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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Sunday, June 7, 2015

FOUR CHARGED BY SEC WITH INSIDER TRADING AND STEALING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
06/03/2015 10:45 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced insider trading charges against four individuals stealing confidential information from investment banks and their public company clients in order to trade in advance of secondary stock offerings.  The scheme allegedly involved at least 15 stocks and generated more than $4.4 million in illegal trading profits.

The SEC alleges that a former day trader living in California, Steven Fishoff, schemed with two friends and his brother-in-law to pose as legitimate portfolio managers and induce investment bankers to bring them “over the wall” and share confidential information about an upcoming secondary offering.  After promising they wouldn’t disclose the nonpublic information to others or trade an issuer’s stock before an offering was announced, they violated the agreements and tipped each other about the upcoming offerings expected to inherently depress the price of the issuer’s stock.  The tippees then shorted the stock before an offering was publicly announced and assured themselves profits on the short sales after the stock price dropped.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, they eventually expanded the scope of their scheme from short selling to buying stock in advance of a positive corporate news announcement based on confidential information obtained about secret negotiations between two large pharmaceutical companies.

Charged along with Fishoff in the SEC’s complaint is his brother-in-law Steven Costantin of New Jersey, his friend and California neighbor Ronald Chernin, and his friend Paul Petrello, also a former day trader who resides in Florida.  In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey today announced criminal charges against Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, and Costantin.

“We allege an insider trading scheme based on a short-selling business model designed to systematically profit on confidential information obtained under false pretenses,” said Sanjay Wadhwa, Senior Associate Director for Enforcement in the SEC’s New York Regional Office.  “But the defendants’ short selling proved to be short-sighted as they overlooked the fact that their trading patterns would be detected and they would be caught by law enforcement.”

The SEC’s complaint charges Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, and Costantin as well as seven entities they collectively controlled with illegal insider trading in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The complaint also charges Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, Costantin, and three associated entities with violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M of the Exchange Act in connection with certain short sales made in advance of public securities offerings in which they purchased shares.

The SEC’s investigation is continuing and being conducted by Dominick Barbieri, David Austin, Matthew Lambert, Stephen Johnson and George Stepaniuk.  The litigation will be led by Todd Brody, Dominick Barbieri, and David Austin.  The case is being supervised by Mr. Wadhwa.  The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Options Regulatory Services Authority.

Saturday, June 6, 2015

CFTC CHAIRMAN MASSAD'S REMARKS BEFORE GLOBAL EXCHANGE AND BROKERAGE CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference (New York)
June 3, 2015
As Prepared For Delivery

Thank you for inviting me today, and I thank Rich for that kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Next month, we will observe the fifth anniversary of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. As you know, this law made dramatic changes to our regulatory system in response to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In particular, it aimed to bring transparency and oversight to the over-the-counter swaps market, and gave the CFTC primary responsibility to accomplish that task.

The timing of this speech is significant to me in another way, as it was exactly one year ago today that I was confirmed by the Senate as chairman of the CFTC. So in light of those two anniversaries, it seems like a good time to take stock. Where are we in implementing these reforms? Is the new regulatory framework achieving the goals envisioned in Dodd-Frank? And what have we done over the last year in particular to advance those objectives? What are our priorities going forward?

All of you appreciate the important role that the derivatives markets play in our economy. In 2008, however, we saw how the build-up of excessive risk in the over-the-counter swaps market made a very bad crisis even worse. There were many causes of the crisis, but particularly because of that excessive swap risk, our government was required to commit $182 billion just to prevent the collapse of a single company – AIG – because its failure at that time, in those circumstances, could have caused our economy to fall into another Great Depression. Our country lost eight million jobs as a result of the crisis. I spent five years at Treasury helping our nation recover from that crisis – including getting all that money back from AIG. I also had a long career working as a corporate lawyer, which included helping to draft the original ISDA master agreements and advising businesses on all sorts of transactions, including derivatives. So I appreciate both the need for reform and the importance of implementing these reforms in a way that ensures that these markets can continue to thrive and contribute to our economy.

The Dodd-Frank Act enacted the four basic reforms agreed to by the leaders of the G-20 nations to bring transparency and oversight to this market: central clearing of standardized swaps, oversight of the largest market participants, regular reporting, and transparent trading on regulated platforms.

Today that framework is largely in place. The vast majority of transactions are centrally cleared. Trading on regulated platforms is a reality. Transaction data is being reported and publicly available. And we have developed a program for the oversight of major market participants.

There is more work to do in all these areas, as I will discuss in a moment. But as I see it, there are a lot of parallels between where we are today with swaps market reform and what happened with securities market reform in the 1930s and 40s. Coming out of the Great Depression, we created a framework for securities regulation and trading which proved tremendously successful. Many of its mandates were revolutionary at the time and therefore quite controversial. When the Securities Exchange Act was passed and required periodic reporting by public companies, the President of the New York Stock Exchange said it was “a menace to national recovery.” History has proved otherwise. Today, the concept of periodic reporting by public companies is about as controversial as seat belts. Indeed, the basic framework created in the 1930s of disclosure, transparency, periodic reporting and trading on regulated exchanges has been the foundation for the growth of our securities markets.

I believe the swaps market reforms we have put in place are similar. I believe the basic framework is one that will benefit our markets and the economy as a whole for decades to come. Is that framework perfect? No. Is there more to do? Yes. So let’s look at where we are.

Congress required that the rules be written within a year of passage of Dodd-Frank, and the agency worked incredibly hard to meet that goal. Now we are in a phase of making necessary minor adjustments to the rules, which is to be expected with any change as significant as this. And so a priority of mine over the last year has been to do just that: to look at how well the new rules are working and to make adjustments where necessary.

So let me give you a quick big picture view of where we are on each of the four key reforms of the OTC swaps market, as well as what I see as the next steps in each of those areas, and then discuss in more detail a couple of key priorities for the months ahead.

Clearing

First is the goal of requiring central clearing of transactions. This is a critical means to monitor and mitigate risk. Here we have accomplished a great deal. Our rules require clearing through central counterparties for most interest rate and credit default swaps, and the percentage of transactions that are centrally cleared in the swaps markets we oversee has gone from about 15 percent in December 2007 to about 75 percent today. That’s a dramatic change.

Importantly, our rules do not impose this requirement on commercial end-users. Nor do we impose the trading mandate on commercial end-users. And an important priority for me over the last year has been to make sure this new framework as a whole does not impose unintended burdens on commercial end-users. They were not the cause of the crisis or the focus of the reforms. And we want to make sure that they can still use these markets to hedge commercial risk effectively.

What are the next steps when it comes to clearing? First, we must recognize that for all its merits, central clearing does not eliminate risk, and therefore we must make sure clearinghouses are strong and resilient. The CFTC has already done a lot of work in this area. Over the last few years, we overhauled our supervisory framework and we increased our oversight. But there is more to do, and there will be significant efforts taking place, including through international organizations.

We will be looking at stress testing of clearinghouses, and whether there should be international standards for stress testing that give us some basis to compare the resiliency of different clearinghouses. And while we hope never to have to use these tools, we will be looking further at recovery and resolution planning.

You may also know that we are engaged in discussions with Europe on cross-border recognition of clearinghouses. While this issue is taking longer to resolve than I expected, I believe we have narrowed the issues and are making good progress. For those interested, I recently gave a speech to a committee of the European Parliament that describes the issues we are discussing in more detail. I believe my counterpart in these discussions, Lord Jonathan Hill of the European Commission, wants to resolve this soon, as I do, and we are working in good faith toward that end. I also believe we can resolve this without disruptions to the market, and I am pleased that the EC has again postponed capital charges toward that end.

Oversight of Swap Dealers

Let me turn to the second reform area, general oversight of major market players. We have made great progress here as well, as we have in place a regulatory framework for supervision of swap dealers. They are now required to observe strong risk management practices, and they will be subject to regular examinations to assess risk and compliance with rules designed to mitigate excessive risk.

Next steps in this area include looking at the swap dealer de minimis threshold. Under the swap dealer rules adopted in 2012, the threshold for determining who is a swap dealer will decline from $8 billion to $3 billion in December of 2017 unless the Commission takes action. I believe it is vital that our actions be data-driven, and so we have started work on a comprehensive report to analyze this issue. We will make a preliminary version available for public comment, and seek comment not only on the methodology and data, but also on the policy questions as to what the threshold should be, and why. I want us to complete this process well in advance of the December 2017 date so that the Commission has some data, analysis, and public input with which to decide what to do.

Another priority for us over the next few months in the area of general oversight is to finalize our proposal on margin requirements for uncleared swaps. This is one of the most important Dodd-Frank requirements that remains to be finalized, and one of the most important overall. There will always be a large part of the swaps market that is not and should not be centrally cleared, and therefore margin is key to minimizing the risk to our system that can come from uncleared bilateral trades. The proposal applies to swap dealers, in their transactions with one another and their transactions with financial institutions that exceed certain thresholds. As with the clearing and trading mandates, commercial firms are exempted.

We are working closely with the bank regulators on this rule. They have the responsibility to issue rules that apply to swap dealers that are banking entities under their respective jurisdictions, and our rule will apply to other swap dealers. It is vitally important that these rules be as consistent as possible, and we are making good progress in this regard. We are also working to have our U.S. rules be similar to rules being considered by Europe and Japan. I expect that they will be consistent on many major issues.

Reporting

With regard to reporting, the public and regulators are benefiting from a new level of market transparency – transparency that did not exist before. All swap transactions, whether cleared or uncleared, must be reported to registered swap data repositories (SDRs), a new type of entity responsible for collecting and maintaining this information. You can now go to public websites and see the price and volume for individual swap transactions. And the CFTC publishes the Weekly Swaps Report that gives the public a snapshot of the swaps market. This means more efficient price discovery for all market participants. Equally important, this reporting enables regulatory authorities to engage in meaningful oversight, and when necessary, enforcement actions.

While we have much better data today than in 2008, we have a lot more work to do to get to where we want to be. One step is revising our rules to bring further clarity to reporting obligations. Later this summer I expect that we will propose some initial changes to the swap reporting rules for cleared swaps designed to clarify reporting obligations and, at the same time, improve the quality and usability of the data in the SDRs. And we are looking at other possible changes as well to improve the data reporting process and usefulness of the information.

This is also an international effort. There are around two dozen data repositories globally. And there are participants around the world who must report. We and the European Central Bank currently co-chair a global task force that is seeking to standardize data standards internationally. While much of this work is highly technical, it is vitally important to international cooperation and transparency.

We will also make sure participants are taking their obligations seriously to provide us good data in the first place. We have taken, and will continue to take, enforcement action against those who do not.

Transparent Trading

Let me turn to the last reform area, which is trading. Today, trading swaps on regulated platforms is a reality. We have nearly two dozen SEFs registered. Each registered exchange is required to operate in accordance with certain statutory core principles. These core principles provide a framework that includes obligations to establish and enforce rules, as well as policies and procedures that enable transparent and efficient trading. SEFs must make trading information publicly available, put into place system safeguards, and maintain financial, operational, and managerial resources necessary to discharge their responsibilities.

So we are making progress, but here too, there is more work to do. We have been looking at ways to improve the framework, focusing on some operational issues where we believe adjustments can improve trading. We have taken action in a number of areas, including steps to make it easier to execute package trades and correct error trades, and steps to simplify trade confirmations and reporting obligations. We are looking at additional issues pertaining to SEF trading as well. For example, we are planning to hold a public roundtable later this year on the made-available-for-trade determination process, where many industry participants have suggested that the agency play a greater role in determining which products should be mandated for trading and when.

We have also been working to harmonize our trading rules with the rules of other jurisdictions where possible. CFTC staff worked with Australian swap platforms to clarify how they can permit U.S. participation under our trading rules. One platform, Yieldbroker, confirmed that it intends to apply for relief and achieve compliance by this fall. This is an important step and we are open to working with other jurisdictions and platforms.

Responding to Changes in the Market

I began by saying that the approaching five year anniversary of Dodd-Frank was a good time to take stock of what has been accomplished in terms of implementing the reforms required by the law. Equally important to consider is: How have the markets changed over the last five years? How does that impact what we are doing? After all, there is always the danger that as regulators, we focus on fighting the last war.

It is beyond the scope of my speech today to discuss all the significant changes to markets over the last few years, or how regulatory actions may be affecting market dynamics and costs. These are important, complex subjects, but they are well beyond the time I have today to explore. Today, however, I’d like to take a few minutes more to just note one major way in which our markets are changing, and how that is affecting our work.

That change has to do with the increased use of electronic and automated trading. Some speak of “high frequency trading” or HFT, a classification that is hard to define precisely. I will focus on automated or algorithmic trading. Over the last decade, automated trading has increased from about 25 percent to well over 50 percent of trading in U.S. financial markets. Looking specifically at the futures markets, almost all trading is electronic in some form, and automated trading accounts for more than 70 percent of trading over the last few years.

I commend to you a recent paper by our Chief Economist office which gives some interesting data on our markets. This looked at over 1.5 billion transactions across over 800 products on CME over a two year period. It found that the percentage of automated trading in financial futures – such as those based on interest rates, currencies or equity indices – was 60 to 80 percent. But even among many physical commodities, there was a high degree of automated trading, such as 40 to 50 percent for many energy and metals products. The paper also provides a lot of rich detail on what types of trades are more likely to be automated.

The increase in electronic, and particularly automated, trading has changed what we do, and how we do it. Let me say at the outset that the increased use of electronic trading has brought many benefits, such as more efficient execution and lower spreads. But it also raises issues. These are somewhat different in the futures markets than in the cash equity markets where they have received the most attention, in part because typically in the futures market, trading of a given product occurs on only one exchange. Nevertheless, the increased use of automated, algorithmic trading poses challenges for how we execute our responsibilities, and it raises important policy questions. For example, it creates profound changes in how we conduct surveillance. The days when market surveillance could be conducted by observing traders in floor pits are long gone. Today, successful market surveillance activities require us to have the ability to continually receive, load, and analyze large volumes of data. We already receive a complete transactions tape, but effective surveillance requires looking at the much larger sets of message data—the bids, offers, cancelations which far outnumber consummated transactions.

And consider that we oversee the markets in a wide range of financial futures products based on interest rates, currencies and equities, as well as over 40 physical commodity categories, each of which has very different characteristics.

Surveillance today requires a massive information technology investment and sophisticated analytical tools that we must develop for these unique environments. And we must have experienced personnel who understand the markets we oversee, who can discern anomalies and patterns and who have the experience, judgment, and skills to know when to investigate further.

The increased use of high speed and electronic trading has impacted our enforcement activity as well. We have recently brought several spoofing cases, where market participants used complex algorithmic strategies to generate and then cancel massive numbers of bids or offers without the intention of actually consummating those transactions in order to affect price. Some have asked, does that mean I cannot cancel a trade without fear of enforcement coming after me? Hardly. Intent is a key element that we must prove. There is a difference between changing your mind in response to changed market conditions and canceling an order you previously entered, and entering an order that you know, at the time, you have no intention of consummating.

The Commission is also looking at automated trading and specifically the use of algorithmic trading strategies from a policy perspective. We have adopted rules requiring certain registrants to automatically screen orders for compliance with risk limits if they are automatically executed. The Commission has also adopted rules to ensure that trading programs, such as algorithms, are regularly tested. In addition, the Commission issued a Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments. We received substantial public comment, and we are currently considering what further actions may be appropriate.

Although we have not made any decisions yet, let me note a few areas we are thinking about. Traditionally, our regulatory framework has required registration by intermediaries handling customer orders and customer funds. In addition, proprietary traders who were physically present on the floor of the exchange and active in the pits had to register as floor traders. Today, the pits are gone, and physical presence on the floor of an exchange is no longer a relevant concept. We are considering whether the successors to those floor traders – proprietary traders with direct electronic access to a trading venue – should be subject to a registration requirement if they engage in algorithmic trading.

We are considering the adequacy of risk controls, and in particular pre-trade controls, with respect to algorithmic trading. The exchanges, and many participants themselves, have put controls in place. The question is whether our rule framework should set some general principles to require measures such as message and execution throttles, kill switches, and controls designed to prevent erroneous orders. We also may consider standards on the development and monitoring of algorithmic trading systems.

We are also considering who should have the responsibility to implement controls. This may include persons using algorithmic trading strategies as well as the exchanges. But what about the role of clearing members who do not see the orders of customers using direct electronic access? Today, our rules require exchanges that permit direct electronic access to have systems to facilitate the clearing member’s management of the financial risk of their direct access customers. Should there be a similar requirement for the exchanges to facilitate the management by clearing members of risks related to those customers’ use of algorithmic trading?

We are looking self-trading – that is, when orders from distinct trading desks or algos from the same firm transact – and its potential implications and effects on the markets. In addition, we are looking at the adequacy of disclosure by exchanges of market maker and incentive programs.

Conclusion

I said at the outset that where we are today in the implementation of reforms of the swaps market has many parallels to the reforms of the securities market after the Great Depression. The framework created then – including public disclosure and regular reporting, and trading on regulated platforms – was controversial at the time. But it has proven to not only be effective, it has provided a vital foundation on which our securities markets grew to become the most dynamic in the world. I believe we can achieve the same result with the derivatives market. We must always be attentive to how the market is changing, and adapt core principles to those changes. I look forward to working with you to achieve that goal.

Last Updated: June 3, 2015

Friday, June 5, 2015

Structured Products – Complexity and Disclosure – Do Retail Investors Really Understand What They Are Buying and What the Risks Are?

Structured Products – Complexity and Disclosure – Do Retail Investors Really Understand What They Are Buying and What the Risks Are?

INVESTMENT ADVISER TO PAY OVER $1 MILLION TO ONCLUDE FRAUD CASES WITH SEC

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Litigation Release No. 23273 / June 1, 2015
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sage Advisory Group, LLC and Benjamin Lee Grant, Civil Action No. 10-cv-11665 (D. Mass. September 29, 2010)
Securities and Exchange Commission v. John A. Grant, Sage Advisory Group, LLC and Benjamin Lee Grant, Civil Action No. 11-cv-11538 (D. Mass. September 1, 2011)
Court Orders Massachusetts Investment Adviser to Pay Over $1 Million to Conclude Two SEC Fraud Cases

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that, on May 29, 2015, the Honorable George A. O'Toole Jr. of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered final judgments against the one-time registered investment adviser Sage Advisory Group, LLC, and its principal, Benjamin Lee Grant ("Lee Grant"), both of Boston, MA, in two fraud cases filed by the SEC. A federal court jury previously found Sage and Lee Grant liable for fraud in the first case, and Sage and Lee Grant recently admitted liability for fraud in the second case. Among other relief, the final judgments impose permanent injunctions against future violations of certain antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and order Sage and Lee Grant to pay a total of $1,051,038.

In the first case, filed on September 29, 2010, the Commission alleged that Lee Grant had fraudulently led his brokerage customers to transfer their assets to Sage, his new advisory firm. Prior to October 2005, Lee Grant was a registered representative of broker-dealer Wedbush Morgan Securities and had customer accounts representing approximately $100 million in assets, virtually all of which were managed by California-based investment adviser First Wilshire Securities Management. According to the complaint, Lee Grant resigned from Wedbush in September 2005 so that he could operate Sage, his own newly-minted investment advisory firm. Lee Grant made false and misleading statements to his former brokerage customers. Among other things, Lee Grant misled customers by telling them that the changes in their accounts were being done at the suggestion of First Wilshire and that First Wilshire was not willing to continue managing the customers' assets if they stayed with Wedbush. Lee Grant also told customers that the "wrap fee" program being offered by Sage offered potential savings, based on historical commission costs - without disclosing that a new arrangement with a discount broker would produce substantial savings to the benefit of Sage, not the customers, under the "wrap fee." To rush his customers to sign up as advisory clients with Sage, Lee Grant falsely suggested that they might suffer disruption in First Wilshire's management of their assets unless they signed and returned the new advisory and custodial account documents as soon as possible.

Following trial, on August 13, 2014, a federal district court jury found both Sage and Lee Grant liable for fraud under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, among other charges.

In the second case, filed on September 1, 2011, the Commission alleged that Sage and Lee Grant separately violated the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act, as did Lee Grant's father, Jack Grant. The Commission's complaint alleged that Jack Grant violated a Commission bar from association with investment advisers by associating with Sage and by acting as an investment adviser himself. The Commission bar had been based on a 1988 Commission enforcement action against Jack Grant alleging that he sold $5,500,000 of unregistered securities and misappropriated investors' funds. The Commission alleged in its September 2011 complaint that, notwithstanding his agreement to accept a Commission bar to settle the 1988 action, Jack Grant did not remove himself from the securities business and instead continued to provide investment advice to individuals and small businesses. The Commission's complaint alleged that he retooled his service as the Law Offices of Jack Grant and used his son, Lee Grant, to help implement his investment advice. The complaint further alleged that Jack Grant, Lee Grant, and Sage failed to inform their advisory clients that Jack Grant was barred from associating with investment advisers. In May 2013, the court entered a final judgment against Jack Grant on a settled basis, ordering Jack Grant to pay a total of $201,392.27, among other relief.

The final judgments entered against Sage and Lee Grant on May 29, 2015 conclude the cases and were entered with Sage's and Lee Grant's consent. The final judgment in the first case acknowledges the jury's liability finding, imposes permanent injunctions against future violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), 206(4), and 204A of the Investment Advisers Act and Rules 204A-1 and 206(4)-7 thereunder, orders Sage and Lee Grant to pay on a joint and several basis $500,000 in disgorgement and $51,038 in prejudgment interest, and orders Lee Grant to pay an additional $350,000 civil penalty. The final judgment in the second case imposes additional permanent injunctions against future violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 207 of the Investment Advisers Act and orders Lee Grant to pay an additional $150,000 civil penalty. As part of their consent in the second case, Sage and Lee Grant acknowledged that their conduct violated the federal securities laws and admitted the underlying facts establishing the violations.

Lee Grant also consented to the Commission's entry in follow-on administrative proceedings of a permanent bar, pursuant to Section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act, prohibiting him from association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser, among other entities. The Commission entered the administrative order on June 1, 2015.

For further information on the first case, see Litigation Release No. 21672 (September 29, 2010) (SEC Charges Massachusetts-Based Investment Adviser with Fraud); and Litigation Release 23066 (August 13, 2014) (Jury Returns Verdict Against Massachusetts Investment Adviser in SEC Fraud Case).

For further information on the second case, see Litigation Release No. 22081 (September 1, 2011) (SEC Charges Massachusetts-Based Attorney for Violating an Investment Adviser Bar and his Son for Failing to Disclose his Father's Bar to Advisory Clients); and Litigation Release No. 22708 (May 30, 2013) (SEC Obtains Final Judgment and Issues Administrative Orders against John A. ("Jack") Grant).

Thursday, June 4, 2015

SEC CHAIRMAN WHITE'S REMARKS BEFORE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Opening Remarks of SEC Chair Mary Jo White before the SEC Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies
Chair Mary Jo White
June 3, 2015

Good morning. Thank you all for being here. Steve, Chris, and all committee members, I appreciate the full agenda you have today, and I will be brief in my update and comments so that you can get to the business at hand.

I am pleased to note that since your last meeting, the Commission in March adopted Regulation A+. I know this Committee was eager for that rule to be finalized, as were we. I believe the rule we adopted will provide an additional and effective path to raising capital that also provides strong investor protections. I look forward to seeing companies put the rules to good use to raise capital.

On other fronts, we continue to advance the completion of our other rulemaking mandates under the JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, and as we have discussed before, it is one of my priorities to complete the crowdfunding rulemaking this year, which is our last significant JOBS Act rulemaking. Crowdfunding in its various forms obviously remains a focus of many others, including this Committee, the states and in various countries around the world.

Indeed, more than 20 states have enacted some form of intrastate crowdfunding legislation or rules, and a number of others are considering similar initiatives. As states are seeking to expand the avenues in which issuers may conduct intrastate offerings, we have focused on the fact that some of our laws and rules were put into place years ago prior to widespread use of the internet and may present challenges to the states’ efforts.

For example, Securities Act Rule 147, which you will be discussing today, created a safe harbor that issuers often rely on for intrastate offerings. Rule 147 was adopted in 1974, and how an issuer might conduct an intrastate offering using the internet was not contemplated at that time. The staff in the Division of Corporation Finance is currently considering ways to improve the rule, by looking at, among other things, the conditions included in the rule for an offering to be considered intrastate. Securities Act Rule 504, an exemption that could be used to facilitate regional crowdfunding offerings for up to $1 million that are registered in one or more states, is another rule that may benefit from modernization and the staff is considering ways to do that. We look forward to having your input on these topics and to hearing your thoughts on whether there are aspects of these or other rules that could be usefully updated or changed.

It is also quite timely for this Committee to be taking up public company disclosure effectiveness. As you know, the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance is hard at work on our initiative to improve the effectiveness of the public company disclosure regime for investors and companies. The staff has sought input from a broad range of market participants and is in the process of developing recommendations for the Commission’s consideration. We welcome your thoughts in this area that I know is of particular interest to many of you.

I look forward to your input on the other topics on your agenda, including the Section 4(a)(1½) exemption, and the issues surrounding broker-dealer registration for those who identify or otherwise “find” potential investors in private placements. I am also glad to see a continuation of your consideration of venture exchanges as an avenue for secondary market liquidity.

I will stop here. As always, we very much appreciate the time and expertise you devote to this Committee. I wish you a very productive meeting.

Thank you.

Wednesday, June 3, 2015

CFTC COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO MAKES STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION MERCHANTS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Statement of Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo for the Market Risk Advisory Committee Meeting
June 1, 2015

Federal government policies are making America’s Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs) an endangered species. The most recent example is the storied commodities firm, Bache, founded in 1879, that is now being dismembered. A French bank is acquiring a portion of it, while thousands of its clients are being told to find new FCMs to serve their business needs.1

While not a household term, “FCMs” are the futures markets equivalent of stock brokers providing critical services for businesses that need to hedge against business and production risks. Today, because of a combination of mismanagement by a few, U.S. monetary policy and over-regulation, FCMs are consolidating at an alarming rate with dire consequences for America’s farmers, ranchers and manufacturers. Tomorrow, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC), under the sponsorship of Commissioner Sharon Bowen, will hold a hearing to discuss the plight of American FCMs.

That hearing will undoubtedly recognize that there are far fewer FCMs than there used to be. The number of FCMs has dramatically fallen in the past 40 years: from over 400 in the late 1970s, to 154 before the 2008 financial crisis,2 and down to just 72 today.3 Of the 72 FCMs registered with the CFTC as of March 2015, 15 firms were dormant, leaving only 57 active firms serving customers.4 As the number of FCMs has dwindled, systemic risk has increased with the five largest firms accounting for more than 70 percent of the market.5 Meanwhile, customer assets held by all FCMs have grown from $169.5 billion in December 2007 to $245.7 billion in March 2015.6

Industry consolidation derives from several factors. Fraud and mismanagement caused spectacular failures of firms like Refco, MF Global and Peregrine Financial. The prolonged U.S. monetary policy of near zero percent interest rates has eliminated a key source of income for FCMs through reinvestment of customer money.7

Another threat to FCM survival comes from burdensome new regulations. The collapse of MF Global and Peregrine Financial prompted a series of new customer protection rules,8 some of which were undoubtedly needed. However, these new rules have impacted small FCMs more harshly than large ones. In addition, the CFTC’s new rules on ownership and control reporting greatly increased compliance and paperwork burdens for FCMs.9 The CFTC also further expanded FCM recordkeeping obligations to include the recording of all oral and written communications leading up to the execution of a transaction.10 The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) rule issued last year by U.S. prudential regulators will make it more expensive for bank-owned FCMs to clear customer trades. That is because the SLR requires banks to hold more capital for every asset on their books, even margin held for clients on cleared trades of commodity futures, leading to diminished FCM income and increased client costs.

FCMs as an industry are spending millions of dollars for infrastructure, technology and compliance personnel to implement these complex regulations. Smaller FCMs that traditionally serve agricultural and small manufacturing interests must devote precious resources to comply with cumbersome rules more easily handled by large bank-affiliated competitors. FCMs are also overwhelmed by significantly increased demands for information from self-regulatory organizations and the CFTC. One FCM told me that it receives around 9,000 regulatory requests per year!

While many new rules contain plausible protections, regulators have lost sight of the increased costs for FCMs. Most of the rules have been imposed without a true analysis of the effect on FCMs and end-users.11 As a result, many small to medium-sized FCMs providing specialized services to everyday businesses are charging higher fees or leaving the industry because they cannot afford the additional infrastructure, technology and compliance costs imposed by the swelling regulations. Still, others have stopped clearing swaps for customers, which has the perverse effect of concentrating risk in fewer and fewer firms, a dangerous proposition in light of Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate.

The Dodd-Frank Act was ostensibly about reforming “Wall Street.” Yet, again, the increased costs and burdens that directly or indirectly flow from the law have negatively impacted Main Street and America’s farmers, ranchers and manufacturers who need the services of the remaining small and medium-sized FCMs. Rules born out of the law are forcing America’s farmers, ranchers and manufacturers to pay higher fees for less choice in FCM services. With fewer firms serving a bigger market, risk is being more concentrated in large bank-affiliated firms, increasing the systemic risk that Dodd-Frank promised to reduce. Undoubtedly, heightened systemic risk arising from FCM consolidation is appropriate for consideration and analysis by MRAC.

If we are not careful, America’s rural producers will soon be left with few places to protect against business risk. The Midwest farmer who plants 1,000 acres of corn may have no choice but to go unhedged against market volatility. Sadly, it appears that the markets where “derivatives” were born are quickly losing their core service providers, possibly forever.

1 Christian Berthelsen and Tatyana Shumsky, SocGen Deal for Bache Illustrates Commodity-Trading Woe, The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/socgen-deal-for-bache-illustrates-commodity-trading-woe-1432681628.

2 CFTC, Selected FCM Financial Data as of December 31, 2007, http://www.cftc.gov/files/tm/fcm/fcmdata1207.pdf (last visited May 26, 2015) (excludes firms registered solely as retail foreign exchange dealers).

3 CFTC, Selected FCM Financial Data as of March 31, 2015, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@financialdataforfcms/documents/file/fcmdata0315.pdf (last visited May 26, 2015) (excludes firms registered solely as retail foreign exchange dealers).

4 Id.

5 Joe Rennison, Nomura Exits Swaps Clearing for US and European Customers, Financial Times, May 12, 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1883676-f896-11e4-be00-00144feab7de.html#axzz3bSYWViZ4 (based on amount of customer collateral required according to CFTC data).

6 The March 2015 number includes $53.1 billion in cleared swaps customer assets that was not included in the December 2007 number. See supra note 2 and 3.

7 17 C.F.R. 1.25.

8 Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds Held by Futures Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 FR 68506, 68510-12 (Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing recent customer protection initiatives).

9 Ownership and Control Reports, Forms 102/102S, 40/40S, and 71, 78 FR 69178 (Nov. 18, 2013).

10 17 C.F.R. 1.35. The rule applies to transactions in a commodity interest and related cash or forward transactions. Oral communications that lead solely to the execution of a related cash or forward transaction are excluded.

11 7 U.S.C. 19(1), CEA 15(a). Given the CFTC’s lax cost-benefit consideration requirements.