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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Sunday, July 1, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER BART CHILTON'S STATEMENT ON CROSS BORDER RULES AND REGULATIONS

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
“Not the Boss”
Statement of Commissioner Bart Chilton on Cross Border
June 29, 2012
I support the proposed cross interpretive guidance and policy statement and exemptive order. These are global interconnected markets and we need to work with our colleagues around the planet to ensure that we have, to the greatest extent practical, harmonized rules, regulations, surveillance and enforcement. The recent Barclays matter, the JPMorgan loss and many other illustrations make the case for this far better than anything else. As they say in the detective programs: These are real cases with real victims.
I’ve often heard teenagers protest, “You're not the boss of me." Well, we in the U.S. aren’t seeking to be the boss of anyone. Nation’s around the world have their own laws, rules and regulations and they have individual sovereign and idiosyncratic issues that not only should be considered, but are at the very fundamental core of nations’ rights to incorporate into whatever they do. No argument on that. At the same time, we all need to accept that these global financial markets operate all the time and cross borders as a matter of course. Risk is very portable; it can be shifted around like a shell game. Trading for a firm headquartered in one nation can take place in another. Like nations’ sovereignty is a fact, so is it a fact that these markets cross borders and are interconnected. These are facts—evident truths.

So, while we do not seek to be the boss of anyone, we do seek to ensure that our consumers, taxpayers, markets and our economy are protected. I assume other nations not only have this parochial interest as well, but that they will ensure analogous laws that address the matter. If nations do this, as a matter of self-interest and global interest, there should not be any bossing around of anyone—easy peasy.

If for some reason, there are not comparable laws of self-interest in nations, and there is the possibility that the lack thereof would be a potential matter of concern to the U.S., our law requires that we address it in an appropriate fashion, and we will do so.
Here are the key points on what the proposal and exemptive order suggest, and I look forward to comments upon both of these important matters. The proposed interpretive guidance and policy statement proposes to (1) define U.S. persons, (2) provide that foreign SDs and MSPs (swaps dealers and major swaps participants, respectively) and foreign affiliates of U.S. SDs and MSPs may be exempted from entity-level requirements under Dodd-Frank if they are subject to comparable and comprehensive foreign regulations, (3) provide that foreign SDs and MSPs and foreign affiliates of U.S. SDs and MSPs are not exempt generally from transaction-level requirements for swaps facing U.S. persons and foreign persons guaranteed by a U.S. person, and (4) provide that foreign SDs and MSPs and foreign affiliates of U.S. SDs and MSPs are generally exempt from transaction-level requirements for swaps facing non-U.S. persons.

Entity-level requirements include: capital; chief compliance officer; risk management; swap data recordkeeping and reporting; and large trader reporting. Transaction-level requirements include: clearing and swap processing; margin and segregation for uncleared swap transactions; mandatory trade execution requirement; swap trading relationship documentation; portfolio reconciliation and compression; real-time public reporting; trade confirmation; and daily trading records.

The proposed exemptive order regarding compliance with certain swap regulations exempts foreign persons (foreign affiliates of U.S. SDs and MSPs and foreign SDs and MSPs) and foreign branches of U.S. SDs and MSPs from transaction-level requirements for swaps with foreign counterparties for 12 months. Swaps with U.S. persons will still be subject to Dodd-Frank transaction-level requirements also for 12 months. External business conduct standards, however, only apply when both counterparties are U.S. persons. The proposed order also exempts U.S. SDs and MSPs from entity-level requirements, except for swap data reporting, recordkeeping, and large trader reporting requirements until January 1, 2013.

In particular, I am interested in receiving comments about how to prevent gaming through the use of conduits or other globe-trotting structures and under what circumstances foreign entities should be seen as being subject to “comparable and comprehensive” regulations. On the latter point, I think we should take an approach that encourages our sister regulators abroad to make the strong reforms necessary to ensure fair and safe global markets.

What we are proposing allows for nations to undertake their own protections that can fit into the overall global regulation, supervision and enforcement of markets. This is not about anyone trying to boss anyone around. This is about a balanced and thoughtful approach—a planetary patchwork of harmonized financial and markets rules of the road. That said, I look forward to comments to ensure that we get this correct.

AN OUTLINE OF AN ALLEGED PONZI-LIKE INVESTMENT FUND

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., June 28, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it has obtained an emergency court order to halt an alleged Ponzi-like scheme operated by Small Business Capital Corp. and its principal Mark Feathers, who raised $42 million by selling securities issued by Investors Prime Fund LLC and SBC Portfolio Fund LLC - two mortgage investment funds they controlled.

The SEC alleges that more than 400 investors were attracted to the funds by promises that profits from mortgage investments would yield annual returns of 7.5 percent or more. In reality, Feathers operated a Ponzi-like scheme by paying returns to investors that came partly from fund profits and partly from other investors.

“Feathers raised millions from investors by promising high returns,” said John McCoy, Associate Regional Director of the SEC’s Los Angeles Office. “The returns turned out to be too good to be true and were funded in part with new investors’ money.”

The SEC alleges that from 2009 to early 2012, Feathers improperly transferred more than $6 million from the funds to Small Business Capital to pay its expenses, including substantial payments to Feathers. According to the SEC, the defendants had the funds account for the transfers in a way that disguised the depletion of fund assets, and did not tell investors that Small Business Capital’s ability to repay was uncertain and that it was only able to make the interest payments owed to the funds by borrowing more from them.
In addition, the SEC alleges that investors were not told that in February and March 2012, the defendants caused one fund to sell mortgages to the other fund at an inflated price, thus generating a “profit” for the selling fund so it could pay Small Business Capital management fees of more than $575,000. The SEC also charged Feathers and Small Business Capital for Small Business Capital’s effecting transactions in the funds’ securities without being registered as a broker-dealer with the SEC.

The Honorable Edward J. Davila for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the SEC’s request for a temporary restraining order and asset freeze against Feathers, Small Business Capital, and the funds, and appointed Thomas A. Seaman as a temporary receiver over Small Business Capital and the funds. Judge Davila has scheduled a court hearing for July 10, 2012, on the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Susan Hannan and Roger Boudreau conducted the investigation and John Bulgozdy will lead the litigation. They work in the SEC's Los Angeles Regional Office.


Saturday, June 30, 2012

Pension Funds as Owners and Investors: A Voice for Working Families

Pension Funds as Owners and Investors: A Voice for Working Families

SEC ALLEGES MARKET MANIPULATION

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., June 27, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today filed fraud charges against New York-based hedge fund adviser Philip A. Falcone and his advisory firm, Harbinger Capital Partners LLC for illicit conduct that included misappropriation of client assets, market manipulation, and betraying clients. The SEC also charged Peter A. Jenson, Harbinger’s former Chief Operating Officer, for aiding and abetting the misappropriation scheme. Additionally, the SEC reached a settlement with Harbinger for unlawful trading.

In a separate, settled action, the SEC charged Harbert Management Corporation, whose affiliates served as the managing members of two Harbinger-related entities, as a controlling person in the market manipulation.

The SEC alleges that Falcone used fund assets to pay his taxes, conducted an illegal “short squeeze” to manipulate bond prices, secretly favored certain customers at the expense of others, and that Harbinger unlawfully bought equity securities in a public offering, after having sold short the same security during a restricted period.

“Today’s charges read like the final exam in a graduate school course in how to operate a hedge fund unlawfully,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “Clients and market participants alike were victimized as Falcone unscrupulously used fund assets to pay his personal taxes, manipulated the market for certain bonds, favored some clients at the expense of others, and violated trading rules intended to prohibit manipulative short sales.”

The SEC filed actions in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Falcone, Jenson, and Harbinger, and, in connection with the illegal trading scheme, separately instituted and settled administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Harbinger.

In particular, the SEC alleges that: Falcone fraudulently obtained $113.2 million from a hedge fund that he advised and misappropriated the proceeds to pay his personal taxes;

Falcone and two Harbinger investment managers through which Falcone operated manipulated the price and availability of a series of distressed high-yield bonds by engaging in an illegal “short squeeze;”

Falcone and Harbinger secretly offered and granted favorable redemption and liquidity rights to certain strategically-important investors in exchange for those investors’ consent to restrict redemption rights of other fund investors, and concealed the arrangement from the fund’s directors and investors; and

Harbinger engaged in illegal trades in connection with the purchase of common stock in three public offerings after having sold the same securities short during a restricted period.

“Not only are hedge fund managers expected to be savvy investors, they are supposed to serve the interests of their clients. Here, in addition to raiding a fund for personal benefit and cutting secret deals with favored investors, Falcone then lied to investors about what he had done,” said Bruce Karpati, Chief of the Asset Management Unit in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

Describing the illegal short squeeze, Gerald W. Hodgkins, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement said, “After he took control of an entire issue of high-yield bonds, Falcone kept buying with an eye toward rigging the market and punishing short sellers to settle a score. In the process, Falcone hijacked the market for the bonds and illegally manipulated their price and availability. The Division will continue to police the bond market to make sure it operates as an efficient market, free of the corrosive effects of manipulators such as Falcone.”

Misappropriation Scheme
In the misappropriation scheme, the SEC alleges that Falcone unlawfully used fund assets to pay his personal taxes. In 2009 Falcone owed federal and state authorities $113.2 million in taxes. Declining to pursue other financing options, such as pledging his personal assets as collateral for a bank loan, Falcone elected instead to take a $113.2 million loan from the Harbinger Capital Partners Special Situations Fund, L.P. – the same fund from which Harbinger had earlier suspended investors from redeeming.

Falcone authorized the transfer of fund assets to himself in a transaction that Jenson helped structure. Falcone and Harbinger never sought or obtained consent from investors prior to using the fund's assets to benefit Falcone.

As part of the misappropriation scheme, the SEC alleges that Falcone and Harbinger, aided by Jenson, made several material misrepresentations and omissions in seeking legal advice regarding the loan and in subsequent communications with investors, including, among other things:
the financing alternatives available to Falcone; the circumstances that led to Falcone’s need for the loan; the ability of the Special Situations Fund to furnish the loan, without disadvantaging investors;

the terms and conditions of the loan, including the interest rate charged and the amount of collateral posted by Falcone; and the role of Harbinger’s outside legal counsel in vetting the transaction.
The SEC also alleges that Falcone and Harbinger delayed disclosing the loan for approximately five months because of their concern that disclosure of Falcone’s financial condition might have a negative impact on investor withdrawals and on Falcone’s ability to attract more investments for other Harbinger funds. Falcone repaid the loan in 2011, after the Commission commenced its investigation.

Market Manipulation / Illegal Short Squeeze
In a separate civil action, the SEC alleges that from 2006 through early 2008 Falcone and two Harbinger investment management entities manipulated the market in a series of distressed high-yield bonds issued by MAAX Holdings Inc. In this fraudulent scheme, Falcone and the Harbinger entities allegedly orchestrated an illegal “short squeeze” – a market manipulation scheme in which an investor constricts the supply of a security, through large purchases or other means, with the intent of forcing settlement from short sellers at arbitrary and inflated prices.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that at Falcone’s direction, Harbinger purchased a large position in the MAAX bonds during April and June of 2006. After hearing rumors that a Wall Street financial services firm was shorting the MAAX bonds and also encouraging its customers to do the same, Falcone decided to seek revenge. In September 2006, Falcone directed the Harbinger-managed funds to buy every available bond in the market, often purchasing the bonds from short sellers. Ultimately, Falcone raised the funds’ stake to approximately 13 percent more than the available supply of the MAAX bonds.

At one point, Harbinger had purchased 22 million more bonds than MAAX had ever issued. Contemporaneously with these purchases, Falcone locked up the MAAX bonds the Harbinger funds had purchased in a custodial account at a bank in Georgia to prevent his brokers from lending out the bonds to sellers seeking to deliver the bonds to purchasers after short sales.

Having seized control of the supply of the MAAX bonds, Falcone then demanded that the Wall Street firm and its customers settle their outstanding MAAX short sales, not disclosing that it would be virtually impossible to find bonds available for delivery. The Wall Street firm bid daily for the bonds, which quickly doubled in price. Then, Falcone engaged in a series of transactions with certain short sellers at arbitrary, inflated prices, while at the same time valuing the funds’ holdings on his books at a small fraction of the prices he charged the covering short sellers.

Preferential Redemption Scheme
In its action alleging misappropriation, the SEC also alleges that in a further breach of Falcone and Harbinger’s fiduciary duties to their clients, Falcone and Harbinger engaged in unlawful preferential redemptions for the benefit of certain favored investors.

In 2009, while soliciting required investor approval to restrict withdrawals from another Harbinger fund, Falcone and Harbinger secretly exempted certain large investors that Falcone deemed to be strategically important from soon-to-be imposed liquidity restrictions – provided those investors voted to approve restrictions that would temporarily stabilize the decline in Harbinger’s assets under management.

Ultimately, pursuant to these ‘vote buying’ agreements, Falcone and Harbinger allegedly permitted these investors who were connected to certain favored institutional investors to withdraw a total of approximately $169 million. Harbinger concealed these quid pro quo arrangements from the independent directors and from fund investors.

Other Illegal Trading by Harbinger
In a separate administrative and cease-and-desist proceeding, the SEC found that between April and June 2009, Harbinger violated Rule 105 of Regulation M of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Rule 105 is an anti-manipulation rule that prohibits short selling securities during a restricted period and then purchasing the same securities in a public offering.

The Commission’s Order censures Harbinger and requires the firm to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations of Rule 105 now or in the future. Harbinger will pay disgorgement in the amount of $857,950, prejudgment interest in the amount of $91,838, and a civil monetary penalty in the amount of $428,975. Harbinger consented to the issuance of the Order without admitting or denying any of the Commission’s findings.

Settlement with Harbert Management Company
In a separate complaint also filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the SEC filed a settled civil action against Harbert and two related investment entities – HMC-New York Inc. and HMC Investors, LLC – for their role in the illegal short squeeze described above.

The SEC alleges in its complaint against Harbert that during the entire period of the short squeeze, Defendants Harbert, HMC-NY and HMC Investors, directly or indirectly, possessed the power to control Falcone and the investment managers through which he operated. HMC-NY and HMC Investors, two entities controlled by Harbert, served as the managing members of two limited liability companies that acted as the general partners of the funds advised by Falcone.

Harbert and its affiliates also provided hedge fund administrative, legal, compliance, risk assessment and other services to the funds. In these capacities, Harbert, HMC-NY and HMC Investors knew of Falcone’s trades in the MAAX bonds, but failed to take appropriate steps to address Falcone’s manipulative conduct. The SEC charged the Harbert defendants as controlling persons pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, alleging that they are jointly and severally liable for Falcone’s and the Harbinger investment managers’ violations of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.

Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint, Defendants Harbert, HMC-NY and HMC Investors have agreed to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1 million. The Harbert defendants also have consented to the entry of a judgment enjoining them from violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The proposed settlement with Harbert is subject to approval by the court.

In the pending federal court actions concerning the first three fraudulent schemes described above, the Commission seeks a variety of sanctions and relief including injunctions against Falcone and Harbinger from violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

In addition, the Commission seeks to enjoin Harbinger and Falcone from controlling any person who violates the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act. As for monetary relief, the Commission seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, prejudgment interest, and civil money penalties from Falcone and Harbinger. The Commission further seeks to prohibit Falcone from serving as an officer and director of any public company. Against Jenson, the Commission seeks to enjoin Jenson from aiding and abetting future violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Advisers Act and seeks to obtain monetary penalties.

The SEC’s investigation was a coordinated effort between teams from the SEC’s headquarters and the New York Regional Office, including Conway T. Dodge, Jr., Robert C. Besse, Ken C. Joseph, Mark Salzberg, Brian Fitzpatrick, and David Stoelting. Messrs. Joseph, Salzberg, and Fitzpatrick are members of the Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. Mr. Stoelting and David Gottesman will lead the SEC’s litigation team.

Friday, June 29, 2012

PETER MADOFF CHARGED WITH FRAUD, FALSIFYING BOOKS IN BROTHER BERNIE'S BUSINESS

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., June 29, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Peter Madoff, the brother of Bernie Madoff, with committing fraud, making false statements to regulators, and falsifying books and records in order to create the false appearance of a functioning compliance program over Madoff’s fraudulent investment advisory operations.

The SEC alleges that Peter Madoff, who served as Chief Compliance Officer and Senior Managing Director at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS) from 1969 to December 2008, created stacks of compliance documents setting out supposedly robust policies and procedures over BMIS’s investment advisory operations. However, Peter Madoff created these compliance manuals, written supervisory procedures, reports of annual compliance reviews, and compliance certifications to merely paper the file. No policies and procedures were ever implemented, and none of the reviews were actually performed even though Peter Madoff represented that he personally completed the reviews.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced parallel criminal charges against Peter Madoff.

“Peter Madoff helped Bernie Madoff create the image of a functioning compliance program purportedly overseen by sophisticated financial professionals,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “Tragically, the image was merely an illusion supported by Peter’s sham paperwork and false filings for which he was rewarded with tens of millions of dollars in stolen investor funds.”

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Bernie Madoff realized in late 2008 that his decades-long scheme was on the verge of collapse. He told Peter Madoff that he could not pay billions of dollars of investor redemption requests and wanted to distribute remaining investor money to family, friends, and favored employees before the scheme collapsed. Peter Madoff then helped choose which family, friends and employees to pay, and rushed to withdraw $200,000 from BMIS’s bank account for himself before the fraud’s final downfall.

The SEC alleges that in addition to creating false compliance materials, Peter Madoff created false broker-dealer and investment advisor registration applications filed by BMIS. He also failed to implement and review required policies and procedures, and falsified the firm’s books and records. Peter Madoff was richly rewarded for his misconduct, pocketing tens of millions of dollars through salary and bonuses, fake trades, sham loans, and direct, undocumented transfers of investor funds to himself from the bank account that BMIS used to perpetrate the Ponzi scheme.

The SEC’s complaint against Peter Madoff alleges that by engaging in this conduct, he violated and aided and abetted violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and Section 207 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; and aided and abetted violations of Sections 15(b)(1), 15(c) and 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 10b-3, 15b3-1 and 17a-3 thereunder, and Sections 204, 206(1), 206(2), 206(4) and 207 of the Advisers Act and Rules 204-2 and 206(4)-7 thereunder.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Aaron P. Arnzen and Kristine M. Zaleskas of the New York Regional Office. The SEC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their coordination and assistance. The SEC’s investigation is continuing.

SEC SETTLES WITH TWO FORMER BEAR STEARNS HEDGE FUND MANAGERS

FROM:  SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
June 25, 2012
Court Approves SEC Settlements with Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Portfolio Managers; SEC Bars Managers from Regulated Industries
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York approved Securities and Exchange Commission settlements with two former Bear Stearns Asset Management portfolio managers on June 18, 2012, bringing to a close the SEC’s civil litigation against the managers. The court ordered Ralph R. Cioffi and Matthew M. Tannin, who co-managed the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, to pay a total of $1.05 million in disgorgement and civil penalties and enjoined them from federal securities law violations. As part of the settlement, the Commission today issued orders instituting administrative proceedings that bar Cioffi and Tannin from industries regulated by the SEC for periods of three years and two years, respectively.

The SEC’s complaint, filed June 19, 2008, alleged that the Bear Stearns funds collapsed in June 2007 after taking highly leveraged positions in structured securities based largely on subprime mortgage-backed securities. Cioffi was the senior portfolio manager, and Tannin was a portfolio manager and the chief operating officer for the funds. According to the complaint, Cioffi and Tannin misrepresented the extent to which the funds had invested in securities backed by subprime mortgages and, during an April 2007 investor conference call, Cioffi misrepresented the level of investor redemption requests. The complaint also alleged that Cioffi did not tell investors about his own April 2007 redemption of a portion of his personal investment in the Enhanced Leverage Fund used to invest in a third fund for which he acted as portfolio manager. The complaint further alleged that Tannin misrepresented that he was going to add to his personal investment in the Enhanced Leverage Fund and that he misrepresented the funds’ prospects during the April 2007 investor call.

Cioffi and Tannin settled the SEC’s charges, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, and consented to the entry of district court judgments that permanently enjoin them from violating Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits untrue statements related to the offer or sale of securities. The judgments also ordered Cioffi to pay $700,000 in disgorgement and a $100,000 civil penalty, and ordered Tannin to pay $200,000 in disgorgement and a $50,000 civil penalty. Cioffi and Tannin further consented to issuance of the Commission orders, which bar them from associating with any investment adviser, broker-dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, for three years as to Cioffi and two years as to Tannin. The Commission issued its orders in administrative proceedings instituted after the district court entered the injunctions.