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Showing posts with label COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

CFTC ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING MANDATORY CLEARING OF iTRAXX CDS INDICES FOR CATEGORY 2 ENTITIES

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

July 25, 2013
CFTC Announces that Mandatory Clearing of iTraxx CDS Indices for Category 2 Entities Begins Today

Washington, DC — The Division of Clearing and Risk (Division) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) announces that the second phase of required clearing for certain iTraxx credit default swap (CDS) indices begins today for Category 2 Entities. Category 2 Entities include commodity pools, private funds, and persons predominantly engaged in activities that are in the business of banking, or in activities that are financial in nature, except for third-party subaccounts. These entities are required to begin clearing iTraxx CDS indices that are subject to the clearing requirement under section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and Regulations 50.2 and 50.4(b) executed on or after July 25, 2013.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended the CEA to require that the Commission determine whether a swap is required to be cleared by a derivatives clearing organization (DCO). The Commission adopted its first clearing requirement determination for four classes of interest rate swaps and two classes of CDS on November 28, 2012.

At the time of the Commission’s initial clearing determination no DCO was offering client clearing for the iTraxx CDS indices. The Commission specified that if no DCO offered client clearing for the indices by February 11, 2013, compliance with the required clearing of iTraxx would begin 60 days after the date on which iTraxx was first offered for client clearing by an eligible DCO.

On February 25, 2013, ICE Clear Credit LLC notified the Commission that it had begun offering customer clearing of the iTraxx CDS indices that are subject to the clearing requirement. The following are the compliance dates previously announced for required clearing of these iTraxx swaps:

Category 1 Entities: Friday, April 26, 2013
Category 2 Entities: Thursday, July 25, 2013
All other entities: Wednesday, October 23, 2013
The compliance dates set forth above do not apply to the clearing schedule for the interest rate swaps and other CDS indices subject to the clearing requirement established in the Commission’s first determination, which are as follows:

Category 1 Entities: Monday, March 11, 2013
Category 2 Entities: Monday, June 10, 2013
All other entities: Monday, September 9, 2013


Friday, April 12, 2013

CFTC CHARGES COMPANY AND PRINCIPAL WITH FOREX FRAUD VIA PONZI SCHEME

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges New York Firm 4X Solutions, Inc. and its Principal, Whileon Chay, with Forex Fraud Ponzi Scheme

Washington, DC
- The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of an enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, charging Defendants 4X Solutions, Inc. (4X) and its principal, Whileon Chay, both of New York City, with fraud and misappropriation in a $4.8 million foreign currency (forex) trading Ponzi scheme.

The CFTC Complaint alleges that Chay and 4X fraudulently solicited approximately $4.8 million from at least 19 pool participants by falsely enticing prospective participants with the prospect of earning returns of 24 percent to 36 percent per year and claiming the ability to profit even in adverse market conditions, "when most have lost and lost dearly." At the same time, Defendants minimized the risks of forex trading, claiming, for example, that Defendants had not suffered a single losing month in 14 years and that 4X provides "a safe haven in our current financial environment," according to the Complaint.

The CFTC Complaint also alleges that Chay, who controlled 4X, lost approximately $2 million trading forex in corporate proprietary accounts and misappropriated approximately $2.8 million, using that money to fund 4X’s operations, make purported profit and investment return payments to their customers, and pay for Chay’s personal expenses, including paying for luxury resorts, expensive restaurants, limousine service, and exotic car rentals. The Complaint further alleges that Chay concealed the trading losses and misappropriation by, among other things, issuing or causing to be issued false monthly account statements and checks that purported to represent trading profits and investment returns. All or nearly all of the purported trading profits or returns made by Defendants came from the principal of other participants, the Complaint alleges.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution to defrauded customers, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Kara Mucha, August A. Imholtz III, James Garcia, Michael Solinsky, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle.

Saturday, April 6, 2013

COURT ORDERS PAYMENT OF $4.8 MILLION IN COMMODITY POOL FRAUD SCHEME

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Federal Court Orders Illinois Resident Brant L. Rushton and his Company, Summit Trading & Capital LLC, to Pay over $4.8 Million for Fraud and other Violations in Commodity Pool Scheme

B. Rushton pled guilty to criminal charges in a parallel federal criminal action and was sentenced to eight years in prison

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that it obtained a federal court Order requiring Defendants Brant L. Rushton (B. Rushton) and Summit Trading & Capital LLC (Summit) of Champaign, Illinois, to jointly pay approximately $1.6 million in restitution to defrauded pool participants and a civil monetary penalty of approximately $3.2 million. The court’s grant of summary judgment also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the Defendants and prohibits them from violating the anti-fraud and other provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission Regulations, as charged.

The Order, entered April 3, 2013, by Judge James E. Shadid of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, stems from a CFTC enforcement action filed November 29, 2011 against Summit, B. Rushton and his wife Melissa C. Rushton (M. Rushton), charging them with fraudulent operation of a commodity pool.

The Order finds that B. Rushton and Summit fraudulently solicited and accepted almost $2 million from multiple pool participants for investment in one or more commodity pools that traded futures contracts. The Order specifically finds that in soliciting participants, B. Rushton falsely represented that he was a successful futures trader who generated consistent profits, when, in fact, B. Rushton’s trading resulted in consistent losses that were concealed from pool participants by issuance of false account statements. According to the Order, almost $1.2 million of participant funds was misappropriated by B. Rushton and Summit.

On July 12, 2012, B. Rushton pled guilty to criminal charges in a parallel federal criminal action stemming from the same conduct and will begin serving an eight-year prison sentence later this year. The CFTC’s action is still pending against M. Rushton, the sole remaining Defendant.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Daniel Jordan, Michael Loconte, Erica Bodin, Rick Glaser, and Richard Wagner.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

TWO COMPANIES AND OWNERS ORDERDED BY CFTC TO PAY OVER $1MILLION IN RESTITUTION AND PENALTIES IN PRECIOUS METALS FRAUD CASE

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Orders Florida Firms, Joseph Glenn Commodities LLC and JGCF LLC, and Owners Scott Newcom and Anthony Pulieri to Pay over $1 Million in Restitution and Penalties for Fraudulent Off-Exchange Transactions in Precious Metals with Retail Customers

Washington DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an Order filing and settling charges against two Boca Raton, Fla., companies, Joseph Glenn Commodities LLC (Joseph Glenn) and JGCF LLC (JGCF), and their sole owners and principals, Scott Newcom and Anthony Pulieri (the Respondents) for engaging in illegal, fraudulent off-exchange financed transactions in precious metals with retail customers.

The CFTC Order, filed on March 27, 2013, requires Joseph Glenn, JGCF, Newcom, and Pulieri to pay approximately $635,000 in restitution to customers for their losses and to return approximately $330,000 remaining in customers’ accounts. The Order requires Pulieri to pay a civil monetary penalty of $100,000. The Order also permanently prohibits the Respondents from registering with the CFTC and imposes a five-year trading ban on trading for others. In addition, the Order prohibits the Respondents from violating the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged, and requires them to comply with certain undertakings, including fully and expeditiously cooperating with the CFTC.

The Illegal and Fraudulent Transactions

The CFTC Order finds that from July 2011 through June 2012, the Respondents solicited retail customers, generally by telephone or through Joseph Glenn’s website, to buy physical precious metals such as gold, silver, copper, platinum, or palladium in what are known as off-exchange leverage transactions. According to the Order, the customers paid the Respondents a portion of the purchase price for the metals, and Joseph Glenn and JGCF purportedly financed the remainder of the purchase price, while charging the customers interest on the amount they purportedly loaned to customers.

The CFTC Order states that such financed off-exchange transactions with retail customers have been illegal since July 16, 2011, when certain amendments of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) became effective. As explained in the Order, financed transactions in commodities with retail customers like those engaged in by the Respondents must be executed on, or subject to, the rules of an exchange approved by the CFTC. Since the Respondents’ transactions were done off-exchange with retail customers, they were illegal.

Furthermore, the CFTC Order states that when Joseph Glenn and JGCF engaged in these illegal transactions they were acting as dealers for a metals merchant called Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC (Hunter Wise), which the CFTC charged with fraud and other violations in federal court in Florida on December 5, 2012 (see CFTC Press Release
6447-12). Hunter Wise was purportedly Joseph Glenn’s and JGCF’s source for the metal and the loans. As alleged in the CFTC Complaint against Hunter Wise and according to the CFTC Order in this case, however, neither Joseph Glenn, JGCF, nor Hunter Wise purchased or held metal on the customers’ behalf, or disbursed any funds to finance the remaining balance of the purchase price. The Order finds that the Respondents’ customers thus never owned, possessed, or received title to the physical commodities that they believed they purchased.

The Order also finds that the Respondents defrauded their customers by misrepresenting the profitability of the financed off-exchange transactions and failing to disclose associated commissions, service, and interest fees.

CFTC staff responsible for this matter are Jon J. Kramer, Joy H. McCormack, Elizabeth M. Streit, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

DODD-FRANK SWAPS CLEARING RULES HAVE BEGUN

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Announces that Mandatory Clearing Begins

Washington, DC
– Today, swap dealers, major swap participants and private funds active in the swaps market are required to begin clearing certain index credit default swaps (CDS) and interest rate swaps that they entered into on or after March 11, 2013. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) amended the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to require clearing of certain swaps. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the Commission to determine whether a swap is required to be cleared by either a Commission-initiated review or a submission from a DCO for the review of a swap, or group, category, type, or class of swap. The clearing requirement determination does not apply to those who are eligible to elect an exception from clearing because they are non-financial entities hedging commercial risk.

"One of the most significant Dodd-Frank reforms begins implementation today," said CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler. "Central clearing lowers the risk of the highly interconnected financial system. It promotes competition in and broadens access to the market by eliminating the need for market participants to individually determine counterparty credit risk, as now clearinghouses stand between buyers and sellers."

As of today, swap dealers and private funds active in the swaps market began clearing certain CDS and interest rate swaps that they entered into on or after March 11. The clearing requirement applies to newly executed swaps, as well as changes in the ownership of a swap. The five swap classes that are required to be cleared include the swaps can be found here: See Related Link.

Market participants electing an exception from mandatory clearing under section 2(h)(7) of the CEA do not have to comply with the reporting requirements for electing the exception until September 9, 2013.

"This week’s implementation of mandatory clearing continues the process of implementing key goals of the Dodd-Frank Act," Chairman Gensler said. "It is an historic change for the markets that will benefit the public and the economy at large. This achievement is a real testament to the dedication and excellence of the CFTC staff working as a team and with other regulators, both domestic and international. I also would like to thank Commissioners Sommers, Chilton, O’Malia and Wetjen for their significant contributions to making the implementation of these reforms now a reality."

Thursday, March 7, 2013

INJUNCTIONS ENTERED IN PRECIOUS METALS COMMODITY FRAUD SCHEME CASE

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Federal Court in Florida Enters Preliminary Injunction Order against Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Lloyds Commodities, LLC, and 18 Other Defendants in Connection with Operating a Multi-Million Dollar Fraudulent Precious Metals Scheme

Finding that new Dodd-Frank anti-fraud authority applies, Court freezes defendants’ assets and appoints special corporate monitor for corporate defendants

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that the Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a Preliminary Injunction Order against Defendants Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC; Hunter Wise Services, LLC; Hunter Wise Credit, LLC; Hunter Wise Trading, LLC; Lloyds Commodities, LLC; Lloyds Commodities Credit Company, LLC; Lloyds Services, LLC; C.D. Hopkins Financial, LLC; Hard Asset Lending Group, LLC; Blackstone Metals Group, LLC; Newbridge Alliance, Inc.; United States Capital Trust, LLC; Harold Edward Martin, Jr.; Fred Jager; James Burbage; Frank Gaudino; Baris Keser; Chadewick Hopkins; John King; and David A. Moore that prohibits the Defendants from offering investments in physical metals to the retail public.

The Court’s decision stems from the CFTC’s December 5, 2012 Complaint charging the Defendants with fraudulently soliciting and accepting at least $46 million from hundreds of customers since July 2011 to invest in physical precious metals, such as gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper. (See CFTC Press Release
6447-12, December 5, 2012). According to the CFTC Complaint, the Defendants claimed to sell physical metals to customers who made a down payment on the amount of physical metals they wished to buy, usually 25 percent of the total purchase price. Defendants allegedly claimed to arrange loans for the balance of the purchase price, and advised customers that their physical metals would be stored in a secure depository. The Complaint alleges that these statements were false because the Defendants did not own, purchase or store any metal for their customers, and that the Defendants cheated and defrauded customers by charging customers interest on loans which were never made, and storage and insurance fees on metals that did not exist. In addition, the Complaint alleges that the offering of these investments in physical metals constituted illegal, off-exchange retail commodity contracts in violation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).

Following a hearing on February 22, 2013, Judge Middlebrooks found that the CFTC had shown a likelihood of success in proving the allegations of the Complaint. In the Court’s Order issued on February 25, Judge Middlebrooks described Hunter Wise as "the conductor of th[e] orchestra, with the other Defendants playing instruments at Hunter Wise’s direction." According to the Order, Hunter Wise provided reports to customers that were misleading because they created the "illusion that actual commodities are being transferred into or out of their accounts, when in reality, no real metals are being transferred as a result of the transaction." According to the Order, "Hunter Wise does not actually buy, sell, loan, store, or transfer physical metals in connection with these retail commodity transactions. Instead, Hunter Wise records and tracks customer orders and trading positions, and then manages its exposure to these retail customer trading positions by using the customer’s funds to trade derivatives – such as futures, forwards and rolling spot contracts – in its own margin trading accounts."

The Court’s Order prohibits the Defendants from trading, soliciting orders, committing fraud or engaging in business activity related to contracts or transactions regulated by the CFTC. In its continuing litigation against the Defendants, the CFTC is seeking a permanent civil injunction, in addition to other remedial relief, including restitution to customers.

The Court’s Order also froze all the defendants’ assets, and appointed Melanie Damian, Esq. as Special Corporate Monitor to assume control over the corporate defendants. The CFTC has established a website that will be updated periodically with information about the ongoing proceedings and has other relevant information for consumers and other victims,
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/CaseStatusReports/hunterwise.

The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the CFTC’s jurisdiction over transactions in physical metals, like these, and requires that such transactions be executed on or subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange or commodity market, according to the Complaint. This new requirement took effect on July 16, 2011. The Complaint alleges that all of the Defendants’ financed commodity transactions after July 16, 2011, were illegal. The Complaint also alleges that the Defendants defrauded customers in all of these financed commodity transactions.

In January 2012 the CFTC issued a
Consumer Fraud Advisory regarding precious metals fraud, saying that it had seen an increase in the number of companies offering customers the opportunity to buy or invest in precious metals. The CFTC’s Consumer Fraud Advisory specifically warned that frequently companies do not purchase any physical metals for the customer, instead simply keep the customer’s funds. The Consumer Fraud Advisory further cautioned consumers that leveraged commodity transactions are unlawful unless executed on a regulated exchange.

The CFTC thanks the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority for their assistance in this matter.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this action are Carlin Metzger, Heather Johnson, Joseph Konizeski, Jeff LeRiche, Peter Riggs, Jennifer Chapin, Steven Turley, Brigitte Weyls, Joseph Patrick, Susan Gradman, Thaddeus Glotfelty, William Janulis, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER O'MALIA SPEAKS ON 'GOOD GOVERNMENT' REGULATION

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia Before Mercatus Center, George Mason University
November 13, 2012
Jim, thanks for that kind introduction.

I am happy to be here and pleased to see the Mercatus Center, as it often does, putting the spotlight today on an issue that is near and dear to my heart: how government regulation affects the real world. That’s right: government regulation has real-world consequences. What a revolutionary concept. You may take this concept for granted, but too often government regulators fail to understand, or take into account, the effect that regulations will have on markets and market participants. And this problem has been especially true in the past two plus years, as government agencies have rushed to promulgate rules under the Dodd-Frank Act. As you know, we at the CFTC have been in the trenches of Dodd-Frank implementation. I would like to take this opportunity now to provide you with some of my thoughts on this implementation process.

Don’t worry – I won’t take you through an exhaustive review of the Commission’s work because at 39 final Dodd-Frank rules and counting we would be here until tomorrow. Instead, what I would like to do is talk to you about good government. You see, I am the government employee who believes that government doesn’t have all the answers and that it must do a better job of developing "good government" solutions.

What Is Good Government?

You may ask: what do I mean by good government? In a nutshell, good government regulation strikes the right balance in order to develop beneficial rules of the road and to implement them according to a measured and reasonable timeline. This approach requires fact-based analysis in order to come up with cost-effective solutions based on a range of policy options.

So, what does it mean specifically in the context of the Commission’s rulemaking process? For rules that have not yet been proposed, good government means faithful adherence to the statutory authority and a strong understanding of the markets that will be affected by the envisioned regulation. For rules that have not yet been finalized, it means understanding and addressing the concerns of market participants and adopting final rules that are clear, consistent and create a level playing field. For rules that have already been finalized, it means providing transparent implementation guidance that is consistent with the final rules. In addition, good government means being aware of the consequences of Commission regulations on market activity and maintaining the flexibility to reassess and revise such regulations where appropriate.

If we apply this framework of good government regulation to what the Commission has done in the past two plus years, we can see many places where we have fallen short of the standard. One example is the position limits rule, which a federal court recently struck down.
1 The Commission will file an appeal, which I don’t support because I agree with the judge’s ruling that the Commission failed to justify its establishment of limits as required by the statute. I would like to point out that the Commission has now been sued three times within the past year on its rulemakings.2

Today I want to focus on three areas in particular of the Commission’s implementation of Dodd-Frank. These are: the October 12 effective date for swap regulations and the resulting ‘futurization’ of the swaps world, the Commission’s final rules for swap execution facilities (SEFs), and the Commission’s guidance on cross-border issues.

The Nightmare of Friday the 12th

I would like to start with the significant date on the Dodd-Frank implementation calendar that we passed last month. On October 12, the joint CFTC-SEC definition of the term swap became effective. This triggered compliance dates for a number of other Commission swaps regulations.

As it turned out, Friday, October 12 was a day of great drama, but certainly not in a good way and certainly not by design. Friday the 13th may have been more appropriate, given the nightmare scenario the Commission was trying to avoid at the absolute last minute. In truth, the nightmare was the fact that we had reached such a point in the first place.

By that evening, the Commission had rushed out 18 no-action letters and guidance documents in a last-minute attempt to mitigate the chaotic impact of all the rules that were to take effect the following Monday. Think about that for a second: 18 relief documents issued on the day before the compliance deadline. We don’t need a study by the Mercatus Center to tell us that this last-minute flurry fell embarrassingly short of the goal of regulatory certainty and the principles of good government regulation.

Good government should take a measured, well-thought out approach to developing a new regulatory regime. To that end, I have repeatedly asked the Commission to publish a clear and specific rulemaking timeline and implementation schedule. Frustratingly, my calls have gone unheeded. A clear and well-reasoned implementation schedule would have allowed the Commission to avoid the hurried, ad-hoc process of temporary relief and interpretations that we witnessed and would have done much to put the Commission’s rulemaking process in the good government category.

Even now, we are not out of the woods yet. The temporary relief provided expires on December 31, and we can’t risk keeping the markets in the dark until the eleventh hour again. The Commission needs to take action by mid-December in order to provide adequate clarity to the markets through the new year. Think of this as the Dodd-Frank Regulatory Cliff.

Let me go back for a minute to October 12. The big storyline is the migration of cleared energy products to the futures markets. In response to regulatory uncertainty in the swaps market, energy customers of both CME and ICE demanded that the markets move to listed futures, instead of swaps. There are good reasons to stay away from the swaps market, including the expansive and ill-defined swap dealer definition and the regulatory consequences of becoming designated as well as uncertainty as to what will be permitted to trade on SEFs. In addition, the capital efficiency of margining all trades in one account is also a powerful financial incentive.

On October 15, the day the new swap rules took effect, the entire market had shifted from a swaps market to the futures market. Liquidity simply dried up in the OTC space. To me, this is evidence of the Commission’s struggle to get swap regulations right.

This futurization of the cleared energy swap market may result in reduced flexibility for some firms because futures contracts, unlike swaps, can’t be individually tailored to meet specific risk needs. However, futures markets offer greater regulatory certainty and provide high liquidity to allow for the efficient hedging of commercial risk.

It was surely not the Commission’s intention to draft rules that would send market participants fleeing from the swaps market. But good government requires more than good intent; it requires good execution of that intent as well. Instead, the Commission has created such a regulatory nightmare that the energy markets have sought cover in the relative safe haven of the futures markets.

And we may very well be at just the start of the futurization of our markets. Again, it’s hard to believe that this brave new world of futurization is what the Commission envisioned would be the end result of its new swaps regulatory regime.

Learning Lessons and Moving Forward

But I bring up these examples not simply to say that the Commission should have done better. Rather, I raise them because learning from mistakes is the crucial first step toward getting us back on the road of good government regulation. And luckily for us, there are several significant rules on the horizon that will give us that opportunity. For example, the Commission has yet to consider final rules on capital and margin requirements. The Volcker rule, which will clarify and distinguish market-making trades from proprietary trading, is also in this category.

These rules will put a final price tag on over-the-counter trades and will have broad and significant consequences for the swaps markets, so it is very important that we get them right. If we make sure to identify concerns raised by market participants and properly address them in the final rules, and then implement the rules in a measured and consistent manner, I am confident that we can get them right.

In any case, those rules are still a bit further down the road. Of more immediate interest are two areas that the Commission will likely consider before the end of the year. These are trade execution, including SEF final rules, and the cross-border guidance.

Swap Execution Facilities

Let me address the SEF rules. This is an area that I am excited about. There are new trading models that offer exciting innovations and ideas that will make the swaps market more transparent and well as more competitive.

As you know, the concept of SEFs was heavily negotiated in Congress as well as at the Commission. SEFs represent a monumental shift away from the current bilateral swap trading model to a centrally regulated trading model. Centralized swap execution should offer market participants greater price transparency, increased access to larger pools of liquidity, and improved operational efficiency. Congress envisioned that SEFs would promote price discovery and competitive trade execution in all asset classes.

The Commission published the proposed SEF rules last January. While the proposal was a good start, a broad array of market participants – from buy-side asset managers, pension funds, commercial end users, farm credit banks and rural power cooperatives to sell-side dealers and even prospective SEFs – expressed concern that if the final rules are adopted as proposed, less liquid swaps will not be able to be executed on the SEF platforms because the proposed SEF rules would limit their choice of execution.

While I am supportive of the overarching objective of promoting pre-trade price transparency, I believe that the SEF final rules should allow for flexible methods of execution including request for quote systems (RFQs). These features will protect the confidential trading strategies of asset managers, pension funds, insurance companies, and farm credit banks and will provide commercial end users access to the swap market to fund their long-term capital and infrastructure projects.

Finally, I hope that the final SEF rules will provide a clear interpretation of the "by any means of interstate commerce" clause contained in the SEF definition. Dodd-Frank defines a SEF as a platform on which multiple participants have the ability to trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants, through any means of interstate commerce.

3 Instead of providing further meaning to the "any means of interstate commerce" clause, the proposal focused on two methods of execution on a SEF: an electronic platform and an RFQ.

Currently, the Commission is considering the suite of related execution rules that determine the viability of SEFs and the overall OTC market going forward. These include mandatory clearing, Core Principle 9, and the block and made available for trading rules in addition to the SEF rules. These rules must work together and reflect the new realities of the evolving market in reaction to the Commission’s already finalized rules.

I remain optimistic that we can develop rules that will encourage a competitive and innovative market in swap trading as envisioned by Congress and something the market has been developing over the past decade. It would be a shame if government rules stood in the way of this opportunity.

Regulatory Overreach: The Commission’s Cross-Border Guidance

Moving now to the third topic I want to discuss: the Commission’s Cross-Border Guidance.

Last week the Commission held a public meeting with regulators representing most of the largest markets across the globe, and their criticism of the Commission’s overreaching cross-border Guidance was consistent and firm. I certainly don’t want to see this draft proposal result in a regulatory tit-for-tat that would create an environment where U.S. financial institutions and market participants are put at a competitive disadvantage based on competing regulatory regimes. I am committed to resolving this regulatory matter to the satisfaction of all regulators and minimizing regulatory overlap and confusion so that market participants have a clear understanding of the new global regulatory paradigm. As such, it means we must redraft our cross-border Guidance.

Let me give you some background. The Commission published its proposed Guidance as well as a related exemptive order in July of this year. The objectives of the Guidance were to (1) clearly define the scope of the extra-territorial reach of Title VII of Dodd-Frank and (2) reinforce the Commission’s commitment to the goals of the G-20 summit by providing a harmonized approach to derivatives regulation.

4

These are sound objectives. However, the proposed Guidance missed the mark in several respects. Start with the fact that it was issued as guidance and not as a formal rulemaking, which would have required the Commission to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. As proposed, market participants will be deprived of an opportunity to review and comment on a cost-benefit assessment despite the significant costs that the Guidance will impose on them.

More fundamentally, the proposed Guidance exceeded the scope of the Commission’s statutory mandate. The statute provides that Dodd-Frank swaps regulations shall not apply to activities outside of the United States unless those activities have a direct and significant connection with activities in the United States.

5 This provision was drafted by Congress as a limitation on our authority, yet the proposed Guidance has interpreted it as the opposite.

As a result, the proposal empowers the Commission to find virtually any swap to have a direct and significant impact on our economy and imposes U.S. rules and obligations, including requirements on transactions, on non-U.S. entities. This has set off alarm bells in foreign capitals across the globe, and the Commission received an unprecedented number of letters from foreign regulators.
6 Just a few weeks ago, a strongly worded joint letter from the top finance officials of the UK, France, EU and Japan again urged the Commission to reconsider its approach and engage much more actively with them to coordinate regulatory efforts across borders. And as I mentioned earlier, these views were strongly echoed by representatives of several foreign regulators at a meeting last week of the Commission’s Global Markets Advisory Committee.

The Commission’s statutory overreach is reflected throughout the proposed Guidance. A prime example is the definition of U.S. person, which as drafted in the proposed Guidance sweeps numerous entities that are outside the U.S. into the Commission’s jurisdiction. The proposal requires non-U.S. counterparties to treat overseas branches of U.S. banks, unlike affiliates of U.S. banks, as U.S. persons. If these foreign companies do enough business with foreign-based U.S. banks, they will be subject to U.S. regulation.

The Commission has heard concerns from a number of U.S. banks that foreign competitors are trying to tempt clients away by pointing to the potential increased costs of doing business with U.S. banks as a result of the Commission’s proposed Guidance. Even more disturbing, the Commission has received more recent indications that many foreign firms are no longer doing business with U.S. banks. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: I cannot support a Commission proposal that puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage to foreign banks, especially those that operate in the United States.

As I mentioned earlier, good government regulations address the concerns of market participants in drafting a final Commission document. In this case, both the market and foreign regulators have spoken loudly.

So here is what the Commission should do. First, the entire Guidance should be scrapped and the document should be re-drafted as a formal rulemaking that provides an opportunity for public comment and includes a cost-benefit assessment.

Second, the proposal should provide a clear, consistent interpretation of the "direct and significant" connection with a sufficient rationale for the extent of the Commission’s extraterritorial reach. Identifying more accurately those activities that could pose a risk to the U.S. will allow the Commission to assess how such risk could be mitigated through clearing and to determine whether other transaction rules must be applied.

Third, the definition of U.S. person should be narrowed to include only those entities that are residents of the U.S., are organized or have a principle place of business in the U.S., or have majority U.S. ownership. It should exclude a foreign affiliate or subsidiary of a U.S. end user that is guaranteed by that end user. This more reasonable definition is similar to the definition articulated by Commission staff in one of the flurry of no-action letters issued on October 12.

Finally, the rule must clearly interpret the concept of "substituted compliance." The proposal indicates that the Commission will review the comparability of non-U.S. regulations with Commission rules. This review should be a broad, big-picture assessment of comparability, not a rule-by-rule analysis. A rule-by-rule comparison could result in a hodgepodge of disparate regulatory requirements that would be a compliance nightmare for market participants. It would also undermine the coordinated regulatory effort that G-20 members have agreed to support.

The bottom line is that today’s swaps markets are global in nature and interconnected. Given this reality, the Commission needs to engage much more actively and meaningfully with foreign regulators and develop a more harmonized approach in order to eliminate redundancy and inconsistency among the respective regulatory regimes.

Conclusion

To conclude, I want to emphasize how important it is for the Commission to be mindful of the real and significant impact that its regulations have on market activity. Anyone who doubted this reality needs look no further than October 12, the new world of futurization that we are seeing in our industry and the mounting lawsuits that the Commission is facing.

Therefore, it is crucial that we apply the principles of good government so that our regulations are clear, consistent and not overly burdensome to market participants. As I’ve noted, we have at times failed to live up to these standards. But if we are willing to learn from these lessons, we can do better with the rules we have before us and on the horizon.

Thank you very much for your time.


Saturday, November 10, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER CHILTON SPEAKS TO THE INVESTMENT AND COMMODITY PRICE CYCLES CONFERENCE

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, GLOBALIZATION AND ENERGY MARKETS,
"Sin-Orgy and Energy"

Address of Commissioner Bart Chilton to the Globalization and Energy Markets: Investment and Commodity Price Cycles Conference, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston, Texas

November 9, 2012

Introduction & Neil Armstrong

Thanks for the introduction. It’s great to be with you today at Rice. There are so many impressive things about this place; the faculty, the research, the bars. It’s hard to pick just one thing as a stand out. If I had to, however, I’d say the work with NASA and the space program is pretty neat. That’s what I’d choose as a very historic achievement.

I have a link to the space program in that I followed in the footsteps of the first man to step foot on the moon. Well, let me be clear, perhaps the link is a little bit tangential. You see, I lived in Neil Armstrong’s room for two years. The Commander went to Purdue, as I did many years later, and we were both members of the same fraternity—Phi Delta Theta. I had the honor to live in his room. There wasn’t much special about the room. Good view of the Student Union and a tarnished plaque on the door…and come to think of it, plenty of plaque throughout the room. Nevertheless, it was cool.

I did actually have the opportunity to meet Commander Armstrong a year or two after college. I was so excited about the opportunity. When I introduced myself, I said that I was a Phi Delt at Purdue and gave him what we call "the grip" which is the secret handshake. It had been decades since the Commander was at Purdue, for gosh sakes, the guy had gone to the moon and back. When I gave him the grip, he looked at me like I was a space alien. He had no clue what physically-funny thing I was doing to his hand. He quickly jerked free and excused himself. It was surely my fault. It is, however, my most notable diss.

I still feel privileged, however, to have lived in his room and been a member of his fraternity at Purdue. As a kid in 1969, I remember being glued to the television and watching the moon landing and his first steps. I had great respect for Neil Armstrong and for the space program, generally. And this superb institution, Rice University, was there through it all. What a superb achievement.

JFK

There’s that legendary JFK speech. The one he gave right here at Rice in the football stadium—The Moon Speech. It was fantastically inspirational. You can find it on-line. The President said, "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard…" What a statement, "…because it was hard…" We did something because it was hard, challenging, and because it was troublesome. We don’t take the easy way out—nope, not us.

FCIC

Well, there’s a similarity there between what has been, and is now, going on in our financial markets. It has also been hard, challenging and troublesome. We are in the process of trying to fix it, and we are not taking the easy way out.

Let’s quickly revisit why the financial meltdown took place to begin with. We had banks and other institutions which were so large that when they were about to go bust, we—all of us—had to provide hundreds-of-billions of dollars in a hideous, budget-busting bailout.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was established to examine what happened. Well, they determined that it wasn’t just one thing. There was a synergy of two main culprits, although to me it was more of a "sin-orgy."

FCIC concluded that there were two culprits to the calamity—and it was the sin-orgy between them that led to the economic collapse. One culprit without the other and it wouldn’t have taken place.

Culprit One: regulators and regulation. In 1999, Congress and President Clinton deregulated banks. The banks were no longer bound by that troublesome Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act that cramped their style and limited what they could do with the money. With the repeal of Glass-Steagall, banks could invest in markets for themselves, for the house, and not just for their customers. That change was a key to the economic collapse. And with the change of the law, regulators also got the message to let the free markets roll. And, roll they did—right over the American people.

Culprit Two and part of the sin-orgy: The captains of Wall Street. FCIC concluded that since they were allowed to do so much more without those pesky rules and regulations, they devised all sorts of creative, exotic and complex financial products. Some of these things were so multifaceted hardly anyone knew what was going on or how to place a value upon them.

Take for example, Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). These we're gambles that certain things would essentially fail. And these CDSs were sold and resold to the point that few understood what they had and how much they were worth. The value was in the eye of the beholder. Folks got over-leveraged as a result. A case in point was Lehman Brothers which was leveraged 30 to 1, according to its last annual financial statement. That was serious trouble.

Guy goes into a bar, takes a seat and says, "Gimme a shot of Jack before the trouble starts." He’s served and tosses it back. "Gimme another before the trouble starts." And he tosses that one back. He says the same thing again and finally, the bartender asks him, "What’s all this trouble you’re talking about?" to which the guy says, "Um, the trouble starts when you realize I don’t have any money."

Dodd-Frank

Well, Congress realized what horrific trouble we were all in. They saw what the sin-orgy had created. And while it wasn’t easy—it was hard—Congress passed and President Obama signed into law, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—otherwise known as Dodd-Frank.

There are 398 Dodd-Frank rules or regulations to be promulgated by various Federal agencies. To date, only 133 are complete—33 percent. The CFTC has done a little better. We’ve completed about two-thirds of our work in finalizing 39 rules of the approximately 60 on our plate.

Now, I’d like to give you an individual explanation of each of those 60 rules—just kidding. We are essentially doing three things.

One:
We are adding transparency to the hundreds-of-trillions of dollars in dark, over-the-counter (OTC) trading that got us into the mess in 2008. Trading will be done on exchanges and will be reported to electronic warehouses called Swaps Data Repositories ore SDRs.

Two:
We are instituting new capital, margin and clearing requirements to ensure that there is no longer systemic risk. If one firm goes down, it will no longer pose a systemic risk to our economy. And,

Three:
We are adding more accountability for customer funds by ensuring electronic access to records, standardized audits and liquidity level alerts and action steps.

Limits


In 2008, the massive influx of long-side speculation levels coincided precisely, exactly with the highest-ever crude oil and gasoline prices in our country—the highest prices ever. West Texas Intermediate crude oil—WTI—at $147 and gas prices at $4.10 a gallon. Although hundreds of people have been queried, not a soul has ever provided a supply and demand fundamentals-only explanation to support this price movement. That’s because it doesn’t exist.

What do exist are numerous studies that show a positive nexus between excessive speculation and prices. In fact, earlier this year the St. Louis Federal Reserve released a study on the subject. MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) released one in 2008, and another that I am particularly thankful for is the one done right here at Rice, at the Baker Institute in 2009, by Professors Amy Myers Jaffe and Ken Medlock. I want to read you just a little bit from this important Rice research.

"So, as the market presence of noncommercial traders increased between 2003 and 2008, the stance of these noncommercial traders has fairly consistently been to hold bullish, long positions that supported rising prices. And, when their market share was highest, so was their net long position, which again roughly coincided (acting as a slight leading indicator) with the peak in oil prices at $147 a barrel in the middle of 2008."

The circumstance was that a lot of financial players, including the large banks who could now invest for themselves—for the house—and not just their customers, in addition to others, wanted to diversify their investment portfolios. The futures markets looked like a promising place to go. So, it is sort of like some of our parents who bought and held blue chip stocks. "Well, sonny boy, when you get older these shares of RCA or IBM or whatever, Microsoft, will be worth something. We are just going to sit on them." And that is what happened with the new money, that massive influx of about $200 billion that Professors Myers Jaffe and Medlock wrote about. They bought and held.

I call these traders Massive Passives, since they are massive, and have a fairly passive investment strategy. They go long and are relatively price insensitive.

They hold, unless something cracked happens…like crude going to near $150 per barrel and the entire economy going into the crapper. Then, they will bail. But as an investment strategy, the Massive Passives aren’t worried about the markets as reflected in the summer driving season or the temperature change from El Nino. Nah, they are in it for the long term. They are betting that, say crude, will be worth more in 2015 than it is today. That’s their gamble.

And, if there are enough of the Massive Passives, and they far out-number the shorts, as we have seen, their strategy will have somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy. They will help to push prices. I’m not suggesting that they drive prices, but they have an impact, and any impact that isn’t based upon fundamentals of supply and demand is problematic for markets.

Why is it a problem? Well, there are two reasons.

One:
Commercial hedgers, like energy companies in the Houston area and elsewhere, use these markets for hedging their actual business risks. They have real physical skin in the game and they need these markets to function properly. If they can do this, it makes them more proficient and effective companies, and that’s good for all of us and our economy. These are markets that were not developed as gambling venues; they were developed to discover price. And,

Two: Consumers and businesses alike benefit from fairly stable pricing. It enables them to plan. Gasoline shouldn’t be $3 a gallon one month and $4 the next. Sure there will be fluctuations, but there shouldn’t be extreme volatility.

So Congress, as part of Dodd-Frank, charged the CFTC with setting speculative trading limits. The law, in my opinion, plainly and clearly mandates these limits. That said, there is a group of the largest speculators on the earth who have questioned the law and want be able to have uninhibited concentration in markets. They’d suggest that there isn’t a problem with holding 30 or more percent of a given market, like we’ve seen in crude, nat gas and silver in recent years. As I’m sure many of you know, these global speculators won a recent court ruling. But our Agency will appeal and I expect we will soon promulgate yet another position limits rule.

This thing, position limits, isn’t easy. Like JFK said, it is hard. But, it is a serious matter for millions. Millions of people and businesses alike can, at times, be paying a speculative premium and that’s just not right. I will keep fighting for them.

Cheetahs


The other market integrity challenge has to do with technology and high frequency traders (HFTs) that I’ve dubbed cheetahs because of their inconceivable speed. They function in milliseconds—one-one thousandth of a second. I’m told that if you are travelling at 100 miles per hour, a millisecond is the time it takes you to go two inches—two inches—inconceivable!

I think these cats have some attributes and I’m not seeking to see them become an endangered species. At the same time, they can also cause difficulties for markets.

We all know that technology isn’t always what it woulda, coulda or shoulda been. We see market technology SNAFUs consistently. We all recollect the Flash Crash from 2010. Most of us heard about the NASDAQ Facebook IPO fiasco. Some of us heard about an oil trader who lost a million bucks in less than a second. There are lots of examples. That’s why in order to safeguard market integrity, I think we need some basic provisions to help cage the cheetahs.

One: They need to be registered. Really, they’re not even registered? Nope. They don’t have to be presently. They need to be.

Two:
They should be required to test their programs before they are put into the live production environment, have wash blocker technology to avoid cross trading, and be required to have kill switches in case their cheetah program goes feral. And,

Three:
We need to update our fines and penalties to keep pace with today’s trading world. More on that later.

Sin-Orgy

So the trouble was 2008 and that sin-orgy. The hard part was passing Dodd-Frank and now implementing these rules to address morphing markets—energy markets and others. But, there is one final challenge that may be beyond much of our control. It is also part of a serious sin-orgy. And let me say, I get no pleasure in saying the stuff I’m about to say. In fact, it truly makes me ill. I bet you can’t wait for it, can you?

Here it is. Here’s the serious sin-orgy. The financial sector had so much crap going on that it makes our heads spin. We are numb to all the violations of law. Most of us can’t even keep track of all the sins going on in our financial sector. We saw both Goldman Sachs and Citi establish these fake-out funds where they pressed their customers to participate, and then once the fake-out funds were populated with their own customers, the banks themselves took the opposite positions.

Wells Fargo—the largest home mortgage bank in the country—entered into a $175 million settlement with the Department of Justice (DoJ)—the second-largest residential fair lending settlement ever. That case involved brokers that charged higher fees and rates to more than 30,000 minority borrowers.

And, if there are enough of the Massive Passives, and they far out-number the shorts, as we have seen, their strategy will have somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy. They will help to push prices. I’m not suggesting that they drive prices, but they have an impact, and any impact that isn’t based upon fundamentals of supply and demand is problematic for markets.

Why is it a problem? Well, there are two reasons.

One:
Commercial hedgers, like energy companies in the Houston area and elsewhere, use these markets for hedging their actual business risks. They have real physical skin in the game and they need these markets to function properly. If they can do this, it makes them more proficient and effective companies, and that’s good for all of us and our economy. These are markets that were not developed as gambling venues; they were developed to discover price. And,

Two: Consumers and businesses alike benefit from fairly stable pricing. It enables them to plan. Gasoline shouldn’t be $3 a gallon one month and $4 the next. Sure there will be fluctuations, but there shouldn’t be extreme volatility.

So Congress, as part of Dodd-Frank, charged the CFTC with setting speculative trading limits. The law, in my opinion, plainly and clearly mandates these limits. That said, there is a group of the largest speculators on the earth who have questioned the law and want be able to have uninhibited concentration in markets. They’d suggest that there isn’t a problem with holding 30 or more percent of a given market, like we’ve seen in crude, nat gas and silver in recent years. As I’m sure many of you know, these global speculators won a recent court ruling. But our Agency will appeal and I expect we will soon promulgate yet another position limits rule.

This thing, position limits, isn’t easy. Like JFK said, it is hard. But, it is a serious matter for millions. Millions of people and businesses alike can, at times, be paying a speculative premium and that’s just not right. I will keep fighting for them.

Cheetahs


The other market integrity challenge has to do with technology and high frequency traders (HFTs) that I’ve dubbed cheetahs because of their inconceivable speed. They function in milliseconds—one-one thousandth of a second. I’m told that if you are travelling at 100 miles per hour, a millisecond is the time it takes you to go two inches—two inches—inconceivable!

I think these cats have some attributes and I’m not seeking to see them become an endangered species. At the same time, they can also cause difficulties for markets.

We all know that technology isn’t always what it woulda, coulda or shoulda been. We see market technology SNAFUs consistently. We all recollect the Flash Crash from 2010. Most of us heard about the NASDAQ Facebook IPO fiasco. Some of us heard about an oil trader who lost a million bucks in less than a second. There are lots of examples. That’s why in order to safeguard market integrity, I think we need some basic provisions to help cage the cheetahs.

One: They need to be registered. Really, they’re not even registered? Nope. They don’t have to be presently. They need to be.

Two:
They should be required to test their programs before they are put into the live production environment, have wash blocker technology to avoid cross trading, and be required to have kill switches in case their cheetah program goes feral. And,

Three:
We need to update our fines and penalties to keep pace with today’s trading world. More on that later.

Sin-Orgy

So the trouble was 2008 and that sin-orgy. The hard part was passing Dodd-Frank and now implementing these rules to address morphing markets—energy markets and others. But, there is one final challenge that may be beyond much of our control. It is also part of a serious sin-orgy. And let me say, I get no pleasure in saying the stuff I’m about to say. In fact, it truly makes me ill. I bet you can’t wait for it, can you?

Here it is. Here’s the serious sin-orgy. The financial sector had so much crap going on that it makes our heads spin. We are numb to all the violations of law. Most of us can’t even keep track of all the sins going on in our financial sector. We saw both Goldman Sachs and Citi establish these fake-out funds where they pressed their customers to participate, and then once the fake-out funds were populated with their own customers, the banks themselves took the opposite positions.

Wells Fargo—the largest home mortgage bank in the country—entered into a $175 million settlement with the Department of Justice (DoJ)—the second-largest residential fair lending settlement ever. That case involved brokers that charged higher fees and rates to more than 30,000 minority borrowers.

Then there is Barclays—one of the largest banks in the world—and its attempted manipulation of Libor rates. As you know, Libor rates affect just about everything in the world involving credit extensions. They are at the foundation of our global economic system, and Barclays tried to rig the numbers. They settled with us for $200 million. They also settled with DoJ and with the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA). And of course, there’s MF Global where, oops, millions went missing. And, there’s Peregrine Financial Group which appears to have engaged in a $200 million fraud.

Last November, Bank of America agreed to a $410 million settlement for charging excessive amounts on overdraft and debit card fees to 13.2 million customers. The bank computer system organized customer debit card and ATM transactions from high to low dollar amounts, as opposed to when the purchase was made. Consequently, customers would enter into negative balance circumstances quicker. As a result, they’d bounce more times and the banks would receive more overdraft fees. Oh, by way, somewhere around 13 banks agreed to enter into settlements for doing comparable things. Merrill Lynch, which was purchased by Bank of America in 2009, was reported to have done the same thing from 2003 to 2011. They charged excessive fees to about 95,000 of their own customers, overbilling them $32.2 million. They were fined $2.8 million. What a deal: overcharge $32.2 million and get fined $2.8 million!

All too often, it is clear that corporate executives crudely calculate fines as a cost of doing business. That’s gotta stop. For example, I was speaking about appropriate cheetah fines. We can only fine $140,000 per violation, but many times consider a day as a violation. Well, a cheetah can make a million in a few seconds, so I’m proposing that our violations should be by the second. Each second you violate the law, it could cost you $140,000. There, that’s a deterrent. If they do the crime, cheetahs or others need to pay a hefty fine and if severe enough, they should do the time. We need to get solemnly serious with the sinners. They need to clean up their acts, and now.

I know that’s a lot. Dodd-Frank will help on remedying the ills of unregulated markets. We need position limits and some policies to cage the financial cheetahs. But this other sin-orgy stuff, we can’t stand for. Look, we get the government and the financial system and the financial firms we deserve. If we have concerns, we have a responsibility to speak up and that includes speaking with our wallets. Choose where your money goes based upon firms that are good corporate citizens.

Conclusion

We all need to be involved—market participants, energy companies, consumers, and the students here at Rice who may or may not ever have anything to do with financial markets but who will nevertheless be impacted.

I’m not suggesting fixing all of this will be easy or trouble-free. It will be hard! But like President Kennedy said right here at Rice, that’s the point. It wasn’t easy going to the moon, but we did it. Rice did it. Commander Neil Armstrong did it.

All of us working together can help ensure we have a safer and more secure financial sector with no sin-orgy that is more efficient and effective and devoid of fraud, abuse and manipulation. That will be good for hedgers and speculators alike and good for markets. But, it will also be good for consumers and good for the economic engine of our democracy.

Thanks.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC TO PAY PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO MONITOR EMPLOYEE

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,

CFTC Orders Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC to Pay $200,000 for Supervision Violations

Washington, DC
- The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an order filing and settling charges that Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (the respondent), a futures commission merchant (FCM) based in Purchase, N.Y., violated CFTC regulation 166.3 by failing to diligently supervise its employees’ handing of customer accounts.

The CFTC order requires Morgan Stanley Smith Barney to pay a $200,000 civil monetary penalty and prohibits it from violating CFTC regulation 166.3, as charged.

According to the order, the respondent’s "Customer A" provided trust services for its clients. In the course of providing such services to one of its clients, the order finds that Customer A accepted orders to trade commodity futures contracts on behalf of its own third party client, accepted the third party client’s money to place those trades, and affected the trades via a contract market on the third party client’s behalf. These contracts were traded in a proprietary futures account in Customer A’s name carried initially at Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (CGMI), a registered FCM, and later in an account carried by the respondent, the order finds. Through these actions, Customer A acted as an FCM, without being registered as such, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), according to the order.

According to the order, from 2006 to 2008, Customer A conducted five transfers of funds from its proprietary commodity futures trading account to a third party client’s bank account. The fact that funds were moving from a proprietary trading account to a third party bank account should have led the respondent’s employees executing the transactions to question Customer A’s actions and to investigate to determine whether the account was being carried properly, the order finds.

However, the respondent’s employees failed to diligently investigate the suspicious transactions, according to the order.

No later than January 15, 2010, the respondent realized that Customer A’s proprietary futures trading account had been carried improperly since 2006, the order finds. Nonetheless, the respondent continued to allow trading on behalf of the third party client to take place in Customer A’s account in January 2010, March 2010, and May 2010, according to the order. The order finds that the third party client’s funds were ultimately moved from Customer A’s proprietary account to an account in the third party client’s name on or about May 27, 2010.

At the time of the above-described events, the respondent maintained an inadequate system of supervision and internal controls to detect and deter violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations, the order finds. Consequently, the respondent failed to diligently supervise the handling by its partners, officers, employees and agents relating to its business as a CFTC registrant, in violation of regulation 166.3, the order finds.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this case are Jason Mahoney, Timothy J. Mulreany, George Malas, Paul Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

Sunday, October 14, 2012

FARR FINANCIAL INC., SETTLES CHARGES WITH CFTC FOR $280,000

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Orders Farr Financial Inc. to Pay $280,000 to Settle Charges of Improper Investment of Customer Segregated Funds and Supervision Failures

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the Farr Financial Inc. (Farr) of San Jose, Calif., agreed to pay a $280,000 civil monetary penalty to settle CFTC charges that it failed to properly invest customer segregated funds and failed to diligently supervise those investment activities. Farr is currently registered with the CFTC as an introducing broker and was registered as a futures commission merchant (FCM) during the period relevant to the settlement.

FCMs receive money, securities, and other property (funds) from their customers to margin, guarantee, or secure the customers’ futures and options trades. Under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations, FCMs are required to segregate customer funds from funds belonging to the FCM, and can invest customer funds only in investments enumerated in CFTC regulation 1.25, such as obligations of the United States, any state (or subdivision thereof), obligations fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States, and other specified instruments that satisfy a general prudential standard consistent with the objectives of preserving principal and maintaining liquidity for customer funds.

During the period from late 2007 through the end of 2010, Farr invested customer funds in at least seven different accounts that failed to comply with the requirements of regulation 1.25, the CFTC order finds. These investments included (1) an investment in a money market mutual fund from which funds could not be withdrawn by the next business day as required by regulation 1.25, (2) five savings or money market deposit accounts, which are not permitted investments under regulation 1.25, and (3) a certificate of deposit whose issuer did not meet the then-existing credit rating requirement of regulation 1.25, the order finds.

Furthermore, Farr failed to diligently supervise its employees and agents in violation of regulation 166.3, the order finds. Farr failed to implement any written policies or procedures governing the opening and maintenance of customer segregated accounts and failed to implement an adequate supervisory structure to insure the proper segregation of funds, according to the order.

Farr also violated several other regulations involving customer funds, including failing to prepare and maintain certain required records and miscalculating the amount of money it was required to segregate for its customers, according to the order.

In addition to imposing the $280,000 civil monetary penalty, the CFTC order requires Farr to cease and desist from further violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The CFTC thanks the National Futures Association for its assistance in this matter.

CFTC staff members responsible for this case are Theodore Z. Polley III, Ken Hampton, William P. Janulis, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner of the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement, and Tom Bloom and Kurt J. Harms of CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight.

Monday, October 1, 2012

A FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A COMMODITY TRADING ADVISOR

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
September 28, 2012

Federal Court Orders Martin B. Rosenthal to Pay $1.2 Million for Aiding and Abetting the Making of False Statements to the NFA, Failing to Register as a Commodity Trading Advisor, and Violating a Previous CFTC Order

 

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it obtained a federal court order requiring Martin B. Rosenthal of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., to pay a civil monetary penalty of $598,000 and disgorgement of $598,000 for aiding and abetting the willful concealment of material facts and the making of false statements to the National Futures Association (NFA), violating a previous CFTC order, and acting as an unregistered Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA). The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against Rosenthal and permanently prohibits him from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.

The consent order for permanent injunction, entered on September 27, 2012, by Judge James I. Cohn of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, stems from a CFTC complaint filed on March 12, 2012 (see CFTC Press Release
6203-12, March 12, 2012).

The order finds that Rosenthal aided and abetted the willful concealment of material facts and the making of false statements to the NFA about a business relationship that Angus Jackson of Florida maintained with Rosenthal, by creating fake invoices purporting to show consulting expenses incurred by Rosenthal’s company that were, in fact, compensation paid to Rosenthal for trading client accounts.

Additionally, the order finds that from approximately January 2000 to at least December 2008, Rosenthal traded futures and options for his clients at Angus Jackson, while failing to register as a CTA and in violation of a trading prohibition for failing to comply with a previous CFTC order. An earlier CFTC order prohibited Rosenthal from trading on registered entities because he failed to pay a 1988 CFTC reparations award.

The CFTC thanks the NFA for its cooperation and assistance in this matter.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Brian M. Walsh, Elizabeth L. Davis, Kenneth McCracken, Rick Glaser, and Richard Wagner.

Sunday, September 30, 2012

CFTC ALLEGES INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANY RAN $53 MILLION WORLDWIDE OFF-EXCHANGE FOREX SCHEME

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Charges Australian Resident Senen Pousa, U.S. Resident Joel Friant, and Their Company, Investment Intelligence Corp., with Operating a Fraudulent $53 Million Worldwide Off-Exchange Forex Scheme, and Texas-based Michael Dillard and Elevation Group, Inc. with Registration Violations

Investment Intelligence does business as ProphetMax Managed FX

Federal court issues order freezing assets of defendants Pousa, Friant, and Investment Intelligence, and prohibiting destruction of books and records

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed a civil enforcement action charging Senen Pousa of Australia, Joel Friant of Bellingham, Wash., and their company, Investment Intelligence Corporation (IIC), an Australian corporation, with operating a fraudulent off-exchange foreign currency (forex) scheme. The complaint also charges Michael Dillard and Elevation Group, Inc., both of Austin, Texas, with registration violations. The scheme allegedly accepted at least $53 million from at least 960 clients worldwide, including at least 697 clients in the United States, and clients in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore, among other countries. None of the defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

On the same day the CFTC complaint was filed, September 18, 2012, Judge Lee Yeakel of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas issued an emergency order freezing the assets of defendants Pousa, Friant, and IIC and prohibiting the destruction of books and records.

The CFTC complaint alleges that from at least January 1, 2012 through the present IIC, through Pousa, Friant and its other agents, and defendants Dillard and Elevation Group, utilized "wealth creation" webcasts, webinars, podcasts, emails, and other online seminars via the Internet to directly and indirectly solicit actual and prospective clients worldwide to open forex trading accounts at IIC. The complaint further alleges that clients were promised by IIC, through Pousa, Friant, and other agents 1) a monthly return of 9 percent, 2) that IIC’s managed forex trading would risk less than 3 percent of a client’s capital per transaction, 3) that IIC was able to limit the risk inherent to forex trading by limiting its managed forex trading to 2 to 5 trades per month, and 4) that IIC has six "proprietary traders" working 24 hours a day trading clients’ funds. The CFTC complaint alleges that all of these representations to clients were false.

On or about May 16-17, 2012, the complaint alleges that clients suffered a loss of over 60 percent of their investment, when IIC, by and through its agents, entered over 200 forex trades in each client’s account in violation of the representations made by IIC, by and through its agents.

The CFTC complaint seeks restitution, rescission, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the anti-fraud provisions of federal commodities laws, as charged.

Further, on September 18, 2012, the court entered a consent order of permanent injunction and ancillary equitable relief against defendants Michael Dillard and Elevation Group, Inc. According to the consent order, the court found that Elevation Group acted as an Introducing Broker and solicited orders from non-ECPs in connection with leveraged forex transactions without registering with the CFTC. The court further found that Dillard acted as an unregistered Associated Person of the Elevation Group, according to the order.

The CFTC greatly appreciates the assistance of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission, U.K. Financial Services Authority, Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, Financial Markets Authority of New Zealand, and New Zealand Serious Fraud Office.

Further, the CFTC greatly appreciates the assistance of the Texas State Securities Board, Washington State Department of Financial Institutions, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this matter are Kyong Koh, Michael Amakor, JonMarc Buffa, Mary Lutz, Timothy Mulreany, Paul Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

CFTC SEEKING TO REVOKE REGISTRATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND OWNER

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

CFTC Seeks to Revoke Registrations of Linda Faye Harris and her companies, CDH Forex Investments, LLC and CDH Global Holdings, LLC

Washington, DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today filed a notice of intent to revoke the registrations of Linda Faye Harris, CDH Forex Investments, LLC (CDH Forex) and CDH Global Holdings, LLC (CDH Global), all of Flower Mound, Texas. CDH Forex is a registered Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading Advisor; CDH Global is a registered Commodity Trading Advisor; and Harris is registered as an Associated Person and is the sole principal of CDH Forex. Harris was an Associated Person and principal of CDH Global.

The notice alleges that Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global are subject to statutory disqualification from CFTC registration based on an order of default judgment and permanent injunction entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 12, 2012 (see CFTC News Release
6286-12 June 21, 2012). The order prohibits defendants from committing further fraud, among other violations. At the hearing held on June 12, 2012, Harris appeared and conceded all allegations in the complaint of violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, but contested only the amount of restitution and civil monetary penalty. The court found none of Harris’ arguments credible and entered the order as submitted by the CFTC. The order contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, which find, in relevant part, 1) that Harris fraudulently solicited at least $2.2 million from customers, out of which total trading losses and misappropriated funds equaled at least $1,361,897, and 2) made material false statements to pool participants. The order also finds that Harris provided false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements to the National Futures Association (NFA), including falsified trading account statements and falsified bank statements, to hide the ongoing fraud from NFA.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Nathan B. Ploener, Manal M. Sultan, Lenel Hickson, Jr., Stephen J. Obie, and Vincent A. McGonagle.

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

CFTC SETTLES "BUCKETED ORDRS" CHARGES AGAINST TRADERS

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Suspends Registrations of Chicago Mercantile Exchange Traders Christopher Foufas, William Kerstein, and Maksim Baron for Unlawful S&P 500 Trading

Washington DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued orders filing and settling charges against Christopher T. Foufas and Maksim Baron of Chicago, Ill., and William K. Kerstein of Riverwoods, Ill., all registered floor brokers in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index futures contract (S&P 500) trading pit.

The CFTC order entered against Foufas finds that he indirectly bucketed his customers’ orders on at least 11 occasions between May 2009 and October 2010. On each of these occasions, Foufas, while filling customers’ orders in the S&P 500 trading pit, indirectly took the opposite side of his customers’ orders for his own account through noncompetitive round-turn trades with accommodating traders, according to the order. This practice permitted Foufas to establish a position for his own account without competitive execution, according to the order.

The CFTC orders entered against Kerstein and Baron find that Kerstein and Baron accommodated another broker in taking the opposite side of his customer orders into his own account on seven and four of these occasions, respectively.

The CFTC orders require Foufas, Kerstein, and Baron to pay civil monetary penalties of $75,000, $50,000, and $20,000, respectively. The orders also suspend Foufas’ and Baron’s floor registrations for two months and Kerstein’s floor registration for one month, removing them from the trading floor. The order also prohibits Foufas from filling or executing orders for customers for 18 months. The orders require all three traders to cease and desist from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The CFTC’s Enforcement Division thanks the staff of the CME’s Market Regulation Department for their assistance.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Jon J. Kramer, Mary Beth Spear, Ava M. Gould, Elizabeth M. Streit, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner. Meghan M. Wise of the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight also contributed to this matter.

Sunday, July 22, 2012

HOUSTON MAN & CO. CHARGED WITH ALLEGED COMMODITY POOL FRAUD

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
July 11, 2012
CFTC Charges Houston-based Christopher Daley and his company, TC Credit Service, LLC, with Solicitation Fraud and Misappropriation in $1.4 Million Dollar Commodity Pool Scheme federal court enters order freezing defendants’ assets and preserving books and recordsWashington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of an anti-fraud enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, charging Christopher D. Daley (Daley) of Houston, Texas, and his firm, TC Credit Service, LLC (TCCS) (doing business as Del-Mair Group, LLC) with operating a commodity pool scheme that fraudulently solicited and accepted approximately $1.4 million from the public. Daley was owner and sole employee of TCCS, and none of the defendants has ever been registered with the CFTC.

On June 19, 2012, a day after the CFTC filed its complaint, the Honorable Judge Lynn N. Hughes, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, issued an emergency order under seal, freezing the defendants’ assets and prohibiting the destruction of books and records.

The CFTC complaint alleges that from at least January 2010 and continuing through at least November 2011, Daley and TCCS fraudulently solicited and accepted at least $1,427,688 from at least 55 members of the public to participate in a commodity pool to trade crude oil futures contracts. TCCS did not at any time during this period maintain any commodity accounts in its name, and Daley’s personal trading accounts sustained consistent net losses each month, according to the complaint. Daley, however, allegedly used only a portion of pool participants’ funds to trade futures contracts, while misappropriating the rest of the funds. Daley used at least $100,000 of pool participants’ funds to pay for personal expenses, such as rent and personal loan payments, and transferred approximately $195,000 of pool participant’s funds to his own personal bank accounts, according to the complaint.

The complaint further alleges that Daley made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, including (1) misrepresenting that Daley’s trading in crude oil futures contracts generated and would generate 20 percent monthly returns on deposits, (2) misrepresenting that the pool never had a losing month, (3) misrepresenting that the pool’s value had increased 60 percent for the year as of March 2011, and (4) omitting that Daley misappropriated pool participants’ funds, that the pool never maintained any commodity interest account in its own name, that Daley’s personal futures trading accounts sustained consistent monthly losses, and that Daley was not properly registered as a Commodity Pool Operator with the CFTC. Moreover, the complaint alleges that Daley issued false account statements to pool participants to conceal the fraud.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution to defrauded customers, a return of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of federal commodities laws.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Eugene Smith, Patricia Gomersall, Christine Ryall, Antoinette Chance, Paul Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

Monday, July 9, 2012

CFTC CHAIRMAN GENSLER SUPPORTS REOPENING OF COMMENTS ON MARGIN PROPOSAL

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Statement of Support
Chairman Gary Gensler
July 6, 2012
Washington, DC – Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Gary Gensler today issued the following statement:
“I support the formal reopening of the comment period on the CFTC’s initial margin proposal so that we can hear further from market participants in light of work being done to internationally harmonize an approach to margin.

“The CFTC has been working with the Federal Reserve, the other U.S. banking regulators, the Securities and Exchange Commission and international regulators and policymakers to align margin requirements for uncleared swaps. I think it is essential that we align these requirements globally, particularly between the major market jurisdictions. The international approach to margin requirements in the consultative paper (sponsored by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions) released today is consistent with the approach the CFTC laid out in its margin proposal last year. It would lower the risk of financial entities, promote clearing and help avoid regulatory arbitrage.”
Last Updated: July 6, 2012