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Showing posts with label RMBS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RMBS. Show all posts

Thursday, August 18, 2016

FORMER HEAD RMBS TRADER AT GOLDMAN SACHS SETTLES FRAUD CHARGES

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Former Goldman Sachs Trader Settles Fraud Charges
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2016-163

Washington D.C., Aug. 16, 2016 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that the former head trader in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) at Goldman Sachs has agreed to be barred from the securities industry and pay $400,000 to settle charges that he repeatedly misled customers and caused them to pay higher prices.

An SEC investigation found that Edwin Chin generated extra revenue for Goldman by concealing the prices at which the firm had bought various RMBS, then re-selling them at higher prices to the buying customer with Goldman keeping the difference.  On other occasions, Chin misled purchasers by suggesting he was actively negotiating a transaction between customers when he was merely selling RMBS out of Goldman’s inventory.

“With no public exchange showing the price for each RMBS trade as it occurs, investors purchasing these securities rely on dealers to be honest about the purchase price they paid,” said Michael J. Osnato, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Complex Financial Instruments Unit.  “Chin repeatedly abused his fundamental duty to serve as an honest transmitter of market information so he could increase Goldman’s trading profits and, indirectly, his own compensation.”

The SEC’s order finds that Chin’s misconduct began in 2010 and continued until he left Goldman in 2012.  Without admitting or denying the findings, Chin agreed to the entry of the order finding that he violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  He agreed to pay $200,000 in disgorgement, $50,000 in prejudgment interest, and a $150,000 penalty.

The SEC’s continuing investigation has been conducted by Andrew Feller, David London, and Heidi Mitza, and the case has been supervised by Celia Moore and Michael Osnato.

Monday, April 11, 2016

GOLDMAN SACHS TO PAY $5 BILLION SETTLEMENT RELATED TO MORTGAGE BUSINESS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT  
Monday, April 11, 2016
Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities

The Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, announced today a $5.06 billion settlement with Goldman Sachs related to Goldman’s conduct in the packaging, securitization, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) between 2005 and 2007.  The resolution announced today requires Goldman to pay $2.385 billion in a civil penalty under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and also requires the bank to provide $1.8 billion in other relief, including relief to underwater homeowners, distressed borrowers and affected communities, in the form of loan forgiveness and financing for affordable housing.  Goldman will also pay $875 million to resolve claims by other federal entities and state claims.  Investors, including federally-insured financial institutions, suffered billions of dollars in losses from investing in RMBS issued and underwritten by Goldman between 2005 and 2007.

“This resolution holds Goldman Sachs accountable for its serious misconduct in falsely assuring investors that securities it sold were backed by sound mortgages, when it knew that they were full of mortgages that were likely to fail,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Stuart F. Delery.  “This $5 billion settlement includes a $1.8 billion commitment to help repair the damage to homeowners and communities that Goldman acknowledges resulted from its conduct, and it makes clear that no institution may inflict this type of harm on investors and the American public without serious consequences.”

“Today’s settlement is another example of the department’s resolve to hold accountable those whose illegal conduct resulted in the financial crisis of 2008,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “Viewed in conjunction with the previous multibillion-dollar recoveries that the department has obtained for similar conduct, this settlement demonstrates the pervasiveness of the banking industry’s fraudulent practices in selling RMBS, and the power of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act as a tool for combatting this type of wrongdoing.”

“Today’s settlement is yet another acknowledgment by one of our leading financial institutions that it did not live up to the representations it made to investors about the products it was selling,” said U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner of the Eastern District of California.  “Goldman’s conduct in exploiting the RMBS market contributed to an international financial crisis that people across the country, including many in the Eastern District of California, continue to struggle to recover from.  I am gratified that this office has developed investigations, first against JPMorgan Chase and now against Goldman Sachs, that have led to significant civil settlements that hold bad actors in this market accountable.  The results obtained by this office and other members of the RMBS Working Group continue to send a message to Wall Street that we remain committed to pursuing those responsible for the financial crisis.”

The $2.385 billion civil monetary penalty resolves claims under FIRREA, which authorizes the federal government to impose civil penalties against financial institutions that violate various predicate offenses, including wire and mail fraud.  The settlement expressly preserves the government’s ability to bring criminal charges against Goldman, and does not release any individuals from potential criminal or civil liability.  In addition, as part of the settlement, Goldman agreed to fully cooperate with any ongoing investigations related to the conduct covered by the agreement.

Of the $875 million Goldman has agreed to pay to settle claims by various other federal and state entities: Goldman will pay $575 million to settle claims by the National Credit Union Administration, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines as successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, $190 million to settle claims by the state of New York, $25 million to settle claims by the state of Illinois and $10 million to settle claims by the state of California.

Goldman will pay out the remaining $1.8 billion in the form of relief to aid consumers harmed by its unlawful conduct.  $1.52 billion of that relief will be paid out pursuant to an agreement with the United States that Goldman will provide loan modifications, including loan forgiveness and forbearance, to distressed and underwater homeowners throughout the country, as well as financing for affordable rental and for-sale housing throughout the country.  This agreement represents the largest commitment in any RMBS agreement to provide financing for affordable housing—a crucial need following the turmoil of the financial crisis.  $280 million will be paid out by Goldman pursuant to an agreement separately negotiated with the state of New York.

The settlement includes a statement of facts to which Goldman has agreed.  That statement of facts describes how Goldman made false and misleading representations to prospective investors about the characteristics of the loans it securitized and the ways in which Goldman would protect investors in its RMBS from harm (the quotes in the following paragraphs are from that agreed-upon statement of facts, unless otherwise noted):

Goldman told investors in offering documents that “[l]oans in the securitized pools were originated generally in accordance with the loan originator’s underwriting guidelines,” other than possible situations where “when the originator identified ‘compensating factors’ at the time of origination.”  But Goldman has today acknowledged that, “Goldman received information indicating that, for certain loan pools, significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations made to investors about the pools of loans to be securitized.”
Specifically, Goldman has now acknowledged that, even when the results of its due diligence on samples of loans from those pools “indicated that the unsampled portions of the pools likely contained additional loans with credit exceptions, Goldman typically did not . . . identify and eliminate any additional loans with credit exceptions.”  Goldman has acknowledged that it “failed to do this even when the samples included significant numbers of loans with credit exceptions.”
Goldman’s Mortgage Capital Committee, which included senior mortgage department personnel and employees from Goldman’s credit and legal departments, was required to approve every RMBS issued by Goldman.  Goldman has now acknowledged that “[t]he Mortgage Capital Committee typically received . . . summaries of Goldman’s due diligence results for certain of the loan pools backing the securitization,” but that “[d]espite the high numbers of loans that Goldman had dropped from the loan pools, the Mortgage Capital Committee approved every RMBS that was presented to it between December 2005 and 2007.”  As one example, in early 2007, Goldman approved and issued a subprime RMBS backed by loans originated by New Century Mortgage Corporation, after Goldman’s due diligence process found that one of the loan pools to be securitized included loans originated with “[e]xtremely aggressive underwriting,” and where Goldman dropped 25 percent of the loans from the due diligence sample on that pool without reviewing the unsampled 70 percent of the pool to determine whether those loans had similar problems.
Goldman has acknowledged that, for one August 2006 RMBS, the due diligence results for some of the loan pools resulted in an “unusually high” percentage of loans with credit and compliance defects.  The Mortgage Capital Committee was presented with a summary of these results and asked “How do we know that we caught everything?”  One transaction manager responded “we don’t.”  Another transaction manager responded, “Depends on what you mean by everything?  Because of the limited sampling . . . we don’t catch everything . . .”  Goldman has now acknowledged that the Mortgage Capital Committee approved this RMBS for securitization without requiring any further due diligence.  
Goldman made detailed representations to investors about its “counterparty qualification process” for vetting loan originators, and told investors and one rating agency that Goldman would engage in ongoing monitoring of loan sellers.  Goldman has now acknowledged, however, that it “received certain negative information regarding the originators’ business practices” and that much of this information was not disclosed to investors.
For example, Goldman has now acknowledged that in late 2006 it conducted an internal analysis of the underwriting guidelines of Fremont Investment & Loan (an originator), which found many of Fremont’s guidelines to be “off market” or “at the aggressive end of market standards.”  Instead of disclosing its view of Fremont’s underwriting, Goldman has acknowledged that it “[u]ndertook a significant marketing effort” to tell investors about what Goldman called Fremont’s “commitment to loan quality over volume” and “significant enhancements to Fremont underwriting guidelines.”  Fremont was shut down by federal regulators within several months of these statements.
In another example, Goldman was aware in early-mid 2006 of certain issues with Countrywide Financial Corporation’s origination process, including a pattern of non-responsiveness and inability to provide sufficient staff to handle the numerous loan pools Countrywide was selling.  In April 2006, while Goldman was preparing an RMBS backed by Countrywide loans for securitization, a Goldman mortgage department manager circulated a “very bullish” equity research report that recommended the purchase of Countrywide stock.  Goldman’s head of due diligence, who had just overseen the due diligence on six Countrywide pools, responded “If they only knew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .”
Meanwhile, as Goldman has acknowledged in this statement of facts, “[Around the end of 2006], Goldman employees observed signs of uncertainty in the residential mortgage market [and] by March 2007, Goldman had largely halted new purchases of subprime loan pools.”
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Colleen Kennedy and Kelli Taylor of the Eastern District of California investigated Goldman’s conduct in connection with RMBS, with the support of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Office of the Inspector General (FHFA-OIG) and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).

“Goldman Sachs had a fiduciary responsibility to investors, which they blatantly side stepped,” said Deputy Inspector General for Investigation Rene Febles of FHFA-OIG.  “They knowingly put investors at risk and in so doing contributed significantly to the financial crisis.  The losses caused by this irresponsible behavior deeply affected not only financial institutions but also taxpayers and one can only hope that Goldman Sachs has learned the difference between risk and deceit.  Two Federal Home Loan Banks suffered significant losses so we are pleased to see both entities receive a portion of this settlement.  We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to hold those accountable who have engaged in misconduct.”

“Goldman took $10 billion in TARP bailout funds knowing that it had fraudulently misrepresented to investors the quality of residential mortgages bundled into mortgage backed securities,” said Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero for TARP.  “Many of these toxic securities were traded in a taxpayer funded bailout program that was designed to unlock frozen credit markets during the crisis.  While crisis investigations take time, SIGTARP is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect taxpayers and bring accountability and justice.”

The settlement is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered tens of billions of dollars on behalf of American consumers and investors for claims against large financial institutions arising from misconduct related to the financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group brings together attorneys, investigators, analysts and staff from multiple state and federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA-OIG, SIGTARP, the Federal Reserve Board’s OIG, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and multiple state Attorneys General offices around the country.  The RMBS Working Group is led by Director Joshua Wilkenfeld and five co-chairs: Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mizer, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Director Andrew Ceresney of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, U.S. Attorney John Walsh of the District of Colorado and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.  This settlement is the fifth multibillion-dollar RMBS settlement announced by the working group.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

MORGAN STANLEY RESOLVES CLAIMS RELATED TO IT'S RESIDENTIAL BACKED SECURITIES SALES

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Thursday, February 11, 2016
Morgan Stanley Agrees to Pay $2.6 Billion Penalty in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities

The Justice Department today announced that Morgan Stanley will pay a $2.6 billion penalty to resolve claims related to Morgan Stanley’s marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  This settlement constitutes the largest component of the set of resolutions with Morgan Stanley entered by members of the RMBS Working Group, which have totaled approximately $5 billion.  As part of the agreement, Morgan Stanley acknowledged in writing that it failed to disclose critical information to prospective investors about the quality of the mortgage loans underlying its RMBS and about its due diligence practices.  Investors, including federally insured financial institutions, suffered billions of dollars in losses from investing in RMBS issued by Morgan Stanley in 2006 and 2007.

“Today’s settlement holds Morgan Stanley appropriately accountable for misleading investors about the subprime mortgage loans underlying the securities it sold,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Stuart F. Delery.  “The Department of Justice will not tolerate those who seek financial gain through deceptive or unfair means, and we will take appropriately aggressive action against financial institutions that knowingly engage in improper investment practices.”

“Those who contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 cannot evade responsibility for their misconduct,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division.  “This resolution demonstrates once again that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act is a powerful weapon for combatting financial fraud and that the department will not hesitate to use it to hold accountable those who violate the law.”

An RMBS is a type of security comprised of a pool of mortgage loans created by banks and other financial institutions.  The expected performance and price of an RMBS is determined by a number of factors, including the characteristics of the borrowers and the value of the properties underlying the RMBS.  Morgan Stanley was one of the institutions that issued RMBS during the period leading up to the economic crisis in 2007 and 2008.

As acknowledged by Morgan Stanley in a detailed statement of facts that is a part of this agreement (and is quoted below), the company made representations to prospective investors about the characteristics of the subprime mortgage loans underlying its RMBS – representations with which it did not comply:

In particular, Morgan Stanley told investors that it did not securitize underwater loans (loans that exceeded the value of the property).  However, Morgan Stanley did not disclose to investors that in April 2006 it had expanded its “risk tolerance” in evaluating loans in order to purchase and securitize “everything possible.”  As Morgan Stanley’s manager of valuation due diligence told an employee in 2006, “please do not mention the ‘slightly higher risk tolerance’ in these communications.  We are running under the radar and do not want to document these types of things.”  As a result, Morgan Stanley ignored information – including broker’s price opinions (BPOs), which are estimates of a property’s value from an independent real estate broker – indicating that thousands of securitized loans were underwater, with combined-loan-to-value ratios over 100 percent.  From January 2006 through mid-2007, Morgan Stanley acknowledged that “Morgan Stanley securitized nearly 9,000 loans with BPO values resulting in [combined loan to value] ratios over 100 percent.”
Morgan Stanley also told investors that it did not securitize loans that failed to meet originators’ guidelines unless those loans had compensating factors.  Morgan Stanley’s offering documents “represented that ‘[the mortgage loans originated or acquired by [the originator] were done so in accordance with the underwriting guidelines established by [the originator]’ but that ‘on a case-by-case-basis, exceptions to the [underwriting guidelines] are made where compensating factors exist.’”  Morgan Stanley has now acknowledged, however, that “Morgan Stanley did not disclose to securitization investors that employees of Morgan Stanley received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines and lacked adequate compensating factors . . . were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors.”  So, in fact, “Morgan Stanley . . . securitized certain loans that neither comported with the originators’ underwriting guidelines nor had adequate compensating factors.”
Likewise, “Morgan Stanley also prepared presentation materials . . . that it used in discussions with potential investors that described the due diligence process for reviewing pools of loans prior to securitization,” but “certain of Morgan Stanley’s actual due diligence practices did not conform to the description of the process set forth” in those materials.
For example, Morgan Stanley obtained BPOs for a percentage of loans in a pool.  Morgan Stanley stated in these presentation materials that it excluded any loan with a BPO value exhibiting an “unacceptable negative variance from the original appraisal,” when in fact “Morgan Stanley never rejected a loan based solely on the BPO results.”
Through these undisclosed practices, Morgan Stanley increased the percentage of mortgage loans it purchased for its RMBS, notwithstanding its awareness about “deteriorating appraisal quality” and “sloppy underwriting” by the sellers of these loans.  The bank has now acknowledged that “Morgan Stanley was aware of problematic lending practices of the subprime originators from which it purchased mortgage loans.”  However, it “did not increase its credit-and-compliance due diligence samples, in part, because it did not want to harm its relationship with its largest subprime originators.” Indeed, Morgan Stanley’s manager of credit-and-compliance due diligence was admonished to “stop fighting and begin recognizing the point that we need monthly volume from our biggest trading partners and that . . . the client [an originator] does not have to sell to Morgan Stanley.”
“In today’s agreement, Morgan Stanley acknowledges it sold billions of dollars in subprime RMBS certificates in 2006 and 2007 while making false promises about the mortgage loans backing those certificates,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brian J. Stretch of the Northern District of California.  “Morgan Stanley touted the quality of the lenders with which it did business and the due diligence process it used to screen out bad loans.  All the while, Morgan Stanley knew that in reality, many of the loans backing its securities were toxic.  Abuses in the mortgage-backed securities industry such as these helped bring about the most devastating financial crisis in our lifetime.  Our office is committed to dedicating the resources necessary to hold those who engage in such reckless actions responsible for their conduct.”

The $2.6 billion civil monetary penalty resolves claims under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).  FIRREA authorizes the federal government to impose civil penalties against financial institutions that violate various predicate offenses, including wire and mail fraud.  The settlement expressly preserves the government’s ability to bring criminal charges against Morgan Stanley, and likewise does not release any individuals from potential criminal or civil liability.  In addition, as part of the settlement, Morgan Stanley promised to cooperate fully with any ongoing investigations related to the conduct covered by the agreement.

In conjunction with today’s announcement of the federal government’s settlement with Morgan Stanley, the states of New York and Illinois – also members of the RMBS Working Group – have announced settlements with Morgan Stanley for $550 million and $22.5 million, respectively, arising from its sale of RMBS.  Among other resolutions, Morgan Stanley previously paid $225 million to  resolve claims brought by the National Credit Union Administration arising from losses related to corporate credit unions’ purchases of RMBS; $1.25 billion to resolve claims by Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) for Morgan Stanley’s alleged violations of federal and state securities laws and common law fraud in connection with RMBS purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and $86.95 million to resolve federal and state securities laws claims brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver on behalf of failed financial institutions.  Morgan Stanley also previously entered into a consent decree with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to pay $275 million to resolve certain RMBS claims.  With today’s announcement, Morgan Stanley will have paid nearly $5 billion to members of the RMBS Working Group in connection with its sale of RMBS.  

Today’s settlement is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered billions of dollars arising from misconduct related to the financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group is a federal and state law enforcement effort focused on investigating fraud and abuse in the RMBS market that helped lead to the 2008 financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group brings together attorneys, investigators, analysts and staff from multiple state and federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, the SEC, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Reserve Board’s OIG, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and multiple state Attorneys General offices around the country.  The RMBS Working Group is led by Director Joshua Wilkenfeld and five co-chairs: Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer of the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Director Andrew Ceresney of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, U.S. Attorney John Walsh of the District of Colorado and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

“The securitization of defective mortgages and the billions of dollars that were lost as a result caused such a hardship to our economy, the housing industry and our nation as a whole that we are still feeling the effects years after,” said Deputy Inspector General for Investigations Rene Febles of FHFA-OIG.  “Morgan Stanley is responsible for their role, which caused enormous losses to investors.  This settlement is one step in recovering from those losses.  We are proud to work with the RMBS Working Group and the U.S. Department of Justice on this and all RMBS matters.”

The settlement was the result of a coordinated effort between the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch and the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of California, with investigative support from FHFA-OIG and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

Monday, July 14, 2014

DOJ ANNOUNCES $7 BILLION TOXIC MORTGAGES SETTLEMENT WITH CITIGROUP

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Monday, July 14, 2014
Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages
Citigroup to Pay the Largest Penalty of Its Kind - $4 Billion

The Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, today announced a $7 billion settlement with Citigroup Inc. to resolve federal and state civil claims related to Citigroup’s conduct in the packaging, securitization, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) prior to Jan. 1, 2009.  The resolution includes a $4 billion civil penalty – the largest penalty to date under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).  As part of the settlement, Citigroup acknowledged it made serious misrepresentations to the public – including the investing public – about the mortgage loans it securitized in RMBS.  The resolution also requires Citigroup to provide relief to underwater homeowners, distressed borrowers and affected communities through a variety of means including financing affordable rental housing developments for low-income families in high-cost areas.  The settlement does not absolve Citigroup or its employees from facing any possible criminal charges.

This settlement is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered $20 billion to date for American consumers and investors.

“This historic penalty is appropriate given the strength of the evidence of the wrongdoing committed by Citi,” said Attorney General Eric Holder.  “The bank's activities contributed mightily to the financial crisis that devastated our economy in 2008.  Taken together, we believe the size and scope of this resolution goes beyond what could be considered the mere cost of doing business.  Citi is not the first financial institution to be held accountable by this Justice Department, and it will certainly not be the last.”

The settlement includes an agreed upon statement of facts that describes how Citigroup made representations to RMBS investors about the quality of the mortgage loans it securitized and sold to investors.  Contrary to those representations, Citigroup securitized and sold RMBS with underlying mortgage loans that it knew had material defects.  As the statement of facts explains, on a number of occasions, Citigroup employees learned that significant percentages of the mortgage loans reviewed in due diligence had material defects.  In one instance, a Citigroup trader stated in an internal email that he “went through the Diligence Reports and think[s] [they] should start praying . . . [he] would not be surprised if half of these loans went down. . . It’s amazing that some of these loans were closed at all.”  Citigroup nevertheless securitized the loan pools containing defective loans and sold the resulting RMBS to investors for billions of dollars.  This conduct, along with similar conduct by other banks that bundled defective and toxic loans into securities and misled investors who purchased those securities, contributed to the financial crisis.
                                 
“Today, we hold Citi accountable for its contributing role in creating the financial crisis, not only by demanding the largest civil penalty in history, but also by requiring innovative consumer relief that will help rectify the harm caused by Citi's conduct,” said Associate Attorney General Tony West.  “In addition to the principal reductions and loan modifications we've built into previous resolutions, this consumer relief menu includes new measures such as $200 million in typically hard-to-obtain financing that will facilitate the construction of affordable rental housing, bringing relief to families pushed into the rental market in the wake of the financial crisis.”

Of the $7 billion resolution, $4.5 billion will be paid to settle federal and state civil claims by various entities related to RMBS: Citigroup will pay $4 billion as a civil penalty to settle the Justice Department claims under FIRREA, $208.25 million to settle federal and state securities claims by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), $102.7 million to settle claims by the state of California, $92 million to settle claims by the state of New York, $44 million to settle claims by the state of Illinois, $45.7  million to settle claims by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and $7.35 to settle claims by the state of Delaware.

Citigroup will pay out the remaining $2.5 billion in the form of relief to aid consumers harmed by the unlawful conduct of Citigroup.  That relief will take various forms, including loan modification for underwater homeowners, refinancing for distressed borrowers, down payment and closing cost assistance to homebuyers, donations to organizations assisting communities in redevelopment and affordable rental housing for low-income families in high-cost areas.  An independent monitor will be appointed to determine whether Citigroup is satisfying its obligations.  If Citigroup fails to live up to its agreement by the end of 2018,  it must pay liquidated damages in the amount of the shortfall to NeighborWorks America, a non-profit organization and leader in providing affordable housing and facilitating community development.

The U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado conducted investigations into Citigroup’s practices related to the sale and issuance of RMBS between 2006 and 2007.

“The strength of our financial markets depends on the truth of the representations that banks provide to investors and the public every day,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh for the District of Colorado, Co-Chair of the RMBS Working Group.  “Today's $7 billion settlement is a major step toward restoring public confidence in those markets.  Due to the tireless work by the Department of Justice, Citigroup is being forced to take responsibility for its home mortgage securitization misconduct in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  As important a step as this settlement is, however, the work of the RMBS working group is far from done, we will continue to pursue our investigations and cases vigorously because many other banks have not yet taken responsibility for their misconduct in packaging and selling RMBS securities.”

“After nearly 50 subpoenas to Citigroup, Trustees, Servicers, Due Diligence providers and their employees, and after collecting nearly 25 million documents relating to every residential mortgage backed security issued or underwritten by Citigroup in 2006 and 2007, our teams found that the misconduct in Citigroup’s deals devastated the nation and the world’s economies, touching everyone,” said U.S. Attorney of the Eastern District of New York Loretta Lynch.  “The investors in Citigroup RMBS included federally-insured financial institutions, as well as a host of states, cities, public and union pension and benefit funds, universities, religious charities, and hospitals, among others.  These are our neighbors in Colorado, New York and around the country, hard-working people who saved and put away for retirement, only to see their savings decimated.”

This settlement resolves civil claims against Citigroup arising out of certain securities packaged, securitized, structured, marketed, and sold by Citigroup.  The agreement does not release individuals from civil charges, nor does it release Citigroup or any individuals from potential criminal prosecution. In addition, as part of the settlement, Citigroup has pledged to fully cooperate in investigations related to the conduct covered by the agreement.

Michael Stephens, Acting Inspector General for the Federal Housing Finance Agency said, “Citigroup securitized billions of dollars of defective mortgages, after which investors suffered enormous losses by purchasing RMBS from Citi not knowing about those defects. Today’s settlement is another significant step by FHFA-OIG and its law enforcement partners to hold accountable those who committed acts of fraud and deceit in the lead up to the financial crisis, and is a necessary step toward reviving a sound RMBS market that is crucial to the housing industry and the American economy.  We are proud to have worked with the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado. They have been great partners and we look forward to our continued work together.”

The underlying investigation was led by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Richard K. Hayes, Kevin Traskos, Lila Bateman, John Vagelatos, J. Chris Larson and Edward K. Newman, with the support of agents from the Office of the Inspector General for the Federal Housing Finance Agency, in conjunction with the President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group.

The RMBS Working Group is a federal and state law enforcement effort focused on investigating fraud and abuse in the RMBS market that helped lead to the 2008 financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group brings together more than 200 attorneys, investigators, analysts and staff from dozens of state and federal agencies including the Department of Justice, 10 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA-OIG, the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Reserve Board’s Office of Inspector General, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and more than 10 state Attorneys General offices around the country.

The RMBS Working Group is led by its Director Geoffrey Graber and its five co-chairs: Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division Stuart Delery, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie Caldwell, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney, U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado John Walsh and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

FDIC ANNOUNCES SETTLEMENT WITH JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CASE

FROM:  U.S. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as Receiver for six failed banks has announced a $515.4 million settlement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its affiliates (JPMorgan) of the receiverships' federal and state securities law claims based on misrepresentations in the offering documents for 40 residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) purchased by the failed banks. The settlement funds will be distributed among the receiverships for the failed Citizens National Bank, Strategic Capital Bank, Colonial Bank, Guaranty Bank, Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company, and United Western Bank. As part of the settlement, JPMorgan has agreed to waive any claims for indemnification from the FDIC in its corporate capacity or its capacity as Receiver for the failed Washington Mutual Bank based on any part of JPMorgan's $13 billion settlement with the United States Department of Justice and other government entities of claims relating to the sale of RMBS, including the $515.4 million settlement with the FDIC.

FDIC Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg said, "The settlement announced today will provide a significant recovery for the six FDIC receiverships. It also fully protects the FDIC from indemnification claims out of this settlement. The FDIC will continue to pursue litigation where necessary in order to recover as much as possible for FDIC receiverships, money that is ultimately returned to the Deposit Insurance Fund, uninsured depositors and creditors of failed banks."

As receiver for failed financial institutions, the FDIC may sue professionals and entities whose conduct resulted in losses to those institutions in order to maximize recoveries. From May 2012 to September 2012, the FDIC as Receiver for five of the failed banks filed ten lawsuits against JPMorgan, its affiliates, and other defendants for violations of federal and state securities laws in connection with the sale of RMBS. As of October 30, 2013, the FDIC has authorized lawsuits based on the sale of RMBS to a total of eight failed institutions and has filed 18 lawsuits seeking damages for violations of federal and state securities laws.

Citizens National Bank and Strategic Capital Bank were each placed into receivership on May 22, 2009; Colonial Bank was placed into receivership on August 14, 2009; Guaranty Bank was placed into receivership on August 21, 2009; Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company was placed into receivership on September 18, 2009; and United Western Bank was placed into receivership on January 21, 2011.

Sunday, November 25, 2012

U.S. SEC CHARGES J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC AND CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES WITH MISLEADING INVESTORS IN OFFERINGS OF RMBS

FROM: U.S. SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Nov. 16, 2012 — In coordination with the federal-state Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group, the Securities and Exchange Commission today charged J.P. Morgan Securities LLC and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) with misleading investors in offerings of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The firms agreed to settlements in which they will pay more than $400 million combined, and the SEC plans to distribute the money to harmed investors.

The SEC alleges that J.P. Morgan misstated information about the delinquency status of mortgage loans that provided collateral for an RMBS offering in which it was the underwriter. J.P. Morgan received fees of more than $2.7 million, and investors sustained losses of at least $37 million on undisclosed delinquent loans. J.P. Morgan also is charged for Bear Stearns' failure to disclose its practice of obtaining and keeping cash settlements from mortgage loan originators on problem loans that Bear Stearns had sold into RMBS trusts. The proceeds from this bulk settlement practice were at least $137.8 million.

J.P. Morgan has agreed to pay $296.9 million to settle the SEC's charges.

According to the SEC's order against Credit Suisse, the firm similarly failed to accurately disclose its practice of retaining cash for itself from the settlement of claims against mortgage loan originators for problems with loans that Credit Suisse had sold into RMBS trusts and no longer owned. Credit Suisse also made misstatements in SEC filings about when it would repurchase mortgage loans from trusts if borrowers missed the first payment due. The firm made $55.7 million in profits and losses avoided from its bulk settlement practice, and its investors lost more than $10 million due to Credit Suisse's practices concerning first payment defaults.

Credit Suisse has agreed to pay $120 million to settle the SEC's charges.

"In many ways, mortgage products such as RMBS were ground zero in the financial crisis," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Misrepresentations in connection with the creation and sale of mortgage securities contributed greatly to the tremendous losses suffered by investors once the U.S. housing market collapsed. Today's actions involving RMBS securities are a continuation of the SEC's strong efforts to pursue wrongdoing committed in connection with the financial crisis."

Mr. Khuzami is a co-chair of the RMBS Working Group, which brings together federal and state agencies to investigate those responsible for misconduct that contributed to the financial crisis through the pooling and sale of RMBS.

RMBS Working Group Co-Chair and U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado John Walsh said, "Today's filings represent significant steps towards the accomplishment of the Working Group's mission - to investigate and confront the abuses in the residential mortgage-backed securities market that significantly contributed to the Financial Crisis. The Working Group model allows the Department of Justice to lend a hand to other enforcement partners around the country who, in turn, have their own unique resources, talents, and legal tools to contribute to the effort. And the Justice Department's efforts in this area have benefited from SEC's work on its own cases."

RMBS Working Group Co-Chair and New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman said, "Today's actions are another step forward in the process of bringing accountability for the misconduct that led to the collapse of the housing market. We will continue to work together on behalf of consumers and investors to ensure that it never happens again."

According to the SEC's complaint against J.P. Morgan filed in federal court in Washington D.C., federal regulations under the securities laws require the disclosure of delinquency information related to assets that provide collateral for an asset-backed securities offering. Information about the delinquency status of mortgage loans in an RMBS transaction is important to investors because those loans are the primary source of funds by which investors can earn interest and obtain repayment of their principal.

The SEC alleges that in the prospectus supplement for the $1.8 billion RMBS offering that occurred in December 2006, J.P. Morgan made materially false and misleading statements about the loans that provided collateral for the transaction. The firm represented that only four loans (.04 percent of the total loans collateralizing the transaction) were delinquent by 30 to 59 days, and that those four were the only loans that had had an instance of delinquency of 30 or more days in the 12 months prior to the "cut-off date" for the transaction. However, at the time J.P. Morgan made these representations, the firm actually had information showing that more than 620 loans (above 7 percent of the total loans collateralizing the transaction) were, and had been, 30 to 59 days delinquent, and the four loans represented as being 30 to 59 days delinquent were in fact 60 to 89 days delinquent.

The SEC's complaint also alleges that Bear Stearns' bulk settlements covered loans collateralizing 156 different RMBS transactions issued from 2005 to 2007. Loan originators were usually required by contract to buy back loans that suffered early payment defaults or had other defects. However, Bear Stearns frequently negotiated discounted cash settlements with these loan originators in lieu of a buy-back on loans that were owned by the RMBS trusts. The firm - both before and after the merger with J.P. Morgan - then kept most of the bulk settlement proceeds. The firm failed to disclose the practice to investors who owned the loans. Bear Stearns repurchased only about 13 percent of these defective bulk settlement loans from the trusts, compared to a nearly 100 percent repurchase rate when loan originators agreed to buy back the defective loans. For most loans covered by bulk settlements, the firm collected money from originators without paying anything to the trusts.

J.P. Morgan settled the SEC's charges by consenting to pay $50.5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a $24 million penalty for the delinquency misstatements, which the SEC will seek to distribute to harmed investors in the transaction through a Fair Fund. J.P. Morgan agreed to pay $162,065,536 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a $60.35 million penalty for the bulk settlement practice misconduct, and the SEC will seek to distribute these funds to harmed investors through a separate Fair Fund. J.P. Morgan consented, without admitting or denying the allegations, to the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining them from violating Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933. The settlement is subject to court approval.

According to the SEC's order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against Credit Suisse, the firm and its affiliated entities misled investors in 75 different RMBS transactions through the bulk settlement practice. From 2005 to 2010, Credit Suisse frequently negotiated bulk settlements with loan originators in lieu of a buy-back of loans that were owned by the RMBS trusts. Credit Suisse kept the bulk settlement proceeds for itself and failed to disclose the practice to investors who owned the loans. In nine of the 75 RMBS trusts, Credit Suisse failed to comply with offering document provisions that required it to repurchase certain early defaulting loans. Credit Suisse also applied different quality review procedures for loans that it sought to put back to originators, instituted a practice of not repurchasing such loans from trusts unless the originators had agreed to repurchase them, and failed to disclose the bulk settlement practice when answering investor questions about early payment defaults.

The SEC's order also found that Credit Suisse made misleading statements about a key investor protection known as the First Payment Default (FPD) provision in two RMBS offerings. The FPD provision required the mortgage loan originator to repurchase or substitute loans that missed payments shortly before or after they were securitized. Credit Suisse misled investors by falsely claiming that "all First Payment Default Risk" was removed from its RMBS, and at the same time limiting the number of FPD loans that were put back to the originator.

Credit Suisse settled the SEC's charges by consenting to pay $68,747,769 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a $33 million penalty, which the SEC will seek to distribute through a Fair Fund to harmed investors in the 75 RMBS transactions affected by the bulk settlement practice. Credit Suisse agreed to pay $12,256,651 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a $6 million penalty, which the SEC will seek to distribute through a separate Fair Fund to harmed investors in the two transactions affected by the FPD misstatements. Credit Suisse agreed to an order, without admitting or denying the allegations, requiring them to cease and desist from violations of Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

These investigations were conducted by members of the SEC Enforcement Division's Structured and New Products Unit in both the Denver and Washington, D.C. offices, including Zachary Carlyle, Mark Cave, Sarra Cho, Allison Herren Lee, Laura Metcalfe, Colin Rand, Thomas Silverstein, John Smith, Andrew Sporkin, Amy Sumner, and Jeffrey Weiss. The trial unit members assigned to this matter were Dugan Bliss, Kyle DeYoung, Jan Folena, and Christian Schultz. The Enforcement Division was assisted by Eugene Canjels and Vance Anthony in the Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation. The SEC thanks the other agencies who are members of the RMBS Working Group for their assistance and cooperation regarding these enforcement actions.

"These actions demonstrate that we intend to hold accountable those who misled investors through poor disclosures in the sale of RMBS and other financial products commonly marketed and sold during the financial crisis. Our efforts in that regard continue," said Kenneth Lench, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division's Structured and New Products Unit.

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

DIRECTOR OF THE SEC’S DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ROBERT KHUZAMI SPEAKS

Remarks at SEC and Department of Justice joint news conference.
The following excerpt is from the SEC website:

January 27, 2012
“Good morning. Mortgage products were in many ways ground zero in the financial crisis.
Individual mortgages were pooled and sliced and diced into sophisticated securities that were a world away from the house, on a street, in a town somewhere in America where a family had realized their dream – the dream of buying a house they could call a home.

A few invested directly in these sophisticated securitized mortgage products, called Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS).

Many more had exposure to the performance of these investments, even if they did not own them directly, or had the performance of their other investments tied to these products.

Regardless of how they were connected to these products, many shared the belief that these investments were safe and secure, the right investment to protect their financial security, fund their retirement, and pay for their kids' education.

That turned out to be terribly wrong. These mortgage products suffered unprecedented losses, and the pain and loss that followed is known all too well.

The job of the SEC and my fellow law enforcement colleagues is to hold accountable those persons, those institutions who lied, who cheated and who misled investors in the sale of these products.
Every failure does not mean that the law was broken, but all of us are committed to identifying the violations that did occur and prosecuting them.

That is why I am so pleased to help lead the RMBS Working Group.
Now each of us here today may have different jurisdiction or different expertise but one thing unites us: a drive to do what it takes to make sure that our efforts leave no stone unturned, no dark corner unexposed to the light.

At the SEC, we have been incredibly busy in the pursuit of financial crisis cases.
We have focused on misconduct by those at the highest corporate levels and by institutions with the greatest involvement in the products, transactions and practices that gave rise to the financial crisis.
So far, we have filed actions against nearly 90 such individuals and entities involving public companies that failed to disclose the increasing risks in their mortgage businesses such as Countrywide, New Century, and IndyMac; against funds and investment advisers that made misleading disclosures when offering funds holding mortgage and other financial products such as Morgan Keegan, State Street Bank and Trust, Charles Schwab and Reserve Fund; against top executives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for failing to accurately disclose subprime exposure; and against banks making misleading disclosures about subprime exposure and the structure of even more complex mortgage products called CDOs such as Goldman Sachs, JPMorganChase and Wachovia.

In these actions, we have named approximately 45 CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate officers.
The SEC’s expertise and experience in mortgage products will be greatly enhanced by our participation in the RMBS Working Group.

We have a long history of successful collaboration with our law enforcement colleagues, including the Department of Justice, FBI, U.S. Attorney Offices, State Attorney’s General, and other authorities around the country. Many of us are on the phone with each other weekly, if not daily, moving our investigations forward.

And through the leadership of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which we have co-chaired since its creation in November 2009, we have strengthened these ties – sharing knowledge and leveraging skills and resources in a way that helps all of us to hold violators accountable.
Today’s announcement is another positive step in this direction.

The Working Group will enhance coordination, efficiencies and the sharing of expertise. It will ensure that we pool the different capabilities, resources, legal theories and remedies that each of us bring to the effort.
Information sharing and collaboration among the widest group of partners, including the State Attorneys General that are part of the Working Group, is in everyone’s interest.
To be clear, investigations into RMBS offerings have been ongoing at the SEC. Along with experts across the agency, we have a specialized unit dedicated to the effort.

We already have issued scores of subpoenas, analyzed more than approximately 25 million pages of documents, dozens and dozens of witnesses, and worked with our industry experts to analyze the terms of these deals and the accuracy of the disclosures made to investors.

We are looking for evidence that a firm failed to disclose important information when selling these securities – for example, misleading disclosures about the credit quality, conformity with underwriting guidelines, underlying property valuations, and delinquency and defects of mortgages in the RMBS pools.
These efforts will be greatly aided by the contributions from my fellow Working Group members.

Thank you.”