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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Friday, October 4, 2013

SEC FILES ACTION AGAINST NEW JERSEY RESIDENT IN ALLEGED PRIME BANK INVESTMENT SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

SEC Charges New Jersey Resident in Prime Bank Investment Scheme and Files Settled Charges Against California Attorney Escrow Agent

On September 27, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against New Jersey resident Brett A. Cooper and his companies Global Funding Systems LLC, Dream Holdings, LLC, Fortitude Investing, LLC, Peninsula Waterfront Development, LP and REOP Group Inc., who from at least November 2008 through about April 2012 perpetrated three fraudulent schemes and engaged in various fraudulent and deceitful acts, practices and courses of business in furtherance of those schemes.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that, in the first scheme, commonly referred to as a “Prime Bank Fraud”, Cooper raised approximately $1.4 million from investors by claiming to have special access to programs that through pooling of funds allowed individual investors to participate in this investment opportunity generally available only to Wall Street insiders. Cooper misrepresented to investors that the financial instruments are issued by the world’s largest and most financially sound banks; used vague, complex, and meaningless legal and financial terms designed to deceive the investors into believing that he offered legitimate investments; misrepresented that extraordinary returns of up to 1,000 percent within as little as 60 days were possible with little risk to principal; lied to investors that their principal would be collateralized with cash or semi-precious gemstones; and lied that their money would remain safe in escrow with attorneys pending the completion of certain steps in the transaction.

In the second scheme, also purportedly involving investment in prime bank paper, Cooper offered to participate as an investor in the purchase and trade of a $100 million bank guarantee on the condition that all investor funds were pooled in an attorney client trust account. Cooper sent a forged escrow agreement, purportedly from an attorney, containing wiring instructions for the attorney client trust account. The wire instructions, however, were for an account controlled by Cooper, not an attorney acting as escrow agent. The four investors unwittingly deposited a total of $925,000 in the phony escrow account which was, in fact, for Cooper’s company Dream Holdings, after which Cooper misappropriated the funds.

In March 2012 Cooper and his company REOP participated in a third scheme involving the sale of a purported Brazilian sovereign bond. Cooper claimed that, in exchange for a $50,000 “fee”, he would locate a buyer for the bond and open an account at a registered broker-dealer, which Cooper claimed was necessary to sell the bond. Cooper forged a letter that purported to be from the broker-dealer indicating that the bond had been “accepted” by the broker-dealer. Based upon this letter, the deceived investor paid Cooper’s $50,000 “fee”.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Cooper used the investor money to pay personal expenses, buy cars, pay associates in the scheme, and fund frequent gambling junkets to casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that, despite his offering and selling of securities, Cooper has never been registered with the SEC to sell securities.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that Cooper and his companies violated the antifraud and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal securities laws. Specifically, the complaint alleges that they each violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; that Cooper aided and abetted violations of Securities Act, Section 17(a) and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; and that Cooper also violated Exchange Act Section 15(a). The SEC seeks permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest thereon, and civil penalties against each defendant.

Also on September 27, 2013, the SEC charged California attorney David H. Frederickson, a sole practitioner, and his law firm The Law Offices of David H. Frederickson, with aiding and abetting Cooper’s prime bank scheme in two transactions in 2010 and 2011.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed separately in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Frederickson served as escrow agent for two of Cooper’s prime bank transactions, and provided letters to investors stating that their investments were secured by collateral owned by Cooper’s company Global Funding Systems LLC. Frederickson did nothing to verify the value, authenticity, or ownership of the collateral, which Cooper claimed to be seven sapphires valued at $376 million. The SEC’s complaint also alleges that by the time Frederickson served as escrow agent for the second of these investors, Frederickson had learned facts indicating that Cooper had affixed Frederickson’s electronic signature to a forged escrow agreement that caused investor funds to be diverted to another Cooper company instead of being sent to Frederickson’s escrow account. Moreover, Frederickson told this second investor that he had served as escrow agent for Cooper in numerous other successful bank instrument trading transactions. In fact, none of the bank instrument trading transactions had been successful.

Frederickson earned a total of $6,790 in escrow fees for these transactions and for a transaction involving an escrow agreement Cooper forged, for which Frederickson provided no escrow services. These fees were paid from the funds of the defrauded investors.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Frederickson and his firm agreed to settle the case against them. The settlement is pending final approval by the court. Specifically, Frederickson and his firm consented to the entry of a final judgment that (1) permanently enjoins each of them from violating or aiding and abetting violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; (2) permanently enjoins each of them from providing professional legal or escrow services in connection with, or from participating directly or indirectly in, the issuance, offer, or sale of securities involving bank guarantees, medium term notes, standby letters of credit, structured notes, and similar instruments, provided, however, that such injunction shall not prevent Frederickson from purchasing or selling securities listed on a national securities exchange; and (3) orders them to pay, jointly and severally, disgorgement and prejudgment interest totaling $7,257, and a civil penalty in the amount of $25,000, for a total of $32,257.

As part of the settlement, and following the entry of the proposed final judgment, Frederickson, without admitting or denying the Commission’s findings, has consented to the entry of a Commission order pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of the Commission’s rules of practice permanently suspending him from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an attorney.
The SEC’s complaints in these matters allege fictitious investments involving so-called "bank guarantees," “stand-by letters of credit,” or foreign “trading platforms,” among other purported investment vehicles. 

SEC SETTLES WITH HEDGE FUND MANAGER IN PONZI SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
SEC Settles Action Against Oregon-Based Hedge Fund Manager Yusaf Jawed, Who Masterminded a Ponzi Scheme

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on Sept. 11, 2013, final judgments were entered against Yusaf Jawed and his two entities (Grifphon Asset Management, LLC and Grifphon Holdings, LLC), which enjoin them from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder and order them to pay disgorgement and interest of $33,909,974. The Commission's previously filed complaint alleged that Jawed through the two entities he controlled masterminded a long-running, $30-plus million Ponzi scheme that defrauded more than 100 investors in the Pacific Northwest and across the country.

Based on the final judgment against Jawed, the Commission issued today an Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions that bars Jawed from association with any investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization.

Thursday, October 3, 2013

MARY JO WHITE'S SPEECH TO THE ANNUAL MARKET STRUCTURE CONFERENCE ON EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE

Focusing on Fundamentals: The Path to Address Equity Market Structure

 

Chair Mary Jo White

Security Traders Association 80th Annual Market Structure Conference, Washington, D.C.
Oct. 2, 2013
I am truly honored to be here, particularly at your 80th annual market structure conference, which makes your conference even older than I am – by about a decade and a half. Thank you for that as well. The much “older than I am” occasions get fewer and farther between.
As market professionals, you obviously live the U.S. equity markets first hand, day in and day out. As an association, you have used your voice to focus attention on the value of our equity markets – an all-important engine for capital formation, job creation, and economic growth.
Like you, I believe that we must constantly strive to ensure that the U.S. equity markets continue to serve the interests of all investors. That mutual challenge must come fully of age and address today’s, not yesterday’s, markets. And today, I will speak about the path forward.

Attracting Investors and Public Companies

The success or failure of capital formation in the equity markets depends on two key constituencies – investors and public companies.
Without investors willing to accept the long-term risks and rewards of ownership in public companies, the equity markets cannot exist. This is equally true whether they participate in the markets directly or indirectly through institutional investors, like mutual or pension funds.
But even interested investors will be greatly limited in their choices if the equity markets do not provide an effective and efficient way for a broad range of public companies to access capital.
Companies directly raise capital in primary offerings, but it is the secondary market that makes these offerings viable. Without a robust secondary market, companies simply cannot attract the necessary interest from investors. A good secondary market assures investors will have an efficient means of liquidating their positions if and when they choose. And a strong secondary market generates price discovery that helps efficiently allocate capital to the companies most able to put it to productive uses.
Market structure plays an essential role in attracting investors and companies to the public equity markets. Our market structure should inspire confidence in investors and companies that they will be treated fairly and that the system will work efficiently. Without this confidence, our market structure can act as a headwind that will impede capital formation.
We are fortunate that the U.S. equity markets currently operate from a position of extraordinary strength. [1] The U.S. equity markets are rightly considered the envy of the world in terms of the companies they attract and their broad investor participation.
But markets continually evolve, and there are signs that require our attention. The number of U.S.-listed companies has declined to approximately 4,900 from a high of more than 8,000 in 1997.[2] And, while estimates of equity participation reached a high of 65% of U.S. households in 2007, they have since declined each year, despite the general rise in equity price levels.[3]

Understanding the Fundamentals

It is natural to ask whether these signs reflect problems in our present equity market structure, particularly given the sweeping transformations of recent years. As traders, you are well aware that trading today is high-tech, high-speed, and widely dispersed among many different trading venues.[4] The extremely short-term strategies of high-frequency trading firms represent more than half of all trading volume.[5] A steadily increasing percentage of trading occurs in “dark” venues, which now appear to execute more than half of the orders of long-term investors.[6] And technology itself has been a transformative force, enabling previously unimaginable methods for order generation, routing, and execution.
Although some have argued otherwise, these developments are not attributable solely to regulatory choices. Competition plays a powerful role. Well before Regulation NMS, market participants were trading in dark pools and trading with highly automated strategies. Many jurisdictions around the world with different regulatory structures than ours are dealing with analogous issues related to off-exchange venues and automated trading.
The SEC, of course, must be in a position to fully understand all aspects of today’s equity market structure. I emphasized from before my first days as SEC Chair that addressing market structure issues would be one of my top priorities.
Back in 2010, the SEC took an important step when it published the Market Structure Concept Release that initiated a comprehensive review of equity market structure. Over the last year, we have intensified this effort, and I believe we should do more.
To address a difficult challenge successfully often starts with a focus on fundamentals. I am concerned that, as the complexity of our market structure has grown, so too has the complexity of the “diagnoses” offered and the “solutions” proffered. Some of those efforts and ideas may very well bear out, but, like batters in a slump who often turn to fundamental mechanics to rebuild and improve their swings, I believe we too must focus on a few important fundamentals in our review of equity market structure. Only with attention to these fundamentals can we get it right and address the issues smartly.
What are these fundamentals?
The first is that technology matters, and properly functioning markets demand it. Operational integrity was essential when markets depended on the technology of pen and paper and it is critical when they depend on sophisticated software.
The second fundamental is that we should identify and test our assumptions about market structure. In some cases, these assumptions seem almost accidental – for example, despite the marketplace’s ability, and our explicit authority, to differentiate between stocks with different trading characteristics, today’s market structure has evolved to be “one-size-fits-all.” In other cases, our assumptions seem driven by long-standing market practices, statutes, or regulations – suggesting that because it always has been a certain way, it must remain that way.
The third fundamental is that decisions should be based, to the extent possible, on empirical evidence. We recognize that the same evidence may be interpreted differently by parties with different assumptions, perspectives, and interests. But much of the current discussion around market structure seems rooted more in anecdote – and, at times, self-interest – than in evidence. If we want to make good decisions about our markets, empirical evidence provides, at the very least, a starting point for a principled dialogue about what – if anything – is to be changed in our market structure.
Let me briefly elaborate on each of these fundamentals.

Focusing on Operational Integrity

One clear, and to my mind indisputable, focus of our attention must be operational integrity. The technology systems that drive today’s markets – and what will become their successors – are here to stay.
There are clear benefits that flow from technology. It has created tremendous efficiency, and many have seen significant improvements in trading costs and access to capital due to the technological revolution in our market structure over the last 15 years. But systems can fail or operate in unexpected or unintended ways. And the risk of that naturally increases as technology systems become faster, more pervasive, and more complex.
We all recognize that some risk of failure is inherent in any technology system. But that does not mean we should not always be striving toward zero tolerance for errors and interruptions. We must address these risks by striking the right balance of reliability, functionality, and cost.
Over the last year and a half, unfortunately, the U.S. equity and options markets have experienced a spate of events that call into question whether the markets have achieved the right balance. These include systems failures at exchanges and problems at broker-dealers with order routing systems. And recently, the equity markets experienced the August 22nd disruption in the dissemination of consolidated market data, which led to a trading halt in all NASDAQ-listed stocks for several hours.
We should not confuse these events as the byproducts of high-frequency trading or activity in dark venues, as some often do. These events involved relatively basic, albeit serious, errors. Many could have happened in a less complex market structure. But the persistent recurrence of these events can undermine the confidence of investors and public companies in the integrity of the U.S. equity market structure as a whole.
In 2010, the SEC took a very important step to address operational integrity at broker-dealers when it adopted the Market Access Rule.[7] The risk management controls it requires are a critically important aspect of market integrity in a structure where orders are generated and routed by computer algorithms that, when defective, can flood the market and rapidly exhaust normal supplies of liquidity.
That rule has now been in place for three years, yet the continued occurrence of failures in order routing systems and controls clearly shows there is still work to be done in implementing effective controls at broker-dealers. And the industry must continue to work on other protections, such as kill switches at exchanges, to address mistakes that slip through a broker-dealer’s controls.
Broker-dealers, of course, are only part of our interconnected market system. Issues with operational integrity extend to exchanges, alternative trading platforms, and other systems.
The SEC and the industry are making progress in this area, but there is still much to do. For our part, this past March we proposed new Regulation SCI to bolster systems compliance and integrity.[8] I look forward to, and ask from you and other industry participants, a constructive and inclusive dialogue as we move forward.
Although we should move forward expeditiously with Regulation SCI, the shutdown of the NASDAQ consolidated data processor confirmed that we cannot wait for, nor rely solely on, this proposed regulation to address especially single points of failure where a disruption can have an impact across the entire national market system.
I met with executives of the exchanges last month and challenged them to together develop and implement the necessary steps to improve the resilience of the technology surrounding critical market infrastructures.[9] In short order, we expect to receive comprehensive action plans that address the standards necessary to establish highly resilient and robust systems for securities information processors. I have also asked the SEC staff to engage the exchanges, clearing agencies, and FINRA to conduct a “mapping” of other critical infrastructure systems and provide assessments of their robustness and resilience.
In addition, I asked the exchanges and FINRA to prioritize their efforts on a number of initiatives to assure that, when problems do occur, they are resolved promptly and in a way that maintains the confidence of investors.[10]
In all of these efforts, we must engage the full range of market participants, including broker-dealers and investors. I look forward to seeing the results of these efforts and their speedy implementation.

Challenging Our Market Structure Assumptions

We also need to rethink some of the assumptions that underlie today’s market structure.
Assumptions matter. They confine the flexibility that we believe is available to us as regulators, and they do the same for you as market participants. It is important that we identify and test these assumptions because technology and trading practices constantly evolve, and even the “perfect” trading model for today quickly becomes obsolete. Trading venues of all types should have the flexibility, and the incentives, to competitively innovate to better meet the needs of their ultimate customers – investors and public companies.
Challenging assumptions is a key part of the comprehensive review of market structure that started with the Concept Release, and I think it is the part that is often emphasized in discussions of a “holistic” review of market structure.

One-Size-Fits-All Market Structure

I believe that one unspoken assumption about our listed equity market structure has been that it must be a “one-size-fits-all” structure. For the most part, market rules and trading mechanisms are today the same regardless of wide variations in the “size” of public companies.
STA has been a leading voice for market structure rules that fit the particular needs of smaller companies. Similarly, our Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies submitted recommendations earlier this year with the goal of improving market structure for smaller companies.[11]
In 1975, Congress gave the SEC authority to facilitate the establishment of a national market system, including authority to establish subsystems for stocks with unique trading characteristics.[12] This authority permits different types of stocks to be treated differently. We should consider how we can better use the data currently available to us to inform those decisions and how we can develop empirical analytics to help us measure success or failure.
As one step in this direction, I have instructed the SEC staff to move forward on earlier efforts to work with the exchanges as they develop and, if possible, present to the Commission for its consideration a plan to implement a pilot program that would allow smaller companies to use wider tick sizes.

Exchange Competition and Self-Regulatory Model

Another set of assumptions about our current market structure is related to the nature of exchange competition and the nature of the self-regulatory model itself.
Equity exchanges today operate fully electronic, high-speed trading systems using a business model that mostly was developed by electronic communications networks, or ECNs, prior to Regulation NMS.[13] Indeed, in many ways, today’s exchanges are yesterday’s ECNs.
Exchanges differ from ECNs, however, in significant respects. Exchanges, for example, continue to exercise self-regulatory functions, even as they operate as for-profit entities.
This model for exchanges has encountered challenges. As I noted earlier, for example, the “lit” exchanges no longer attract even one-half of long-term investor orders.
From time to time, equity exchanges have adopted trading models that use different fee structures or attempt to focus on different priorities, such as order size or retail investor participation.[14] These models have been met with mixed success, which raises the question as to whether exchanges have a real opportunity to develop different trading models that preserve pricing transparency and are more attractive to investors.
As is true for all important aspects of our current market structure, the current nature of exchange competition and the self-regulatory model should be fully evaluated in light of the evolving market structure and trading practices. This evaluation should include whether the current exchange regulatory structure continues to meet the needs of investors and public companies. Does it provide sufficient flexibility for exchanges to implement transparent trading models that can effectively compete for investor orders? Does the current approach to self-regulation limit or support exchange trading models?
This evaluation should also assess how trading venues can better balance their commercial incentives and regulatory responsibilities. For example, is there an appropriate balance for exchanges in key areas, such as the maintenance of critical market infrastructure? And are off-exchange venues subject to appropriate regulatory requirements for the types of business they today conduct?

Grounding Market Structure Assessments in Empirical Evidence

The SEC’s 2010 Concept Release[15] asked some of these and other questions about the performance of the post-Regulation NMS market structure generally. It also asked commenters for data to support their responses. Strikingly, little such data was provided.
This is a significant issue. We – and you – are best positioned to assess and develop any proposed changes to market structure, whether they are initiated by us or through competition among participants, if we have meaningful empirical evidence.
Data alone, of course, will not reconcile all of the widely differing and often conflicting views on market structure. But the right data can be used to test hypotheses, identify and eliminate potential problems, and narrow and focus the debate to the real issues. Investors, companies, and markets all demand – and deserve – as much.

Developing Better Sources

For our part, we are engaging in a wide-ranging effort to seek out better sources of data to better assess today’s complex markets.
These sources include MIDAS, the market information and data analysis system that the SEC staff began operating in January. The SEC also adopted the Large Trader Reporting Rule,[16] which began last year to more efficiently collect information on most of the trading activity of key market participants, including high‑frequency traders. In addition, the SEC adopted the Consolidated Audit Trail Rule,[17] which, when implemented, should significantly enhance the ability of regulators to monitor the equity markets. In the meantime, SEC staff is using FINRA’s existing audit trail data to analyze equity trading, particularly in the off-exchange markets.
We also are paying close attention to initiatives of foreign regulators who are dealing with market structure issues analogous to ours.[18]

Engaging the Public Debate

Our next immediate step is to start making this empirical information, which we are already using extensively, publicly available to help inform the broader market structure debate. All should have an opportunity to consider the issues with the benefit of the information we have and are using.
So, today, I am pleased to announce a new initiative we are launching that is designed to promote a fuller empirical understanding of the equity markets. SEC staff has prepared and assembled resources and data on the SEC’s web site focusing exclusively on equity market structure. The new web site should be available as early as next week and will serve as a central location for us to publicly share evolving data, research, and analysis.
Part of this initiative will be to disseminate data and related observations drawn from MIDAS that address the nature and quality of displayed liquidity across the full range of U.S.-listed equities –from the life-time of quotes, to the speed of the market, to the nature of order cancellations.
Every day MIDAS collects one billion records, time-stamped to the microsecond. The information comes from the consolidated tapes and the proprietary feeds of each exchange, and includes posted orders and quotes, modifications and cancellations, and trade executions both on- and off-exchange. Typically, only sophisticated market participants have had access to all of this data, and fewer still have had the ability to process it.
The web site will allow users to explore key market metrics and trends based on aggregate analyses of tens of billions of MIDAS records over the last year. Not only are we making these analyses available, we’re making them accessible. With the click of a mouse, results will be available in clear, easy‑to‑read charts and graphs.
We expect this new tool to transform the debate on market structure by focusing it as never before on data, not anecdote.
To give an illustration, the staff has developed a data series tracking the total volume of visible orders at all the price levels sent to our public exchanges and comparing this volume to the total volume of shares actually traded. As expected, only a small percentage of orders sent to exchanges are not cancelled and actually result in trades. But perhaps less expected is that cancellation rates for orders in exchange-traded products can generally be five to ten times larger than for corporate stocks.[19] Such observations highlight how different types of equity products can vary in their effects on markets and their structure.
Staff has also used this data to compare the speed at which exchange orders are cancelled to the speed at which orders are executed. Recent data on corporate stocks shows that almost two-thirds of all orders “rest” for half a second or longer. Though we can clearly see that quotes are sometimes cancelled within a millisecond or faster, the data show that the high-speed market is not dominated by such cancellations. In fact, over a quarter of all exchange-based trades in corporate stocks are executed against orders that have rested for only half a second or less. These findings not only provide an empirical basis for measuring and tracking the speed of today’s markets, but also suggest that even short-lived quotes are generally accessible by at least some traders.
The new web site will also feature staff research papers based on a variety of data sources and staff reviews that identify and assemble information from the expanding economic literature on market structure topics. One paper, using order audit trail data on off-exchange trading, provides key metrics describing the underlying nature of off-exchange trading by the 44 alternative trading systems that trade equity securities. The staff’s primary observation is that ATS trading looks very similar in many respects to exchange trading.[20] Another paper summarizes current studies that address market fragmentation – both visible and dark. Additional research papers and reviews are already planned.
We are very excited about this new initiative and we look forward to your feedback.

Conclusion

Gathering, disseminating, and analyzing data, testing assumptions about our complex, dispersed marketplace, and ensuring the integrity of market technology are the fundamental steps that are needed to address today’s market structure concerns in a responsible manner.
Participation of STA members, other market participants, and the broader public is needed to advance these measures. In many cases, a little homework may address a concern or identify a necessary action for the SEC or the industry. In others, these measures may generate more questions and require additional analysis, providing the building blocks for more complex initiatives.
Ultimately, we must be able to show investors and companies that concerns about the current U.S. equity market structure can be properly diagnosed and, when needed, properly addressed. This is a very high priority for me. I am confident that this goal can be achieved and that the U.S. equity markets will continue to work well for investors so that they can both drive capital formation and participate in the benefits of economic growth.
Thank you.


[1] By the end of 2012, U.S. equity markets served more than 4,900 listed companies, and the market capitalization of these companies was more than $18 trillion – more than five times greater than any other jurisdiction. Source: World Federation of Exchanges (statistics available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual-query-tool). In addition, 52% of all U.S. households are estimated to have some form of equity investment. Source: Gallup (available athttp://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx).
[2] Source: World Federation of Exchanges (statistics available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual-query-tool).
[4] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61358, “Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,” 75 FR 3594, 3598 (January 21, 2010) (“Market Structure Concept Release”) (trading volume divided among many different exchanges, ATSs, and internalizing broker-dealers).
[5] Market Structure Concept Release, 75 FR at 3606.
[6] Rule 606 of Regulation NMS, 17 CFR 242.606, requires brokers to prepare quarterly reports on the trading venues to which they route customer orders. For the quarter ending June 30, 2013, these reports from large retail brokers and institutional agency brokers generally indicate that they routed a majority or more of their customer orders to off-exchange dark venues.
[7] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63241, “Risk Management Controls for Broker-Dealers with Market Access,” 75 FR 69792 (November 15, 2010).
[8] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69077, “Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity,” 78 FR 18084 (March 25, 2013).
[9] SEC Chair White Statement on Meeting With Leaders of Exchanges, September 12, 2013 (available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539804861).
[10] Id. These initiatives include improving the process of declaring and communicating trading halts, breaking erroneous trades, and reopening the market following significant market events.
[11] Letter dated March 21, 2013, from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Co-Chairs, Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, to The Honorable Elisse B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (available athttp://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-032113-emerg-co-ltr.pdf) (recommending a separate U.S. equity market that would facilitate trading in the securities of small and emerging companies); letter dated March 21, 2013, from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Co-Chairs, Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, to The Honorable Elisse B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (available athttp://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-032113-spread-tick-size.pdf) (providing recommendations regarding trading spreads for smaller exchange-listed companies).
[12] Section 11A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1.
[13] Among other things, exchanges generally are “agnostic” when it comes to their participants, at least in principle. For the most part, orders from all participants are treated alike, and market makers have both few advantages and few obligations. Exchanges also generally charge significant access fees to liquidity taking orders and then rebate nearly all of the fees to liquidity providing orders. And exchanges offer tools that facilitate short-term algorithmic trading, such as co-located servers, complex order types, and data feeds with detailed order information.
[14] The NASDAQ Philadelphia Exchange, for example, launched a trading model focused on size of orders rather than speed, but attracted little volume. The NYSE and other exchanges have launched retail investor programs that, at least thus far, also have attracted little volume. And some exchanges have adopted different fee models, charging liquidity providers instead of liquidity takers.
[15] Market Structure Concept Release, 75 FR at 3596 (“To more fully understand the effects of these and other changes in equity trading, the Commission is conducting a comprehensive review of equity market structure. It is assessing whether market structure rules have kept pace with, among other things, changes in trading technology and practices.”).
[16] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64976, “Large Trader Reporting,” 76 FR 46960 (August 3, 2011).
[17] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67457, “Consolidated Audit Trail,” 77 FR 45722 (August 1, 2012).
[18] Market structure initiatives in other countries include regulatory steps related to high frequency trading and dark trading venues that have been implemented in Europe, Canada, and Australia, all of which may generate interesting empirical data that could help assess the considerations of similar measures in the United States.
[19] Higher cancellation rates do not suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with ETPs, and there are some well-understood reasons why cancellation rates for ETPs may, on average, be higher than for stocks. Every time an ETP component stock changes price, for example, market makers need to update their quotes – including cancelling their prior quotes – for the ETP.
[20] For example, approximately 70% of reported trades at both ATSs and exchanges are precisely 100 shares. And though five ATSs have average order sizes that exceed 1,000 shares, this volume represents only 3% of total ATS volume.

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

2 BANK EXECUTIVES CHARGED BY SEC WITH MAKING MISTATEMENTS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
SEC Charges Two Bank Executives for Financial Misstatements and Failure to Disclose Probable Loss on Troubled Loan

On September 24, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged two former bank executives at Illinois-based Mercantile Bancorp with failing to recognize in financial statements a probable loss on one of the bank’s largest troubled loans. Former CEO Ted Awerkamp of Amarillo, Texas, and former CFO Michael McGrath of Quincy, Ill., agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying penalties of $100,000 each and being barred from acting as an officer or director of a publicly traded company.

The SEC alleges that prior to the end of the third quarter in 2010, Awerkamp knew that the borrower in a shared national credit loan for a large residential real estate development to be built in Colorado Springs was unwilling or unable to contribute the necessary funds to complete the project, which served as collateral for the loan. He also knew that the collateral had declined significantly in value. After the third quarter but still weeks before the bank’s quarterly report was filed, Awerkamp and McGrath also learned that the borrower missed a loan payment and declared bankruptcy. Based on these and other events, U.S. accounting rules required Mercantile to recognize a $5.28 million loan loss in its third quarter financial statements, yet the bank failed to do so.

According to the SEC’s complaint, the failure to report the loan loss caused Mercantile to falsely state that its main subsidiary bank had met certain capital ratio thresholds required by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Mercantile also understated its net loss for the quarter and the nine months ending September 30. The bank reported those figures as $7.5 million and $11 million when they were actually at least $12.78 million and $16.28 million. Mercantile also falsely stated that its main subsidiary bank had a net income of $1.8 million for first nine months of 2010 when it actually had a net loss of at least $3.48 million during that period.

The SEC’s complaint charges Mercantile with violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-11 and 13a-13. Awerkamp is charged with violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b) and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, 13b2-1 and 13b2-2. He also is charged with aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-11 and 13a-13. McGrath is charged with violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b) and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, 13b2-1 and 13b2-2. He also is charged with aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13.

Mercantile, Awerkamp, and McGrath consented to the entry of final judgments without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations. In addition to the monetary sanctions and officer-and-director bars against Awerkamp and McGrath, they agreed to be permanently enjoined from future violations of these provisions of the securities laws.


Tuesday, October 1, 2013

SEC CHARGES VIDEO GAME COMPANY CEO IN SCHEME TO INFLATE COMPANY REVENUE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
SEC Charges CEO of Video Game Company and Purported Consultant in Revenue Inflation Scheme

On September 24, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged the founder of a religious-themed video game manufacturer and his friend with scheming to falsely inflate the company's revenue by nearly 1,300 percent in a one-year period through sham circular transactions.

The SEC alleges that Troy Lyndon, who serves as the company's CEO and CFO, caused Left Behind Games Inc. to issue almost two billion shares of stock to Ronald Zaucha as purported compensation for consulting services to the California-based company. The true purpose of the arrangement was to enable Zaucha to sell millions of unregistered shares of Left Behind Games stock into the market and then kick back a portion of his stock proceeds to the company in order to prop up its revenue at a time when it was in dire need of additional funds.

The SEC's complaint was filed September 24, 2013. Lyndon lives in Honolulu and Zaucha lives in Maui. The company's stock was suspended by the SEC today.

According to the SEC's complaint, Left Behind Games was founded in 2001 and touted itself as "the only publicly-traded exclusive publisher of Christian modern media" and "the world leader in the publication of Christian video games and a Christian social network provider." However, financial troubles caused the company to terminate all of its employees and close its office at the end of 2011.

The SEC alleges that Lyndon and Zaucha concocted their scheme beginning in 2009 in an apparent last-ditch fraudulent effort to save the company, which was unprofitable and severely undercapitalized at the time. Left Behind Games issued stock to Zaucha for his so-called consulting services, and at Lyndon's direction he promptly sold virtually all of his stock for approximately $4.6 million in proceeds. Zaucha then kicked back approximately $3.3 million of these proceeds to the company in three deceiving ways.

The SEC alleges that Zaucha first paid the company $871,000 between September 2009 and June 2010 for what his consulting agreement termed as "early-sell fees" for his excessive sale of stock. Secondly, in December 2010, Zaucha formed a company called Lighthouse Distributors and used the proceeds of his stock sales to finance the purchase of approximately $1.38 million in old and obsolete inventory from Left Behind Games. Lighthouse simply gave most of these products away to churches and religious organizations, yet Left Behind Games improperly recognized the revenue from these sham transactions and falsely claimed that its revenue had increased nearly 1,300 percent from the prior fiscal year. Zaucha later kicked back another $1 million to Left Behind Games as instructed by Lyndon. Meanwhile, Lyndon allowed Zaucha to retain $1.28 million of his stock sale proceeds for personal uses, which included the purchase of condominiums in Maui and Orange County, Calif.

Zaucha performed few, if any, consulting services, according to the SEC's complaint. Each of the consulting agreements was vague about the services that Zaucha would provide. One agreement noted that Zaucha had experience in marketing related to non-profit corporations when, in fact, Lyndon understood Zaucha's experience to be as a pastor running prison ministries rather than in marketing. Two agreements also vaguely stated that Zaucha would perform services to build an "independent rep network" to contact church pastors in an effort to offer Left Behind Games products. In reality, Left Behind Games had no "network" of independent representatives calling potential purchasers of its products.

The SEC's complaint alleges that Lyndon and Zaucha violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The complaint also alleges that Lyndon violated Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 13a-14, 13b2-1, and 13b2-2, and that he aided and abetted Left Behind Games' violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13. The complaint seeks permanent injunctions, financial penalties, and penny stock bars against Lyndon and Zaucha, and an officer-and-director bar against Lyndon.

The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Lucee Kirka, Carol Shau, and Marc Blau of the Los Angeles office. The SEC's litigation will be led by Karen Matteson and Amy Longo.

Monday, September 30, 2013

HEDGE FUND ADVISER CHARGED WITH BREACHING FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR ROLE IN CONFLICTED PERSONAL TRANSACTION

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
SEC Charges N.Y.-Based Hedge Fund Adviser With Breaching Fiduciary Duty By Participating in Conflicted Principal Transaction


2013-183 Washington D.C., Sept. 18, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission charged the adviser to a New York-based hedge fund with breaching his fiduciary duty by engineering an undisclosed principal transaction in which he had a financial conflict of interest.

In a principal transaction, an adviser acting for its own account buys a security from a client account or sells a security to a client account.  Principal transactions can pose potential conflicts between the interests of the adviser and the client, and therefore advisers are required to disclose in writing any financial interest or conflicted role when advising a client on the other side of the trade.  They also must obtain the client’s consent.

The SEC alleges that Shadron L. Stastney, a partner at investment advisory firm Vicis Capital LLC, traded as a principal when he authorized the client hedge fund to pay approximately $7.5 million to purchase a basket of illiquid securities from a personal friend and outside business partner hired by the firm as a managing director.  Stastney required his friend to divest these personal securities holdings as he came on board at the firm because they overlapped with securities in which the hedge fund also was invested.  Stastney failed to tell the client hedge fund or any other partners and management at the firm that he had a financial stake in some of the same securities sold into the fund.  Stastney personally benefited and received a portion of the proceeds from the sale, and therefore was trading as a principal in the transaction.

Stastney agreed to pay more than $2.9 million to settle the SEC’s charges.

“Fund advisers cannot sit on both sides of a transaction as buyer and seller without the consent of the clients who rely on them for unbiased investment advice,” said Julie M. Riewe, Co-Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit.  “Stastney failed to live up to his fiduciary duty when he unilaterally set the terms of the transaction and authorized it without disclosing that he would personally profit from it.”

According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding, in late December 2007 and early January 2008, Stastney arranged for his friend to sell the conflicted securities to the client hedge fund – Vicis Capital Master Fund – for $7.475 million.  Stastney’s friend informed him at the time that Stastney had a financial interest in some of the conflict securities, and Stastney would receive a portion of the sales proceeds.

The SEC’s order alleges that Stastney informed his two partners at the firm about the contemplated transaction, but never disclosed his personal financial interest in the transaction to them.  Stastney also did not disclose the conflict to the individual serving as the firm’s chief financial officer and chief compliance officer.  Moreover, Stastney failed to disclose to the trustee of the hedge fund that he had a personal financial interest in the transaction, and failed to obtain the client’s consent as required in a principal transaction.

According to the SEC’s order, after the hedge fund purchased the conflicted securities, Stastney’s friend wired Stastney’s share of more than $2 million of the sales proceeds to his personal savings bank account.

The SEC’s order requires Stastney, who lives in Marlboro, N.J., to pay disgorgement of $2,033,710.46, prejudgment interest of $501,385.06, and a penalty of $375,000.  Stastney also is barred from association with any investment company, investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, or transfer agent for at least 18 months.  Stastney will be permitted to finish winding down the fund under the oversight of an independent monitor payable at his own expense.  Stastney has consented to the issuance of the order without admitting or denying any of the findings and has agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 206(2) and 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Vincenzo A. DeLeo and Brian E. Fitzpatrick of the Asset Management Unit with the assistance of James Flynn, Alistaire Bambach, and Nancy A. Brown in the New York Regional Office.  The case was supervised by Sharon B. Binger.  The investigation began following an examination of the firm by Jennifer M. Klein, Arthur Schmidt, and Belinda L. Rodriquez under the supervision of Dawn M. Blakenship.