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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Tuesday, May 19, 2015

CFTC COMMISSIONER BOWEN'S SPEECH BEFORE 2015 COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Commissioner Bowen Speech before the Managed Funds Association, 2015 Compliance Conference
May 5, 2015

Thank you John for the introduction and good morning everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here today at the Managed Funds Association’s 2015 Compliance Conference. I would like to give a few very brief remarks before we move into my fireside chat with Adam Cooper. I have known Adam through our membership on the Northwestern Law School Board, which I chaired several years ago. I look forward to our conversation at the end of my brief remarks this morning. Of course, my remarks today are my own and do not reflect the views of my fellow Commissioners or the CFTC staff.

In my eleven months as a Commissioner, I’ve spoken about a few topics that are at the top of my agenda and which I hope the Commission will address early during my term. One of those is the need for increased regulation of retail foreign exchange transactions, which I believe is necessary to protect the retail investors who trade in that market. Another is the need for full funding of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) so that we will have strong, comprehensive oversight of the swaps and futures markets. Still another is the need to finalize the remaining regulations required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, aka Dodd-Frank.

Finally, I have also spoken about my belief that we need to ensure that our system of regulation, including our universe of self-regulatory organizations, works efficiently and effectively. In fact, I would like to talk to you today about a subject that confirms my belief that we need to finish our Dodd-Frank rules, while enhancing our overall comprehensive regulations. Specifically, I want to talk to you about the topic of governance.

As compliance professionals, I know that you all understand how good governance protocols and rules are at the heart of how any fund or corporation operates. What some of you may not know is that the CFTC was tasked to issue regulations on this subject under Dodd-Frank. Per Section 726 of Dodd-Frank, “In order to mitigate conflicts of interest,” the CFTC was supposed to issues rules within six months of the law’s passage that could potentially “include numerical limits on the control of, or the voting rights with respect to, any derivatives clearing organization that clears swaps, swap execution facility, or board of trade” that is sufficiently involved in the swaps market.1 Additionally, we were mandated to adopt those rules if we determined that “such rules are necessary or appropriate to improve the governance of” a derivatives clearing organization (DCO), a contract market, or certain swap execution facilities (SEFs).2

This rulemaking requirement was one of the first things we acted on. Back in October 2010, almost three months after Dodd-Frank became law, we issued a proposed rule on this subject. It provided guidelines on conflicts of interest over these entities and also crafted a system to improve the governance of DCOs and SEFs.3 Ironically, however, we have not finalized that governance proposal in the intervening five years nor have we issued a new proposal.

So, to some extent, one of the first regulations out of the gate has become one of the last ones to be completed. In fact, the governance rulemaking is one of three major rules we have to complete, along with such well-known regulations as position limits and capital for swap dealers and margin for uncleared swaps. And honestly, I believe that it is as important for us to complete and promulgate a rule on governance, as it is for us to complete those two rules.

The reason I believe completing the rule on governance is critical is two-fold. First, the governance of designated contract markets (DCMs) and SEFs is critical to how the overall markets we regulate function. As a reminder, the governance proposal covered a number of major topics - from compensation policies for public boards of directors4 to an expertise standard for other members of public boards.5 The proposal even required that boards of directors of registered entities engage in an annual performance review.6 Some of those concepts might seem self-evident, but it’s critical that all such entities have such policies in place.

Second, I believe this rule can and should be part of a broader effort to address another key issue at present: improving culture. As I have mentioned previously and as seems self-evident, we have a culture problem in finance at present.7 As a Commissioner at the CFTC, I’ve seen a significant number of settlements and alleged violations of our laws in the last eleven months. Sometimes those violations are from individuals deliberately seeking to defraud investors. Other times, however, the violations come from large organizations that have previously violated the rules. And that is something that should trouble us.

I believe the governance rule is a major tool to deter rule-breaking. Culture comes from the top – when you have a strong, independent, and involved board of directors, it’s more likely that issues will be fixed before they become problems or cause a regulation or law to be broken.

I think completing this governance rule is important because it is a critical step in the process of addressing our mandate. We need to be able to release a strong rule on governance practices for SEFs and DCMs if we’re going to fix the broader culture problem on Wall Street. We all expect that the governance of our DCMs and SEFs will be superior – after all, these markets revolve around trust. If market participants don’t trust that decisions are made fairly on an exchange, they are less likely to trade on that exchange.

It is because of that key fact that I believe there is support for strong governance rules on these entities because they’re the intermediaries between industry players. They’re a big part of the marketplace. And if we want to fix a big problem like culture, this is a good place to start. If we can establish strong, robust governance practices on DCMs and SEFs, that may not be a panacea to our cultural ills, but it could be a small dose of medicine.

To return to the particular rule at hand, the 2010 governance proposal was filled with a number of good, worthy ideas. I want to offer my thoughts on how to enhance this governance rulemaking. My hope is that with these and possibly other enhancements, we can at least be closer to introducing model rules and best practices that serve as a template to improve the culture in the financial industry.

First, we need to have some qualitative standard for board membership. The previous proposal required that 35% of the members of boards of directors of our registrants be public directors and that those boards have a minimum of two public directors.8 I see why that was done that way – specific numerical standards are easy to implement. But I think we can do better. After all, a person being a public director doesn’t immediately make them a good director. We want people who are fully invested in their firms and who will diligently oversee management accountability.

To put a finer point on it, I do think you need a sufficient number of public directors to achieve meaningful independence. We could approach an independence standard through a holistic review of the board’s independence or we may require certifications by the public directors each year to the stockholders that they are truly independent. Alternatively, we could ask that the board certify that it is providing adequate resources to improve culture and the tone at the top or that it craft plans for improving the overall culture of a company. Clearly the standard needs to be more dynamic than just a number. It also has to be one that can clearly be consistently met by a registrant.

Second, I think we should use this rule to ensure that issues of culture will merit the active attention of the board. The previous proposal had provisions that mandated the board of directors to do certain things. For instance, it mandated an annual self-review and required that a registered entity establish procedures to remove a member of the board. I think this rule can be enhanced with a requirement that issues of culture be considered by the board.

There are several ways this could work. As I mentioned in my OpRisk speech, “If there isn’t a dedicated person in the company trying to improve the culture – both through communication and making it clear that the rules need to be constantly followed – the culture won’t broadly improve.”9

Third, we need to try and standardize governance across entities as much as possible. Good governance principles should apply across entities, financial or non-financial, because they provide simple incentives designed to protect the company and its shareholders from issues; inadvertent errors as well as deliberate ones. Entities should strive to ensure that a board is independent and that it is really taking a separate hard-look at the company’s actions, just as entities should strive to prevent conflicts of interest from arising.

Yet, we should not be micro-managing the process. If we’re crafting rules that are too entrenched in the particulars of how a DCM operates, we’re making two mistakes. First, having standards that aren’t largely uniform will lead to additional legal and compliance expenses for those entities. Differing standards could lead to confusion and result in entities making mistakes. Second, we’re missing the chance to actually establish standards that could be a model for others to use, and that would be a clear missed opportunity to improve the culture in finance and increase board independence.

If we can seek standardization and harmonization on the particulars of data standards or determine which country has the jurisdiction over a particular trade, we shouldn’t shy away from the chance to seek standardization on this subject. And I hope and believe that if we can establish strong rules on these entities -- rules that work -- there will be other private sector entities that will voluntarily adopt these rules as well.

I would hope that many entities which are not SEFs or DCMs would view a new governance rule as a model and adopt it voluntarily. But even if they do not, I believe we have the ability to set governance rules on a number of swap dealers and major swap participants, and that we should consider whether it makes sense to apply this rule to those entities.

If you’re going to have an optimally effective organization, you’ve got to have good governance. It’s a condition that is absolutely necessary for success. I believe the time has come for the CFTC to finish this rule, ideally before the end of this calendar year. Thank you and I look forward to my fireside chat with Adam and questions from the audience. Obviously, time is a constraint, so feel free to reach out to me or my staff if you do not have the opportunity to ask a question or raise issues this morning.

1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 726(a), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/hr4173_enrolledbill.pdf at page 320.

2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 726(b), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/hr4173_enrolledbill.pdf at page 320.

3 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 17 CFR Parts 1, 37, 38, 39 & 40, October 18, 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 63732, [hereinafter “Proposed CFTC Governance Rule”], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-26220a.pdf.

4 Proposed CFTC Governance Rule, 17 C.F.R. Part 40.9(b)(4), at 75 Fed. Reg. 63752, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-26220a.pdf.

5 Proposed CFTC Governance Rule, 17 C.F.R. Part 40.9(b)(3), at 75 Fed. Reg. 63751, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-26220a.pdf.

6 Proposed CFTC Governance Rule, 17 C.F.R. Part 40.9(b)(5), at 75 Fed. Reg. 63752, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-26220a.pdf.

7 Commissioner Sharon Y. Bowen, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Remarks of CFTC Commissioner Sharon Y. Bowen Before the 17th Annual OpRisk North America,” March 25, 2015, available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opabowen-2.

8 Proposed Governance Rule, 17 C.F.R. Part 40.9(b)(1)(i), at 75 Fed. Reg. 63751, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-26220a.pdf.

9 Commissioner Sharon Y. Bowen, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Remarks of CFTC Commissioner Sharon Y. Bowen Before the 17th Annual OpRisk North America,” March 25, 2015, available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opabowen-2.

Last Updated: May 5, 2015

Monday, May 18, 2015

SEC CHARGES "MAN CAMP" OPERATOR FOR ALLEGEDLY DEFRAUDING INVESTORS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Litigation Release No. 23252 / May 6, 2015
Securities and Exchange Commission v. North Dakota Developments, LLC, Robert L. Gavin, and Daniel J. Hogan, et. al., Civil Action No. 4:15-cv-00053-DLH-CSM (D.N.D.)
SEC Halts Bakken Oil and Gas-Related Investment Scheme

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced charges and an emergency asset freeze against North Dakota Developments, LLC ("NDD") and its two principals for allegedly defrauding investors in a scheme to purportedly build and operate short-term housing facilities or "man camps" for workers in the Bakken oil and gas formation of North Dakota and Montana.

The SEC alleges that NDD and its owners Robert L. Gavin and Daniel J. Hogan have raised over $62 million from hundreds of investors in various states in the U.S. and foreign countries for interests in one of four "man camp" projects. According to the SEC's complaint filed yesterday in U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, investors bought "units" in NDD's projects motivated by the Defendants' promises of exceptionally high annual returns, up to 42%, and that NDD would jointly manage all of the units as a fully-developed short-term housing facility with amenities typically found in a hotel. The SEC also alleges that the Defendants offered investors the option of receiving a "guaranteed" annual return of up to 25% of the purchase price of their unit without regard to actual rental income. As further inducement to invest, Defendants also promised investors that the various projects would be operational in a very short time frame, often within months. In reality, the SEC alleges, despite the substantial amount of funds raised by the Defendants since May 2012, at the present time, none of the projects are fully operational and one of the projects offered does not even have governmental approval for construction to begin.

According to the SEC's complaint, Defendants directly or indirectly made material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the use of investor funds, the payment of commissions, and the return on the investment. Among other things, the SEC alleges that NDD's first project was delayed and unprofitable. The SEC alleges that, despite the lack of profits, the Defendants made Ponzi-style payments to certain early investors by paying their "guaranteed" returns using funds provided by later investors. The SEC also alleges that instead of developing the projects as promised, the Defendants have misappropriated over $25 million of investor funds to pay undisclosed commissions to sales agents, make payments to Gavin and Hogan, make investments in unrelated Bakken area projects for Gavin's and Hogan's personal benefit, and to make the Ponzi-like payments.

On May 5, 2015, the Honorable Daniel L. Hovland for the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota granted the SEC's request for a temporary restraining order and asset freeze against NDD, Gavin, and Hogan. A court hearing has been scheduled for May 18, 2015, on the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Commission's complaint alleges that NDD, Gavin, and Hogan violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; and seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and financial penalties against each of them.

The SEC's investigation has been conducted by Michael Cates, Anne Romero, and J. Lee Robinson of the Denver Regional Office, with supervision by Ian S. Karpel. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the North Dakota Securities Department.

Sunday, May 17, 2015

CFTC CHARGES NEVADA-BASED COMPANY WITH MAKING ILLEGAL OFF-EXCHANGE PRECIOUS METALS TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
April 27, 2015
CFTC Charges Nevada-Based My Global Leverage, LLC and Toney Blondo Eggleston with Engaging in Illegal, Off-Exchange Precious Metals Transactions with Retail Customers

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced the filing of a civil injunctive enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Defendants My Global Leverage, LLC (MGL) and its owner and managing member Toney Blondo Eggleston, who resides in Newport Coast, California. The CFTC Complaint charges the Defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange transactions in precious metals with retail customers on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis. The Complaint further alleges that Eggleston, as controlling person for MGL, is liable for MGL’s violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

According to the Complaint, since at least July 16, 2011 and continuing through at least November 2012, MGL, by and through its employees including Eggleston, solicited retail customers by telephone to engage in leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions. During that period, approximately 12 of MGL’s customers paid approximately $786,000 to MGL in connection with precious metals transactions, and MGL received commissions and fees totaling approximately $257,680 in connection with these precious metals transactions, according to the Complaint.

Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, leveraged, margined, or financed transactions such as those conducted by MGL, are illegal off-exchange transactions unless they result in actual delivery of metal within 28 days. The Complaint alleges that metals were never actually delivered in connection with the leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions made on behalf of MGL’s customers.

The Complaint further alleges that MGL executed the illegal precious metals transactions through Hunter Wise, LLC (Hunter Wise). The CFTC filed an enforcement action against Hunter Wise, among others, in December 2012, charging the defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange precious metals transactions, and charging Hunter Wise with fraud and other violations (see CFTC Press Releases 6447-12 and 6655-13).

On February 19, 2014, the court found that Hunter Wise had no actual metal to deliver to customers and held that Hunter Wise engaged in illegal precious metals transactions and was required to register as a Futures Commission Merchant but did not do so and therefore violated Sections 4(a) and 4d of the CEA (see CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, et al., 12-81311 (Order on the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment)). On April 15, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction and held that the CFTC’s jurisdiction under Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the CEA extends to the precious metals transactions at issue in the case and that no exception to the CFTC’s jurisdiction applied. And, on May 16, 2014, after a bench trial on the remaining claims, including fraud, the District Court entered an Order finding that Hunter Wise fraudulently misrepresented the nature of precious metals transactions that resulted in millions of dollars in customer losses (see CFTC Press Release 6935-14).

In its continuing litigation against MGL and Eggleston, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction from future violations of the CEA, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Glenn Chernigoff, Michelle Bougas, Alison B. Wilson, and Rick Glaser.

Saturday, May 16, 2015

CFTC CHARGES TELEPHONE SOLICITOR WITH ENGAGING IN ILLEGAL, OFF-EXCHANGE PRECIOUS METALS TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
April 21, 2015
CFTC Charges Florida-Based Sentry Asset Group, LLC and its Owner, John Pakel, with Engaging in Illegal, Off-Exchange Precious Metals Transactions

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Defendants Sentry Asset Group, LLC (SAG) of Boca Raton, Florida, and its owner and manager, John Pakel of Del Ray, Florida. The CFTC Complaint charges the Defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange transactions in precious metals with retail customers on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis. The Complaint further alleges that as controlling person for SAG, Pakel is liable for SAG’s violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

According to the Complaint, since at least March 2012 and continuing through at least July 2013, SAG, by and through its employees including Pakel, solicited retail customers by telephone to engage in leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions. During the period, SAG’s customers paid more than $1.1 million to SAG in connection with precious metal transactions, and SAG received commissions and fees totaling $278,767 in connection with these precious metals transactions. In addition, the Complaint alleges that SAG accepted customer orders and funds and thus acted as a Futures Commission Merchant without registering with the CFTC as such.

Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, leveraged, margined, or financed transactions such as those conducted by SAG, are illegal off-exchange transactions unless they result in actual delivery of metal within 28 days. The Complaint alleges that metals were never actually delivered in connection with the leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions made on behalf of SAG’s customers.

The Order further finds that SAG and Pakel executed the illegal precious metals transactions through Lloyds Commodities, LLC (Lloyds), Hunter Wise, LLC (Hunter Wise), and AmeriFirst Management LLC (AmeriFirst). The CFTC filed enforcement actions against, among others, Lloyds and Hunter Wise in December 2012 and AmeriFirst in July 2013, charging each with engaging in illegal, off-exchange precious metals transactions, and charging AmeriFirst and Hunter Wise with fraud and other violations (see CFTC Press Releases 6447-12 and 6655-13).

On September 18, 2013, the court entered a consent Order resolving the Commission’s claims against AmeriFirst, finding it liable for illegal off-exchange precious metals transactions and fraud (see CFTC Press Release 6973-14).

On February 5, 2014, in a consent Order resolving the Commission’s claims against Lloyds, the court ordered Lloyds Commodities to pay over $5 million in restitution and penalties (see CFTC Press Release 6850-14).

On February 19, 2014, the court found that Hunter Wise had no actual metal to deliver to customers and held that Hunter Wise engaged in illegal precious metals transactions and was required to register as a Futures Commission Merchant but did not do so and therefore violated Sections 4(a) and 4d of the CEA (see CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, et al., 12-81311-CIV (Order on the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment)). On April 15, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction and held that the Commission’s jurisdiction under Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the CEA extends to the precious metals transactions at issue in the case and that no exception to the Commission’s jurisdiction applied. And, on May 16, 2014, after a bench trial on the remaining claims, including fraud, the court entered an Order finding that Hunter Wise fraudulently misrepresented the nature of precious metals transactions that resulted in millions of dollars in customer losses (see CFTC Press Release 6935-14).

In its continuing litigation against SAG and Pakel, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction from future violations of the CEA, as charged.

The CFTC cautions victims that restitution orders may not result in the recovery of money lost because the wrongdoers may not have sufficient funds or assets. The CFTC will continue to fight vigorously for the protection of customers and to ensure the wrongdoers are held accountable.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Eugenia Vroustouris, Michael Loconte, James H. Holl, III, and Rick Glaser.

Friday, May 15, 2015

CFTC CHARGES MAN, COMPANIES WITH COMMODITY POOL FRAUD,

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
April 30, 2015
CFTC Charges North Carolina Resident Barry C. Taylor and His Companies with Commodity Pool Fraud in a Multi-Million Dollar Fraudulent Forex Scheme and with Registration Violations

Federal Court Enters Emergency Order Freezing Defendants’ Assets and Protecting Books and Records

Defendants’ Fraudulent Scheme Allegedly Solicited over $2.4 Million from Approximately 24 Members of the Public

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed a civil enforcement Complaint against Barry C. Taylor of Franklin, North Carolina, charging him with operating a multi-million dollar fraudulent scheme through his firms, OTC Investments LLC and Forex Currency Trade Advisors, LLC (collectively, Defendants). On April 22, 2015, Judge Martin Reidinger of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Asheville Division entered an emergency restraining Order freezing Defendants’ assets and prohibiting the destruction or concealment of their books and records. None of the Defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC, as is required.

The CFTC Complaint, filed under seal on April 21, 2015, alleges that from at least August 1, 2011 through the present, the Defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme that solicited more than $2.4 million from approximately 24 members of the public in North Carolina and other states within the United States and in Canada to participate in a commodity pool that traded leveraged or margined retail off-exchange foreign currency (forex) contracts.

The Complaint further alleges that Taylor misappropriated pool participant funds for personal and other business uses, and to conceal his fraudulent scheme and misappropriation. Also, as alleged, Taylor issued or caused to be issued false account statements to one or more pool participants to cover up his fraudulent scheme.

Taylor, among other things, allegedly made material misrepresentations and omissions to commodity pool participants that 1) Defendants were engaged in profitable forex trading and 2) failed to disclose that Defendants traded only a portion of pool participant funds and misappropriated the remainder through a combination of personal expenditures and partial distributions of diminishing commodity pool funds to pool participants to lull and deceive them.

The Complaint also charges that the Defendants used pool participant funds to pay purported trading profits and supposedly returned pool participants’ principal in the manner of a Ponzi scheme.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks a return of ill-gotten gains, restitution, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the federal commodities laws, as charged.

The CFTC cautions victims that restitution orders may not result in the recovery of money lost because the wrongdoers may not have sufficient funds or assets. The CFTC will continue to fight vigorously for the protection of customers and to ensure the wrongdoers are held accountable.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of North Carolina and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are JonMarc P. Buffa, Peter M. Haas, Patricia A. Gomersall, Tashieka Taylor, and Paul G. Hayeck.