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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Sunday, September 18, 2011

CFTC COMMISSIONER SCOTT O’MALIA ON PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF DODD-FRANK RULEMAKINGS

The following is from an open meeting of the CFTC and is an excerpt from the CFTC website: September 8, 2011 “Waking Up to Reality” “Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking you for scheduling this hearing to discuss the important issue of implementation of our Dodd-Frank rulemakings. I would also like to thank the team responsible for preparing the two proposals before us. I understand that these proposals aim to provide greater certainty to the market as to when the Commission will impose the clearing and trading mandates, as well as when the Commission will require compliance with certain documentation and margining rules. I am grateful that the Commission has attempted to provide more certainty. However, I fear that the market will find that these proposals raise more questions than they answer. These proposals fail to facilitate a transition to the new regulatory regime in the orderly manner that the market – as well as the Commission – desires. Implementation: What We Don’t Know Rather than defining what we know, these proposals emphasize what we don’t know about the implementation plan. I would just like to highlight six areas where more guidance is necessary so that market participants could have begun to allocate resources appropriately. First, the proposal for the clearing and trading mandates may not apply in certain situations. The proposal states, “When issuing a mandatory clearing determination, the Commission would set an effective date by which all market participants would have to comply. In other words, the proposed compliance schedules would be used only when the Commission believes phasing is necessary based on the considerations outlined in this release.” Therefore, despite the proposal, market participants would need to look at each individual mandatory clearing determination to ascertain whether the specified phasing would apply. To date, neither the Commission nor staff has issued any guidance on the substantive criteria that will be used to make mandatory clearing determinations, including any criteria relating to when such determinations would become effective. Second, neither proposal provides market participants with beginning nor end dates. For example, the proposal for the clearing and trading mandates appropriately states that the Commission must finalize no less than five rulemakings before it can trigger the specified compliance phasing schedule. Those rulemakings include: (i) entity definitions; (ii) the end-user exception; (iii) the protection of cleared swaps customer contracts and collateral; (iv) core principles for designated contract markets; and (v) core principles for swap execution facilities. The proposal provides no insight as to when the Commission anticipates finalizing these rulemakings. Third, these proposals only address a handful of the requirements that market participants will need to comply with when the Commission finalizes all of the Dodd-Frank rulemakings. For example, the proposal relating to documentation and margining acknowledges that, in addition to the rulemakings that the compliance schedule addresses, swap dealers and major swap participants would need to comply with “rules proposed under Section 4s(e) (capital requirements), Section 4s(f) (reporting and recordkeeping), Section 4s(g) (daily trading records), Section 4s(h) (business conduct standards), Section 4s(j) (duties, including trading, risk management, disclosure of information, conflicts of interest, and antitrust considerations), and Section 4s(k) (designation of a chief compliance officer).” Although long, this list includes only the entity-specific rulemakings. It does not include more market-wide obligations such as mandatory clearing and trading. The Commission should have proposed a comprehensive schedule detailing: (i) for each registered entity, compliance dates for each of its entity-specific obligations under Dodd-Frank; and (ii) for each market-wide obligation, the entities affected (whether registered or unregistered), along with appropriate compliance dates. Instead, we again choose to leave the market to review the effective date sections of each final rulemaking in a vacuum. If the Commission is making this choice because the Commission itself is still not clear on how all of its proposals will work in concert together, and how the industry might be able to comply with such proposals, then we have not taken the important step of truly understanding the costs and benefits of our mosaic of rules. Fourth, these proposals do not make it clear why the Commission has decided to phase implementation on 90, 180, and 270-day timeframes. Several participants in the May 4, 2011, implementation roundtable sought longer timeframes to accommodate, among other things, documentation requirements. For example, the Managed Futures Association proposed a 120, 210, 270 day tiered implementation approach. The proposals fail to accommodate these comments, and does not justify why or estimate the cost of the Commission’s approach. Fifth, the proposals incorporate an incomplete and inadequate cost-benefit analysis. The proposals boldly and oddly characterize themselves as relief from time frames in other proposals or in determinations that the Commission has not yet made. I reiterate: the Commission should have proposed a comprehensive schedule that would have complemented and informed existing proposals and provided structure to future determinations. The Commission should then have analyzed the costs and benefits of the comprehensive schedule, including appropriate quantification. With respect to market-wide obligations, such as the clearing and trading mandate, we know that the technology investments required for implementation will be massive. New clearing and trading entities, as well as data repositories, all need to be connected to each other and to firms. In developing back office systems alone the TABBGroup estimated that the industry would spend in 2011 over $3.4 billion globally and $1 billion in the United States. With respect to entity-specific obligations, firms will have to make large investments in new software to manage new margin requirements, price aggregation systems and risk management systems. Knowing when and how the markets are required to deploy these systems is vital to the success of implementing the new market structure required under the Dodd-Frank Act. When billions of dollars are at stake you simply do not rely on guesses and estimates based on vague conditions. Unfortunately, the proposals do not mention technology requirements and the costs required to execute the strategies. Finally, on a substantive note, this rule discusses issues such as what is meant by “made available to trade.” It is clear that the Commission has yet to communicate what this standard means. Instead of signaling that we need to address this issue, the Commission is silent. Similarly, instead of making it clear that the Commission will publish guidance on how mandatory clearing determinations will be made, it is still unclear how that process will work. The rule proposals also fail to ask some important questions, like how the Commission’s proposed implementation requirements will affect entities and transactions located outside of the United States. Implementation: The Reality These proposals do accomplish one thing. They force us to wake to reality and recognize that the earliest the Commission can complete the last of the triggering rules is the end of the first quarter of 2012. As I previously mentioned, those rules must be finalized before the Commission can begin phasing in compliance. The realities of this schedule will push the clearing and trading mandate to approximately the third quarter of 2012, or just before the G-20 commitment to implement clearing. We cannot continue to pretend, as we did when the Commission published its Effective Date Order, that all of the Dodd-Frank rulemakings will be in place by December 31, 2011, and that the Commission will be able to thoughtfully consider final rulemakings at the untenable pace that would be necessary to meet that arbitrary deadline. I want to be clear. I support completing final rulemakings in a reasonable time frame. I believe that the timely implementation of such rulemakings is important. I am mindful, though, that it is not the Commission, but industry, that will do the real work of making the regulatory jargon and Federal Register pages that constitute our final rulemakings a functioning reality. If we want to promote timely implementation, we need to tell the industry when it will be expected to do what, so that in turn, it can make the costly investments in technology and staff that will be necessary to implement what are very complex requirements. International Coordination and Extraterritoriality Now, I would like to turn to another item on the agenda that is not a Dodd-Frank rulemaking, but that illustrates certain themes that the Commission has not addressed in a cohesive manner, either in the final rulemakings that it has adopted, the proposals before us today, or other proposals that it is in the process of finalizing. That item is the report by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets. The themes that I would like to focus on are international coordination and extraterritoriality. First, on international coordination, it is becoming increasingly clear that the schedule for financial reform is converging among the G-20 nations. It is less clear that the substantive policies underlying financial reform is experiencing the same convergence. That fact may have competitive implications that the Commission has yet to examine fully. The IOSCO Principles illustrates some of the tensions surrounding international coordination that we have seen, and will continue to see, with respect to Dodd-Frank rulemaking. For example, while each IOSCO member supports the organization’s general principles, each member may have widely different interpretations of exactly what regulations would accord with such principles. For example, the IOSCO Principle on Intervention Powers in the Market states that IOSCO members should have “position management powers,” including powers to set both: (i) traditional position accountability limits; and (ii) ex ante position limits. However, the Principle acknowledges that different IOSCO members may place different emphases on the two powers and that ex ante position limits may be most useful in the delivery month. As we know, the Commission has set forth its position limits proposal. Regulators in other jurisdictions may set forth dramatically different proposals and still comport with the IOSCO Principle. How the Commission plans to manage international regulatory arbitrage, and how the Commission intends to enforce that plan, remains to be seen. I predict that this theme will run through many of our upcoming rulemakings, including those pertaining to core principles for derivatives clearing organizations. Second, on extraterritoriality, in order for the Commission to coordinate internationally other regulators should ideally have an understanding of the manner in which the Commission perceives the boundaries of its jurisdiction, even if those regulators do not agree. To date, the Commission has produced nothing to afford other regulators, not to mention market participants, such understanding. Uncertainty delays crucial international dialogue on financial reform. I would urge the Commission to make its thoughts on extraterritoriality known sooner rather than later. I would also strongly urge the Commission to take a more comprehensive approach towards extraterritoriality, and an approach that is coordinated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), than it has chosen to take with respect to the proposals on compliance before us today. Finally, a word on technology. To comport with the IOSCO Principles, the Commission needs to invest more than the minimum in technology. Only by investing more can we achieve the goals of real-time surveillance. Having “position management powers” means very little if the Commission lacks the tools to exercise those powers. Therefore, I am going to close by urging the Commission, as I have done many times in the past, to focus on improving its technological capabilities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.”

Saturday, September 17, 2011

SEC ANNOUNCED A FINAL JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST FORMER CEO OF BROOKE CAPITAL CORPORATION

The following is an excerpt from the SEC website: “The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that the United States District Court for the District of Kansas entered a judgment, dated September 8, 2011, against Kyle L. Garst, the former chief executive officer of Kansas-based Brooke Capital Corporation (“Brooke Capital”). Brooke Capital was an insurance agency franchisor and a subsidiary of Brooke Corporation, a Kansas company founded by Robert Orr. Garst, without admitting or denying the Commission’s allegations, consented to a judgment enjoining him from future violations of the federal securities laws. According to the SEC’s Complaint, in SEC filings signed by Garst, Brooke Capital’s former management inflated the number of reported insurance agency franchise locations by including failed and abandoned locations in totals set forth in SEC filings for year-end 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. The Complaint also alleges that Brooke Capital’s former management, among other things, concealed the nature and extent of Brooke Capital’s financial assistance to its franchisees, which included making franchise loan payments on behalf of struggling franchisees, and failed to disclose the company’s dire liquidity and financial condition. Specifically, the judgment enjoins Garst from violating Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rules 10b-5, 13b2-1, 13b2-2, and 13a-14 thereunder, and from aiding and abetting violations Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder. In addition to the injunction, the judgment bars Garst from serving as an officer or director of a public company and imposes a $130,000 civil penalty.”

CFTC ANNOUNCED FEDERAL COURT FREEZES ASSETS OF ALLEGED COMMODITY SCHEME FRAUDSTERS

September 9, 2011 The following is an excerpt from the CFTC website: “Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that a federal court in Charlotte, N.C., entered an emergency order freezing assets held by defendants Toby D. Hunter of Waxhaw, N.C., and his companies, Prestige Capital Advisors, LLC (Prestige) and D2W Capital Management, LLC (D2W) of Charlotte, N.C. The court’s order, entered by Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr., also prohibits the destruction of books and records and grants the CFTC immediate access to such documents. The judge ordered Hunter to appear in court on October 3, 2011, for a preliminary injunction hearing. The order arises out of a CFTC civil complaint filed on September 6, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division. The CFTC’s complaint alleges that, since April 2008, Hunter, Prestige, and D2W fraudulently solicited and accepted funds from the general public to trade pooled investments in commodity futures, options on commodity futures and managed forex accounts. As a result of defendants’ allegedly fraudulent solicitation, at least six individuals invested $4.65 million with the Prestige Multi-Strategy Fund, LP, a pool established by Hunter and Prestige. In addition, the defendants solicited and received $2.36 million in connection with forex trading accounts managed by D2W. Defendants also allegedly misrepresented the profitability of their trading programs by posting false purported returns on a website called BarclayHedge. The complaint further alleges that defendants misappropriated some of the Prestige investors’ funds and issued false account statements to investors in both schemes in order to perpetuate defendants’ fraud. In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks a return of ill-gotten gains, restitution to defrauded customers, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the federal commodities laws. The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the National Futures Association and the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority.”

Friday, September 16, 2011

SEATTLE BROKER CHARGED BY SEC WITH FRAUD

The following excerpt is from the SEC website: September 8, 2011 “The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Seattle-area securities broker with fraud, and seeks an order from the federal court in Seattle to freeze the broker’s assets. The SEC alleges that Richard A. Finger, Jr. of Bellevue, Wash., and his brokerage firm Black Diamond Securities LLC lost millions of dollars for customers in a matter of months through risky, undisclosed options trading and excessive, concealed commissions. Finger opened the firm in February and began managing nearly $5 million in assets, mainly for friends and family members. The SEC alleges that Finger concealed his misconduct from customers by providing them with doctored account statements inflating their account balances and understating his commission charges. Unbeknownst to his customers, Finger allegedly embarked on a high-frequency, high-risk options trading strategy that lost nearly $2 million over the following months. At the same time, Black Diamond charged customers more than $2 million in commissions, and Finger diverted some funds to his personal bank account to support a lifestyle that included a $2 million home and luxury vehicles. The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal district court for the Western District of Washington, charges Finger and Black Diamond with violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and charges Black Diamond with violating Section 15(c)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act and Finger with aiding and abetting violations of Section 15(c)(1)(A). The SEC seeks permanent injunctions, an accounting, an asset freeze, disgorgement with prejudgment interest, and civil monetary penalties.”

Thursday, September 15, 2011

SEC FILES COURT COMPLAINT ALLEGING FRAUD AGAINST 3 MANAGERS

The following is an excerpt from the SEC website: “The Securities and Exchange Commission announced the filing of a complaint in federal district court against James O’Reilly (O’Reilly), James P. McAluney (McAluney), and Martin Cutler (Cutler) (collectively, “Defendants”). The complaint alleges that O’Reilly, McAluney, and Cutler were the managers and control persons involved in a series of fraudulent and unregistered offerings in Shale Synergy, LLC (Shale), Shale Synergy II, LLC (Shale II), and Ranch Rock Properties, LLC (Ranch Rock). The Complaint alleges that from at least December 2007 until July 2009, Defendants solicited funds from investors through a series of Rule 506 Regulation D offerings of membership interests in Shale, Shale II and Ranch Rock. The Defendants raised approximately $16 million from about 130 investors. The companies were to generate returns of from 7.5% to 9% a quarter from investments in oil and gas interests purchased by Shale, Shale II and Ranch Rock. However, instead of purchasing oil & gas assets, approximately $13 million of the funds raised from investors were transferred to Joseph S. Blimline (Blimline) and various Blimline-controlled entities. Throughout Defendants’ solicitations, Blimline acted as a secret partner. Defendants never disclosed Blimline’s involvement and control, or his past securities disciplinary action to investors. According to the Commission’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the Defendants falsely represented to investors that Shale would acquire the promissory notes issued by two Blimline entities and acquire substantially all of the entities’ underlying assets. The Complaint alleges that, the defendants failed to disclose that investor funds of Shale, Shale II, and Ranch Rock would be commingled to pay expenses, and that Blimline would be making all investment decision. The Complaint further alleges that although Shale failed to make its December 2008 investor distributions, the Defendants continued to solicit investors for Shale II and Ranch Rock without disclosing the financial difficulties at Shale. The Commission’s complaint seeks to enjoin the defendants from future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and civil penalties.”

SEC ALLEGES TEXAS MAN TARGETED DEAF INVESTORS IN FRAUD SCHEME

The following is an excerpt from the SEC website: “Washington, D.C., Sept. 9, 2011 — The Securities and Exchange Commission has charged a Corinth, Texas man with securities fraud for soliciting more than $3.45 million from several thousand deaf investors in an investment scheme that the SEC halted last year. The SEC previously charged Imperia Invest IBC with securities fraud and obtained an emergency court order to freeze the investment company’s assets. In a complaint filed late yesterday, the SEC alleges that Dunn, who is deaf, solicited investments for Imperia over a three-year period from others in the deaf community, promising them he would invest in Imperia on their behalf. What Dunn did not tell investors is that he was misappropriating a portion of their funds to pay his mortgage, car payments, car insurance, and a variety of other personal expenses. Dunn sent the remaining amounts to Imperia’s offshore bank accounts. While Imperia guaranteed returns of 1.2 percent per day on these investments, investors have never been paid any interest after giving their money to Dunn to invest. Even after the SEC charged Imperia and issued an investor alert about the scheme, Dunn continued to reassure investors that Imperia was legitimate and they would be paid. “Dunn was aware that Imperia lost investor money and was not accurately crediting investor accounts, yet he continued to send investor money to Imperia without disclosing to investors what was happening,” said Kenneth D. Israel, Director of the SEC’s Salt Lake Regional Office. “To further take advantage of others in the deaf community, Dunn was siphoning off about 10 percent of the money he collected from investors to pay his own bills before sending the rest of money into the Imperia quagmire.” According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Plano, Texas, Imperia purported to invest in Traded Endowment Policies (TEP), which is the British term for viatical settlements that involve the sale of an insurance policy by the policy owner before the policy matures. The TEP investments offered by Imperia were investment contracts in which investors were required to invest at least $50, which purportedly allowed the customer to obtain an $80,000 loan from an unnamed foreign bank that would be used to purchase a TEP. Imperia then claimed to trade the TEPs and pay a guaranteed return to the investor of 1.2 percent per day. The SEC alleges that Dunn misrepresented to investors that he would help them invest with Imperia to purchase TEPs. No investor funds were used to purchase TEPs. Dunn also represented to investors that he had met and knew the individuals behind Imperia. However, Dunn had never actually met anyone affiliated with Imperia. According to the SEC’s complaint, Imperia also required that investors purchase a Visa debit card to access their investment proceeds. Imperia charged customers a fee to purchase the Visa debit card ranging from $145 to $450. Visa had not authorized Imperia to use its name or trademarks and sent Imperia a cease-and-desist letter instructing it to halt unauthorized use of the Visa name and logo. Nonetheless, Dunn solicited and collected investor money for these purported Visa debit card purchases. According to the SEC’s complaint, Dunn’s investors transferred funds to him via money orders that he then cashed and deposited into accounts he controlled. From there, he forwarded funds to Imperia. Dunn initially sent money to Paypal-like accounts in Costa Rica, Panama and the British Virgin Islands, but later wired it directly to bank accounts with no apparent link to Imperia in such various other countries as Cyprus and New Zealand. The SEC alleges that Dunn did not attempt to verify whether Imperia was actually investing the money as promised. He also failed to verify whether Imperia was licensed to sell securities in any state, whether any registration statements relating to the offers or sales of Imperia securities were filed with the SEC, or whether Imperia was registered with the SEC in any capacity. The SEC alleges that Dunn violated Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. This matter was investigated by Jennifer Moore and Scott Frost of the SEC’s Salt Lake Regional Office and the litigation will be led by Daniel Wadley. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the State of Maine Office of Securities, the Securities Commission of the Bahamas, the Vanuatu Financial Services Commission, and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission.”