SENATORS ACCUSE GOLDMAN SACHS AND OTHERS OF WIDESPREAD FRAUD

The following release was from the web site of Senator Carl Levin, Chairman on the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. It reveals widespread fraud and misrepresentations at various wall street firms during the financial meltdown which has led us to the current great recession:

" WASHINGTON – Concluding a two-year bipartisan investigation, Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Senator Tom Coburn M.D., R-Okla., Chairman and Ranking Republican on the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, today released a 635-page final report (PDF, 6MB) on their inquiry into key causes of the financial crisis. The report catalogs conflicts of interest, heedless risk-taking and failures of federal oversight that helped push the country into the deepest recession since the Great Depression.

“Using emails, memos and other internal documents, this report tells the inside story of an economic assault that cost millions of Americans their jobs and homes, while wiping out investors, good businesses, and markets,” said Levin. “High risk lending, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings, and Wall Street firms engaging in massive conflicts of interest, contaminated the U.S. financial system with toxic mortgages and undermined public trust in U.S. markets. Using their own words in documents subpoenaed by the Subcommittee, the report discloses how financial firms deliberately took advantage of their clients and investors, how credit rating agencies assigned AAA ratings to high risk securities, and how regulators sat on their hands instead of reining in the unsafe and unsound practices all around them. Rampant conflicts of interest are the threads that run through every chapter of this sordid story.”

“The free market has helped make America great, but it only functions when people deal with each other honestly and transparently. At the heart of the financial crisis were unresolved, and often undisclosed, conflicts of interest,” said Dr. Coburn. “Blame for this mess lies everywhere from federal regulators who cast a blind eye, Wall Street bankers who let greed run wild, and members of Congress who failed to provide oversight.”

The Levin-Coburn report expands on evidence gathered at four Subcommittee hearings in April 2010, examining four aspects of the crisis through detailed case studies: high-risk mortgage lending, using the case of Washington Mutual Bank, a $300 billion thrift that became the largest bank failure in U.S. history; regulatory inaction, focusing on the Office of Thrift Supervision’s failed oversight of Washington Mutual; inflated credit ratings that misled investors, examining the actions of the nation’s two largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; and the role played by investment banks, focusing primarily on Goldman Sachs, creating and selling structured finance products that foisted billions of dollars of losses on investors, while the bank itself profited from betting against the mortgage market.

New Evidence. Today’s report presents new facts, new findings and recommendations, with more than 700 new documents totaling over 5,800 pages. It recounts how Washington Mutual aggressively issued and sold high-risk mortgages to Wall Street, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, even as its executives predicted a housing bubble that would burst, and offers new detail about how its regulator deferred to the bank’s management. New documents show how Goldman used net short positions to benefit from the downturn in the mortgage market, and designed, marketed, and sold CDOs in ways that created conflicts of interest with the firm’s clients and at times led to the bank’s profiting from the same products that caused substantial losses for its clients. Other new information provides additional detail about how credit rating agencies rushed to rate new mortgage-backed securities and collect lucrative rating fees before issuing mass ratings downgrades that shocked the financial markets and triggered a collapse in the value of mortgage related securities. Over 120 new documents provide insights into how Deutsche Bank contributed to the mortgage mess.

“Our investigation found a financial snake pit rife with greed, conflicts of interest, and wrongdoing,” said Levin. Among the report’s highlights are the following.

High Risk Lending. With an eye on short term profits, Washington Mutual launched a strategy of high-risk mortgage lending in early 2005, even as the bank’s own top executives stated that the condition of the housing market “signifies a bubble” with risks that “will come back to haunt us.” Executives forged ahead despite repeated warnings from inside and outside the bank that the risks were excessive, its lending standards and risk management systems were deficient, and many of its loans were tainted by fraud or prone to early default. WaMu’s chief credit officer complained at one point that “[a]ny attempts to enforce [a] more disciplined underwriting approach were continuously thwarted by an aggressive, and often times abusive group of Sales employees within the organization.” From 2003 to 2006, WaMu shifted its loan originations from low risk, fixed rate mortgages, which fell from 64% to 25% of its loan originations, to high risk loans, which jumped from 19% to 55% of its originations. WaMu and its subprime lender, Long Beach Mortgage, securitized hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality, sometimes fraudulent mortgages, at times without full disclosure to investors, weakening U.S. financial markets. New analysis shows how WaMu sold some of its high risk loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and played one off the other to make more money.
Regulatory Failures. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Washington Mutual’s primary regulator, repeatedly failed to correct WaMu’s unsafe and unsound lending practices, despite logging nearly 500 serious deficiencies at the bank over five years, from 2003 to 2008. New information details the regulator’s deference to bank management and how it used the bank’s short term profits to excuse high risk activities. Although WaMu recorded increasing problems from its high risk loans, including delinquencies that doubled year after year in its risky Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) portfolio, OTS examiners failed to clamp down on WaMu’s high risk lending. OTS did not even consider bringing an enforcement action against the bank until it began losing substantial sums in 2008. OTS also failed until 2008, to lower the bank’s overall high rating or the rating awarded to WaMu’s management, despite the bank’s ongoing failure to correct serious deficiencies. When the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) advocated taking tougher action, OTS officials not only refused, but impeded FDIC oversight of the bank. When the New York State Attorney General sued two appraisal firms for colluding with WaMu to inflate property values, OTS took nearly a year to conduct its own investigation and finally recommended taking action -- a week after the bank had failed. The OTS Director treated WaMu, which was its largest thrift and supplied 15% of the agency’s budget, as a “constituent” and struck an apologetic tone when informing WaMu’s CEO of its decision to take an enforcement action. When diligent oversight conflicted with OTS officials’ desire to protect their “constituent” and the agency’s own turf, they ignored their oversight responsibilities.
Inflated Credit Ratings. The Report concludes that the most immediate cause of the financial crisis was the July 2007 mass ratings downgrades by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s that exposed the risky nature of mortgage-related investments that, just months before, the same firms had deemed to be as safe as Treasury bills. The result was a collapse in the value of mortgage related securities that devastated investors. Internal emails show that credit rating agency personnel knew their ratings would not “hold” and delayed imposing tougher ratings criteria to “massage the … numbers to preserve market share.” Even after they finally adjusted their risk models to reflect the higher risk mortgages being issued, the firms often failed to apply the revised models to existing securities, and helped investment banks rush risky investments to market before tougher rating criteria took effect. They also continued to pull in lucrative fees of up to $135,000 to rate a mortgage backed security and up to $750,000 to rate a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) – fees that might have been lost if they angered issuers by providing lower ratings. The mass rating downgrades they finally initiated were not an effort to come clean, but were necessitated by skyrocketing mortgage delinquencies and securities plummeting in value. In the end, over 90% of the AAA ratings given to mortgage-backed securities in 2006 and 2007 were downgraded to junk status, including 75 out of 75 AAA-rated Long Beach securities issued in 2006. When sound credit ratings conflicted with collecting profitable fees, credit rating agencies chose the fees.
Investment Banks and Structured Finance. Investment banks reviewed by the Subcommittee assembled and sold billions of dollars in mortgage-related investments that flooded financial markets with high-risk assets. They charged $1 to $8 million in fees to construct, underwrite, and market a mortgage-backed security, and $5 to $10 million per CDO. New documents detail how Deutsche Bank helped assembled a $1.1 billion CDO known as Gemstone 7, stood by as it was filled it with low-quality assets that its top CDO trader referred to as “crap” and “pigs,” and rushed to sell it “before the market falls off a cliff.” Deutsche Bank lost $4.5 billion when the mortgage market collapsed, but would have lost even more if it had not cut its losses by selling CDOs like Gemstone. When Goldman Sachs realized the mortgage market was in decline, it took actions to profit from that decline at the expense of its clients. New documents detail how, in 2007, Goldman’s Structured Products Group twice amassed and profited from large net short positions in mortgage related securities. At the same time the firm was betting against the mortgage market as a whole, Goldman assembled and aggressively marketed to its clients poor quality CDOs that it actively bet against by taking large short positions in those transactions. New documents and information detail how Goldman recommended four CDOs, Hudson, Anderson, Timberwolf, and Abacus, to its clients without fully disclosing key information about those products, Goldman’s own market views, or its adverse economic interests. For example, in Hudson, Goldman told investors that its interests were “aligned” with theirs when, in fact, Goldman held 100% of the short side of the CDO and had adverse interests to the investors, and described Hudson’s assets were “sourced from the Street,” when in fact, Goldman had selected and priced the assets without any third party involvement. New documents also reveal that, at one point in May 2007, Goldman Sachs unsuccessfully tried to execute a “short squeeze” in the mortgage market so that Goldman could scoop up short positions at artificially depressed prices and profit as the mortgage market declined.
Recommendations. The Report offers 19 recommendations to address the conflicts of interest and abuses exposed in the Report. The recommendations advocate, for example, strong implementation of the new restrictions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest; and action by the SEC to rank credit rating agencies according to the accuracy of their ratings. Other recommendations seek to advance low risk mortgages, greater transparency in the marketplace, and more protective capital, liquidity, and loss reserves."

The above review of the certain banking businesses came from the web site of Senator Carl Levin. If these allegations are true then, the United States has a really big problem with several major financial institutions. Hopefully, the department of justice will work to enforce the laws that exist to protect the public from the monsters in the banking sector who embrace fraud for personal gains.

FORMER COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CEO TO PAY 22.5 MIL. TO SETTLE CHARGES

The SEC released its settlement details with the former CEO of Countrywide Financial. Although this is just a punishment which amounts to a fine at least the SEC has done something whereas, the rest of the government is worried about cutting social programs for the elderly and even our veterans. The people who served our country directly though military service and those who worked hard all their lives and supported the government by paying social security and medicare taxes are again those who will have to pay the price for rampant fraud and abuse by con-men and paid off government officials.

The following is an excerpt from the SEC web pages regarding it's settlement with Countrywide Financial:

"Washington, D.C., Oct. 15, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that former Countrywide Financial CEO Angelo Mozilo will pay a record $22.5 million penalty to settle SEC charges that he and two other former Countrywide executives misled investors as the subprime mortgage crisis emerged. The settlement also permanently bars Mozilo from ever again serving as an officer or director of a publicly traded company.

Mozilo’s financial penalty is the largest ever paid by a public company's senior executive in an SEC settlement. Mozilo also agreed to $45 million in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to settle the SEC’s disclosure violation and insider trading charges against him, for a total financial settlement of $67.5 million that will be returned to harmed investors.

Former Countrywide chief operating officer David Sambol agreed to a settlement in which he is liable for $5 million in disgorgement and a $520,000 penalty, and a three-year officer and director bar. Former chief financial officer Eric Sieracki agreed to pay a $130,000 penalty and a one-year bar from practicing before the Commission. In settling the SEC’s charges, the former executives neither admit nor deny the allegations against them.

The penalties and disgorgement paid by Sambol and Sieracki will also be returned to harmed investors.

“Mozilo’s record penalty is the fitting outcome for a corporate executive who deliberately disregarded his duties to investors by concealing what he saw from inside the executive suite — a looming disaster in which Countrywide was buckling under the weight of increasing risky mortgage underwriting, mounting defaults and delinquencies, and a deteriorating business model,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement.

John McCoy, Associate Regional Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, “This settlement will provide affected shareholders significant financial relief, and reinforces the message that corporate officers have a personal responsibility to provide investors with an accurate and complete picture of known risks and uncertainties facing a company.”

The settlement was approved by the Honorable John F. Walter, United States District Judge for the Central District of California in a court hearing held today.

The SEC filed charges against Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki on June 4, 2009, alleging that they failed to disclose to investors the significant credit risk that Countrywide was taking on as a result of its efforts to build and maintain market share. Investors were misled by representations assuring them that Countrywide was primarily a prime quality mortgage lender that had avoided the excesses of its competitors. In reality, Countrywide was writing increasingly risky loans and its senior executives knew that defaults and delinquencies in its servicing portfolio as well as the loans it packaged and sold as mortgage-backed securities would rise as a result.

The SEC’s complaint further alleged that Mozilo engaged in insider trading in the securities of Countrywide by establishing four 10b5-1 sales plans in October, November, and December 2006 while he was aware of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide’s increasing credit risk and the risk regarding the poor expected performance of Countrywide-originated loans.

In addition to the financial penalties, Mozilo and Sambol consented to the entry of a final judgment that provides for a permanent injunction against violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Mozilo also consented to the entry of a permanent officer and director bar, and Sambol consented to the entry of a three-year bar.

Sieracki agreed to a permanent injunction from further violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and consented to a one-year bar under the Commission’s Rule of Practice 102(e)(3).

The SEC investigation that led to the filing and settlement of this enforcement action was conducted by Michele Wein Layne, Spencer E. Bendell, Lynn M. Dean, Paris Wynn, and Sam Puathasnanon. Together with Associate Regional Director John M. McCoy, that same team has been handling the SEC’s litigation.

The SEC has filed many other enforcement actions involving mortgage-related securities and mortgage-related products linked to the financial crisis, including:

American Home Mortgage (4/28/2009)
Reserve Fund (5/05/2009)
Evergreen (6/08/2009)
New Century (12/07/2009)
Brookstreet (12/08/2009)
Goldman Sachs (4/16/2010)
Farkas/Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (6/16/2010)
ICP (6/21/2010)
Citigroup (7/29/2010)"

Angelo Mazilo was for many people in the press the very face of the slick, fast talking salesman and con-man who helped to fuel the housing bubble by making loans to everyone. Mr. Mazilo was in fact just one of many thousands of people who made millions by tweaking the truth. In fact, there have been so many big businessmen who committed fraud in this country that capitalism is becoming as big a failure here as communism was in the old Soviet Union. Our free enterprise system has been replaced by some toxic form of economics which rewards liars and frauds and punishes honest men of good character because they will not pay government officials for the right to conduct an honest business in the United States of America.

ACCOUNTANTS CREATE A PONZI SCHEME: MORE BUSINESS AS USUSAL

Thanks to our complex tax and legal system, accounting is one of those few remaining fields in America in which there are still good paying jobs. To become an accountant it takes years of study at an accredited college plus years of on the job training not to mention the tests that must be passed to become a certified public accountant or CPA.

In the following release of information by the SEC two accountants developed a scheme to sell fake securities in a gas pipeline to the public. These investment securities paid a 10% rate of return which of course is generally not available during a recession. On the other hand, many pipelines do pay a dividend in excess of 5% to holders of securities in what are known as Master Limited Partnerships or MLP’s. I currently own a few shares in an MLP that pays about 6.5 %. An MLP is different than a regular company in that the MLP is set up to return much of the revenue to investors rather than to keep most of the revenue for retained earnings for future expansion and sales promotions. There are also differences in how taxes are paid on an MLP for which you must consult an accountant to learn such details.

In the following case the accountants allegedly used a gas pipeline that had not been used for years as the basis of setting up a Ponzi scheme to pay old investors a large dividend based upon selling more securities to new suckers (investors). Please read the following excerpt from the SEC online site if you wish to know the details of this scheme:

“Washington, D.C., July 22, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged two certified public accountants with fraud and is seeking an emergency court order to freeze their assets after they sold phony securities to investors and then stole the money for personal use.
The SEC alleges that Laurence M. Brown and Ronald Mangini, who reside in Westchester County, N.Y., took the name of an inoperative company owned by a client of their accounting firm and sold investors fake promissory notes and common stock in what they purported to be a profitable company operating a gas pipeline in Tennessee. They falsely touted themselves as senior officers of the company, which they proclaimed to have a captive market in its area and a stable minimum rate of production with quality gas that could be sold well above market prices. What Brown and Mangini concealed from investors was that the pipeline had been inoperative for more than a decade. Behind the scenes, Brown and Mangini were instead operating a Ponzi scheme and diverting investor funds into their personal bank accounts and those of family members.

"Brown and Mangini not only deceived investors into making investments in a pipeline that was not producing any gas at all, but they stole the identity of a company owned by a client in order to do it," said George Canellos, Director of the SEC's New York Regional Office. "Brown and Mangini also victimized and betrayed the trust of other accounting clients who invested in their scheme."

According to the SEC's complaint, filed in federal court in Manhattan, Brown and Mangini began selling common stock and promissory notes of a company called Infinity Reserves-Tennessee Inc. as early as April 2008. They peddled the phony securities to clients of their accounting practice and other investors. Without authorization from the client who solely owned Infinity Reserves, Brown and Mangini used the company name to sell the stock and notes. Brown and Mangini falsely represented themselves as senior officers of Infinity Reserves with authority to sell the securities, calling themselves "president" and "secretary-treasurer" respectively. The phony notes promised investors a 10 percent annual return that would be paid semiannually on the principal amount of the investment.

According to the SEC's complaint, Infinity Reserves owns one principal asset — a gas gathering and trunk pipeline system located in Tennessee that it has not operated for more than a decade. The offering document that Brown and Mangini provided investors falsely portrays the investment as interests in an active system with an interconnect into the Duke Energy main east-west trunk line. The offering document falsely explained supposed merits of the investment and made various untrue statements while assuring investors that Infinity Reserves enjoyed a captive market in its area, a stable minimum rate of production, and quality gas that could be sold at a 20 percent premium over market prices. The offering document did not tell investors that the pipeline had been inoperative for years and thus in reality had no market for its gas and no minimum rate of production.

The SEC alleges that Brown and Mangini illegally obtained more than $2.1 million from investors. In classic Ponzi scheme fashion, they returned approximately $136,000 to certain investors in the form of interest payments. At least $1.6 million of investor funds were transferred to personal bank accounts controlled by Brown, Mangini, or family members including Mangini's wife and Browns's wife and daughter. The family members are named as relief defendants in the SEC's complaint for the purposes of recovering investor funds in their possession.

The SEC's complaint charges Brown and Mangini with violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. In addition to the emergency relief, the SEC's complaint seeks permanent injunctions, disgorgement of the defendants' and relief defendants' ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, and financial penalties from the defendants.

In addition to the SEC's charges, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York today brought criminal charges against Laurence Brown concerning the same illegal activities alleged in the SEC's complaint.

Brown is a repeat securities law offender. In 1994, the SEC charged Brown with, among other things, violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in connection with another offering fraud. Brown was enjoined from future violations of those provisions and barred from associating with any broker, dealer, government securities broker or dealer, investment company, investment adviser, or municipal securities dealer.”

I give two thumbs up to the SEC and to the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York. The SEC can only recover stolen money and implement fines but, there are others in government who can make stealing peoples life savings a real crime. But, of course there are many politicians who would disagree with what they call “making a business practice a crime” or “criminalizing business”.

SEC CHARGES KENNETH IRA STAR WITH FRAUD

It seems another Wall Street investment guru has come under the scrutiny of the SEC. It looks like in this case the alleged perpetrators just openly stole funds from their client’s accounts. These alleged perpetrators stole the money in a way that they could easily be caught. The way the smart people on Wall Street steal is to pay themselves fantastical amounts of compensation no matter how poorly their companies are performing. Stealing money out of a company through perks and compensation should be the number one class at all business school. What is nice about looting a business via compensation packages is that it is legalized stealing. The government has given such schemes the stamp of approval. Setting up Ponzi schemes and taking money out of client accounts is just stupid.

The following is part of a press document released by the SEC and posted on their web site:

“Washington, D.C., May 27, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Manhattan-based financial advisor Kenneth Ira Starr with fraud and is seeking an emergency court order to freeze his assets after he stole client money for his personal use, including the purchase last month of a multi-million dollar apartment where he and his wife now reside.

Starr and two entities he controls — Starr Investment Advisors LLC and Starr & Company LLC — have made unauthorized transfers of money in client accounts that ultimately wound up in Starr’s personal accounts. They violated securities laws pertaining to investment advisers in order to perpetrate the scheme.

Most investment advisers do not maintain physical custody of their clients’ assets, and those assets are instead held by qualified third-party custodians such as a regulated bank or a registered broker-dealer. In this case, the SEC alleges that certain client assets were held in a safe in Starr & Company’s offices despite the fact that Starr and his firms were not qualified custodians. Their ability to steal client funds was enhanced by the failure of Starr Investment Advisors to comply with asset custody rules that require firms to engage an independent public accountant to perform yearly surprise examinations of client assets in the firm’s custody.

“Starr breached his fiduciary duty as an investment adviser in the most egregious manner possible — he stole the funds his clients entrusted to him,” said George Canellos, Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. “Starr betrayed the trust of some clients who have looked to him for years for investment advice and financial guidance.”

According to the SEC’s complaint, filed in federal court in Manhattan, Starr and his companies transferred $7 million from the accounts of three clients between April 13 and April 16, 2010, without any authorization. The transferred funds were ultimately used to purchase a $7.6 million apartment on the Upper East Side in Manhattan on April 16. When one of the clients detected the unauthorized transfer and demanded the money be returned, Starr reimbursed that client with money siphoned from the account of another client without authorization. The other two investors have not been reimbursed.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that the unauthorized transfers in April 2010 were not the only instances when Starr misappropriated client funds. In August 2009, Starr and his entities began transferring approximately $1.7 million from the personal account of a client and from the account of a charity run by this client. These were all unauthorized transfers. In April 2010, an additional transfer of $750,000 was attempted from an account belonging to this client. But this time, Starr’s plans were frustrated because the bank alerted the client, who then halted the transfer. The client then reviewed the account transactions and uncovered the unauthorized $1.7 million transfers in 2009. When confronted about these transactions, Starr gave improbable explanations before eventually reimbursing the client with money that appears to have come from the bank account of another unrelated party.

The SEC’s complaint names two relief defendants in order to recover client assets now in their possession:

Diane Passage — Starr’s wife with whom he has a joint bank account.

Colcave LLC — An entity through which Starr purchased the apartment.

The SEC’s complaint charges each of the three defendants with violations of Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and, further, charges Starr Investment Advisors with violations of Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-2(a)(1) thereunder. In addition to the emergency relief, the SEC’s complaint seeks permanent injunctions barring future violations of the charged provisions of the federal securities laws, disgorgement of the defendants’ and relief defendants’ ill-gotten gains plus pre-judgment interest, and financial penalties from the defendants.”

With all the fraud charges the SEC actually files you hear of almost no criminal follow-up by the FBI or any authority that could put a few of the bad guys behind bars for at least the summer. At the very least they should have to wear a T-shirt for a month that says “I’m A Wall Street Fraudster”.

MAKER OF ATM AND VOTING MACHINES CHARGED WITH FRAUD

The security firm Diebold, Inc., of Canton Ohio, has been charged along with three former executives with fraudulent accounting. Diebold is listed on Wikipedia as one of the largest ATM manufacturing companies in the United States. The executives at Diebold Inc., tried to get their earnings numbers to correspond to the estimates given by Wall Street analysts. Companies who miss estimates often have their market value slide lower and can even have more difficulty in obtaining credit. Most importantly to many executives is the fact their bonus might not be as lucrative if the stock price takes a nose dive because the management did not meet the expectations of market analysts. The following is an excerpt of the post the SEC has put up:

“Washington, D.C., June 2, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Diebold, Inc. and three former financial executives for engaging in a fraudulent accounting scheme to inflate the company's earnings. The SEC separately filed an enforcement action against Diebold's former CEO seeking reimbursement of certain financial benefits that he received while Diebold was committing accounting fraud.

The SEC alleges that Diebold's financial management received "flash reports" — sometimes on a daily basis — comparing the company's actual earnings to analyst earnings forecasts. Diebold's financial management prepared "opportunity lists" of ways to close the gap between the company's actual financial results and analyst forecasts. Many of the opportunities on these lists were fraudulent accounting transactions designed to improperly recognize revenue or otherwise inflate Diebold's financial performance.

Diebold — an Ohio-based company that manufactures and sells ATMs, bank security systems and electronic voting machines — agreed to pay a $25 million penalty to settle the SEC's charges. Diebold's former CEO Walden O'Dell agreed to reimburse cash bonuses, stock, and stock options under the "clawback" provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

The SEC's case against Diebold's former CFO Gregory Geswein, former Controller and later CFO Kevin Krakora, and former Director of Corporate Accounting Sandra Miller is ongoing.

“Financial executives borrowed from many different chapters of the deceptive accounting playbook to fraudulently boost the company's bottom line," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "When executives disregard their professional obligations to investors, both they and their companies face significant legal consequences."

Scott W. Friestad, Associate Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, added, "Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley is an important investor protection provision because it encourages senior management to proactively take steps to prevent fraudulent schemes from happening on their watch. We will continue to seek reimbursement of bonuses and other incentive compensation from CEOs and CFOs in appropriate cases."
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act deprives corporate executives of certain compensation received while their companies were misleading investors, even in cases where that executive is not alleged to have violated the securities laws personally. The SEC has not alleged that O'Dell engaged in the fraud. Under the settlement, O'Dell has agreed to reimburse the company $470,016 in cash bonuses, 30,000 shares of Diebold stock, and stock options for 85,000 shares of Diebold stock.

According to the SEC's complaint against Diebold, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the company manipulated its earnings from at least 2002 through 2007 to meet financial performance forecasts, and made material misstatements and omissions to investors in dozens of SEC filings and press releases. Diebold's improper accounting practices misstated the company's reported pre-tax earnings by at least $127 million. Among the fraudulent accounting practices used to inflate earnings and meet forecasts were:

Improper use of "bill and hold" accounting.
Recognition of revenue on a lease agreement subject to a side buy-back agreement.

Manipulating reserves and accruals.
Improperly delaying and capitalizing expenses.
Writing up the value of used inventory.

Without admitting or denying the SEC's charges, Diebold consented to a final judgment ordering payment of the $25 million penalty and permanently enjoining the company from future violations of the antifraud, reporting, books and records, and internal control provisions of the federal securities laws.

The SEC charged Geswein, Krakora, and Miller, in a complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Exchange Act Rules 10b 5 and 13b2-1; and aiding and abetting Diebold's violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13. In addition, the SEC charged Geswein and Krakora with violating Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 13b2-2 and Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Commission seeks permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and financial penalties. The SEC also seeks officer-and-director bars against Geswein and Krakora as well as their reimbursement of bonuses and other incentive and equity compensation.”

Most people should feel just a bit uneasy to know that the company responsible for the security of their bank and many other financial transactions has just been found guilty of accounting fraud. Diebold Inc. seems to have a lot of issues in regards to honesty and integrity. The following is from Wikapedia and helps to outline some of the company’s ongoing problems.

“In August 2003, Walden O'Dell, then the chief executive of Diebold, announced that he had been a top fund-raiser for President George W. Bush and had sent a get-out-the-funds letter to 100 wealthy and politically inclined friends in the Republican Party, to be held at his home in a suburb of Columbus, Ohio.

In December 2005, O'Dell resigned following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.
In March 2007, it was reported by the Associated Press that Diebold was considering divesting itself of its voting machine subsidiary because it was "widely seen as tarnishing the company's reputation".
In August 2007, Wikipedia Scanner found that edits via the company's IP addresses occurred to Diebold's Wikipedia article, removing criticisms of the company's products, references to its CEO's fund-raising for President Bush and other negative criticism from the Wikipedia page about the company in November 2005.”

TWO SHORT SELLERS FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THE RULES

The SEC has caught two more individuals that were illegally shorting stocks. This is the first enforcement actions brought under rule 105. Rule 105 is meant to help stop the malicious market manipulations which has caused harm to the markets and has driven many retail (individual) investors away. Short selling when used as a hedge against sharp losses is a good thing. Short selling as a method of gambling is a dangerous thing to do for the short seller. The only time it is not dangerous is if the short seller has taken his own risk from the gamble via manipulating the market so that the stock will go down. It is like playing with a loaded deck of cards and that is perhaps a greater threat to capitalism than communism, fascism or any other ism.

The following is an excerpt from the SEC internet site. The SEC is at least finding some of the miscreants. It is too bad The Department of Justice does not take a keener interest in what may be the greatest threat to our national survival since WWII.

“Washington, D.C., May 11, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged two Boca Raton, Fla., residents for engaging in illegal short selling of securities in advance of participating in numerous secondary offerings to make illicit profits.

These mark the first enforcement actions brought by the SEC under Rule 105 of Regulation M against individuals with no securities industry background. Rule 105 helps prevent abusive short selling and market manipulation by ensuring that offering prices are set by natural forces of supply and demand for the securities in a secondary offering rather than by manipulative activity.

In separate orders issued by the Commission, Peter G. Grabler was charged with repeatedly violating Rule 105 over a period of more than two years for gains of $636,123. Leonard Adams was charged with similarly violating Rule 105 for gains of $331,387. According to the orders, Grabler and Adams engaged in a strategy of participating in numerous secondary offerings of stock in public companies in order to improve their access to initial public offerings underwritten by the same broker-dealers through which they participated in the secondary offerings.

Grabler and Adams, who both lived in Massachusetts during the period of the wrongdoing, agreed to pay a combined total of more than $1.5 million to settle the SEC's charges.

"Rule 105 applies just as much to individuals trading in their own accounts as it does to investment advisers and their related funds, which have been the subject of prior SEC enforcement actions," said David P. Bergers, Director of the SEC's Boston Regional Office. "Grabler and Adams engaged in a trading strategy that by its very nature violates the SEC's rules."

Short selling ahead of offerings can reduce the proceeds received by public companies and their shareholders by artificially depressing the market price shortly before the company prices its offering. The SEC amended Rule 105 effective October 2007 to prevent this trading practice known as "shorting into the deal." The revised rule generally prohibits the purchase of offering shares by any person who sold short the same securities within five business days before the pricing of the offering.
According to the SEC's orders, Grabler engaged in transactions prohibited by Rule 105 on at least 119 occasions between February 2006 and November 2008, involving secondary offerings by at least 102 issuers. Adams engaged in illegal transactions on at least 94 occasions between March 2006 and November 2008, involving secondary offerings by at least 86 issuers. The SEC found that Grabler opened or controlled at least 52 brokerage accounts at more than a dozen broker-dealers and that Adams opened or controlled at least 32 brokerages accounts also at more than a dozen broker-dealers.
In settling the SEC's charges without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, Grabler and Adams separately consented to cease and desist from violating Rule 105. Grabler will pay more than $988,000 to settle the SEC's charges, and Adams will pay more than $514,000”

Well, the SEC has caught and fined more crooks. As a long time investor in securities and commodities I have seen a lot of market manipulation. In this case the criminals were stealing a relative small amount of money but, they did get a just fine and perhaps they should get some criminal charges brought against them but unfortunately, the SEC cannot try people and put them away.

One thing that should be noted in this case is how much trouble a couple of guys can cause through illegal short sales. It would be good if the SEC would look into a lot of the shenanigans that went on in the 2007-2008 melt down. Several major brokerages have been rumored to have made a tremendous fortune shorting stocks so far down that the underlying businesses could not get loans to stay in business. Some of these short sellers may have been such large institutions that they created the short selling market for these stocks which wiped a lot of retail investors out and forced good companies to lay off employees. The aforesaid happens if the collapsing price of a stock of a business causes that business to have problems getting loans to fund day to day operations.

BROKERS ACCUSED OF HELPING TO SELL PENNY STOCKS UNLAWFULLY

The sale of penny stocks are often looked upon as controversial way to raise capital. Many investors will not purchase stocks that sell for under $10.00 for fear the company may not have the financial ability to survive. However, sometimes a stock may be undervalued by the market and becomes a really good value at really low prices.

Of course anyone with a copy machine can print off stock certificates and anyone with a computer can set up bogus securities to sell to the public. Most people remember all the anecdotal stories of Internet companies being formed and then raising capital on the basis of just an idea with no real business behind the issued securities. This type of behaviour is something the SEC is mandated to investigate.

Because companies who engage in security sales are required to make sure that bogus the securities they sell are legitimate; the SEC brought the following action against Leeb Brokerage Services:


"Washington, D.C., April 27, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced administrative proceedings against five securities professionals accused of facilitating unlawful sales of penny stocks to investors and failing to act as "gatekeepers" as required under the federal securities laws.

The SEC's Division of Enforcement alleges that three registered representatives and two supervisors at Leeb Brokerage Services allowed customers to routinely deliver large blocks of privately obtained shares of penny stocks into their accounts at the firm. The customers would then sell them to the public in transactions that were not registered with the SEC under the securities laws. The accused securities professionals allowed these sales without sufficiently investigating whether they were facilitating illegal underwriting, and they also caused the firm's failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) as required under the Bank Secrecy Act to report potential misconduct by their customers.

-"Firms whose customers repeatedly bring in large blocks of microcap securities for sale to the public have an obligation to ensure they are not facilitating wrongdoing," said George S. Canellos, Director of the SEC's New York Regional Office. "Securities professionals who turn a blind eye to suspicious customer conduct are not fulfilling their duties as gatekeepers and risk violating the securities laws themselves."

The SEC's Division of Enforcement alleges that Leeb registered representatives Ronald Bloomfield, John Earl Martin, Sr., and Victor Labi failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry before allowing the public sales of the large blocks of penny stocks in violation of the registration provisions of the federal securities laws. The Enforcement Division further alleges that the firm's president Eugene Miller and its chief compliance officer Robert Gorgia failed to reasonably supervise the conduct of these representatives. All five individuals are accused of aiding and abetting the firm's failure to file SARs. These events occurred between 2005 and 2007. Leeb is no longer in business.

According to the Commission's order instituting administrative proceedings, the Leeb representatives ignored obvious red flags indicating that their customers were violating securities laws by engaging in illegal distributions of securities through their Leeb accounts. One group of customer accounts was affiliated with an individual who had previously been involved in a pump-and-dump scheme, and with a stock promoter who routinely received shares in compensation for promotional services for penny stock companies. The accounts earned more than $20 million in proceeds while repeatedly depositing privately obtained shares and then selling them to the public, raising the constant specter that Leeb was facilitating "scalping." Another Leeb customer wired more than $30 million in penny stock proceeds to a bank in Liechtenstein, a tax haven.

The SEC's Division of Enforcement alleges that despite these and other suspicious activities of their customers, the accused Leeb representatives and supervisors ignored their obligation to report the possible misconduct to authorities. Such disregard of the firm's reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act enabled Leeb's customer activity, and the commissions it generated, to continue unfettered. And the public was exposed to repeated risk of unlawful distributions of penny stocks.

A hearing will be scheduled before an administrative law judge to determine whether the accused individuals committed the alleged violations and provide them an opportunity to defend the allegations. The hearing also will determine what sanctions, if any, are appropriate in the public interest."

The above was quoted from the SEC official web page. The possibility of fraud is great in an unregulated industry and it is good that there are regulations to help protect the public from being victims of heinous crimes. The unfortunate thing is that too many politicians believe that it is alright that people loose their life savings to fraudsters. These politicians believe that stealing from people is just one very legitimate form of capitalism that should be protected from governmental intervention. This form of capitalism only works if the public is allowed to exact vengeance upon fraudsters the same way vengeance was enacted upon horse thieves in the old west. "Horse Thief Capitalism" only works if you have a "Horse Thief Justice System" otherwise, it is important to have strong aggressive governmental institutions to protect the public from fraud and the fraudsters from "Horse Thief Justice".

CEO CHARGED WITH STEALING

It is sad that we have so many businessmen that are just pure thieves. This makes us all look bad and undermines our cherrished free enterprise system. These very successful fraudsters also set a bad example for the kids. Hard work does not pay off nearly as well as being a Wall Street Fraudster. The following is another exerpt from the SEC web site that shows how very bad many executives behave:

"Washington, D.C., March 15, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three former senior executives and a former director of an Omaha-based database compilation company for their roles in a scheme in which the CEO funneled illegal compensation to himself in the form of perks worth millions of dollars.
The SEC alleges that Vinod Gupta, the former CEO and Chairman of infoUSA Inc. and infoGROUP Inc. (Info), fraudulently used corporate funds to pay almost $9.5 million in personal expenses to support his lavish lifestyle. He additionally caused the company to enter into $9.3 million of undisclosed business transactions between Info and other companies in which he had a personal stake.
The SEC also charged the former chairman of Info's audit committee, Vasant H. Raval, and two of the company's former chief financial officers, Rajnish K. Das and Stormy L. Dean, for enabling Gupta to carry out the scheme.

"Gupta stole millions of dollars from Info shareholders by treating the company like it was his personal ATM," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Other corporate officers also abused their positions of trust by looking the other way instead of standing up for investors and bringing the scheme to a halt."
Donald M. Hoerl, Director of the SEC's Denver Regional Office, added, "Officers and directors must ensure that shareholders receive accurate and complete disclosure of all compensation paid to executives. Raval, as chairman of the audit committee, neglected these duties and allowed the money to flow to Gupta unbeknownst to investors."
The SEC's complaints, filed in federal district court in Nebraska, allege that from 2003 to 2007, Gupta improperly used corporate funds for more than $3 million worth of personal jet travel for himself, family, and friends to such destinations as South Africa, Italy, and Cancun. He also used investor money to pay $2.8 million in expenses related to his yacht; $1.3 million in personal credit card expenses; and other costs associated with 28 club memberships, 20 automobiles, homes around the country, and three personal life insurance policies. The SEC also alleges that Gupta failed to inform Info's other board members of the material fact that he had purchased shares of an Info acquisition target for his own ill-gotten financial benefit.
The SEC alleges that Raval failed to respond appropriately to various red flags concerning Gupta's expenses and Info's related party transactions with Gupta's other entities. Two Info internal auditors raised concerns to Raval that Gupta was submitting requests for reimbursement of personal expenses, yet Raval failed to take meaningful action to further investigate the matter and he omitted critical facts in a report to the board concerning Gupta's expenses.
The SEC further alleges that Das and Dean allowed Gupta to support his lavish lifestyle by rubber-stamping hundreds of his expense reimbursement requests. Das and Dean approved Gupta's expense reimbursement requests despite the fact that the requests lacked sufficient explanation of business purpose and supporting documentation, even in the face of concerns raised by several Info employees. Das and Dean also signed management representation letters to Info's outside auditor falsely representing that all related party transactions with Gupta's entities had been properly recorded and disclosed in Info's financial statements.
Gupta, Raval, and Info agreed to settle the SEC's charges without admitting or denying the allegations against them.
Gupta agreed to pay disgorgement of $4,045,000, prejudgment interest of $1,145,400, and a penalty of $2,240,700. He consented to an order barring him from serving as an officer or director of a public company, and placing restrictions on the voting of his Info common stock. Gupta consented to a final judgment enjoining him from violations of Sections 10(b), 13(b)(5), and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, 13b2-1, 13b2-2, 14a-3, and 14a-9 and from aiding and abetting Info's violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) and Rules 13a-1, 13a-13, and 12b-20.
Raval agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty and consented to an order barring him from serving as an officer or director of a public company for five years. He also consented to a final judgment enjoining him from violations of Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 14(a) and Rules 10b-5, 14a-3, and 14a-9, and from aiding and abetting Info's violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1.
Info consented to the issuance of an Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order without admitting or denying any of the findings in the SEC's order. The Order orders Info to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B), and 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 14a-3, and 14a-9.
The SEC's case against Das and Dean is ongoing. They are charged with violating Exchange Act Sections 10(b), 13(b)(5), and 14(a), and Rules 10b-5, 13a-14, 13b2-1, 13b2-2, 14a-3, and 14a-9, and for aiding and abetting Info's violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B), and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1. Additionally, Das is charged with violating Exchange Act Rule 13a-13. The Commission's complaint seeks permanent injunctions, financial penalties, prejudgment interest, and an officer and director bar against both defendants."

JP MORGAN CAUGHT UP IN PAY-TO-PLAY MUNI BOND SCHEME

The following is an excerpt from the SEC web page in regards to a recent action taken by the SEC. It seems that a JP Morgan executive gave a campaign contribution to a politician responsible for the issuance of Municipal bonds. Such contributions are not legal under MSRB Rule G-37. The SEC explains the rule in the following:

"Washington, D.C., March 18, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today issued a report warning firms that municipal securities rules prohibiting pay-to-play apply to affiliated financial professionals, not just a firm's employees.

The pay-to-play rule, MSRB Rule G-37, generally prohibits firms from underwriting municipal bonds for an issuer for two years after a municipal finance professional (MFP) involved with that firm makes a campaign contribution to an elected official of that municipality.

In the Report of Investigation, the Commission makes clear that an executive who supervises the activities of a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer is not exempt from the MSRB's pay-to-play rule just because he or she may be outside the firm's corporate governance structure. As such, an executive may be deemed an MFP if he or she is not part of a broker-dealer, but oversees the broker-dealer from the vantage of the holding company.

“Firms and associated persons must adhere strictly to municipal securities pay-to-play rules,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “Firms cannot rely solely upon titles or organizational charts in determining whether a person is subject to those rules.”

When the Commission approved the rule in 1994, it indicated that banks and bank holding companies affiliated with brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers were excluded from the rule. Since then, the Commission has not directly addressed whether directors, officers or employees of such banks and bank holding companies are MFPs if they supervise the public finance activities of brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers or serve on executive committees that engage in such supervision.

The Commission's Report of Investigation stems from an Enforcement Division inquiry into whether JP Morgan Securities Inc. (JPMSI) violated the MSRB Rule. According to the Report, JPMSI underwrote municipal bonds issued by the state of California within two years after a then-Vice Chairman of JPMSI's parent bank holding company (JP Morgan Chase) gave a $1,000 contribution to a California elected official.

Under Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Commission may investigate violations of the federal securities laws and at its discretion "publish information concerning any such violations." JPMSI consented to the issuance of the Report without admitting or denying any of the statements or conclusions."

It is apparent from the above that some corporations bribe public officials for government business. Many in this nation state that the government should keep it's nose out of the way businesses are run. Maybe big business should keep its checkbook closed instead of trying bribe the government to send the peoples money into the coffers of big firms.