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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

SEC CHARGES COMPUTER COMPANY AND FORMER EXECS IN ALLEGED ACCOUNTING FRAUD SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
06/05/2015 09:40 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Computer Sciences Corporation and former executives with manipulating financial results and concealing significant problems about the company’s largest and most high-profile contract.  The SEC additionally charged former finance executives involved with CSC’s international businesses for ignoring basic accounting standards to increase reported profits.

CSC agreed to pay a $190 million penalty to settle the charges, and five of the eight charged executives agreed to settlements.  Former CEO Michael Laphen agreed to return to CSC more than $3.7 million in compensation under the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and pay a $750,000 penalty.  Former CFO Michael Mancuso agreed to return $369,100 in compensation and pay a $175,000 penalty.

The SEC filed complaints in federal court in Manhattan against former CSC finance executives Robert Sutcliffe, Edward Parker, and Chris Edwards, who are contesting the charges against them.  Sutcliffe was CSC’s finance director for its multi-billion dollar contract with the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS).

The SEC alleges that CSC’s accounting and disclosure fraud began after the company learned it would lose money on the NHS contract because it was unable to meet certain deadlines.  To avoid the large hit to its earnings that CSC was required to record, Sutcliffe allegedly added items to CSC’s accounting models that artificially increased its profits but had no basis in reality.  CSC, with Laphen’s approval, then continued to avoid the financial impact of its delays by basing its models on contract amendments it was proposing to the NHS rather than the actual contract.  In reality, NHS officials repeatedly rejected CSC’s requests that the NHS pay the company higher prices for less work.  By basing its models on the flailing proposals, CSC artificially avoided recording significant reductions in its earnings in 2010 and 2011.

The SEC’s investigation found that Laphen and Mancuso repeatedly failed to comply with multiple rules requiring them to disclose these issues to investors, and they made public statements about the NHS contract that misled investors about CSC’s performance.  Mancuso also concealed from investors a prepayment arrangement that allowed CSC to meet its cash flow targets by effectively borrowing large sums of money from the NHS at a high interest rate.  Mancuso merely told investors that CSC was hitting its targets “the old fashioned hard way.”

“When companies face significant difficulties impacting their businesses, they and their top executives must truthfully disclose this information to investors,” said Andrew J. Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “CSC repeatedly based its financial results and disclosures on the NHS contract it was negotiating rather than the one it actually had, and misled investors about the true status of the contract.  The significant sanctions in this case against the company, CEO, and CFO reflect our focus on ensuring that such misconduct is vigorously pursued and punished.”

Stephen L. Cohen, Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, “The wide-ranging misconduct in this case spanned several countries and occurred over multiple years, reflecting significant management lapses and internal controls failures.  We expect this settlement and the recommendations of an independent ethics and compliance consultant will help prevent future misconduct.”

In addition to the accounting and disclosure violations involving the NHS contract, the SEC’s investigation found that CSC and finance executives in Australia and Denmark fraudulently manipulated the financial results of the company’s businesses in those regions.

The SEC alleges that Parker, who served as controller in Australia, along with regional CFO Wayne Banks overstated the company’s earnings by using “cookie jar” reserves and failing to record expenses as required.  They overstated CSC’s operating results by more than 5 percent in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 and allowed the company to meet analysts’ earnings targets during that period.  Banks agreed to settle the charges and pay disgorgement of $10,990 with prejudgment interest of $2,400, plus accept an officer-and-director bar of at least four years as well as a bar from practicing as an accountant on behalf of SEC-regulated entities for at least four years.  The SEC’s case continues against Parker.

In CSC’s Nordic region, the SEC alleges a variety of accounting manipulations to fraudulently inflate operating results as finance executives there struggled to achieve budgets set by CSC management in the U.S.  Among the misconduct was improperly accounting for client disputes, overstating assets, and capitalizing expenses.  For example, Edwards, who was a finance manager, allegedly recorded and maintained large amounts of “prepaid assets” that CSC was required to actually record as expenses.  This tactic guaranteed these expenses would not reduce CSC’s earnings.  CSC’s finance director of the Nordic region Paul Wakefield also engaged in the accounting fraud, which overstated CSC’s consolidated pre-tax income in Denmark as much as 7 percent.  CSC’s finance manager Claus Zilmer was involved in violations of the financial reporting and books and records provisions of the securities laws.  Wakefield and Zilmer agreed to settle the charges, with Wakefield agreeing to accept an officer-and-director bar of at least three years as well as a bar from practicing as an accountant on behalf of SEC-regulated entities for at least three years.  The SEC’s case continues against Edwards.

CSC and the five settling executives neither admit nor deny the findings in the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against them.  CSC must retain an independent consultant to review the company’s ethics and compliance programs.  The SEC particularly acknowledges the cooperation of Wakefield in its investigation, which was conducted by Shelby Hunt, David Miller, Ian Rupell, Robert Peak, and Joseph Zambuto Jr.  The SEC appreciates the assistance of the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority.

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Dissenting Statement on the Final Interagency Policy Statement:Failing to Advance Diversity and Inclusion

Dissenting Statement on the Final Interagency Policy Statement:Failing to Advance Diversity and Inclusion

SEC ANNOUNCES CANADIAN TRADER TO PAY $1 MILLION FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
06/09/2015 01:35 PM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that a trader residing in Canada has agreed to pay more than $1 million to settle charges that he shorted U.S. stocks in companies planning follow-on offerings and then illegally bought shares in the follow-on offerings to lock in significant profits with little to no market risk.

An SEC investigation found that Andrew L. Evans through his firm Maritime Asset Management violated an anti-manipulation provision of the federal securities laws known as Rule 105 on nearly a dozen occasions.  Rule 105 prohibits short selling an equity security during a restricted period (generally five business days before a public offering) and then purchasing that same security through the offering.  By purchasing lower-priced shares in the follow-on offerings that he could use to cover his short sales, Evans reaped $582,175 in illegal profits.

“Evans repeatedly gamed the system by short selling shares that he knew he could later obtain at a lower price,” said Jina L. Choi, Director of the SEC’s San Francisco Regional Office.  “Rule 105 was specifically designed to prevent unfair and manipulative trading that erodes pricing integrity and the ability of issuers to effectively raise capital.”

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court in San Francisco, Evans’s short selling violations occurred from December 2010 to May 2012.  The settlement, which is subject to court approval, requires Evans to pay disgorgement of $582,175, prejudgment interest of $63,424, and a penalty of $364,389 for a total of $1,009,988.  Without admitting or denying the allegations, Evans agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating Rule 105 in the future.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Robert J.  Durham and

Monday, June 8, 2015

SEC WARNS INVESTORS TO CHECK BACKGROUNDS OF INVESTMENT SOLICITORS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
6/03/2015 11:50 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission warned investors to thoroughly check the claimed credentials of people soliciting their investments to ensure they are not falsifying, exaggerating, or hiding facts about their backgrounds.  The agency has brought several recent enforcement cases along these lines, including two actions announced today.

An investor alert issued by the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy cautions, “Do not trust someone with your investment money just because he or she claims to have impressive credentials or experience, or manages to create a ‘buzz of success.’”  The alert notes that investors sometimes unintentionally contribute to a fraudster’s false reputation of success and accomplishment by merely repeating to others the misrepresentations being made to them.  Investors can conduct background checks of financial professionals to ensure they are properly licensed or registered with the SEC, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or a state regulatory authority by visiting the “Ask and Check” section of the SEC’s Investor.gov website.

The SEC Enforcement Division today announced two separate fraud cases against investment advisers who made false claims about their experience and industry accolades in an effort to gain the trust and confidence of investors.

“Advisers looking to raise funds cannot lie about their backgrounds to lull investors into a false sense of security about their purported expertise or the profitability of a potential investment,” said Julie M. Riewe, Co-Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit.  “Each adviser in these cases used false claims about his background to create trustworthiness and lend credibility to their offering schemes.”

An SEC investigation found that Michael G. Thomas of Oil City, Pa., touted that he was named a “Top 25 Rising Business Star” by Fortune Magazine as he solicited investors through blast e-mails and the Internet for a private fund named Michael G. Investments LLC.  No such distinction actually exists at Fortune Magazine, and Thomas also greatly exaggerated his own past investment performance, misrepresented that certain industry professionals would co-manage and advise the fund, and inflated the fund’s projected performance.  To settle the SEC’s charges, Thomas agreed to pay a $25,000 penalty and consented to an order requiring him not to participate in the issuance, offer, or sale of certain securities for five years.  He also is barred from associating with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser for at least five years.

A separate SEC investigation found that Todd M. Schoenberger of Lewes, Del., misrepresented that he had a college degree from the University of Maryland and touted his appearances on cable news programs while soliciting investors to purchase promissory notes issued by his unregistered investment advisory firm LandColt Capital LP.  Schoenberger falsely told prospective investors that LandColt would repay the notes through fees earned from managing a private fund.  Schoenberger never actually launched the fund, never had the commitments of capital to the fund that he claimed, and never paid investors the returns he promised.  To settle the SEC’s charges, Schoenberger agreed to pay $65,000 in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest.  He consented to an order barring him from associating with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser and from serving as an officer or director of a public company.

The SEC’s investigation of Thomas was conducted by Mark D. Salzberg and Corey A. Schuster of the Asset Management Unit, and the case was supervised by Panayiota K. Bougiamas and Jeffrey B. Finnell.  The SEC’s investigation of Schoenberger was conducted by John G. Westrick of the Asset Management Unit and supervised by Stephen E. Donahue.  The investor alert was prepared by M. Owen Donley III and Holly Pal in the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy.

Sunday, June 7, 2015

FOUR CHARGED BY SEC WITH INSIDER TRADING AND STEALING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
06/03/2015 10:45 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced insider trading charges against four individuals stealing confidential information from investment banks and their public company clients in order to trade in advance of secondary stock offerings.  The scheme allegedly involved at least 15 stocks and generated more than $4.4 million in illegal trading profits.

The SEC alleges that a former day trader living in California, Steven Fishoff, schemed with two friends and his brother-in-law to pose as legitimate portfolio managers and induce investment bankers to bring them “over the wall” and share confidential information about an upcoming secondary offering.  After promising they wouldn’t disclose the nonpublic information to others or trade an issuer’s stock before an offering was announced, they violated the agreements and tipped each other about the upcoming offerings expected to inherently depress the price of the issuer’s stock.  The tippees then shorted the stock before an offering was publicly announced and assured themselves profits on the short sales after the stock price dropped.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, they eventually expanded the scope of their scheme from short selling to buying stock in advance of a positive corporate news announcement based on confidential information obtained about secret negotiations between two large pharmaceutical companies.

Charged along with Fishoff in the SEC’s complaint is his brother-in-law Steven Costantin of New Jersey, his friend and California neighbor Ronald Chernin, and his friend Paul Petrello, also a former day trader who resides in Florida.  In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey today announced criminal charges against Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, and Costantin.

“We allege an insider trading scheme based on a short-selling business model designed to systematically profit on confidential information obtained under false pretenses,” said Sanjay Wadhwa, Senior Associate Director for Enforcement in the SEC’s New York Regional Office.  “But the defendants’ short selling proved to be short-sighted as they overlooked the fact that their trading patterns would be detected and they would be caught by law enforcement.”

The SEC’s complaint charges Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, and Costantin as well as seven entities they collectively controlled with illegal insider trading in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The complaint also charges Fishoff, Petrello, Chernin, Costantin, and three associated entities with violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M of the Exchange Act in connection with certain short sales made in advance of public securities offerings in which they purchased shares.

The SEC’s investigation is continuing and being conducted by Dominick Barbieri, David Austin, Matthew Lambert, Stephen Johnson and George Stepaniuk.  The litigation will be led by Todd Brody, Dominick Barbieri, and David Austin.  The case is being supervised by Mr. Wadhwa.  The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Options Regulatory Services Authority.

Saturday, June 6, 2015

CFTC CHAIRMAN MASSAD'S REMARKS BEFORE GLOBAL EXCHANGE AND BROKERAGE CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference (New York)
June 3, 2015
As Prepared For Delivery

Thank you for inviting me today, and I thank Rich for that kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here.

Next month, we will observe the fifth anniversary of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. As you know, this law made dramatic changes to our regulatory system in response to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In particular, it aimed to bring transparency and oversight to the over-the-counter swaps market, and gave the CFTC primary responsibility to accomplish that task.

The timing of this speech is significant to me in another way, as it was exactly one year ago today that I was confirmed by the Senate as chairman of the CFTC. So in light of those two anniversaries, it seems like a good time to take stock. Where are we in implementing these reforms? Is the new regulatory framework achieving the goals envisioned in Dodd-Frank? And what have we done over the last year in particular to advance those objectives? What are our priorities going forward?

All of you appreciate the important role that the derivatives markets play in our economy. In 2008, however, we saw how the build-up of excessive risk in the over-the-counter swaps market made a very bad crisis even worse. There were many causes of the crisis, but particularly because of that excessive swap risk, our government was required to commit $182 billion just to prevent the collapse of a single company – AIG – because its failure at that time, in those circumstances, could have caused our economy to fall into another Great Depression. Our country lost eight million jobs as a result of the crisis. I spent five years at Treasury helping our nation recover from that crisis – including getting all that money back from AIG. I also had a long career working as a corporate lawyer, which included helping to draft the original ISDA master agreements and advising businesses on all sorts of transactions, including derivatives. So I appreciate both the need for reform and the importance of implementing these reforms in a way that ensures that these markets can continue to thrive and contribute to our economy.

The Dodd-Frank Act enacted the four basic reforms agreed to by the leaders of the G-20 nations to bring transparency and oversight to this market: central clearing of standardized swaps, oversight of the largest market participants, regular reporting, and transparent trading on regulated platforms.

Today that framework is largely in place. The vast majority of transactions are centrally cleared. Trading on regulated platforms is a reality. Transaction data is being reported and publicly available. And we have developed a program for the oversight of major market participants.

There is more work to do in all these areas, as I will discuss in a moment. But as I see it, there are a lot of parallels between where we are today with swaps market reform and what happened with securities market reform in the 1930s and 40s. Coming out of the Great Depression, we created a framework for securities regulation and trading which proved tremendously successful. Many of its mandates were revolutionary at the time and therefore quite controversial. When the Securities Exchange Act was passed and required periodic reporting by public companies, the President of the New York Stock Exchange said it was “a menace to national recovery.” History has proved otherwise. Today, the concept of periodic reporting by public companies is about as controversial as seat belts. Indeed, the basic framework created in the 1930s of disclosure, transparency, periodic reporting and trading on regulated exchanges has been the foundation for the growth of our securities markets.

I believe the swaps market reforms we have put in place are similar. I believe the basic framework is one that will benefit our markets and the economy as a whole for decades to come. Is that framework perfect? No. Is there more to do? Yes. So let’s look at where we are.

Congress required that the rules be written within a year of passage of Dodd-Frank, and the agency worked incredibly hard to meet that goal. Now we are in a phase of making necessary minor adjustments to the rules, which is to be expected with any change as significant as this. And so a priority of mine over the last year has been to do just that: to look at how well the new rules are working and to make adjustments where necessary.

So let me give you a quick big picture view of where we are on each of the four key reforms of the OTC swaps market, as well as what I see as the next steps in each of those areas, and then discuss in more detail a couple of key priorities for the months ahead.

Clearing

First is the goal of requiring central clearing of transactions. This is a critical means to monitor and mitigate risk. Here we have accomplished a great deal. Our rules require clearing through central counterparties for most interest rate and credit default swaps, and the percentage of transactions that are centrally cleared in the swaps markets we oversee has gone from about 15 percent in December 2007 to about 75 percent today. That’s a dramatic change.

Importantly, our rules do not impose this requirement on commercial end-users. Nor do we impose the trading mandate on commercial end-users. And an important priority for me over the last year has been to make sure this new framework as a whole does not impose unintended burdens on commercial end-users. They were not the cause of the crisis or the focus of the reforms. And we want to make sure that they can still use these markets to hedge commercial risk effectively.

What are the next steps when it comes to clearing? First, we must recognize that for all its merits, central clearing does not eliminate risk, and therefore we must make sure clearinghouses are strong and resilient. The CFTC has already done a lot of work in this area. Over the last few years, we overhauled our supervisory framework and we increased our oversight. But there is more to do, and there will be significant efforts taking place, including through international organizations.

We will be looking at stress testing of clearinghouses, and whether there should be international standards for stress testing that give us some basis to compare the resiliency of different clearinghouses. And while we hope never to have to use these tools, we will be looking further at recovery and resolution planning.

You may also know that we are engaged in discussions with Europe on cross-border recognition of clearinghouses. While this issue is taking longer to resolve than I expected, I believe we have narrowed the issues and are making good progress. For those interested, I recently gave a speech to a committee of the European Parliament that describes the issues we are discussing in more detail. I believe my counterpart in these discussions, Lord Jonathan Hill of the European Commission, wants to resolve this soon, as I do, and we are working in good faith toward that end. I also believe we can resolve this without disruptions to the market, and I am pleased that the EC has again postponed capital charges toward that end.

Oversight of Swap Dealers

Let me turn to the second reform area, general oversight of major market players. We have made great progress here as well, as we have in place a regulatory framework for supervision of swap dealers. They are now required to observe strong risk management practices, and they will be subject to regular examinations to assess risk and compliance with rules designed to mitigate excessive risk.

Next steps in this area include looking at the swap dealer de minimis threshold. Under the swap dealer rules adopted in 2012, the threshold for determining who is a swap dealer will decline from $8 billion to $3 billion in December of 2017 unless the Commission takes action. I believe it is vital that our actions be data-driven, and so we have started work on a comprehensive report to analyze this issue. We will make a preliminary version available for public comment, and seek comment not only on the methodology and data, but also on the policy questions as to what the threshold should be, and why. I want us to complete this process well in advance of the December 2017 date so that the Commission has some data, analysis, and public input with which to decide what to do.

Another priority for us over the next few months in the area of general oversight is to finalize our proposal on margin requirements for uncleared swaps. This is one of the most important Dodd-Frank requirements that remains to be finalized, and one of the most important overall. There will always be a large part of the swaps market that is not and should not be centrally cleared, and therefore margin is key to minimizing the risk to our system that can come from uncleared bilateral trades. The proposal applies to swap dealers, in their transactions with one another and their transactions with financial institutions that exceed certain thresholds. As with the clearing and trading mandates, commercial firms are exempted.

We are working closely with the bank regulators on this rule. They have the responsibility to issue rules that apply to swap dealers that are banking entities under their respective jurisdictions, and our rule will apply to other swap dealers. It is vitally important that these rules be as consistent as possible, and we are making good progress in this regard. We are also working to have our U.S. rules be similar to rules being considered by Europe and Japan. I expect that they will be consistent on many major issues.

Reporting

With regard to reporting, the public and regulators are benefiting from a new level of market transparency – transparency that did not exist before. All swap transactions, whether cleared or uncleared, must be reported to registered swap data repositories (SDRs), a new type of entity responsible for collecting and maintaining this information. You can now go to public websites and see the price and volume for individual swap transactions. And the CFTC publishes the Weekly Swaps Report that gives the public a snapshot of the swaps market. This means more efficient price discovery for all market participants. Equally important, this reporting enables regulatory authorities to engage in meaningful oversight, and when necessary, enforcement actions.

While we have much better data today than in 2008, we have a lot more work to do to get to where we want to be. One step is revising our rules to bring further clarity to reporting obligations. Later this summer I expect that we will propose some initial changes to the swap reporting rules for cleared swaps designed to clarify reporting obligations and, at the same time, improve the quality and usability of the data in the SDRs. And we are looking at other possible changes as well to improve the data reporting process and usefulness of the information.

This is also an international effort. There are around two dozen data repositories globally. And there are participants around the world who must report. We and the European Central Bank currently co-chair a global task force that is seeking to standardize data standards internationally. While much of this work is highly technical, it is vitally important to international cooperation and transparency.

We will also make sure participants are taking their obligations seriously to provide us good data in the first place. We have taken, and will continue to take, enforcement action against those who do not.

Transparent Trading

Let me turn to the last reform area, which is trading. Today, trading swaps on regulated platforms is a reality. We have nearly two dozen SEFs registered. Each registered exchange is required to operate in accordance with certain statutory core principles. These core principles provide a framework that includes obligations to establish and enforce rules, as well as policies and procedures that enable transparent and efficient trading. SEFs must make trading information publicly available, put into place system safeguards, and maintain financial, operational, and managerial resources necessary to discharge their responsibilities.

So we are making progress, but here too, there is more work to do. We have been looking at ways to improve the framework, focusing on some operational issues where we believe adjustments can improve trading. We have taken action in a number of areas, including steps to make it easier to execute package trades and correct error trades, and steps to simplify trade confirmations and reporting obligations. We are looking at additional issues pertaining to SEF trading as well. For example, we are planning to hold a public roundtable later this year on the made-available-for-trade determination process, where many industry participants have suggested that the agency play a greater role in determining which products should be mandated for trading and when.

We have also been working to harmonize our trading rules with the rules of other jurisdictions where possible. CFTC staff worked with Australian swap platforms to clarify how they can permit U.S. participation under our trading rules. One platform, Yieldbroker, confirmed that it intends to apply for relief and achieve compliance by this fall. This is an important step and we are open to working with other jurisdictions and platforms.

Responding to Changes in the Market

I began by saying that the approaching five year anniversary of Dodd-Frank was a good time to take stock of what has been accomplished in terms of implementing the reforms required by the law. Equally important to consider is: How have the markets changed over the last five years? How does that impact what we are doing? After all, there is always the danger that as regulators, we focus on fighting the last war.

It is beyond the scope of my speech today to discuss all the significant changes to markets over the last few years, or how regulatory actions may be affecting market dynamics and costs. These are important, complex subjects, but they are well beyond the time I have today to explore. Today, however, I’d like to take a few minutes more to just note one major way in which our markets are changing, and how that is affecting our work.

That change has to do with the increased use of electronic and automated trading. Some speak of “high frequency trading” or HFT, a classification that is hard to define precisely. I will focus on automated or algorithmic trading. Over the last decade, automated trading has increased from about 25 percent to well over 50 percent of trading in U.S. financial markets. Looking specifically at the futures markets, almost all trading is electronic in some form, and automated trading accounts for more than 70 percent of trading over the last few years.

I commend to you a recent paper by our Chief Economist office which gives some interesting data on our markets. This looked at over 1.5 billion transactions across over 800 products on CME over a two year period. It found that the percentage of automated trading in financial futures – such as those based on interest rates, currencies or equity indices – was 60 to 80 percent. But even among many physical commodities, there was a high degree of automated trading, such as 40 to 50 percent for many energy and metals products. The paper also provides a lot of rich detail on what types of trades are more likely to be automated.

The increase in electronic, and particularly automated, trading has changed what we do, and how we do it. Let me say at the outset that the increased use of electronic trading has brought many benefits, such as more efficient execution and lower spreads. But it also raises issues. These are somewhat different in the futures markets than in the cash equity markets where they have received the most attention, in part because typically in the futures market, trading of a given product occurs on only one exchange. Nevertheless, the increased use of automated, algorithmic trading poses challenges for how we execute our responsibilities, and it raises important policy questions. For example, it creates profound changes in how we conduct surveillance. The days when market surveillance could be conducted by observing traders in floor pits are long gone. Today, successful market surveillance activities require us to have the ability to continually receive, load, and analyze large volumes of data. We already receive a complete transactions tape, but effective surveillance requires looking at the much larger sets of message data—the bids, offers, cancelations which far outnumber consummated transactions.

And consider that we oversee the markets in a wide range of financial futures products based on interest rates, currencies and equities, as well as over 40 physical commodity categories, each of which has very different characteristics.

Surveillance today requires a massive information technology investment and sophisticated analytical tools that we must develop for these unique environments. And we must have experienced personnel who understand the markets we oversee, who can discern anomalies and patterns and who have the experience, judgment, and skills to know when to investigate further.

The increased use of high speed and electronic trading has impacted our enforcement activity as well. We have recently brought several spoofing cases, where market participants used complex algorithmic strategies to generate and then cancel massive numbers of bids or offers without the intention of actually consummating those transactions in order to affect price. Some have asked, does that mean I cannot cancel a trade without fear of enforcement coming after me? Hardly. Intent is a key element that we must prove. There is a difference between changing your mind in response to changed market conditions and canceling an order you previously entered, and entering an order that you know, at the time, you have no intention of consummating.

The Commission is also looking at automated trading and specifically the use of algorithmic trading strategies from a policy perspective. We have adopted rules requiring certain registrants to automatically screen orders for compliance with risk limits if they are automatically executed. The Commission has also adopted rules to ensure that trading programs, such as algorithms, are regularly tested. In addition, the Commission issued a Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments. We received substantial public comment, and we are currently considering what further actions may be appropriate.

Although we have not made any decisions yet, let me note a few areas we are thinking about. Traditionally, our regulatory framework has required registration by intermediaries handling customer orders and customer funds. In addition, proprietary traders who were physically present on the floor of the exchange and active in the pits had to register as floor traders. Today, the pits are gone, and physical presence on the floor of an exchange is no longer a relevant concept. We are considering whether the successors to those floor traders – proprietary traders with direct electronic access to a trading venue – should be subject to a registration requirement if they engage in algorithmic trading.

We are considering the adequacy of risk controls, and in particular pre-trade controls, with respect to algorithmic trading. The exchanges, and many participants themselves, have put controls in place. The question is whether our rule framework should set some general principles to require measures such as message and execution throttles, kill switches, and controls designed to prevent erroneous orders. We also may consider standards on the development and monitoring of algorithmic trading systems.

We are also considering who should have the responsibility to implement controls. This may include persons using algorithmic trading strategies as well as the exchanges. But what about the role of clearing members who do not see the orders of customers using direct electronic access? Today, our rules require exchanges that permit direct electronic access to have systems to facilitate the clearing member’s management of the financial risk of their direct access customers. Should there be a similar requirement for the exchanges to facilitate the management by clearing members of risks related to those customers’ use of algorithmic trading?

We are looking self-trading – that is, when orders from distinct trading desks or algos from the same firm transact – and its potential implications and effects on the markets. In addition, we are looking at the adequacy of disclosure by exchanges of market maker and incentive programs.

Conclusion

I said at the outset that where we are today in the implementation of reforms of the swaps market has many parallels to the reforms of the securities market after the Great Depression. The framework created then – including public disclosure and regular reporting, and trading on regulated platforms – was controversial at the time. But it has proven to not only be effective, it has provided a vital foundation on which our securities markets grew to become the most dynamic in the world. I believe we can achieve the same result with the derivatives market. We must always be attentive to how the market is changing, and adapt core principles to those changes. I look forward to working with you to achieve that goal.

Last Updated: June 3, 2015