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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Thursday, August 2, 2012

LOCATE PLUS HOLDINGS CORPORATION AGREES TO SETTLE SECURITIES FRAUD CHARGES

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
July 30, 2012The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) announced today that LocatePlus Holdings Corporation (LocatePlus) has agreed to settle charges it engaged in securities fraud from 2005 through 2007 by misleading investors about its funding and revenue in violation of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws. As part of the settlement, LocatePlus consented to an administrative order which prevents it from selling its securities in the public market.

Without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations, LocatePlus consented to the entry of a final judgment enjoining it from further violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b), 13(a),13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. The proposed judgment, which is subject to court approval, will not impose monetary relief against LocatePlus in light of its bankruptcy and financial condition. LocatePlus also consented to an administrative order entered today, in separate previously-instituted administrative proceedings, revoking the registration of its securities pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Exchange Act based upon its filing of certain materially deficient reports and its repeated failure to file other required periodic reports. As a result of that administrative order, LocatePlus' securities will no longer trade in the public markets.

On October 14, 2010, the Commission filed a civil enforcement action in federal district court in Massachusetts alleging that LocatePlus violated the anti-fraud and the books and records provisions of the federal securities laws. LocatePlus is a former Beverly, Massachusetts-based company that sold on-line access to public record databases for investigative searches. On November 10, 2010, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts unsealed an indictment against former LocatePlus chief executive officer Jon Latorella, and former LocatePlus chief financial officer James Fields, charging them with conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their roles in a scheme to fraudulently inflate revenue at LocatePlus, as well as a scheme to manipulate the stock of another company. On the same day, the Commission amended its previously-filed civil injunctive action against LocatePlus, arising out of the same conduct, to add Latorella and Fields as defendants. On June 16, 2011, LocatePlus filed a petition for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts thereafter appointed a Trustee. On June 14, 2012, Latorella was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment in the criminal case, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and the payment of restitution to be determined at a later hearing. The Commission's civil injunctive action against Latorella and Fields is stayed until the conclusion of the criminal case, which remains pending against Fields.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

COMPANY CHARGED WITH USING DUMMY ASSETS

FROM: U.S. SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Firm to Pay $127.5 Million to Settle ChargesWashington, D.C., July 18, 2012
— The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the U.S. investment banking subsidiary of Japan-based Mizuho Financial Group and three former employees with misleading investors in a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) by using "dummy assets" to inflate the deal’s credit ratings. The SEC also charged the firm that served as the deal’s collateral manager and the person who was its portfolio manager.

According to the SEC’s complaint against Mizuho Securities USA Inc., the firm made approximately $10 million in structuring and marketing fees in the deal. Mizuho agreed to pay $127.5 million to settle the SEC’s charges, and the others charged also agreed to settle the SEC’s actions against them.

The SEC alleges that Mizuho structured and marketed Delphinus CDO 2007-1, a CDO that was backed by subprime bonds at a time when the housing market was showing signs of severe distress. The deal was contingent upon Mizuho obtaining credit ratings it used to market the notes to investors. When its employees realized that Delphinus could not meet one rating agency’s newly announced criteria intended to protect CDO investors from the uncertainty of ratings downgrades, they submitted to the rating firm a portfolio containing millions of dollars in dummy assets that inaccurately reflected the collateral held by Delphinus. Once the firm rated the inaccurate portfolio, Mizuho closed the transaction and sold the notes to investors using the misleading ratings. Delphinus defaulted in 2008 and eventually was liquidated in 2010. Mizuho sustained substantial losses from Delphinus.

"This case demonstrates once again that bankers and market participants who embrace a ‘get the deal done at all costs’ strategy will be identified, charged, and punished," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "This is a constant theme throughout the many SEC enforcement actions arising out of the financial crisis, and is one that everyone involved in securities transactions and our financial markets would be well-advised to respect."

Kenneth Lench, Chief of the SEC’s Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit, added, "Mizuho and its employees undermined the integrity of the rating process by furnishing inaccurate information about the Delphinus portfolio. Investors expect and are entitled to receive legitimate ratings in order to help them assess their investments."

According to the SEC’s settled administrative proceedings against the three former Mizuho employees responsible for the Delphinus deal, Alexander Rekeda headed the group that structured the $1.6 billion CDO, Xavier Capdepon modeled the transaction for the rating agencies, and Gwen Snorteland was the transaction manager responsible for structuring and closing Delphinus. Delaware Asset Advisers (DAA) served as Delphinus’s collateral manager and the DAA portfolio manager was Wei (Alex) Wei.

According to the SEC’s complaint against Mizuho filed in federal court in Manhattan, all of the collateral assets for Delphinus had been purchased by July 17, 2007, and the transaction was scheduled to close on July 19. However, around noon on July 18, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) issued a press release announcing changes to its CDO rating criteria requiring certain categories of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) to be adjusted downward for purposes of calculating their default probability. The Mizuho employees knew that Delphinus’s actual portfolio contained a substantial amount of RMBS that were subject to the downward ratings, and that Delphinus, as constructed, could not meet its rating targets under these tougher standards. To enable Delphinus to close anyway, the Mizuho employees e-mailed multiple alternative portfolios to S&P that contained dummy assets that were superior in credit quality to the assets that had been actually acquired for the CDO. Once the necessary ratings were secured by the use of dummy assets, the Delphinus transaction closed by mid-afternoon on July 19 and securities were sold based upon these higher ratings. Investors were thus misled to believe that the Delphinus notes had achieved the advertised ratings that the actual closing portfolio would not support.

According to the SEC’s complaint, in connection with Delphinus’s subsequent request for a required rating confirmation from S&P, Mizuho employees provided and arranged for others to provide further inaccurate information about the composition of Delphinus’s assets. Primarily, they misrepresented that Delphinus’s effective date was August 6 rather than July 19. S&P then provided Delphinus with the ratings confirmation using the improper effective date of August 6.

Everyone charged by the SEC agreed to settlements without admitting or denying the charges. Mizuho consented to the entry of a final judgment requiring payment of $10 million in disgorgement, $2.5 million in prejudgment interest, and a $115 million penalty. The settlement, which requires court approval, also permanently enjoins Mizuho from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act.

In the related administrative proceedings against Rekeda, Capdepon, and Snorteland, the SEC found that Rekeda violated Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act, and Capdepon and Snorteland violated Section 17(a). Rekeda and Capdepon each agreed to pay a $125,000 penalty while the decision on whether there will be a penalty for Snorteland will be decided at a later date. Rekeda agreed to be suspended from the securities industry for 12 months, Capdepon and Snorteland each agreed to be barred from the securities industry for one year, and all three agreed to cease and desist from further violations of the respective sections of the Securities Act they violated.

The SEC instituted settled administrative proceedings against DAA and Wei based on their post-closing conduct. DAA consented to the entry of an order requiring the firm to pay disgorgement of $2,228,372, prejudgment interest of $357,776, and a penalty of $2,228,372. Wei consented to the entry of an order requiring him to pay a $50,000 penalty and suspending him from associating with any investment adviser for six months. Both DAA and Wei consented to cease and desist from violating Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act.

The SEC investigation into the Delphinus transaction, which is continuing, was conducted by the Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit led by Kenneth Lench and Reid Muoio. The investigative attorneys were Robert Leidenheimer, Lawrence Renbaum, and James Murtha, and the trial attorneys were Jan Folena, Suzanne Romajas, and Alan Lieberman.

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

CFTC SETTLES "BUCKETED ORDRS" CHARGES AGAINST TRADERS

FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Suspends Registrations of Chicago Mercantile Exchange Traders Christopher Foufas, William Kerstein, and Maksim Baron for Unlawful S&P 500 Trading

Washington DC
– The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued orders filing and settling charges against Christopher T. Foufas and Maksim Baron of Chicago, Ill., and William K. Kerstein of Riverwoods, Ill., all registered floor brokers in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index futures contract (S&P 500) trading pit.

The CFTC order entered against Foufas finds that he indirectly bucketed his customers’ orders on at least 11 occasions between May 2009 and October 2010. On each of these occasions, Foufas, while filling customers’ orders in the S&P 500 trading pit, indirectly took the opposite side of his customers’ orders for his own account through noncompetitive round-turn trades with accommodating traders, according to the order. This practice permitted Foufas to establish a position for his own account without competitive execution, according to the order.

The CFTC orders entered against Kerstein and Baron find that Kerstein and Baron accommodated another broker in taking the opposite side of his customer orders into his own account on seven and four of these occasions, respectively.

The CFTC orders require Foufas, Kerstein, and Baron to pay civil monetary penalties of $75,000, $50,000, and $20,000, respectively. The orders also suspend Foufas’ and Baron’s floor registrations for two months and Kerstein’s floor registration for one month, removing them from the trading floor. The order also prohibits Foufas from filling or executing orders for customers for 18 months. The orders require all three traders to cease and desist from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.

The CFTC’s Enforcement Division thanks the staff of the CME’s Market Regulation Department for their assistance.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Jon J. Kramer, Mary Beth Spear, Ava M. Gould, Elizabeth M. Streit, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner. Meghan M. Wise of the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight also contributed to this matter.

Monday, July 30, 2012

TWO OPTIONS TRADERS TO PAY $14.5 MILLION TO SETTLE SHORT SALES CASE

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., July 17, 2012The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that two options traders who the agency charged with short selling violations have agreed to pay more than $14.5 million to settle the case against them.

An SEC investigation found that brothers Jeffrey A. Wolfson and Robert A. Wolfson engaged in naked short selling by failing to locate shares involved in short sales and failing to close out the resulting failures to deliver. SEC rules require short sellers to locate shares to borrow before selling them short, and they must purchase securities to close out their failures to deliver by a specified date. The Wolfsons made approximately $9.5 million in illegal profits from their naked short selling transactions.

"The Wolfsons attempted to game short-selling restrictions in order to win millions of dollars in illegal profits. This settlement deprives them of those profits and more," said Andrew M. Calamari, Acting Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office.

According to the SEC’s orders settling the administrative proceedings against the Wolfsons, they made illegal naked short sales from July 2006 to July 2007. Jeffrey Wolfson, who lives in the Chicago area, conducted illegal naked short sales while working as a broker-dealer himself and later as the principal trader at a Chicago-based brokerage firm that is no longer in business. Robert Wolfson, who lives in Massachusetts, conducted illegal naked short sales while trading in an account at New York-based broker-dealer Golden Anchor Trading II LLC, which also was charged by the SEC and agreed to the settlement. Jeffrey Wolfson generated approximately $8.8 million in net illicit trading profits, and Robert Wolfson and Golden Anchor made more than $700,000.

The Wolfsons and Golden Anchor settled the SEC’s administrative proceedings without admitting or denying the findings. Jeffrey Wolfson is required to pay $13.425 million, which includes a $2.5 million penalty in addition to disgorgement and prejudgment interest. Robert Wolfson and Golden Anchor are required to collectively pay $1.1 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and penalties. Jeffrey Wolfson is suspended from working in the securities industry for 12 months, and Robert Wolfson is suspended for four months. Golden Anchor has been censured, and along with the Wolfsons is subject to a cease and desist order from committing or causing violations of the short sale rules they violated.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted in the New York Regional Office by Steven Rawlings, Peter Altenbach, Daniel Marcus, and Layla Mayer. The litigation was led by Kevin McGrath. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the Chicago Board Options Exchange and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in this matter.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

JUDGMENTS ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR DISTRIBUTING UNREGISTERED SHARES OF UNIVERSAL EXPRESS INC.

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an amended judgment
on July 26, 2012, against defendants Michael J. Xirinachs and Emerald Asset
Advisors LLC (Emerald Asset) of Melville, New York, previously finding on August
11, 2011 that they had engaged in an unregistered distribution of billions of
shares of Universal Express Inc. (USXP) between February 2006 and June 2007. The
judgment enjoined Xirinachs and Emerald Asset from future violations of the
securities registration provisions of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933,
ordered them jointly and severally to disgorge over $3.8 million in profits plus
prejudgment interest, and pay civil penalties of $3,835,000 based on 590
unregistered transactions; ordered Xirinachs separately to disgorge over
$428,000 in compensation plus prejudgment interest, and pay civil penalties of
$2,119,000 based on 326 unregistered transactions; and barred Xirinachs and
Emerald Asset from participating in penny stock offerings for three years, but
allowed them to purchase penny stocks during that period. The other defendants
were previously sanctioned on September 8, 2011.

Saturday, July 28, 2012

SEC UNDER SECRETARY MILLER SPEAKS AT BRETTEN WOODS COMMITTEE

Remarks of SEC Under Secretary Miller at an event hosted by the Bretten Woods Committee

"Navigating Transformatinal Change of Global Financial Landscape: Realizing Systemic Stability, Avoiding Unintended Consequences"

As prepared for deliveryWASHINGTON -
Thank you very much for the invitation to join you today.

Meetings like this are important opportunities for global leaders in the public and private sectors to collaborate and learn from each other. I am joined today by my colleagues from the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research. As we work to get the rules of regulatory reform right and to address threats to financial stability, we need broad engagement. Every rule I work on benefits from public input.

Today I want to build on your constructive dialogue by talking about our progress implementing regulatory reform and the challenges that remain, particularly in connection with identifying and addressing risks to financial stability. Then I look forward to answering your questions.

For the last two years, Treasury and financial regulators have been hard at work creating a more resilient financial system. We were given a big assignment, and we have made tremendous progress. Nine out of 10 rules with deadlines before mid-July have been proposed or finalized. New institutions are up and running and already hard at work, including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, and the Office of Financial Research, or better known to you as the CFPB, the FSOC, and the OFR. The framework of our new system is in place.

Financial reform has significantly improved our ability to monitor and contain risks to financial stability. Financial institutions are much stronger, making them better able to withstand shocks. Increased trading on exchanges and new trade repositories and reporting are bringing transparency to markets. The FSOC and OFR are actively monitoring threats to financial stability and strengthening coordination among regulators. Every day I see more evidence of this progress.

But even with the benefit of these new rules and institutions, we approach the task of identifying and addressing risks to financial stability with humility. In my experience, you are never handed the same script for a financial crisis or shock. The next financial crisis is unlikely to look like the last. Problems can surface in unexpected ways that will challenge even the most sophisticated tools and the smartest regulators.

The reforms we have put in place have made our financial system less vulnerable, but we all have more to do.

PROGRESSA Strengthening Economy As a result of this Administration’s efforts, we’ve made considerable progress in repairing the economic damage from the crisis and putting our financial system on sounder footing.
The U.S. economy is gradually getting stronger. GDP is back to its pre-crisis levels. The private sector has added more than 4.4 million jobs over the last 28 months.
Not only is credit expanding, but the cost of credit has fallen significantly from the peaks of the crisis. Commercial and industrial lending at banks increased 10 percent in 2011 and increased at an annual rate of 11 percent in the first five months of this year.
Our national deficit peaked three years ago in 2009, both in dollars and as a share of GDP.
The government has closed most of the emergency programs put in place during the crisis and recovered most of its financial sector investments. For example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program is expected to cost taxpayers a small fraction of original forecasts. Most of the expected cost will be a result of the support provided to the housing market, which is showing signs of stabilizing.

But challenges remain. Although the U.S. economy is still expanding, the pace of economic growth has slowed during the last two quarters. Headwinds from Europe are partly to blame. In addition, the rise in oil prices earlier this year, the ongoing government spending reduction, and slow rates of growth in income have all adversely affected U.S. growth.

The slowdown in U.S. growth could be exacerbated by uncertainty about fiscal matters. The United States faces unsustainable fiscal deficits. To restore fiscal responsibility, policy makers must take action but there is significant uncertainty about the shape of the reforms to tax policy and spending to come.

Further, global economic growth has slowed in recent months and forecasts for future growth have been reduced. The continuing crisis in Europe is the key factor behind the slowdown. Growth in China, India, Brazil and other large emerging economies has also slowed as a result of weaker external demand combined with the effects of past policy tightening and an increase in risk aversion.

In summary, U.S. economic activity has moderated in recent months, with growth held back by a number of temporary factors. Looking ahead, the fundamentals for the private sector are generally supportive, and the housing market appears to be stabilizing. We continue to expect growth to strengthen gradually going forward.

Financial Regulatory Reform: Stronger Financial Institutions and Financial MarketsDespite these challenges, we have remained focused on the need to complete financial regulatory reform, which we believe is a necessary foundation for sustained economic growth and financial stability. More resilient financial institutions and markets are less vulnerable to financial shocks and less likely to propagate risk.

I want to highlight a few specific areas where we believe reform is building stronger institutions and markets.
More capital: We have forced banks to substantially increase the amount of capital they hold, so that they are able to provide credit to the economy and absorb losses in the future. Banks have added over $400 billion of high-quality capital, up 70 percent from three years ago.

Reduced leverage: Overall leverage in the financial system has been reduced significantly. Financial sector debt has dropped by more than $3 trillion since the crisis, and household debt is down $900 billion.

More stable funding models: Banks are funding themselves more conservatively, relying less on riskier short-term funding. As we learned during the financial crisis, reliance on short-term funding can quickly threaten a troubled firm. In addition, the use of the "shadow banking system"—a key source of financial stress during the crisis—has decreased substantially.

Reducing risk: Regulators are limiting risk-taking at the largest financial institutions, recognizing the outsized threats they can pose in times of market stress. Federal regulators have imposed tougher standards on the largest banks, and we can now subject the largest non-banks to enhanced supervision and prudential standards. Eight large financial market utilities, such as clearinghouses, will now be subject to heightened risk management standards. High-risk trading strategies and investments at depository institutions will be more constrained by the Volcker Rule.

Limiting contagion: Regulators are putting in place the framework for the "orderly liquidation authority," a mechanism to unwind large, complex financial companies. Through this authority, which was sorely lacking during the crisis, we are protecting taxpayers and preserving financial stability in the event of a failure of a large financial firm. In addition, nine of the largest bank holding companies recently submitted their "living wills," providing contingency plans for an orderly bankruptcy.

And finally,
More transparent derivatives markets: The SEC and CFTC are putting in place a new framework for derivatives oversight, providing new safeguards for market participants. Following the adoption of swaps definitions this month, more than 20 key rulemakings can now move forward. This marks a major milestone in the implementation of derivatives reforms. As swaps move onto transparent trading venues and are centrally cleared, regulators and market participants will have much more insight into these exposures and potential risks in the derivatives markets.
Financial Regulatory Reform: Identifying and Addressing Risks to Financial StabilityFSOC
We are also building new institutions. The Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research, both created by the Dodd-Frank Act, are actively monitoring and mitigating threats to the stability of the financial system.

Since its first meeting in October 2010, the FSOC has met regularly to discuss market developments and potential threats to stability. Most recently, the FSOC has focused on the situation in Europe, our housing market, and the lessons to be drawn from recent errors in risk management at several major financial institutions, including the failure of MF Global and the trading losses at JPMorgan Chase.

One of the duties of the FSOC is to facilitate information-sharing and coordination among its member agencies. In the run-up to the crisis, fragmentation in our regulatory system allowed many risks to slip through the cracks. As Chair of the FSOC, Secretary Geithner continues to make it a priority that the work of the regulators is well-coordinated.

Last week, the FSOC released its second annual report, which includes a review of significant financial market and regulatory developments, potential emerging threats to financial stability, and recommendations to strengthen the financial system. As Under Secretary, I spend time working with the FSOC staff and agencies, and I can tell you that generating the report is an extraordinarily useful and demanding process.

OFRThe Dodd-Frank Act also established the OFR to collect and standardize financial data, perform essential research, and develop new tools for measuring and monitoring risk. In its first annual report, also released last week, the OFR noted that gaps in financial data and in our understanding of the financial system still represent risks.

Currently, the OFR is working on a number of projects with the FSOC, including developing metrics for and indicators of financial stability. The OFR is also providing analysis related to the FSOC’s evaluation of nonbank financial companies for potential designation for Federal Reserve supervision and enhanced prudential standards.

One ongoing priority is establishing a legal entity identifier (LEI), or unique, global standard for identifying parties to financial transactions. The LEI can improve the quality of financial data, especially in identifying the largest and most complex firms’ exposures, and thus help to detect a buildup of risk in the system.

Current Threats to Financial StabilitySo where do we see threats to financial stability today? I would like to highlight just a couple of areas raised in the FSOC’s report.

Risks in Wholesale Funding MarketsThe FSOC recommended a set of reforms to address structural vulnerabilities, particularly in wholesale short-term funding markets such as money market funds and the tri-party repurchase agreement market. As we saw during the financial crisis, these sources of funding were particularly vulnerable to disruption, which quickly spread through the markets.

Firms should closely monitor their reliance on wholesale short-term funding. Maturity transformation, which entails funding longer-term assets with short-term debt, is a core function of the financial system, but overreliance can create additional vulnerabilities in stressed environments.

The SEC adopted a number of reforms to the regulation of money market funds in 2010 that provided additional safeguards. However, money market funds continue to lack a mechanism to absorb a sudden loss in value of a portfolio security, and investors have an incentive to redeem at the first indication of any perceived threat to the value or liquidity of the fund, potentially disadvantaging remaining shareholders. The FSOC recommends that the SEC publish structural reform options for public comment and ultimately adopt additional reforms.

In the tri-party repo markets, the FSOC supports additional steps toward reducing intraday credit exposure between clearing banks and market participants. In addition, the FSOC recommends that regulators and industry participants work together to better define standards for collateral management in the tri-party repo market, particularly for lenders (such as money market funds) that have certain restrictions on the instruments that they can hold.

Risk Management and Supervisory AttentionThe FSOC also recommends that financial institutions establish strong risk management and reporting structures to help ensure that risks are evaluated independently and at appropriately senior levels. This means prudent risk management practices for complex trading strategies. Financial institutions also need to maintain disciplined credit underwriting standards and vet emerging financial products.

The report notes, for example, that high-speed trading is an area where increased speed and automation of trade execution may require a parallel increase in trading risk management and controls. The Flash Crash in May 2010 highlighted system-wide vulnerabilities in the equities and futures markets. Since then, the regulators have taken a number of steps to address potential risks.

For example, the SEC put in place a dynamic single-stock circuit breaker called the limit up/limit down rule. In addition, they recently approved a plan to create a consolidated audit trail that would allow regulators to monitor and respond to events in the equity markets in a more robust and timely manner. However, more work needs to be done as financial markets evolve and high speed trading becomes more prevalent. We must continue to track developments and analyze risks with real-time policy responses.

GOING FORWARD: PARTNERING IN FINANCIAL STABILITYAs you can see, reform is improving the way we identify threats to financial stability. We have made tremendous strides. Our financial system is stronger and safer. A number of important reforms are in place. The FSOC and the OFR are on the job.

While the government will continue to work diligently to strengthen the financial system against potential threats, we cannot do this alone. The financial services industry must become a stronger partner in both regulatory reform and initiatives aimed at financial stability.

During the financial crisis, some in the private sector acted irresponsibly. Risk built up where we did not have visibility or the tools to contain it. Taking risk is an important engine of financial returns, but it must be managed.

I would like to share a few suggestions on how the private sector can do its part.

First of all, reward people for both realizing profit and constraining risk. A culture that primarily rewards short-term profits should be set aside in favor of one that strives for long-term gains and stability.

Implement best-in-class risk management practices.
Run rigorous stress tests and scenario analyses. Consider how investments and activities can have unintended consequences for financial markets.
Increase transparency in financial reporting beyond existing requirements.
Empower, recognize, and reward effective risk managers. Signal to the organization that risk management is valued.
Participate in industry forums to share lessons learned and develop best practices.

These initiatives are not only good for the financial system but also benefit financial firms by promoting client, customer, bondholder, and stockholder confidence.

I would also add that the relentless efforts of some in the financial industry to undermine, work around, or stall reform are short-sighted. I strongly believe that such efforts will further undermine trust in financial firms – trust that is essential for the functioning of the industry.

Regulatory reform benefits, not disadvantages, financial firms. We look forward to continued engagement to make our financial system more vibrant and safe. To achieve that, the financial services industry and the government each have a lot of work to do. We share responsibility for protecting Americans from the extraordinary damage – lost jobs, lost homes, lost businesses, and lost wealth – that a financial crisis can cause. Americans deserve a financial system that is the foundation for sustained growth and economic security.

Thank you.