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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Friday, March 20, 2015

CFTC CHAIRMAN MASSAD'S REMARKS AT NATIONAL GRAIN AND FEED ASSOCIATION CONVENTION

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the National Grain and Feed Association 119th Annual Convention
March 17, 2015
As Prepared For Delivery

Thank you for inviting me today, and I thank Gary for that kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here. It’s been a while since I have been to San Antonio, but I am not a stranger to this part of the country. I drove in this morning from Austin, where I spent last night. Both my mother and sister live there, and my brother lives in Houston. My family lived in Texas for many years when I was a kid – in Midland, Brownsville and Houston. My father worked in the oil business so we moved around a lot between Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma. Eventually as my dad advanced in his career we moved to the Northeast. When my dad retired, my folks moved back to Texas and my siblings gradually migrated back as well. I was the black sheep of the family who stayed in the Northeast, other than some years in the Midwest and abroad. So I hope those of you from this part of the country will give me a little credit for at least having lived here, rather than concluding I’ve got bad judgment for not coming back.

While my time in Texas had more to do with oil than with agriculture, as a kid I did spend some time on farmland outside of Tyler Texas. My uncle, who still lives in Dallas, and my father had some land there, and we’d come for part of the summer and vacations. They had a few cattle that a local guy tended for them. I can’t say that taught me anything about raising cattle – other than to watch where I was walking – but I have fond memories of those times.

Moving around a lot as a kid, and later as an adult, taught me a few things about our country. One is you appreciate the incredible richness and physical beauty of this country. Another is you learn to listen to and respect those who may have a different point of view. When you live in different parts of the country and the world, when you have to make new friends and acquaintances, you come to appreciate that people can look at things differently. Now, of course, if you work in Washington as I do, admitting that others may have a reasonable point of view, even if you don’t agree with it, can be an occupational hazard. But I try to do the best I can despite this limitation.

My view of the country was also shaped by the fact that my grandparents were immigrants who came over as teenagers, one suitcase in hand and speaking no English. After getting past Ellis Island, they went to Oklahoma and Kansas. This was in the years before World War I. They struggled hard to make it and create a better life for their kids. And my parents were part of the Greatest Generation, who grew up learning how to survive and build a better life for their kids in the face of events that were totally out of their control – the Depression and then World War II.

I say all this because many of the characteristics that have made our country great – the richness of the land, the diversity of our people, the opportunities for those who work hard, and the challenge of dealing with forces and events that are far greater than you and are outside of your control – are deeply tied to agriculture. You all know that, I’m sure. Every day, your work, your lives are shaped by these things – the richness of the land, the opportunity for those who work hard, and the challenge of dealing with events beyond your control.

So today I want to say a few words about the importance of the agricultural industry to our work at the CFTC, then talk about our current priorities, and then I would be happy to take your questions.

The agricultural industry is the foundation for the CFTC. Indeed, helping the agricultural industry is what gave this agency its start, its purpose, and it remains central to our mission today.

As you know, the futures industry started because farmers and ranchers needed a way to deal with events outside of their control – the uncertainties of weather, the unpredictability of the market. Many decades before people in finance figured out that they could manage interest rate or credit risk using futures, people in agriculture were hedging risk. Futures on agricultural commodities have been traded in the U.S. since the 19th century and have been regulated at the federal level since the 1920s. The CFTC itself was part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture before becoming an independent agency in 1974-1975. And, in fact, the newly independent Commission initially worked out of the USDA basement and cafeteria.

In the hall leading to my office in the CFTC’s headquarters, there’s a wall with historic objects documenting the roots of the agency in the agriculture sector. You can see some of the first agricultural contracts approved by the USDA – objects signed by both USDA Secretary Henry Wallace Sr. of the Hoover administration and Secretary Henry Wallace Jr. of the Roosevelt administration.

Many things have changed in the 40 years since the agency was created. Like the agricultural industry itself, the derivatives markets we at the CFTC oversee have grown and changed over the years. The number and types of futures, options and swaps have increased dramatically, with products based on energy, metals, interest rates, currencies, and equities in addition to those based on agricultural commodities. The markets have grown substantially in size. U.S. futures and options markets are now estimated to be $30 - $40 trillion, measured in notional value, and the swaps markets are around ten times that amount. The way trades take place has also changed. Trading pits have given way to automated, electronic trading.

Despite these significant changes, a few things haven’t changed: the first is the importance of agricultural futures products. While they may no longer be the largest segment of the markets by volume, their importance is just as great today as it was then, just as agriculture is just as important today as it was then – if not, in each case, more so. After all, our agricultural industry doesn’t just put food on the table for every American family, it feeds the world. You all also know that while there have been tremendous advances in technology, science and knowledge, and our ability to influence or control many things, you still can’t control the weather. And even if you can at least predict the weather a bit better, you can’t predict or control the market. And so, the derivatives markets have remained just as important for agricultural folks as they were when they started: farmers and ranchers rely on these markets to hedge price, production, and other risk.

For these very reasons, the connection, and commitment, of the CFTC to agriculture is still strong, and our mission has changed very little. At its core, our mission is to make sure that the farmers, ranchers, and other businesses that depend on these markets to hedge risk can use them effectively. Our job is to help these markets thrive, to do all we can to make sure they operate with integrity, to prevent fraud and manipulation, and to protect customers.

The global financial crisis, however, taught us that this is not the only thing we must think about. We learned how excessive risk and a lack of transparency in the over-the-counter swaps market could intensify the crisis and the damage it caused. Now, I know that excessive swap risk wasn’t created by agricultural futures. I know it wasn’t caused by farmers, ranchers, or other commercial businesses hedging routine price risk. But the damage that was caused by the crisis hit all of us: millions of jobs lost and homes foreclosed, many businesses shuttered, and countless retirements and college educations deferred. I saw the terrible impacts first hand and spent five years working to help our nation recover. It’s an experience that has shaped how I approach being Chairman of the CFTC.

So the task for us today is to do our job in a way that helps make sure these markets continue to thrive and work well for the businesses that depend on them, while also making sure they do not create excessive risk to our financial system or our economy generally.

If you look at what we have been doing since June, when two other commissioners and I took office, you will see that we are addressing both those goals, and trying to do so in a pragmatic, balanced manner. We have been active in a number of areas, and I want to review what we have been doing and what’s on our agenda in the months ahead.

Before I do so, I want to thank the CFTC staff. Our recent progress and, really, how far we have come since the crisis is a credit to their hard work and dedication. I also want to thank my fellow commissioners as well for their willingness to collaborate and work constructively together.

I know all of us are committed to carrying out the CFTC’s responsibilities and enhancing these markets.

I also want to acknowledge the work that the NGFA and its members do to help us do our work. Your participation in the issues facing the Commission is appreciated and very valuable. We appreciate your input through comment letters, and through arranging meetings or occasions like this one.

I’m also pleased that we have NGFA representation on our Agricultural Advisory Committee. Our advisory committees are a very good way for us to get input from the public. I am the sponsor of the Agricultural Advisory Committee. As chairman, I get to choose, and I wanted to be the sponsor of this committee because of the importance of agriculture to the CFTC and these markets, and because the issues interest me. We had an excellent meeting in Washington in December, where we were joined by Secretary Vilsack. MJ Anderson and Todd Kemp were there, and it was an excellent opportunity to hear directly from farmers, ranchers, and others, who rely on these markets day in and day out – about how our rules are working, where some adjustments may be necessary, and perhaps most importantly, what issues we should be focusing on going forward.

Let me describe some of the things we’ve been doing and some of our current priorities.

Making Sure the Markets Work for Commercial End-Users

I believe that a key measure of our markets’ success is how well they serve the needs of commercial end-users – the farmers, ranchers and wide range of other businesses that depend on them. So a key priority since I took office has been to address some of the concerns of end-users with respect to our rules and fine-tune them where possible.

Last November, the Commission proposed to modify one of our customer-protection related rules to address a concern that I know many of you have had, as have others in the agricultural community, regarding the posting of collateral. Market participants asked that we modify the rules so that the deadline for futures commission merchants to post “residual interest” would not automatically become earlier in the day a couple years from now. This deadline can affect when customers must post collateral. So we have proposed changing the rule so that the deadline would not become earlier unless the Commission takes affirmative action to change it.

I should note that we separately made it clear that you can use electronic transfers, or ACH payments, which makes it easier to meet the deadline.

We also proposed to revise our rules regarding record-keeping requirements to provide some relief to commercial end-users. We proposed to exempt end-users and commodity trading advisors from certain recordkeeping requirements related to text messages and phone calls, as well as from some requirements as to how records must be kept.

On both the residual interest and record-keeping proposals, I appreciate the NGFA’s input and support for these changes, although I also recognize that you’d like us to make further changes. I hope we can take final action on both proposals soon.

We have taken a number of other steps as well that may not be of direct concern to you but that reflect our desire to address the needs of end-users generally. These other changes include making it easier for local utility companies to access the energy swaps market. We also recently proposed to clarify when forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality – a contractual right to receive more or less of a commodity at the negotiated contract price – will be excluded from being considered swaps. This change, if adopted, should make it easier for commercial companies to use these types of contracts in their daily operations efficiently.

The Commission staff has also taken action to make sure that end-users can use the Congressional exemptions given to them regarding clearing and swap trading if they enter into swaps through a treasury affiliate.

Some of these changes affect the cost of trading, an issue that I know is of concern to many of you. We will continue to focus on these costs. I have recently spoken out about a banking regulation that may increase the cost of clearing because of requirements placed on clearing members. This pertains to the leverage ratio. I’ve directed our staff to work with the staffs of the banking regulators to see if they can modify this rule to address the concern.

Finishing the Remaining Rules

Another priority for us is completing the position limits rule. Congress mandated that we implement position limits to address the risk of excessive speculation. In doing so, we must make sure that commercial end-users like agricultural producers can continue to engage in bona fide hedging. We have received substantial public input on the position limits rule. We got input at the Agricultural Advisory Committee meeting last December, for example. The Commission and CFTC staff are considering these comments carefully. We understand the importance of bona fide hedging, and I want you to know that we are looking at the concerns many of you have raised. We are going to take our time to get this right.

Another rule we must finish is our proposed rule on margin for uncleared swaps. This would require swap dealers to post and collect margin from their counterparties on uncleared swaps, much as is required on cleared swaps. This helps reduce the risk of those trades and the risk to our financial system as a whole. Our rule makes clear that swap dealers are not required to collect margin from end-user counterparties. This is consistent with Congress’s intent. Congress recognized that the activities of commercial end-users in the derivatives markets do not create the same types or degree of risk as with large financial institutions, and so Congress provided these exemptions to minimize the impact of necessary regulatory reform on commercial end-users.

Enforcement

We also remain committed to a robust surveillance and enforcement program to prevent fraud and manipulation. There is nothing more important to restore and maintain public confidence in our markets than robust enforcement. An important part of this effort is vigorous financial surveillance over futures commission merchants. We have stepped up our efforts to make sure FCMs safeguard customer funds and meet their financial obligations to clearinghouses. We require FCMs to make daily reports demonstrating compliance with the segregation obligations; and to provide notice to us of certain withdrawals of funds from the customer segregated accounts. Depositaries holding customer funds also are required to confirm balances on a daily basis, so that it is possible to verify that the funds that FCMs report as being held for customers are, in fact, on deposit. And CFTC staff, working with the self-regulatory organizations, conduct periodic on-site examinations of the FCMs to assess their compliance with the financial requirements.

With regard to enforcement, we have been vigilant in bringing cases where FCMs have failed to meet their financial and regulatory obligations – not maintaining sufficient capital or keeping customer funds properly segregated, for example. We have held some of the world’s largest banks accountable for attempting to manipulate LIBOR. And we recently ordered five of the biggest banks in the world to pay $1.5 billion in fines for attempting to manipulate foreign exchange benchmarks. We have brought successful cases against those who would attempt to manipulate our markets through high frequency trading using spoofing strategies. And we have also stopped crooks trying to defraud seniors through precious metal scams and Ponzi schemes. In all these efforts, our goal is to make sure that the markets we oversee operate fairly for all participants regardless of their size or sophistication.

Finally, we are focused on new challenges and risks in our markets. Cybersecurity has been getting a lot of attention, and rightly so. It is now perhaps the single biggest threat to financial stability. We are making this a priority in our examinations. Another example of a new challenge is automated, electronic trading, including high frequency trading. We are looking at whether we should take further action to make sure this type of trading does not lead to unfair advantages for some traders or pose excessive risks to our markets.

We are also doing all we can to make sure clearinghouses are strong and stable. The reforms that are being implemented worldwide since the financial crisis have made clearinghouses even more important in the global financial system. A few clearinghouses, in particular, are clearing most of the futures and swaps products. As a result, there is more attention being paid around the world to the risks that clearinghouses pose and what would happen if there was a problem at a clearinghouse. As we think about these issues, we need to address financial stability concerns while still making sure that clearinghouses, and clearing members, can operate successfully so that their clients – end-users like you – can still participate in these markets in a cost-effective manner.

The Importance of Market Participant Feedback

In all that we do, feedback from people like you, businesses that use these markets, is vital. Your input helps us understand the issues you face in using these markets. That’s particularly helpful when we face the task of balancing competing objectives. So I look forward to your continued input.

Resources

One of the biggest challenges we face is simply that there is more we should be doing that we cannot do because of resources. Not more rules to write, but rather, things like responding quickly to the concerns of market participants. Dealing with the threats posed by cybersecurity, or the challenges of high frequency trading. Or simply processing requests for registration, rule changes, or new product approvals. The CFTC’s current budget has simply not kept up with the growth of the markets and our responsibilities.

We have more work to do than we have people to do it. This means we cannot be as responsive as we wish to be. And today’s markets are sophisticated and technology driven. To be effective, our oversight must be as well. Without additional resources, it is difficult for us to do the job that I believe our markets need and the American people deserve.

Conclusion

The United States has the best derivatives markets in the world – the most dynamic, innovative, competitive and transparent. They have been an engine of our economic growth and prosperity, in large part because they have attracted participants and served the needs of end-users who depend on them. I know this group understands the importance of risk management and price discovery more than most. I look forward to working with all of you to make sure that these markets continue to work well for businesses like yours in the years ahead.

Thank you for inviting me. I would be happy to take some questions.

Thursday, March 19, 2015

A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015

A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015

FDIC CHAIRMAN GRUENBERG'S STATEMENT BEFORE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS

FROM:  FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 
Speeches & Testimony
Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Examining the Regulatory Regime for Regional Banks before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building; Washington, DC
March 19, 2015

Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the regulatory regime for regional banks. My testimony will begin with a profile of the large companies subject to the enhanced prudential standards requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). I then will describe how regulators have implemented the enhanced standards requirements. Finally, I will review various considerations important to any discussion of proposals to change these requirements.

Profile of Large Companies Subject to Section 165

Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to establish enhanced prudential standards for certain groups of institutions. The Act defines these institutions to include bank holding companies with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 billion and nonbank financial companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) has designated for Federal Reserve supervision.
The companies that meet the $50 billion threshold for enhanced prudential standards represent a significant portion of the U.S. banking industry. As of December 31, 2014, 37 companies with combined assets of $15.7 trillion reported total assets greater than $50 billion. They owned a total of 72 FDIC-insured subsidiary banks and savings institutions, with combined assets of $11.3 trillion, or 73 percent of total FDIC-insured institution assets.

The 37 companies represent a diverse set of business models. The four largest companies, holding combined assets of $8.2 trillion, are universal banks that engage in commercial banking, investment banking, and other financial services. Another twenty companies holding $3.3 trillion in assets are diversified commercial banks that essentially take deposits and make loans. The remaining 13 companies, with a combined total of $4.2 trillion in assets, do not engage predominantly in traditional commercial banking activities. These companies include two investment banks, four custodial banks, two credit-card banks, one online bank, and four specialty institutions. The 37 institutions include eight U.S.-owned institutions that are designated as global systemically important banks by the Financial Stability Board. They include the four universal banks, two investment banks, and two custodial banks.

By way of contrast, the FDIC's Community Banking Study of December 2012 profiled institutions that provide traditional, relationship-based banking services. The FDIC developed criteria for the Study to identify community banks that included more than a strict asset size threshold. These criteria included a ratio of loans-to-assets of at least 33 percent, a ratio of core deposits-to-assets of at least 50 percent, and a maximum of 75 offices operating in no more than two large metropolitan statistical areas and in no more than three states. Based on criteria developed in the Study, 93 percent of all FDIC-insured institutions with 13 percent of FDIC-insured institution assets currently meet the criteria of a community bank. This represents 6,037 institutions, 5,676 of which have assets under $1 billion. The average community bank holds $342 million in assets, has a total of six offices, and operates in one state and one large metropolitan area.

The FDIC does not have a similar set of criteria to identify regional banks. Regional banks may be thought of as institutions that are much larger in asset size than a typical community bank and that tend to focus on more traditional activities and lending products. These institutions typically have expanded branch operations and lending products that may serve several metropolitan areas and they may do business across several states. Regional banks are less complex than the very largest banks, which may have operations and revenue sources beyond traditional lending products.

The 20 holding companies identified as diversified commercial banks -- the subset of the 37 institutions with total assets over $50 billion noted earlier -- have a traditional banking business model that involves taking deposits and making loans, and they derive the majority of their income from their lending activities. Operationally, however, the 20 diversified commercial banks are much more complex than traditional community banks. They operate in a much larger geographic region, and have a much larger footprint within their geographic region.

Of the 20 holding companies:

Seven have total assets from $50 billion to $100 billion. They have an average of nearly 700 offices, and operate in 12 states and 22 large metropolitan areas.
Nine have assets from $100 billion to $250 billion. They have an average of nearly 1,200 offices, and operate in 12 states and 24 large metropolitan areas.
Four have total assets from $250 billion to $500 billion. They have an average of nearly 1,800 offices, and operate in 18 states and 24 large metropolitan areas.
The operational complexity of these 20 diversified commercial bank holding companies presents challenges that community banks do not. Supervisory tools and regulations need to match the complexity of these large $50 billion plus organizations. Any particular institution at the lower to middle part of the grouping may be a dominant player within a particular geographic or market segment and as such may require greater regulatory attention. If there would be a failure, the resolution of any one of these organizations may present challenges. In addition, the failure of more than one of these institutions during a period of severe financial stress could present challenges to financial stability.
Implementation of Enhanced Prudential Standards

Section 165 provides the FDIC with explicit responsibilities in two substantive areas related to prudential supervision: resolution plans and stress testing. In both areas, the FDIC has tailored requirements to fit the complexity of the affected institutions.

Resolution planning

Resolution plans, or living wills, are an important tool for protecting the economy and preventing future taxpayer bailouts. Requiring these plans ensures that firms establish, in advance, how they could be resolved in an orderly way under the Bankruptcy Code in the event of material financial distress or failure. The plans also provide important information to regulators, so they can better prepare for failure to protect markets and taxpayers.

In 2011, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve jointly issued a final rule implementing the resolution plan requirements of Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act (the 165(d) rule) for bank holding companies. The FDIC also issued a separate rule that requires all insured depository institutions (IDIs) with greater than $50 billion in assets to submit resolution plans to the FDIC for their orderly resolution through the FDIC's traditional resolution powers under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act). The 165(d) rule and the IDI resolution plan rule are designed to work in tandem by covering the full range of business lines, legal entities, and capital-structure combinations within a large financial firm.
Bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets and nonbank financial companies regulated by the Federal Reserve are subject to the requirement to prepare resolution plans. However, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve used our statutory discretion to develop a joint resolution planning rule which recognizes the differences among institutions and scales the regulatory requirements and potential burdens to the size and complexity of the institutions subject to that rule. The joint rule also allows the agencies to modify the frequency and timing of required resolution plans.

Our resolution plan regulations also are structured so that both firms and regulators are focused on the areas of greatest risk. Smaller, simpler, and less complex institutions have much smaller and simpler resolution plans than more systemic institutions, with complex structures, multiple business lines, and large numbers of legal entities.

In implementing the requirement for resolution plans, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve instituted a staggered schedule for plan submissions to reflect differing risk profiles. The first group of companies required to file plans on or before July 1, 2012, included bank holding companies with $250 billion or more in nonbank assets. This group comprised 11 institutions—seven U.S. bank holding companies and four foreign banking organizations. These institutions generally ranked among the largest institutions in the United States, although some equally large institutions with smaller amounts of nonbank assets, did not file in this group.

The second group was comprised of bank holding companies with $100 billion or more, but less than $250 billion, in total non-bank assets. These firms submitted their initial resolution plans on or before July 1, 2013. The remaining companies, those subject to the rule with less than $100 billion in total non-bank assets, submitted their initial plans on or before December 31, 2013.

Grouping the firms by their holdings of nonbank assets provided the agencies with an initial proxy for firm complexity. By delaying the submission of plans for those with fewer nonbank assets, less complex firms were given more time to prepare. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve also were able to focus on those firms that are more likely to pose serious adverse effects to the U.S. financial system should they need to be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code. Based on their groupings and measured by asset size as of December 2011, no U.S. bank holding company (BHC) with less than $200 billion in total consolidated assets was required to file with either the first or second group of filers.

For their initial submissions, bank holding companies with less than $100 billion in total nonbank assets and 85 percent or more of their assets in an insured depository institution also were generally permitted to submit tailored resolution plans. Tailored resolution plans simplify the task of creating a living will by aligning it with the FDIC’s IDI resolution plan requirement and focusing on the firm’s nonbank operations. Since the initial filings, the FDIC and Federal Reserve have further recognized differences among institutions with less than $100 billion in nonbank assets and nearly all U.S. institutions in this category filed tailored plans.

Though smaller firms are less systemic, appropriately tailored resolution plans or other enhanced prudential supervision requirements for these firms provide important benefits. Any particular institution at the lower to middle part of the grouping may be a dominant player within a particular geographic or market segment, and its failure would likely have a sizeable impact for those markets. The Deposit Insurance Fund also would face a substantial loss from the failure of even one of these firms. Finally, the size of these firms presents an obstacle in arranging the sale to another firm as only other larger firms would be likely acquirers. Therefore, the FDIC and Federal Reserve should continue to receive and review resolution plans in order to ensure that a rapid and orderly resolution of these companies through bankruptcy could occur in a way that protects taxpayers and the economy.

Stress testing

Section 165(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the federal banking agencies to issue regulations requiring financial companies with more than $10 billion in total consolidated assets to conduct annual stress tests. The statutory language governing stress testing is more detailed and prescriptive than the language covering other prudential standards, leaving the regulators with less discretion to tailor the stress testing process. The Act requires IDIs and BHCs with assets greater than $10 billion to conduct an annual company-run stress test, while BHCs with assets greater than $50 billion must conduct semiannual, company-run stress tests and also are subject to stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve. The company-run tests must include three scenarios and the institutions must publish a summary of the results.

In October 2012, the FDIC, OCC, and the Federal Reserve issued substantially similar regulations to implement the company-run stress test requirements. The FDIC’s stress testing rules, like those of the other agencies, are tailored to the size of the institutions consistent with the expectations under section 165 for progressive application of the requirements. Under the agencies' implementing regulations, organizations in the $10 billion to $50 billion asset size range have more time to conduct the tests and are subject to less extensive informational requirements, as compared to larger institutions. Currently, 107 IDIs are subject to the banking agencies’ stress testing rules, with the FDIC serving as primary federal regulator for 28 of these IDIs.

Stress testing requirements are an important risk-assessment supervisory tool. The stress tests conducted under the Dodd-Frank Act provide forward-looking information to supervisors to assist in their overall assessments of a covered bank’s capital adequacy and to aid in identifying downside risks and the potential impact of adverse outcomes on the covered bank. Further, these stress tests are expected to support ongoing improvement in a covered bank’s internal assessments of capital adequacy and overall capital planning.

Other Regulatory Standards Affecting Regional Banks

Many of the standards required under section 165 address issues that are within the longstanding regulatory and supervisory purview of the federal banking agencies. For example, with respect to banking organizations, the agencies have pre-existing authority to establish regulatory capital requirements, liquidity standards, risk-management standards, and concentration limits, to mandate disclosures and regular reports, and to conduct stress tests or require banking organizations to do so. These are important safety and soundness authorities that the agencies have exercised by regulation and supervision in the normal course and outside the context of section 165.

The FDIC's capital rules are issued pursuant to its general safety and soundness authority and the FDI Act. In many cases, FDIC capital regulations and those of other federal banking agencies are consistent with standards developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. For example, recent comprehensive revisions to the agencies’ capital rules and the liquidity coverage ratio rule incorporated aspects of the Basel III accord, which was developed separate and independent from, and mostly before, the Dodd-Frank Act was finalized.

These capital and liquidity rules play an important role in promoting the safety and soundness of the banking industry, including regional and larger banks. The agencies’ capital rules are entirely consistent with the statutory goal in section 165 of progressively strengthening standards for the largest institutions. As a baseline, a set of generally applicable capital rules apply to all institutions. A defined group1 of large or internationally active banking organizations are subject to more extensive U.S. application of Basel capital and liquidity standards. In addition, eight Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are subject to enhanced supplemental leverage capital requirements.
Policy Considerations

Section 165 establishes the principle that regulatory standards should be more stringent for the largest institutions. This idea is rooted in the experience of the financial crisis, where the largest financial institutions proved most vulnerable to sudden market-based stress, with effects that included significant disruption of the real economy. The thresholds in the enhanced prudential standards legislative framework state Congress’s expectation for the asset levels at which enhanced regulatory standards should start to apply, while providing for regulatory flexibility to set the details of how those standards should progress in stringency.
In our judgment, the concept of enhanced regulatory standards for the largest institutions is sound, and is consistent with our longstanding approach to bank supervision. Certainly, degrees of size, risk, and complexity exist among the banking organizations subject to section 165, but all are large institutions. Some of the specializations and more extensive operations of regional banks require elevated risk controls, risk mitigations, corporate governance, and internal expertise than what is expected from community banks. We should be cautious about making changes to the statutory framework of heightened prudential standards that would result in a lowering of expectations for the risk management of large banks.

That being said, it is appropriate to take into account differences in the size and complexity of banking organizations when formulating regulatory standards. The federal banking agencies have taken into account such differences in a number of contexts separate and apart from section 165. Examples include asset thresholds for the interagency capital rules, trading book thresholds for the application of the market risk rule, and proposed notional derivatives thresholds for margin requirements. These examples and other size thresholds illustrate that precedents exist apart from section 165 for the application of different and heightened regulatory standards to larger institutions, and that different size thresholds may be appropriate for different types of requirements. Finally, many of the rules that apply to more complex capital market activities do not apply, as a practical matter, to the types of traditional lending activities that many regional banks conduct.

Conclusion

Section 165 provides for significant flexibility in implementation of its requirements. The agencies have made appropriate use of this flexibility thus far, and where issues have been raised by industry, we believe that we have been responsive. The FDIC remains open to further discussion on how best to tailor various enhanced prudential standards and other regulations and supervisory actions to best address risk profiles presented by large institutions, including regional banks.