companies and their shareholder-owners truly engage in an honest dialogue.

So, inspired by the Bard, I’d like to give you three things to think about when considering MD&A. First, set the stage. Second, know your audience. And finally, know your players.

“All the world’s a stage….”3 Shakespeare wrote that too. And I’m not even going to mention the one about lawyers.

When we talk about disclosure, SEC regulations merely set the stage. But they aren’t designed to tell the whole story. That’s where you and the managers you oversee come in — enter stage right.

Regulations are the floor but not the ceiling. They tell companies what, at a minimum, should be covered, but it’s up to the company to make sure the story gets told. That’s where MD&A becomes a real opportunity for the company to tell shareholders what’s really going on. And if the company’s management isn’t doing that, or isn’t doing it well, it’s up to the directors to ask questions, suggest changes, and require more information.

You should take this role very seriously. You are the investor’s voice and advocate, and they deserve a good story. Now, a good story may not always be a happy story. Shakespeare was a master of both tragedy and comedy. But the real story — and by that I mean the whole story — is the one that needs to be told.

I’m going to read you a comment that was actually issued by the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance to an issuer regarding its MD&A. Bear with me, it’s a little long:

We believe your current disclosures are too general in nature and do not provide your investor with a complete picture of your enterprise by segment and as a whole. In this regard, for each period presented and for each of your reportable segments, revise to:

Clearly disclose and quantify each material factor that contributed to the change in revenue and operating income, indicating the impact by geographic area;

Provide insight into the underlying business drivers or conditions that contributed to these changes;

***
Describe any other known trends or uncertainties that have had or you expect may reasonably have a material impact on your operations and if you believe that these trends are indicative of future performance.
This is not a comment a company (or a board) should be happy to see. This comment outlines very basic things that should have been covered by this MD&A, but weren’t — it reflects a play that no one would want to see because the stage has not been properly set.

No MD&A should be merely a recitation of the financial statements. Give investors the when, the where, the why and, perhaps most importantly, the what’s next.

Here’s another comment:

We note that you identify and quantify various factors that impacted the year to year trends of your results of operations and the related financial statement line items … but did not discuss the business developments or external events that underlie these factors. Please expand your MD&A to explain in greater detail what gave rise to the factors that you have identified, and indicate whether or not you expect them to have a continuing impact on your results of operations in the future.

This is another comment no one should be happy to receive. I’m told that sometimes companies will leave out disclosure and wait to see if the SEC staff will issue a comment. If that’s true, and I worry that it is, I must say that that is entirely the wrong approach. The staff is very good at asking the right questions to require better disclosure, but they are not insiders. They do not know your company the way that you do. Frankly, they should not be doing your job for you, nor should we expect them to.

Sometimes finding the right details to give investors is hard. Predicting the impact, either positive or negative, of a future event is even more challenging. It requires significant judgment and thoughtful consideration. But it’s a task that should be undertaken by the very insiders who have the information to make that call, so that investors have the complete story. The focus should always be on the investors.

And that brings me to my second point: know your audience.

Well, that’s easy enough. Your audience is your investors. And in my view, you should address your investors like they are your business partners, and the MD&A should reflect that perspective. You wouldn’t address a business partner with boilerplate. Your investors deserve the same respect.

They also deserve the whole story. As some of you know, I frequently use the example of my fictional Aunt Millie, the archetype of the retail investor. Well, Aunt Millie has been reading, or trying to read, corporate disclosure for years, and I’m not sure she has ever seen an MD&A that reads quite like one of her Agatha Christie novels — where Detective Hercule Poirot solves each and every mystery step by step. To be honest, I fear that my dear Aunt Millie might just leave this Earth without having ever seen the kind of truly informative and complete MD&A that I have dreamed of for years.

Please don’t let this happen to my dear Aunt Millie! Perhaps you’d even be willing to go back and read one of the more well-known Supreme Court cases about disclosure, TSC Industries. That case gives us the famous concept of evaluating disclosure by looking at the “total mix” of information, but it also says that doubts about whether disclosure is required should “be resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to protect.” 4

I listed in a speech from 2010 (I told you I’d been talking about this for a while) some questions that investors probably still want to know the answers to after reading an MD&A.5 I think they are still quite relevant today:

What is the company’s business today?

How did it perform?

Where is the cash?

What are the company’s key business drivers?

What are the risks and uncertainties?

How flexibly can the company respond to change?

What do the company’s future prospects look like?
And of course there may be other questions to answer that are specific to your company. But the MD&A is the place to answer them clearly, thoroughly, and directly.

When I served as the Chairman of the Commission, there was a sign on my office door that read simply “How does it help investors?” It was a reminder that everything the Commission does should be focused on that goal.

Sometimes I think that every board meeting should prominently display a similar sign, one reading “What do investors want to know?” Let it serve as a reminder to everyone in the room that disclosure isn’t driven by what the company wants to disclose but by what the investors want to know. That should be front and center as you review the MD&A.

How the company gets to those answers brings me to my third point today: know your players.

In addition to examining the content of the MD&A, I believe the board should know the people and the processes involved in putting it together. First, what is the attitude of management towards disclosure? If they believe that robust, transparent disclosure is a good thing, then that tone will affect both the employees involved in providing information that is relevant to disclosure and to those designing controls and procedures to ensure that information is evaluated by management in a timely, thoughtful manner.

And I believe directors can influence that tone by being engaged, by reading the disclosure with a critical eye and by holding management’s feet to the fire when they believe there is more to the story that ought to be told. Ask yourself, what do I know about the company’s performance that cannot be reasonably inferred from the financial statements?

You are the investor’s voice and as the company’s stewards, you should also be their advocate as well. You play such a crucial role in ensuring that the company’s true story is told, and that’s the story that investors deserve to hear.

And disclosure has other positive effects. Full disclosure is a hallmark of good corporate governance — which should serve to help create the positive corporate culture that results in effective processes and procedures necessary to reveal the important information that your investors need to know. You can only be successful at good governance if you are also successful at disclosure.

Better disclosure equals better markets. It really can be that simple. I hope, as I conclude today, that you’ll always keep the investor — and of course, especially my dear Aunt Millie — at the forefront of your mind each and every time you embrace your important role in the disclosure process.

Thank you.

1 The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publications or statements by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, other Commissioners, or the Commission staff.

2 King Lear (I.i.94).

3 As You Like It, (II.vii.139).

4 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, at 448 (1976).

5 Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, Remarks Before WESFACCA (March 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch030510ebw.htm.

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

SEVERAL CEO'S AND COMPANIES CHARGED WITH FRAUD IN PENNY STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission charged several CEOs and their companies, and five penny stock promoters with securities fraud for their roles in various illicit kickback and market manipulation schemes involving microcap stocks.

The SEC worked closely with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the separate schemes were uncovered. The U.S. Attorney’s Office today announced criminal charges against the same individuals facing SEC civil charges.

According to complaints the SEC filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, defendants Thomas Gaffney, Health Sciences Group, Inc., Mark Balbirer, Stephen F. Molinari, and Nationwide Pharmassist Corp. engaged in a scheme involving the payment of an undisclosed kickback to a pension fund manager or hedge fund principal in exchange for the fund’s purchase of restricted shares of stock in a microcap company.

According to additional complaints also filed in the Southern District of Florida, defendants Jack Freedman, Jeffrey L. Schultz, Redfin Network, Inc., Richard P. Greene, Peter Santamaria, Douglas P. Martin, VHGI Holdings, Inc., and Sheldon R. Simon engaged in various schemes. Some schemes involved undisclosed inducement payments made to individuals to facilitate the manipulation of the stock of several microcap issuers. One scheme involved an undisclosed bribe that was to be paid to a stockbroker who agreed to purchase a microcap company’s stock in the open market for his customers’ discretionary accounts.

The SEC alleges that the defendants in the schemes involving undisclosed kickbacks understood they needed to disguise the kickbacks as payments to phony companies, which they knew would perform no actual work. In the schemes involving the undisclosed inducement payments or bribe, the SEC alleges that the defendants knew their illegal activities were meant to artificially inflate the companies’ stock volume and prices.

The SEC’s complaints allege the defendants violated Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5(a) and/or 10b-5(c) thereunder. The SEC is seeking permanent injunctions, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, and financial penalties against all the defendants; penny stock bars against all the individual defendants; and officer-and-director bars against defendants Schultz, Martin, Gaffney, and Molinari.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Miami Division, in these investigations.

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

SEC ISSUED RISK ALERT TO DETECT OPTIONS TRADES THAT CIRCUMVENT SHORT-SALE RULE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington D.C., Aug. 9, 2013 — 

The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a Risk Alert to help market participants detect and prevent options trading that circumvents an SEC short-sale rule.

The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) issued the alert after its examiners observed options trading strategies that appear to evade certain requirements of the short-sale rule.  The alert describes the strategies used by some customers, broker-dealers and clearing firms, summarizes related enforcement actions, and notes practices that some firms have found to be effective in detecting and preventing trading intended to evade the rule, known as Regulation SHO.

Regulation SHO tightened requirements for short sales, which involve sales of borrowed securities. Short sellers profit from price declines by replacing borrowed securities at a lower price.  Under Regulation SHO, short sellers who fail to deliver securities after the settlement date are required to close out their position immediately, unless they qualify as bona fide market makers for a limited amount of extra time to close-out.  As noted in the alert, the trading strategies observed by the OCIE staff may give the impression of satisfying the Regulation SHO “close-out requirement,” while in effect evading it.  These sham close-outs violate the SEC rule, which aims to ensure that trades settle promptly, thereby reducing settlement failures.

“This Risk Alert encourages awareness of options trading activity used to avoid complying with the close-out requirements under Regulation SHO,” said OCIE Director Andrew Bowden.  “The alert describes these trading activities in detail to help broker-dealers and their correspondent clearing firms avoid the regulatory and reputational risks that are posed by these activities.”

In addition, the Risk Alert describes activities that the staff has observed that may indicate an attempt to circumvent Regulation SHO.  These include:

Trading exclusively or excessively in hard-to-borrow securities or threshold list securities, or in near-term listed options on such securities

Large short positions in hard-to-borrow securities or threshold list securities
Large failure to deliver positions in an account, often in multiple securities
Continuous failure to deliver positions

Using buy-writes, married puts, or both, particularly deep in-the-money buy-writes or married puts, to satisfy the close-out requirement

Using buy-writes with little to no open interest aside from that trader’s activity, resulting in all or nearly all of the call options being assigned

Trading in customizable FLEX options in hard-to-borrow securities or threshold list securities, particularly very short-term FLEX options

Purported market makers trading in hard-to-borrow or threshold list securities claiming the exception from the locate requirement of Regulation SHO; often these traders do not make markets in these securities, but instead make trades only to take advantage of the option mispricing

Multiple large trades with the same trader acting as a contra party in several hard-to-borrow or threshold list securities; often traders assist each other to avoid having to deliver shares

Eric Peterson and Tom Mester of the National Exam Program staff contributed substantially to the preparation of this Risk Alert.  They received valuable input from the Division of Trading and Markets and the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.


Monday, August 19, 2013

CFTC RULES FOR ALIGNMENT OF DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

CFTC Issues Proposed Rules for Derivatives Clearing Organizations to align with International Standards

Washington, DC — The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed rules to establish additional standards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations (SIDCOs) that are consistent with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) and address all of the remaining gaps between part 39 of the Commission’s regulations and the PFMIs.

These rules, together with the existing derivatives clearing organizations rules, would establish standards that are consistent with the PFMIs and would allow SIDCOs to continue to be Qualifying Central Counterparties (QCCPs) for purposes of international bank capital standards. The proposed rules include substantive requirements relating to governance, financial resources, system safeguards, special default rules and procedures for uncovered losses or shortfalls, risk management, additional disclosure requirements, efficiency, and recovery and wind-down procedures.

In addition, because of the potential advantages afforded to QCCPs (namely, lower capital charges for banks clearing through a QCCP), the proposed rules include procedures by which derivatives clearing organizations other than SIDCOs may elect to become subject to these additional standards.

Sunday, August 18, 2013

SEC CHARGES TWO FORMER JP MORGAN TRADERS WITH FRAUDULENTLY OVERVALUING INVESTMENTS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien G. Grout, Civil Action No. 13-CV-5677 (S.D.N.Y.)

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that it charged two former traders at JPMorgan Chase & Co. with fraudulently overvaluing investments in order to hide massive losses in a portfolio they managed.

The SEC alleges that Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout were required to mark the portfolio's investments at fair value in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and JPMorgan's internal accounting policy. But when the portfolio began experiencing mounting losses in early 2012, Martin-Artajo and Grout schemed to deliberately mismark hundreds of positions by maximizing their value instead of marking them at the mid-market prices that would reveal the losses. Their mismarking scheme caused JPMorgan's reported first quarter income before income tax expense to be overstated by $660 million.

In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Martin-Artajo and Grout.

According to the SEC's complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Martin-Artajo and Grout worked in JPMorgan's chief investment office (CIO), which created the portfolio known as Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) as a hedge against adverse credit events. The portfolio was primarily invested in credit derivative indices and tranches. The market value of SCP's positions began to steadily decline in early 2012 due to improving credit conditions and a recent change in investment strategy. Martin-Artajo and Grout began concealing the losses in March 2012 by providing management with fraudulent valuations of SCP's investments.

The SEC alleges that Martin-Artajo directed Grout to revise the manner in which he marked SCP's investments. Instead of continuing to price the portfolio's positions based on the mid-market prices contained in dealer quotes the CIO received, SCP's positions were instead marked at the most aggressive end of the dealers' bid-offer spread. On several occasions, Martin-Artajo provided a desired daily loss target that would enable the concealment of the extent of the losses. Grout entered the marks every day into JPMorgan's books and records, and sent daily profit and loss reports to CIO management in which he understated SCP's losses. For a period, Grout maintained a spreadsheet to track the difference between his marks and the mid-market prices previously used to value SCP's positions. By mid-March, this spreadsheet showed that the difference had grown to $432 million.

The SEC alleges that contrary to JPMorgan's accounting policy, Martin-Artajo instructed Grout on March 30 to wait for better prices after the close of trading in London in the hope that activity in the U.S. markets could support better marks for SCP's positions. The concealment of losses continued beyond the first quarter. By late April, trading counterparties raised collateral disputes over SCP positions totaling more than a half-billion dollars. Shortly thereafter, JPMorgan's management stripped the SCP traders of their marking authority and began valuing the book at the consensus mid-market prices.

The SEC's complaint alleges that Martin-Artajo and Grout violated Sections 10(b) and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 13b2-1, and aided and abetted pursuant to Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act violations of Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) and Rules 12b-20, 13a-11 and 13a-13.

The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Michael Osnato, Steven Rawlings, Peter Altenbach, Joshua Brodsky, Daniel Michael, Kapil Agrawal, Eli Bass, Daniel Nigro, Sharon Bryant, and Christopher Mele of the New York Regional Office. The litigation will be led by Joseph Boryshansky.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Saturday, August 17, 2013

SEC CHARGES FORMER EXECUTIVE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BASED COMPANY WITH INSIDER TRADING

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

SEC Charges Former Executive of Massachusetts-Based Company with Insider Trading

The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Joseph M. Tocci, a former executive of Massachusetts-based American Superconductor Corporation, with insider trading ahead of an April 5, 2011 company announcement that caused the company's stock price to tumble 42% and reaped Tocci over $80,000 in profits. Tocci has agreed to settle the charges by, among other things, paying a total of over $170,000 in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty.

In a Complaint filed on August 12, 2013, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Boston, the SEC alleges that Tocci, age 59, of Belmont, Massachusetts, used confidential information he obtained as the assistant treasurer of American Superconductor to purchase option contracts through which Tocci essentially bet that the company's stock price would soon decrease on the release of negative news. According to the SEC's Complaint, on or about March 31, 2011, Tocci learned through communications with American Superconductor's chief financial officer ("CFO") that the company's largest customer, Sinovel Wind Group Co. Ltd., had refused to accept shipments scheduled for delivery by the close of the company's fiscal year on March 31, 2011, and had failed to pay past due amounts for earlier shipments. These developments, the CFO said, would likely require a public announcement from American Superconductor within the next few days. The CFO instructed Tocci to keep this information confidential. On April 1, 2011, the Complaint alleges, Tocci improperly used this material, nonpublic information to purchase 100 put option contracts, which increased in value as American Superconductor's stock price decreased. On April 5, 2011, after the close of trading, the company announced that its financial results for its fourth quarter and fiscal year ended March 31, 2011 would be lower than expected due to a deteriorating relationship with Sinovel. The next day, American Superconductor's stock price plummeted 42%. By then selling his 100 put option contracts, Tocci earned illegal profits of approximately $82,439.

Tocci has agreed to settle this case by consenting to a judgment enjoining him from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and ordering him to pay disgorgement of $82,439 (representing his ill-gotten gains) plus prejudgment interest of $6,109 and a civil penalty of $82,439. Tocci also agreed to plead guilty in a parallel criminal case brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts in connection with the same conduct.

The SEC's investigation was conducted by Asita Obeyesekere, Michael Foster, and Kevin Kelcourse in the SEC's Boston Regional Office. The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Boston Field Office. The Commission also thanks the Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority for their assistance.