Search This Blog


This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063
Showing posts with label CFTC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CFTC. Show all posts

Friday, April 17, 2015

CFTC CHARGES COMPANY AND PRINCIPALS WITH POOL FRAUD

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
March 31, 2015
CFTC Charges Maverick International, Inc. and its Principals Wesley Allen Brown and Edward Rubin with Pool Fraud and Other Violations

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced the filing of a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, charging Defendants Maverick International, Inc. and its principals, Wesley Allen Brown and Edward Rubin, with operating a fraudulent commodity pool and other violations of federal commodity laws. Maverick International, Inc. purportedly maintains offices in Wilmington, Delaware; however, its address is actually the address of a mail forwarding service. Brown currently resides in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, and Rubin resides in Winnabow, North Carolina.

The CFTC Complaint was filed under seal on March 23, 2015, and on March 26, 2015, U.S. District Court Judge Brian J. Davis issued an emergency Order freezing and preserving assets under Defendants’ control and prohibiting them from destroying documents or denying CFTC staff access to their books and records.  The Court scheduled a hearing for April 8, 2015, on the CFTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

The CFTC Complaint charges that, as early as June 18, 2008, Defendants solicited and accepted more than $2 million from members of the public to trade commodity futures contracts in a commodity pool. As alleged, the Defendants misappropriated all of the $2 million to pay their personal and business expenses, including rent, meals, and more than $200,000 in cash withdrawals.

The Complaint alleges that Brown used his position as an associate pastor at a Flagler Beach, Florida, church to solicit congregants to participate in the fraudulent scheme. Through in-person solicitations and the Defendants’ website (wealthnavigator.org), Brown represented to actual and potential participants that the Defendants profitably traded commodity futures and precious metals on behalf of participants. These representations were false, because Defendants misappropriated all of the participants’ funds, and no trading on behalf of participants took place, according to the Complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks full restitution to defrauded pool participants, disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains, a civil monetary penalty, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction against future violations of federal commodities laws, as charged.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventh Judicial District of Florida; the Florida Office of Financial Regulation; the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida; the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State, Securities Division; the Sherriff’s Department, Brunswick County, North Carolina; and the City of Myrtle North Myrtle Beach, Department of Public Safety.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Timothy J. Mulreany, George Malas, and Paul Hayeck.

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

CFTC CHARGES MAN WITH FRAUD AND ACTING AS AN UNREGISTERED FUTURES COMMISSION MERCHANT

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
November 25, 2014
CFTC Charges California Resident Thomas Gillons with Fraud and Acting as an Unregistered Futures Commission Merchant

Federal Court Issues Emergency Order Freezing Gillon’s Assets and Protecting Books and Records

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced the filing of a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, charging Defendant Thomas Gillons of Napa County, California, with fraud and acting as a Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) without being registered as such with the CFTC.

On the same day the Complaint was filed, November 19, 2014, U.S. District Judge Ronald A. Guzman issued an emergency Order freezing and preserving assets under the control of Gillons and prohibiting him from destroying documents or denying CFTC staff access to his books and records. The court scheduled a hearing for December 1, 2014, on the CFTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

Gillons Allegedly Misappropriated Nearly $130,000 in Customer Funds

The CFTC’s Complaint alleges that, since at least August 31, 2013, Gillons fraudulently solicited and accepted at least $194,000 from at least three customers by claiming that he was a licensed broker and would trade their funds in a sub-account in customers’ names, earning them a 12 to 14 percent return. However, in reality, Gillons’ broker license had been suspended, and he was not currently registered with any securities firm, according to the Complaint. Moreover, Gillons traded only a portion of customer funds, losing approximately $55,234 and misappropriating at least $129,766 in customer funds, the Complaint alleges.

Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that Gillons accepted money to margin, guarantee, or secure commodity futures trades without being registered with the CFTC as an FCM.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Stephanie Reinhart, Melissa Glasbrenner, David Terrell, Scott Williamson, and Rosemary Hollinger.

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

CFTC CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ON $1.4 BILLION BANK ENFORCEMENT FINE AND SETTLEMENT

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Statement of Chairman Tim Massad on today’s Forex Enforcement Announcement
November 12, 2014

Washington, DC – U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman made the following statement on today’s enforcement action against five banks for attempting to manipulate the foreign exchange benchmark rate. The five banks settled with the CFTC and agreed to pay a $1.4 billion fine, and they will be required to implement policies and procedures to prevent this misconduct going forward.

“Integrity of the market place is a paramount concern to the CFTC, and today’s enforcement action should be seen as a message to all market participants that wrongdoing and foul play in the financial markets is unacceptable and will not be tolerated,” said Chairman Massad. “I want to especially thank the dedicated and hardworking staff of the CFTC’s Enforcement Division, who spent countless hours in order to uncover this egregious behavior and hold those responsible accountable for it.”

Last Updated: November 12, 2014

Sunday, September 7, 2014

CFTC ORDERS ORDERS PRECIOUS METALS TRADING COMPAMY AND OWNERS TO PAY $2.9 MILLION

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
CFTC Orders S.J. Woods, Inc., Peter Blanco, and Paul Proscia to Pay over $2.9 Million in Restitution and Permanently Bars Them from the Commodities Industry

Washington DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued an Order filing and settling charges against S.J. Woods, Inc. (SJW) and its owners, Peter Blanco and Paul Proscia (together Respondents), involving their participation in illegal, off-exchange financed transactions in precious metals with retail customers. The Order requires Respondents jointly to pay restitution totaling $2,971,992.23 to their customers, imposes permanent trading bans against them, and prohibits them from violating the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged. SJW’s principal place of business is Holbrook, New York. Blanco is a resident of Brightwaters, New York, and Proscia is a resident of Sayville, New York.

The Illegal Transactions

The CFTC Order finds that from July 2011 through February 2013, Respondents solicited retail customers, generally by telephone, to buy and sell physical precious metals, such as gold and silver, in off-exchange, leveraged transactions. According to the Order, customers paid as little as 25 percent of the purchase price for the metals, and Respondents purportedly financed the remainder of the purchase price, while charging customers interest on the amount borrowed.

The CFTC Order states that financed, off-exchange transactions with retail customers have been illegal since July 16, 2011, when certain amendments of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 became effective. As explained in the Order, financed transactions in commodities with retail customers like those engaged in by Respondents must be executed on, or subject to, the rules of a CFTC-approved board of trade. Since Respondents’ transactions were done off-exchange, with customers who were not eligible contract participants, they were illegal, the Order finds.

The CFTC cautions victims that restitution orders may not result in the recovery of money lost because the wrongdoers may not have sufficient funds or assets. The CFTC will continue to fight vigorously for the protection of customers and to ensure the wrongdoers are held accountable.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this matter are Boaz Green, Kara Mucha, James H. Holl, III, and Rick Glaser.

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

MERRILL LYNCH TO PAY CFTC FINE FOR SUPERVISORY FAILURES

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

CFTC Orders Merrill Lynch to Pay $1.2 Million Fine for Supervision Failures

Firm’s Supervisory Failures over Fee Processing Led to Client Overcharges at Times

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an Order filing and simultaneously settling charges against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Merrill Lynch) for failing to diligently supervise its officers’, employees’, and agents’ processing of futures exchange and clearing fees charged to its customers from at least January 1, 2010 through April 2013. Merrill Lynch is a CFTC-registered Futures Commission Merchant and approved swap firm located in New York, New York.
The CFTC Order finds that Merrill Lynch’s fee reconciliation process for identifying and correcting discrepancies between the invoices from the exchange clearinghouses and the amounts charged its customers had been faulty for more than two years. As a result, Merrill over-accrued fees from some clients and under-accrued fees from others. These fee reconciliations show that Merrill paid more than $318 million in exchange and clearing fees to the CME and Chicago Board of Trade during that time, but had unexplained over-accruals of approximately $451,318 (0.14% of fees paid) from 196 clients, according to the Order.
Additionally, the CFTC Order finds that Merrill Lynch did not hire qualified personnel to conduct and oversee its fee reconciliations and did not provide any completed procedures manuals regarding fee reconciliations to its staff until at least April 2013. The Order also finds that procedures Merrill Lynch did have up until that time were viewed as ”not fit for purpose” because they were “fundamentally flawed.” Merrill Lynch also did not provide any meaningful training to employees regarding how to conduct fee reconciliations until 2013, the Order finds.
The CFTC Order requires Merrill Lynch to pay a $1.2 million civil monetary penalty and cease and desist from violating CFTC Regulation 166.3 governing diligent supervision. The Order also requires Merrill Lynch to comply with undertakings that include, hiring an outside consulting firm to assist in training staff and reviewing and updating its current procedures regarding exchange and clearing fee reconciliations.
The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Susan Gradman, Joseph Patrick, Brigitte Weyls, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

COURT ORDERS MAN AND HIS COMPANY TO PAY OVER $500,000 FOR OFF-EXCHANGE PRECIOUS METALS TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Federal Court Orders Florida Resident Lawrence Scott Spain and His Florida Company, Palm Beach Capital LLC, to Pay More than $520,000 in Restitution for Engaging in Illegal, Off-Exchange Precious Metals Transactions

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that on August 4, 2014, Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a Consent Order for Permanent Injunction against Florida resident Lawrence Scott Spain and his company, Palm Beach Capital LLC (PBC) (the Defendants), for engaging in illegal, off-exchange precious metals transactions. The Order requires the Defendants, jointly and severally, to pay restitution of $526,960; imposes permanent trading, solicitation and registration bans against them; and prohibits them from engaging in illegal, off-exchange retail commodity transactions, as charged. Spain’s last known address was in Boca Raton, Florida.

The court’s Order stems from a CFTC Complaint filed on May 13, 2014, that charged the Defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange transactions in precious metals with retail customers on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis (see CFTC Press Release and Complaint 6931-14). The Complaint further alleged that Spain, as controlling person for PBC, is liable for PBC’s violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.

The Order provides that Melanie Damian, Esq. is responsible for collecting restitution and making any distributions to PBC’s customers. Ms. Damian was appointed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida as Special Monitor, Corporate Manager and Equity Receiver in the CFTC’s enforcement action against, among others, Lloyds Commodities, LLC and certain of its associated entities (referred to collectively as Lloyds Commodities) and Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC and certain of its associated entities (referred to collectively as Hunter Wise) (see CFTC Press Releases 6447-12, December 12, 2012 and 6935-14, May 22, 2014). The Order finds that PBC transacted the illegal precious metals transactions through Lloyds Commodities and Hunter Wise.

The Order further finds that, since at least July 16, 2011 and continuing through at least August 2012, PBC, by and through its employees including Spain, solicited retail customers by telephone and on PBC’s website, to engage in off-exchange leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals (including gold, silver, platinum and palladium) transactions. During that period, according to the Order, approximately 39 of PBC’s customers paid at least $1.35 million to PBC in connection with precious metals transactions. The Order finds that these customers lost at least $1.25 million of their funds to trading losses, commissions, fees, and other charges by PBC and other companies, and that PBC received commissions and fees totaling $526,960 in connection with these precious metals transactions.

Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, leveraged, margined, or financed transactions such as those conducted by PBC, are illegal off-exchange transactions unless they result in actual delivery of the commodity involved within 28 days. The Order finds that metals were never actually delivered in connection with the leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions made on behalf of PBC’s customers.

The CFTC cautions victims that restitution orders may not result in the recovery of money lost because the wrongdoers may not have sufficient funds or assets. The CFTC will continue to fight vigorously for the protection of customers and to ensure the wrongdoers are held accountable.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Michael C. McLaughlin, David W. MacGregor, Lenel Hickson, Jr., and Manal M. Sultan.

Sunday, June 22, 2014

COURT ORDERS $44 MILLION IN SANCTIONS FOR COMMODITY POOL FRAUD AND MISAPPROPRIATION

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Federal Court in Utah Imposes over $44 Million in Sanctions against Robert Andres and His Company, Winsome Investment Trust, and Robert Holloway and His Company, US Ventures, for Commodity Pool Fraud and Misappropriation

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah Filed Parallel Criminal Actions against Andres and Holloway

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) obtained a federal court Order requiring Defendants Robert J. Andres of Houston, Texas, his company, Winsome Investment Trust (Winsome), Robert L. Holloway of San Diego, California, and his company US Ventures LC (USV), to pay a civil monetary penalty of $32,370,000 and restitution for defrauded customers totaling $12 million. The court’s Order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against Andres, Winsome, Holloway, and USV and prohibits them from violating provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

The default judgment Order stems from a CFTC civil enforcement action filed on January 24, 2011, that charged the Defendants with fraud in the operation of a commodity futures pool (see CFTC Press Release 5976-11). The Order (see Related Link) was entered by the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins of the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah on June 6, 2014.

Specifically, the Order finds that:

• From at least May 2005 through November 2008, Andres and Winsome fraudulently solicited and accepted at least $50.2 million from at least 243 individuals to invest in a commodity futures pool operated by Holloway and USV.  In their solicitations, Andres and Winsome falsely claimed a successful track record and guaranteed the return of participants’ principal and profits; however, contrary to Andres’s and Winsome’s claims of consistently profitable trading, USV’s and Holloway’s futures trading was not successful, sustaining overall net losses of approximately $10.7 million.

• The Defendants allegedly traded only a portion of Winsome’s pool’s funds and misappropriated the majority of participant funds to pay purported “profits” to pool participants in a manner akin to a Ponzi scheme, to provide money to Andres’ wife, and to invest in various unrelated and undisclosed businesses, including using $4.2 million of participant funds to purchase an aerospace consulting business.

• Holloway used participant funds to pay personal and unrelated business expenses, and to pay for houses, cars, home furnishings, jewelry, lawn and maid services, and credit card bills in the name of his wife.  Holloway also used participant funds to finance his wife’s eBay business, Alcoy Enterprises, LLC.

• Andres and Holloway attempted to conceal the fraud by directing employees to falsify participants’ account records and by providing e-mailed account statements to participants falsely representing that Holloway profitably traded pool funds -– sustaining virtually no losses during the relevant period.

In a parallel criminal actions brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah, Andres was indicted on five counts of wire fraud, and Holloway was indicted on four counts of wire fraud and one count of making and filing a false income tax return. Holloway’s trial date is currently set for July 8, 2014. Andres pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, and he is scheduled to be sentenced on August 20, 2014.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the ComisiĆ³n Nacional del Mercado de Valores (Spain), the Dubai Financial Services Authority, and the British Virgin Islands Financial Services Commission.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Alan Edelman, Kevin S. Webb, Michelle S. Bougas, Heather Johnson, Kara Mucha, James H. Holl III, and Gretchen L. Lowe.

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

CFTC OBTAINS DEFAULT JUDGEMENT IN COMMODITY POOL FRAUD CASE

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 

CFTC Obtains Default Judgment against New York-based SK Madison Commodities, LLC and its Principals, Michael James Seward and Yan Kaziyev, for Commodity Pool Fraud and Other Violations

Federal Court Orders Defendants to Pay More than $3.5 Million in Restitution and a Monetary Penalty in CFTC Anti-Fraud Action

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge Sidney H. Stein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan) entered an Order of default judgment and permanent injunction against CFTC Defendants Michael James Seward, Yan Kaziyev, and their company SK Madison Commodities, LLC (SKMC), a Commodity Pool Operator based in New York City. The Order requires the Defendants to pay restitution totaling $1,036,981.01 and a civil monetary penalty of $2,486,865.57. The Order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the Defendants and orders that assets controlled by SK Madison, LLC, a successor company named as a Relief Defendant in the action, be released and applied toward payment of Defendants’ restitution obligation.

The court’s Order, entered on June 9, 2014, stems from a CFTC Complaint filed on March 24, 2014 (see CFTC Press Release 6892-14) alleging that Seward and Kaziyev, by and through SKMC, fraudulently solicited more than $1.3 million from members of the public to trade futures in a commodity pool by, among other things, misrepresenting their trading practices and historical trading returns. The Complaint further alleged that the Defendants prepared and distributed to pool participants false account statements and performance reports showing huge profits while at the same time, Defendants were losing money trading futures and diverting large amounts of pool participants’ funds for Defendants’ own use. In addition to fraud, the Complaint charged Defendants with certain registration violations. As a result of the filing of this action, more than $500,000 of pool participant funds controlled by the Defendants and the Relief Defendant were frozen.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Daniel Jordan, Michael Loconte, Matthew Elkan, and Rick Glaser.

Friday, May 30, 2014

CFTC CHARGES COUPLE AND COMPANY WITH MAKING ILLEGAL OFF-EXCHANGE COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
CFTC Charges Florida Residents Cindy and Paul Vandivier and Their Company, Mintline, Inc., with Fraud in Connection with Illegal, Off-Exchange Commodity Transactions

Federal Court Issues Order Freezing Defendants’ Assets and Prohibiting Destruction of Books and Records

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it obtained an emergency court Order on May 13, 2014, freezing and preserving the assets under the control of Cindy Vandivier, Paul Vandivier, and their company, Mintline, Inc. (collectively, the Defendants), all of Coconut Creek, Florida. The court’s Order, entered by Judge William J. Zloch of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, also prohibits the Vandiviers and Mintline from destroying books and records and grants the CFTC immediate access to such documents. Neither Mintline nor Cindy Vandivier has ever been registered with the CFTC, and Paul Vandivier has no current registration status with the CFTC.

The Order stems from a CFTC enforcement action filed on May 12, 2014, charging the Vandiviers and Mintline with fraudulently soliciting customers and misappropriating customer funds in connection with illegal, off-exchange transactions in precious metals from July 2011 to at least April 2013.

Defendants Allegedly Misappropriated Virtually All of the Customers’ Funds

According to the CFTC Complaint, the Defendants purported to sell physical metals, on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis to retail customers located throughout the United States. The Complaint alleges that the Defendants, in fact, did not purchase, sell, transfer ownership of, deliver, or arrange for storage of any physical metals in connection with the financed metals transactions, but instead misappropriated virtually all of the customers’ funds, using a portion of those funds to pay for office and personal expenses.

The CFTC Complaint further alleges that the Defendants falsely represented to customers that their metals were being held in secured depositories, and fraudulently charged customers interest on purported loans to finance the purchase of the metals. In reality, the Complaint alleges that no physical metal was stored for Defendants’ customers and no loans were made to customers to purchase physical metal.

Sometime between January and April 2013, the Defendants ceased operations, leaving customers without their metals or a return of their funds, according to the Complaint.

In its continuing litigation against the Defendants, the CFTC seeks full restitution to defrauded customers, a return of ill-gotten gains, permanent trading and registration bans, civil monetary penalties, and a permanent injunction from future violations of federal commodities laws, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Alan Edelman, Michelle Bougas, James H. Holl, III, and Rick Glaser.

Tuesday, May 27, 2014

CFTC ACTING CHAIRMAN WETJEN ANNOUNCES 3 ACTIONS TO IMPROVE MARKETS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
May 22, 2014

Acting Chairman Mark Wetjen Announces Three Actions to Protect Liquidity for Certain End-Users, Further Consider Certain Hedging Practices, and Promote Trading on SEFs and DCMs

Washington, DC — The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) Acting Chairman Mark Wetjen and Commissioner Scott O’Malia announced three actions to benefit utility special entities, further consider certain hedging practices for commercial market participants, and promote end-user trading on swap execution facilities (SEFs) and designated contract markets (DCMs).

Acting Chairman Mark Wetjen said, “I am pleased the Commission is acting to address the impact the special entity de minimis threshold is having on utility special entities and the markets in which they operate and to further consider the appropriate treatment of hedging practices in the marketplace today.”

“I am equally pleased,” continued Acting Chairman Wetjen, “that the Divisions are acting to promote trading on SEFs and DCMs and give certain members of these important exchanges and platforms additional time to come into compliance with Regulation 1.35(a).”

“These proposals collectively reflect our continuing efforts to ensure that market regulations accomplish their intended function without creating negative, unintended consequences, in particular for commercial end-users,” said Acting Chairman Wetjen.

”Today marks a significant victory for the end-user community and for the Commission’s rulemaking process. End-users will win today, with the proposal fixing the Special Entity rule and further relief from rule 1.35, which applied unworkable and costly recording requirements. The relief will remain effective until the Commission revisits the rule to appropriately tailor the rule’s requirements to the relevant entities and more carefully consider the costs and technological feasibility of compliance with the rule. I am pleased that the Commission has chosen to confront the shortcomings in its rules by using the proper process that is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act,” said Commissioner O’Malia.

CFTC Issues Proposal to Amend its Regulations for Entities Entering into Swaps with Utility Special Entities

The Commission issued today a proposed rule amendment to adjust the de minimis threshold for determining if an entity that enters into swaps with utility special entities must register as a swap dealer.

The proposal would amend the Commission’s swap dealer definition to permit a person dealing in “utility operations-related swaps” with “utility special entities” to exclude those swaps in determining whether that person has exceeded the de minimis threshold specific to dealing with special entities. Under the proposal, however, such swaps would be counted for determining whether the general dealing de minimis threshold applies.

The Commission is seeking comments from the public on the proposal. The comment period will close 30 days after the proposal is published in the Federal Register.

CFTC Publishes Notice to Open Comment Period to Further Consider Certain Issues Related to Hedging of Physical Commodities

Acting Chairman Wetjen, with the support of Commissioner O’Malia, previously directed the staff to hold a public roundtable on June 19, 2014 to consider certain hedging issues relating to market practices in physical commodity derivatives.

In order to provide interested parties with an opportunity to comment on the issues to be discussed at that roundtable, the Commission is opening comment periods for two previous proposals, the Position Limits Proposal and the Aggregation Proposal, for a three-week period starting June 12, 2014 (one week before the roundtable) and ending July 3, 2014 (two weeks following the roundtable).

The Commission specifically asked market participants to comment on the following issues: hedges of a physical commodity by a commercial enterprise, including gross hedging, cross-commodity hedging, anticipatory hedging, and the process for obtaining a non-enumerated exemption; the setting of spot month limits in physical-delivery and cash-settled contracts and a conditional spot-month limit exemption; the setting of non-spot limits for wheat contracts; the aggregation exemption for certain ownership interests of greater than 50 percent in an owned entity; and aggregation based on substantially identical trading strategies.

CFTC Staff Issues No-Action Relief from Compliance with Certain Requirements under Regulation 1.35(a) for Certain Members of Designated Contract Markets or Swap Execution Facilities

To incentivize trading on SEFs and DCMs, the Commission’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight and Division of Market Oversight also today issued a no-action letter that provides relief with respect to compliance with certain recordkeeping provisions of Regulation 1.35(a) to members of designated contract markets or swap execution facilities that are not registered or required to be registered with the Commission (Covered Members).

The letter provides relief, pending further Commission action, to Covered Members with respect to complying with the requirements under Regulation 1.35(a) to keep electronic text messages and to keep records in a form and manner identifiable and searchable by transaction.

Friday, May 16, 2014

CFTC ACTING CHAIRMAN'S TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Testimony of Mark P. Wetjen Acting Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services And General Government
May 14, 2014

Good morning, Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Johanns and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on the President's Fiscal Year 2015 funding request and budget justification for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC).

During the last two years, despite significant budgetary constraints, the CFTC has made important progress in fulfilling its mission. As you know, under the Commodity Exchange Act, the Commission has oversight responsibilities for the derivatives markets, which include futures, options, cash, and swaps. Each of these markets is significant. Collectively, they have taken on particular importance to the U.S. economy in recent decades and, as a consequence, have grown substantially in size, measuring hundreds of trillions of dollars in notional value. Their operation and integrity are critical to the effective functioning of the U.S. and global economies.

At their core, the derivatives markets exist to help farmers, producers, small businesses, manufacturers and lenders focus on what they do best: providing goods and services and allocating capital to reduce risk and meet Main Street demand. Well-regulated derivatives markets facilitate job creation and the growth of the economy by providing a means for managing and assuming prices risks and broadly disseminating, and discovering, pricing information.

Stated more simply, through the derivatives marketplace, a farmer can lock in a price for his crop; a small business can lock in an interest rate that would otherwise fluctuate, perhaps raising its costs; a global manufacturer can lock in a currency value, allowing it to better plan and grow its global business; and a lender can manage its assets and balance sheet to ensure it can continue lending, fueling the economy in the process.

Essentially, these complex markets facilitate the assumption and distribution of risk throughout the financial system. Well-working derivatives markets are key to supporting a strong, growing economy by enabling the efficient transfer of risk, and therefore the efficient production of goods and services. Accordingly, it is critical that these markets are subject to appropriate governmental oversight.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Committee members, I do not intend the testimony that follows to sound alarmist, or to overstate the case for additional resources, but I do want to be sure that Congress, and this committee in particular, have a clear picture of the potential risks posed by the continued state of funding for the agency. When not overseen properly, the derivatives markets may experience irregularities or failures of firms intermediating in them – events that can severely and negatively impact the economy as a whole and cause dramatic losses for individual participants. The stakes, therefore, are high.

The CFT C’s Responsibilities Have Grown Substantially in Recent Years

The unfortunate reality is that, at current funding levels, the Commission is unable to adequately fulfill the mission given to it by Congress: to prevent disruptions to market integrity, protect customer assets, monitor and reduce the build-up of systemic risk, and ensure to the greatest extent possible that the derivatives markets are free of fraud and manipulation.

Recent increases in the agency’s funding have been essential and appreciated. They have not, however, kept pace with the growth of the Commission’s responsibilities, including those given to it under Dodd-Frank.

Various statistics have been used to measure this increase in responsibilities. One often-cited measure is the increase in the gross notional size of the marketplace now under the Commission’s oversight. Other measures, though, are equally and perhaps more illustrative.

Trading Volume Has Increased

For instance, the trading volume of CFTC-regulated futures and options contracts was 3,060 million contracts in 2010 and rose to 3,477 million in 2013. Similarly, the volume of interest rate swap trading activity by the 15 largest dealers averaged 249,564 swap events each in 2010, and by 2012, averaged 332,484 each (according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) data). Those transactions, moreover, can be executed in significantly more trading venues, and types of trading venues, both here and abroad. In addition, the complexity of the markets – its products and sophistication of the market tools, such as automated-trading techniques – has increased greatly over the years.

Clearing Houses Manage More Risk

The notional value of derivatives centrally cleared by clearing houses was $124 trillion in 2010 (according to ISDA data), and is now approximately $223 trillion (according to CFTC data from swap data repositories (“SDRs”)). That is nearly a 100 percent increase. The expanded use of clearinghouses is significant in this context because, among other things, it means that the Commission must ensure through appropriate oversight that these entities continue to properly manage the various types of risks that are incident to a market structure dependent on central clearing. A clearinghouse’s failure to adhere to rigorous risk management practices established by the Commission’s regulations, now more than ever, could have significant economic consequences. The Commission directly oversees fifteen registered clearinghouses and two of them, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc., and ICE Clear Credit LLC, have been designated as systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.

Clearing Houses and Intermediaries Manage More Customer Funds

The amount of customer funds held by clearinghouses and futures commission merchants (FCMs) was $177 billion in 2010 and is now over $218 billion, another substantial increase. These are customer funds in the form of cash and securities deposited at firms to be used for margin payments made by the end-users of the markets, like farmers, to support their trading activities. Again, Commission rules are designed to ensure customer funds are safely kept by these market intermediaries, and a failure to provide the proper level of oversight increases the risk of certain practices by firms, including operational risks or fraud. In fact, recent events in the FCM community led to the temporary or permanent loss of more than a billion dollars of customer funds.

Substantially Larger Number of Firms Now Registered with the CFTC

The total number of registrants and registered entities overseen directly or indirectly by the Commission, depending on the measure, has increased by at least 40 percent in the last four years. This includes 102 swap dealers and two major swap participants (MSPs).

In addition, the CFTC oversees more than 4,000 advisers and operators of managed funds, some of which have significant outward exposures in and across multiple markets. It is conceivable that the failure of some of these funds could have spill-over effects on the financial system. In all cases, investors in these funds are entitled to know their money is being appropriately held and invested.

Additionally, the Commission directly or indirectly supervises another approximately 64,000 registrants, mostly associated persons that solicit or accept customer orders or participate in certain managed funds, or that invest customer funds through discretionary accounts. Although it leverages the resources of the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”), the Commission itself must oversee these registrants in certain areas and provide guidance and interpretations to the SROs. The Commission does so with a total staff of only 648 employees currently onboard – about 1 percent of the number of registrants under its purview. Separately, the Commission must oversee more than three dozen registered entities, including clearinghouses and trading venues, each of which is subject to a complex set of regulatory requirements newly established or modified by the Dodd-Frank Act and designed to mitigate systemic risk.

By almost any measure, in fact, the portfolio of entities that the Commission is charged with overseeing has expanded dramatically in size and risk over the last half decade. The intermediaries in the derivatives markets are by and large well-run firms that perform important services in the markets and for their customers. Nevertheless, collectively, these firms can potentially pose risks – in some cases significant risks – to the financial system and the broader economy. Accordingly, those relying upon these firms and the public deserve assurance that such firms are supervised by an agency capable of meaningful oversight.

The CFTC Has Made Important Progress But Has Been Significantly Constrained

For much of FY 2013, the CFTC operated under continuing resolutions, which extended the FY 2012 appropriation of $205 million. These appropriations, however, were subject to sequestration. Effectively, our operating budget for FY 2013 was $195 million. Thus, the FY 2014 appropriation of $215 million was a modest budgetary increase for the Commission, lifting the agency’s appropriations above the sequestration level of $195 million that has posed significant challenges for the agency’s orderly operation. As directed by Congress, the agency has submitted a FY 2014 Spend Plan outlining its allocation of current resources, which reflects an increased emphasis on examinations and technology-related staff.

Even with these significant budget constraints, the dedicated staff of the Commission were able to complete the majority of new rulemakings required by the Dodd-Frank Act – about 50 rulemakings in all. This was in addition to the Commission’s ongoing work overseeing the futures exchange and options markets. These regulatory efforts resulted in greater transparency, which is critical to reducing systemic risk and lowering costs to end-users, while improving efficiency and supporting competition.

With regard to technology, we made progress in a variety of areas. We improved the quality of data reported to swap data repositories and have laid groundwork to receive, analyze and promulgate new datasets from SROs related to new authorities. We upgraded data analytics platforms to keep up with market growth. Financial risk surveillance tools were enhanced to support monitoring and stress testing related to new authorities. The Commission has prototyped a high-performance computing platform that dramatically reduces data analytics computation times and an on-line portal for regulatory business transactions to improve staff and industry productivity. The Commission has implemented enhanced position limit monitoring and is ready to implement pre-trade and heightened account ownership and control surveillance. Finally, the Commission has ensured that foundational server, storage, networking, and workstation technology are refreshed on a cost-effective cycle and that technology investments have cybersecurity and business continuity built-in.

In its role as a law enforcement agency, the Commission’s enforcement arm protects market participants and other members of the public from fraud, manipulation and other abusive practices in the futures, options, cash, and swaps markets, and prosecutes those who engage in such conduct. As of May 1, 2014, the Commission filed 31 enforcement actions in FY 2014 and also obtained orders imposing more than $2.2 billion in sanctions. By way of comparison, in FY 2013, the Commission filed 82 enforcement actions, and obtained orders imposing more than $1.7 billion in sanctions.

With the bulk of rulemaking behind us, the necessary focus must be examinations, market supervision and enforcement. Simply stated, this requires appropriate staffing and technological resources sufficiently robust to oversee what are highly advanced, complex global markets, and be able to take effective and timely enforcement action.

The FY 2015 Request Prioritizes Examinations, Technology, Market Integrity, and Enforcement

The President’s FY 2015 budget request reflects these priorities and highlights both the importance of the Commission’s mission and the potential effects of continuing to operate under difficult budgetary constraints.

The request is a significant step towards the longer-term funding level that is necessary to fully and responsibly fulfill the agency’s core mission: protecting the safety and integrity of the derivatives markets. It recognizes the immediate need for an appropriation of $280 million and approximately 920 staff years (FTEs) for the agency, an increase of $65 million and 253 FTEs over the FY 2014 levels, heavily weighted towards examinations, surveillance, and technology functions.

In this regard, the request balances the need for more technological tools to monitor the markets, detect fraud and manipulation, and identify risk and compliance issues, with the need for staff with the requisite expertise to analyze the data collected through technology and determine how to use the results of that analysis to fulfill the Commission’s mission as the regulator of the derivatives markets. Both are essential to carrying out the agency’s mandate. Technology, after all, is an important means for the agency to effectively carry out critical oversight work; it is not an end in itself.

In light of technological developments in the markets today, the agency has committed to an increased focus on technology. The FY 2015 budget request includes a $15 million increase in technology funding above the FY 2014 appropriation, or about a 42 percent increase, solely for IT investments.

In my remaining testimony, I will review three of the primary mission priorities for FY 2015.

Examinations

The President’s request would provide $38 million and 158 FTEs for examinations, which also covers the compliance activities of the Commission. As compared to FY 2014, this request is an increase of $15 million and 63 FTEs.

I noted earlier that the Commission has seen substantial growth in, among other things, trading volumes, customer funds held by intermediaries in the derivatives markets, and margin and risk held by clearinghouses. Examinations and regulatory compliance oversight are perhaps the best deterrents to fraud and improper or insufficient risk management and, as such, remain essential to compliance with the Commission’s customer protection and risk management rules.

The Commission has a direct examinations program for clearinghouses and designated contract markets, and it will soon directly examine swap execution facilities and SDRs. However, the agency does not at this time have the resources to place full-time staff on site at these registered entities, even systemically-important clearing organizations, unlike a number of other financial regulators that have on-the-ground staff at the significant firms they oversee. The Divisions of Market Oversight and Clearing and Risk collectively have a total of 47 examinations positions in FY 2014 to monitor, review, and report on some of the most complex financial market operations in the world.

The Commission today performs only high-level, limited-scope reviews of the nearly 100 FCMs holding over $218 billion in customer funds and 102 swap dealers. In fact, the Commission currently has a staff of only 38 to examine these firms, and to review and analyze, among other things, over 1,200 financial filings and over 2,400 regulatory notices each year. This staff level is less than the number the Commission had in 2010, yet the number of firms requiring its attention has almost doubled, and there has been a noted increase in the complexity and risk profile of the firms. Additionally, although it has begun legal compliance oversight of swap dealers and MSPs, the Commission has been able to allocate only 13 FTEs for this purpose. This number is insufficient to perform the necessary level of oversight of the newly registered swap dealer entities.

In FY 2014, the Commission overall will have a mere 95 staff positions dedicated to examinations of the thousands of different registrants that should be subject to thorough oversight and examinations. The reality is that the agency has fallen far short of performance goals for its examinations activities, and it will continue to do so in the absence of additional funding from Congress. For example, as detailed in the Annual Performance Review for FY 2013, the Commission failed to meet performance targets for system safeguard examinations and for conducting direct examinations of FCM and non-FCM intermediaries. The President’s budget request appropriately calls on Congress to bolster the examinations function at the agency, and it would protect the public, and money deposited by customers, by enhancing the examinations program staff by more than 66 percent in FY 2015.

Moreover, if Congress fully funds the President’s request, the Commission can move toward annual reviews of all significant clearinghouses and trading platforms and perform more effective monitoring of market participants and intermediaries. Partially funding the request will mean accepting potentially avoidable risk in the derivatives markets as the Commission is forced to forego more in-depth financial, operational and risk reviews of the firms within its jurisdiction. Thus, the Commission would be reactive, rather than proactive in regard to firm or industry risk issues.

Technology and Market Integrity

The FY 2015 request also supports a substantial increase in technology investments relative to FY 2014, roughly a 42 percent increase. The $50 million investment in technology will provide millions of dollars for new and sophisticated analytical systems that will, in part, assist the Commission in its efforts to ensure market integrity. As global markets have moved almost entirely to electronic systems, the Commission must invest in technology required to collect and analyze market data, and to handle the unprecedented volumes of transaction-level data provided by financial markets.

The President’s FY 2015 budget request supports, in addition, 103 data-analytics and surveillance-related positions in the Division of Market Oversight alone, an increase of more than 98 percent over the FY 2014 staffing levels. Market surveillance is a core Commission mission, and it is an area that depends heavily on technology. As trading across the world has moved almost entirely to electronic systems, the Commission must make the technology investments required to collect and make sense of market data and handle the unprecedented volumes of transaction-level data provided by financial markets.

Effective market surveillance, though, equally depends on the Commission’s ability to hire and retain experienced market professionals who can analyze extremely complex and voluminous data from multiple trading markets and develop sophisticated analytics and models to respond to and identify trading activity that warrants investigation. The FY 2015 investment in high-performance hardware and software therefore must be paired with investments in personnel that can employ technology investments effectively.

Accordingly, to make use of existing and new IT investments, the FY 2015 request would provide funding for 193 FTEs, an increase of 74 FTEs over FY 2014. These new staff positions are necessary for the Commission to receive, analyze, and effectively surveil the markets it oversees. These new positions, together with the technology investments included in the FY 2015 request, will enable the Commission to make market surveillance a core component of our mission.

The CFTC has invested appropriated funds in FY 2013 and FY 2014 in technology to make important progress. We have the groundwork in place to receive and effectively analyze swaps transaction data submitted to repositories and SROs related to new authorities. The FY 2015 request would provide funding to continue and increase the pace of progress in the areas noted above and also support the additional examination, enforcement, and economic and legal staff. Effective use of technology is essential to our mission to ensure market integrity, promote transparency, and effectively surveil market participants.

Enforcement

The President’s FY 2015 request would provide $62 million and 200 FTEs for enforcement, an increase of $16 million and 51 FTEs over FY 2014. The simple fact is that, without a robust, effective enforcement program, the Commission cannot fulfill its mandate to ensure a fair playing field. From FY 2011 to date, the Commission has filed 314 enforcement actions and also obtained orders imposing more than $5.4 billion in sanctions.

The cases the agency pursues range from sophisticated manipulative and disruptive trading schemes in markets the Commission regulates, including financial instruments, oil, gas, precious metals and agricultural products, to quick strike actions against Ponzi schemes that victimize investors. The agency also is engaged in complex litigations related to issues of financial market integrity and customer protection. By way of example, in FY 2013, the CFTC filed and settled charges against three financial institutions for engaging in manipulation, attempted manipulation and false reporting of LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates.

Such investigations continue to be a significant and important part of the Division of Enforcement’s docket. Preventing manipulation is critical to the Commission’s mission to help protect taxpayers and the markets, but manipulation investigations, in particular, strain resources and time. And once a case is filed, the priority must shift to the litigation. In addition to requiring significant time and resources at the Commission, litigation requires additional resources, such as the retention of costly expert witnesses.

In 2002, when the Commission was responsible for the futures and options markets alone, the Division of Enforcement had approximately 154 people. Today, the agency’s responsibilities have substantially increased. The CFTC now also has anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority over the vast swaps market and the host of new market participants the agency now oversees. In addition, the agency is now responsible for pursuing cases under our enhanced Dodd-Frank authority that prohibits the reckless use of manipulative or deceptive schemes. Notwithstanding these additional responsibilities, however, total enforcement staff has shrunk – there are currently only 147 members of the enforcement staff. The President’s budget request would bring this number to 200. More cops on the beat means the public is better assured that the rules of the road are being followed.

In addition to the need for additional enforcement staff and resources, the CFTC also believes technology investments will make our enforcement staff more efficient. For instance, the FY 2015 request would support developing and enhancing forensic analysis and case management capabilities to assist in the development of analytical evidence for enforcement cases. In FY 2013 and FY 2014, appropriated funds invested in information technology have enabled the Commission to continue enhancing enforcement and litigation automation services, including a major upgrade to the document and digital evidence review platform that will enable staff to keep pace with the exploding volume of data required to successfully conduct enforcement actions.

A full increase for enforcement means that the agency can pursue more investigations and better protect the public and the markets. A less than full increase means that the CFTC will continue to face difficult choices about how to use its limited enforcement resources. At this point, it is not clear that the agency could maintain the current volume and types of cases, as well as ensure timely responses to market events.

Other FY 2015 Priorities: International Policy Coordination & Economic and Legal Analysis

The global nature of the derivatives markets makes it imperative that the United States consult and coordinate with international authorities. For example, the Commission recently announced significant progress towards harmonizing a regulatory framework for CFTC-regulated SEFs and EU-regulated multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). The Commission is working internationally to promote robust and consistent standards, to avoid or minimize potentially conflicting or duplicative requirements, and to engage in cooperative supervision, wherever possible.

Over the past two years, the CFTC, SEC, European Commission, European Securities and Markets Authority, and other market regulators from around the globe have been meeting regularly to discuss and resolve issues with the goal of harmonizing financial reform. The Commission also participates in numerous international working groups regarding derivatives. The Commission’s international efforts directly support global consistency in the oversight of the derivatives markets. In addition, the Commission anticipates a significant need for ongoing international policy coordination related to both market participants and infrastructure in the swaps markets. The Commission also anticipates a need for ongoing international work and coordination in the development of data and reporting standards under Dodd-Frank rules. Dodd- Frank further provided a framework for foreign trading platforms to seek registration as foreign boards of trade, and 24 applications have been submitted so far.

Full funding for international policy means the Commission will be able to maintain our coordination efforts with financial regulators and market participants from around the globe. If available funding is decreased, we will be less able to engage in cooperative work with our international counterparts, respond to requests, and provide staffing for various standard-setting projects. The President’s FY 2015 request would enable the Commission to sustain its efforts, providing $4.2 million and 15 FTEs that would be dedicated to international policy.

In addition, for FY 2015, the President’s budget would support $24 million and 92 FTEs to invest in robust economic analysis teams and Commission-wide legal analysis. Compared to the FY 2014 Spending Plan, this request is an increase of $4 million and 18 FTEs. Both of these teams support all of the Commission’s divisions.

The CFTC’s economists analyze innovations in trading technology, developments in trading instruments and market structure, and interactions among various market participants in the futures and swaps markets. Economics staff with particular expertise and experience provides leverage to dedicated staff in other divisions to anticipate and address significant regulatory, surveillance, clearing, and enforcement challenges. Economic analysis plays an integral role in the development, implementation, and review of financial regulations to ensure that the regulations are economically sound and subjected to a careful consideration of potential costs and benefits. Economic analysis also is critical to the public transparency initiatives of the Commission, such as the Weekly Swaps Report. Moving into FY 2015, the CFTC’s economists will be working to integrate large quantities of swaps market data with data from designated contract markets and swap execution facilities, and large swaps and futures position data to provide a more comprehensive view of the derivatives markets.

The legal analysis team provides interpretations of Commission statutory and regulatory authority and, where appropriate, provides exemptive, interpretive, and no-action letters to CFTC registrants and market participants. In FY 2013, the Commission experienced a significant increase in the number and complexity of requests from market participants for written interpretations and no-action letters, and this trend is expected to increase into FY 2015.

A full increase for the economics and legal analysis mission means the Commission will be able to support each of the CFTC’s divisions with economic and legal analysis. Funding short of this full increase or flat funding means an increasingly strained ability to integrate and analyze vast amounts of data the Commission is receiving on the derivatives markets, thus impacting our ability to study and detect problems that could be detrimental to the economy. Flat funding also means the Commission’s legal analysis team will continue to be constrained in supporting front- line examinations, adding to the delays in responding to market participants and processing applications, and hampering the team’s ability to support enforcement efforts.

Conclusion

Effective oversight of the futures and swaps markets requires additional resources for the Commission. This means investing in both personnel and information technology. We need staff to analyze the vast amounts of data we are receiving on the swaps and futures markets. We need staff to regularly examine firms, clearinghouses, trade repositories, and trading platforms. We need staff to bring enforcement actions against perpetrators of fraud and manipulation. The agency’s ability to appropriately oversee the marketplace hinges on securing additional resources.

Thank you again for inviting me today, and I look forward to your questions.

Thursday, May 15, 2014

CFTC OFFICIAL'S TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE REGARDING AUTOMATED TRADING ENVIRONMENTS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Testimony of Vincent McGonagle, Director of the Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
May 13, 2014

Chairwoman Stabenow, Ranking Member Cochran and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Vincent McGonagle and I am the Director of the Division of Market Oversight at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission). I am pleased to appear before the Committee to provide an overview of the CFTC’s Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments (Concept Release). The Concept Release reflects the Commission’s ongoing commitment to the safety and soundness of U.S. derivatives markets in times of technological change, including automated and high-frequency trading (HFT).

My written testimony today will describe the Concept Release and provide an overview of public comments received in response to the risk controls and market enhancements discussed therein. It will also describe the regulatory context in which automated and high-frequency trading currently operate, and numerous measures already taken by the Commission to safeguard trading in modern, technology-driven markets.

Background on Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s Mission

The purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act (Act) is to serve the public interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information. Consistent with its mission statement and statutory charge, the CFTC is tasked with protecting market participants and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and systemic risk related to derivatives – both futures and swaps – and to foster transparent, open, competitive and financially sound markets. In carrying out its mission and statutory charge, and to promote market integrity, the CFTC polices derivatives markets for various abuses and works to ensure the protection of customer funds.

To fulfill these roles, the Commission oversees designated contract markets (DCMs), swap execution facilities (SEFs), derivatives clearing organizations, swap data repositories, swap dealers (SDs), futures commission merchants (FCMs) and other intermediaries. The Act generally requires that all futures transactions be conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that the CFTC designates as a DCM. Sections 5 and 6 of the Act and Part 38 of the Commission’s regulations provide the legal framework for the Commission to designate DCMs, along with each DCM’s self-regulatory compliance requirements with respect to the trading of commodity futures contracts. With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), DCMs were also permitted to list swap contracts. Dodd-Frank also adopted a new regulatory category for exchanges that provide exclusively for the trading of swaps (i.e., SEFs).

Exchanges’ Self-Regulatory Responsibilities and CFTC Oversight

DCMs and SEFs play an important role in the regulatory structure established for derivatives markets by the Act. As self-regulatory organizations (SROs) they are responsible for front-line oversight of all exchange-traded derivatives subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. DCMs must comply with 23 core principles, including core principles requiring them to establish, monitor and enforce compliance with their rules and to have the capacity to detect, investigate and sanction violative conduct1 and to prevent manipulation and price distortion.2 SEFs are subject to 15 core principles and must comply with similar requirements to establish and enforce trading and participation rules that will deter abuses, and have the capacity to detect and investigate rule violations.3 SEFs are also required to monitor trading in swaps to prevent manipulation and price distortion.4 Commission regulations require DCMs and SEFs to prohibit abusive trading practices by exchange members and market participants, including abuses against customers. Prohibited practices include, but are not limited to, trading ahead of customer orders, accommodation trading, improper cross trading, front-running, wash-trading, pre-arranged trades unless otherwise permitted, fraudulent trading and money passes. DCMs and SEFs must prohibit any other manipulative or disruptive trading practice prohibited by the Act or Commission regulations, and any trading practice that the DCM or SEF believes to be abusive.5

To fulfill these responsibilities, DCMs and SEFs are required to and do maintain in-house compliance departments with appropriate human and technology resources, or to contract with third-party regulatory service providers recognized under the Act. DCMs and SEFs must also maintain complete audit trails. For example, DCMs have extensive electronic records of activity on their electronic trade matching platforms. A subset of such records—trade and related order data—is provided to the CFTC daily by DCMs for the Commission’s own surveillance activities.6

The Division of Market Oversight conducts rule enforcement reviews of DCMs’ self-regulatory programs and evaluates their compliance with the Act and Commission regulations. Such reviews aim to promote DCMs’ effective performance as SROs by examining core principles most closely-related to their self-regulatory programs. These include core principles governing DCMs’ trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, audit trail, and disciplinary programs. The Division will conduct similar reviews of SEFs in the future. In addition, the Division also conducts direct surveillance of its regulated markets, and continues to improve the regulatory data available for this purpose. For example, in November 2013 the Commission published final rules to improve its identification of participants in futures and swaps markets (OCR Final Rules).7 While enhancing the Commission’s already robust position-based reporting regime, the OCR Final Rules also create new volume-based reporting requirements that significantly expand the Commission’s view into its regulated markets, including with respect to high-frequency traders.

Expansion of CFTC Enforcement Authority under Dodd-Frank and New Regulations Relevant to Automated Markets

The Commission’s responsibilities under the Act include mandates to prevent and deter fraud, manipulation, and disruptive trading. Dodd-Frank broadened the Commission’s enforcement authority to include swaps markets. Under the new law and rules implementing it, the Commission’s anti-manipulation reach is extended to prohibit the reckless use of manipulative schemes. Specifically, Section 6(c)(3) of the Act now makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity. In addition, new Section 4c(a) of the Act now explicitly prohibits disruptive trading practices, such as the violation of bids or offers, intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period, or the placement of bids or offers with the intent to cancel such bids or offers before execution (commonly known as “spoofing”).8

A number of Commission rulemakings to implement Dodd-Frank have focused specifically on safeguards for automated trading. These new rules address both market participants, such as FCMs, SDs and others, and exchanges, including both DCMs and SEFs. In April 2012, the Commission adopted Regulations 1.73 and 23.609 requiring FCMs, SDs and major swap participants (“MSPs”) that are clearing members to establish risk-based limits based on “position size, order size, margin requirements, or similar factors” for all proprietary accounts and customer accounts.9 The rules also require FCMs, SDs and MSPs to “use automated means to screen orders for compliance with the [risk] limits” when such orders are subject to automated execution.10 The Commission also adopted rules in April 2012 requiring SDs and MSPs to ensure that their “use of trading programs is subject to policies and procedures governing the use, supervision, maintenance, testing, and inspection of the program.”11

In June 2012, the Commission adopted rules to implement the 23 core principles for DCMs.12 Regulation 38.255 requires DCMs to “establish and maintain risk control mechanisms to prevent and reduce the potential risk of price distortions and market disruptions, including, but not limited to, market restrictions that pause or halt trading in market conditions prescribed by the designated contract market.”13 Regulation 37.405 imposes similar requirements on SEFs.14 In addition, the Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 4 (Prevention of Market Disruption) and Guidance to SEF Core Principle 4 (Monitoring of Trading and Trade Processing) identify pre-trade limits on order size, price collars or bands, message throttles and daily price limits as responsive measures that a DCM or SEF may implement to demonstrate compliance with elements of Core Principle 4.15

The DCM rules also set forth risk control requirements for exchanges that provide direct market access (“DMA”) to clients. Regulation 38.607 requires DCMs that permit DMA to have effective systems and controls reasonably designed to facilitate an FCM’s management of financial risk. These systems and controls include automated pre-trade controls through which member FCMs can implement financial risk limits.16 Regulation 38.607 also requires DCMs to implement and enforce rules requiring member FCMs to use these systems and controls.17 Finally, the DCM rules implement new requirements in the Act related to exchanges’ cyber security and system safeguard programs. As with its rule enforcement reviews, the Division also conducts periodic systems safeguards examinations to review DCMs’ compliance with the systems safeguards and cyber security requirements of the Act and Commission regulations. The Act and Commission regulations also address cyber security and system safeguards within SEFs.

The CFTC’s Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments

The Commission’s Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments was published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2013.18 The initial 90-day comment period closed on December 11, 2013, but was reopened from January 21 through February 14, 2014, in conjunction with a meeting of the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee (TAC). As discussed in further detail below, the Concept Release considers a series of potential pre-trade risk controls; post-trade reports; the design, testing, and supervision standards for automated trading systems (ATS) which generate orders for entry into automated markets; market structure initiatives; and other measures designed to reduce risk or improve the functioning of automated markets. The Concept Release also requests public comment on 124 separate questions regarding the necessity and operation of such measures in today’s markets. In this regard, the Concept Release serves as a vehicle to catalogue existing industry practices, determining their efficacy and implementation to date, and evaluating the need for additional measures. The Concept Release is not a proposed rule, but rather a prior step designed to engage a public dialogue and educate the Commission so that it may make an informed determination as to whether rulemaking is necessary and, if so, the substantive requirements of such a rulemaking.

The Commission received a total of 43 public comments on the Concept Release, including comments from DCMs; an array of trading firms; trade associations; public interest groups; members of academia; a U.S. federal reserve bank; and consulting, technology and information service providers in the financial industry. All comments are available on cftc.gov. Many of the comments received are detailed and thorough, including some comment letters that addressed all 124 questions presented in the Concept Release. One commenter conducted a survey of its member firms to gauge existing risk-management practices. Other commenters provided academic papers in support of their points of view, and some focused on elements of the Concept Release that are of particular interest to them. CFTC Staff is studying all comments received and will make initial recommendations once its review is complete.

Fundamentally, the Concept Release asks whether existing risk controls in automated trading environments are sufficient to match the technologies and risks of modern markets. In this regard, the Concept Release focuses on the totality of the automated trading environment, including the progression of orders from the ATSs that generate them, through the clearing firms that guarantee customer orders, and on to execution by registered trading platforms. The Concept Release also addresses ATSs themselves, including their design, testing and supervision. It also raises a number of related issues, ranging from the underlying data streams used by ATSs to inform their trading decisions, to the special considerations involved in trading via direct market access. It also asks whether terms such as “high-frequency trading” should be defined in regulations, and whether HFT firms should be registered with the Commission.

The Concept Release was informed by a number of factors, including: (1) controls or best practices already in use or developed within industry; (2) existing CFTC regulatory standards that address automated trading; and (3) best practices developed by expert groups and outside organizations, including international standard setting bodies, foreign jurisdictions, and the CFTC’s TAC.

The Concept Release begins with an overview of the automated trading environment, including the development of automated order-generating and trade-matching systems; advances in high-speed communication networks; the growth of interconnected automated markets; and the changed role of humans in markets. It also highlights the importance of ATSs as tools for the generation and routing of orders.

These developments are addressed in the Concept Release through a series of 23 potential risk controls and other measures broadly grouped into four categories. The first includes “pre-trade risk controls,” such as controls designed to prevent potential errors or disruptions from reaching trading platforms, or to minimize their impact once they have. Specific pre-trade risk controls include maximum message rates, execution throttles, and maximum order sizes. Depending on the measure, pre-trade risk controls could be applicable to all trading firms; to trading firms operating ATSs; to clearing firms; or to trading platforms. The Concept Release includes a total of eight pre-trade risk controls and sub-controls.

A second category of safeguards includes “post-trade reports” and “other post-trade measures.” Examples in this category include reports that promote the flow of order, trade and position information; uniform trade adjustment or cancellation policies; and standardized error trade reporting obligations. These measures could be applicable to all trading firms; to trading platforms; or to clearing houses. There are a total of five post-trade reports and other measures or sub-measures in this category, including post-order, post-trade, and post-clearing drop copies.

The third category of risk controls discussed in the Concept Release is termed “system safeguards,” including safeguards for the design, testing and supervision of ATSs, as well as measures such as “kill switches” that facilitate emergency intervention in the case of malfunctioning ATSs. Such safeguards would generally be applicable to trading firms operating ATSs, and depending on the control, might also apply to trading platforms and others. The Concept Release presents a total of seven system safeguards, some with subparts.

Finally, the Concept Release presents a fourth category of measures focusing on various options for potentially improving market functioning or structure. These includes measures such as mandatory publication by exchanges of various market quality indicators to help inform market participants (e.g., order to fill ratios; execution speeds for different types of orders and order sizes; price impacts associated with different trade sizes; and average order duration). They also include a number potential measures requiring exchanges to amend their trade matching systems by, for example: (1) providing batch auctions instead of continuous trade matching; (2) prioritizing orders resting in the order book for some minimum period of time; or (3) aggregating multiple small orders from the same legal entity entered contemporaneously at the same price level and assigning them the lowest priority time-stamp of all orders so aggregated.

As a threshold matter, the Concept Release recognizes that orders and trades in automated environments pass through multiple stages in their lifecycle, from order generation, to execution, to clearing, and steps in between. Accordingly, it solicited comment regarding the appropriate stage or stages at which risk controls should be placed. Focal points for the implementation of risk controls described in the Concept Release include: (i) ATSs prior to order submission; (ii) clearing firms; (iii) trading platforms prior to exposing orders to the market; (iv) clearing houses; and (v) other risk control options, such as third-party “hubs” through which orders or order information could flow to uniformly mitigate risks across various platforms. The Concept Release recognizes that the appropriate location of a risk control also may depend on the type of control or its intended purpose. Therefore, it specifically seeks comment on this question, and on the desirability of a “layered” or “defense in depth” approach that places the same or similar risk controls at more than one stage of the order and trade lifecycle.

Given the variety and complexity of matters raised in the Concept Release, commenters understandably held a range of opinions. Many commenters expressed satisfaction that the Commission has undertaken this review of risk controls and system safeguards in automated trading environments. Based on comments received and other indications, a number of parties support certain Commission actions. Some have expressed “race to the bottom” concerns in the absence of minimum regulatory standards. In this regard, any risk controls that introduce latency (i.e., reduce speed) in the generation or transmission of orders could create competitive disadvantage for firms that adopt them unilaterally.

Most commenters also supported a multi-layered approach to risk controls. One commenter stated, for example, that a “holistic approach, with overlapping supervisory obligations, offers the most robust protection by engaging all levels of the supply chain…and eliminating the possibility that a single point of failure will cause significant harm to the market.” Another entity commented with respect to ATS testing and change management that “the same levels of responsibility for testing and change management should apply to all market participants that deploy their own technology, as well as providers of technology that allows access to the markets.”

At the same time, other measures contemplated in the Concept Release drew opposition by a majority of commenters. For example, a majority of parties who commented on the idea of a credit risk control implemented through a centralized hub were opposed to the idea, citing costs, complexity and an undesirable concentration of risk.

Certain key questions in the Concept Release drew very divergent opinions. Commenters disagreed on the need for a regulatory definition of high-frequency trading. Just over half of the parties who commented on this point were opposed to a definition, while the remainder were in favor. The question of defining high-frequency trading is closely related to the question of whether HFT firms not already registered with the Commission in some capacity should be required to register. Those opposed to defining high-frequency trading suggested that no clear distinction can be drawn between automated trading and high-frequency automated trading, or pointed to the difficulty in defining HFT and to the concern that any definition of HFT would become obsolete over time.

A commenter’s opinion as to whether HFT should be defined typically ran in parallel with its opinion as to whether risk controls should apply equally to all automated systems, or whether high-frequency trading or HFT firms deserve special regulatory attention. Those requesting HFT-specific measures logically saw a need to define high-frequency trading. More fundamentally, however, some academic commenters discussed concerns around the speed of trading, including within exchange order books, and suggested steps to slow trading or to reduce any potential advantages that come with speed.

One recurring theme across comments is whether pre-trade risk controls and other measures should focus on high-level principles or be more granular instead. Many industry commenters stated their preference for a principles-based approach to any rules that the Commission may adopt. These commenters argued that prescriptive requirements will become obsolete as technologies advance; may not account for the unique characteristics of market participants; and could result in participants designing around such measures. Similarly, one commenter noted that the best way to achieve standardization of risk controls is through implementing “best practices” developed through working groups of DCMs, FCMs, and other market participants.

Other commenters, however, expressed a need for more prescriptive rules. One argued, for example, that prescriptive rules are necessary unless the Commission receives documentation that the risk controls implemented by firms and exchanges are consistent and effective. Another commenter questioned whether the incentives facing industry participants would permit them to, quote, “sacrifice speed for prudent risk controls.”

Finally, as with the high-level questions discussed above, many of the specific pre-trade risk controls and other safeguards discussed in the Concept Release drew divergent opinions, either around whether the control should be a regulatory requirement or, if a requirement, how granular it should be. Commenters also addressed the appropriate design and use of particular risk controls. For example, one commenter stated that “kill switches, if implemented and used properly, can serve as an effective last-resort means of risk control,” but “are not a panacea and should only be used during extreme events when all other courses of action have been exhausted.” Another commenter specified that kill switches should exist at the trading firm, clearing firm and trading platform level, and that the Commission should assess the methodology used to set kill switch limits.

As noted previously, staff continues to review all comments received and to refine its thoughts. Next steps could include potential recommendations to the Commission for notice and comment rulemaking in one or more areas addressed by the Concept Release.

This concludes my written testimony.

1 See 17 CFR 38.150 (Core Principle 2—Compliance with Rules).

2 See 17 CFR 38.250 (Core Principle 4—Prevention of Market Disruption).

3 See 17 CFR 37.200 (Core Principle 2—Compliance with Rules).

4 See 17 CFR 37.400 (Core Principle 4—Monitoring of Trading and Trade Processing).

5 See 17 CFR 38.152 and 17 CFR 37.203(a).

6 DCMs provide information to the Commission on a “T + 1” basis, i.e., on trade date plus 1.

7 Commission, Final Rule: Ownership and Control Reports, Forms 102/102S, 40/40S, and 71, 77 FR 69177 (Nov. 18, 2013).

8 The Commission further clarified the scope of these prohibited disruptive trading practices in its Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement on Disruptive Practices. 78 FR 31890 (May 28, 2013).

9 17 CFR 1.73(a)(1) and 23.609(a)(1).

10 17 CFR 1.73(a)(2)(i) and 17 CFR 23.609(a)(2)(i).

11 17 CFR 23.600(d)(9).

12 Commission, Final Rule: Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612 (Jun. 19, 2012) (the “DCM Final Rules”).

13 17 CFR 38.255.

14 17 CFR 37.405.

15 DCM Final Rules, 77 FR at 36718; Commission, Final Rule: Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 FR 33476, 33601 (June 4, 2013).

16 17 CFR 38.607.

17 Id.

18 Commission, Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 FR 56542 (Sept. 12, 2013).

Last Updated: May 13, 2014

Monday, May 5, 2014

CFTC FREEZES ASSETS IN MISAPPROPRIATION CASE INVOLVING ALLEGED FOREX FRAUD

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Federal Court Freezes Assets of EJS Capital Management, LLC, Alex Vladimir Ekdeshman and Edward J. Servider and Relief Defendants in CFTC Action Charging Misappropriation of Nearly $2 Million in Ongoing Forex Fraud Scheme

Defendant Ekdeshman also charged with violating Federal Court Order

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that The Honorable Kevin P. Castel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 1, 2014, entered a restraining order freezing assets and prohibiting the destruction or concealment of books and records of Defendants EJS Capital Management, LLC (EJS), Alex Vladimir Ekdeshman of Holmdel, N.J., and Edward J. Servider of Staten Island, N.Y (collectively Defendants), and of Relief Defendants Alisa Ekdeshman of Holmdel, N.J. (Ekdeshman’s wife), Executive Services of Florida LLC, Executive Management Services of Montana Inc., and Michael Vilner of Sunny Isles Beach, Fla.

The Court’s order arises out of a Complaint filed on May 1, 2014, charging Defendants with fraudulent solicitation of more than $2 million, misappropriation of most of those funds, issuing false account statements, and registration violations in an ongoing retail foreign currency (forex) fraud scheme.

The CFTC also charged that Ekdeshman is in violation of a U.S. District Court Order entered on July 8, 2013, arising out of a prior CFTC action against Ekdeshman where he was charged with solicitation fraud and misappropriating “the vast majority” of customer funds for business expenses. Specifically, the Complaint charged Ekdeshman and Paramount Management, LLC with operating a fraudulent scheme that solicited more than $1.3 million from approximately 110 retail customers to engage in leveraged or margined foreign currency (forex) transactions with unregistered off-shore counterparties. CFTC v. Paramount Management, LLC and Alex Vladimir Ekdeshman, C.A. No. 13-Civ. 4436 (CM) (SDNY Sept. 9, 2013) (see CFTC Press Release 6690-13). The prior court Order against Ekdeshman permanently prohibited Ekdeshman from cheating or defrauding other persons, from soliciting, receiving or accepting funds from any person for the purpose of purchasing or selling forex contracts, and from engaging in any activity requiring registration with the CFTC.

According to the CFTC’s Complaint filed yesterday, between April 2013 and the present, the Defendants fraudulently solicited more than $2 million from at least 90 retail customers. The Complaint alleges that the Defendants misappropriated almost all of the customer funds for their own use, including vacations in Florida and Italy, automobile leases, liquor purchases, employee salaries and commissions, and office rent. The Complaint further alleges that Defendants issued false account statements to customers that listed profits from forex trading although no customer funds were traded in forex and no profits were generated from forex trading. And the Complaint charges that EJS’s website falsely reported that specified EJS trading had been profitable.

The CFTC Complaint also alleges that the Relief Defendants directly and indirectly received funds from EJS bank accounts to which they have no legitimate claim. None of the Defendants or Relief Defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

The Court has set a hearing date on the CFTC’s motion for a preliminary injunction for May 12, 2014. In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution for the benefit of defrauded EJS customers, civil monetary penalties, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction from future violations of federal commodities laws, as charged.

In a criminal action, on May 2, 2014, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that it had filed a criminal complaint charging Ekdeshman with one count each of commodities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud.  Ekdeshman was arrested in Holmdel, N.J., by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI, the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority, l'AutoritĆ© des MarchĆ©s Financiers du QuĆ©bec, and the Financial Services Board of the Republic of South Africa.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Nathan B. Ploener, Philip D. Rix, Elizabeth C. Brennan, Steven Ringer, Lenel Hickson, Jr., and Manal M. Sultan.

Monday, April 21, 2014

COMPANY TO PAY PENALTY FOR VIOLATING MINIMUM FINANCIAL REQUIREMENT RULES

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Capital Market Services, LLC Ordered to Pay $275,000 Penalty to Settle CFTC Charges of Violating Minimum Financial Requirement Rules

Washington, DC–The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an Order filing and simultaneously settling charges that, between March 2009 and October 2012, Capital Market Services, LLC (CMS), a CFTC-registered Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) and former Retail Foreign Exchange Dealer (RFED) headquartered in New York, New York, failed to comply with minimum financial requirements for FCMs and RFEDs. The CFTC Order requires CMS to pay a $275,000 civil monetary penalty and to cease and desist from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, as charged.

The Order recognizes CMS’s cooperation and corrective action it undertook after its deficiencies were discovered.

According to the Order, under CFTC regulations, an FCM must maintain adjusted net capital (ANC) equal to or in excess of the greatest of $1,000,000 or various other measures, including the “amount of [ANC] required by a registered futures association of which it is a member.” Between January 2009 and mid-December 2010, while a Forex Dealer Member (FDM) with the National Futures Association (NFA), CMS was subject to the NFA’s FDM Financial Requirements, which imposed ANC requirements that ranged between $15,000,000 and approximately $21,000,000. CFTC Regulations also require that an RFED maintains ANC of $20,000,000 plus five percent of its total retail forex obligation in excess of $10,000,000 at all times. CMS’s ANC requirement as an RFED was approximately $21,000,000.

CMS did not maintain its required ANC during at least 17 separate months between March 2009 and October 2012, with month-end ANC computations showing that CMS was undercapitalized by more than $19 million at one point, the Order finds.

CMS has been registered with the CFTC as an FCM since January 2002 and was registered as an RFED from September 2009 to mid-December 2010. CMS also operated as an FDM from approximately January 2009 until mid-December 2010.

The CFTC thanks the NFA for its assistance.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Kevin S. Webb, Brandon Tasco, Michael Solinsky, Charles D. Marvine, Paul G. Hayeck, and Richard Wagner. Annette Vitale of the CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight also assisted in this matter.