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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Friday, November 23, 2012

"SKY-HIGH" YIELDS, SECRET EUROPEAN TRUST AND, SEC CHARGES OF INVESTOR FRAUD

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the operators of a long-running prime bank scheme with defrauding investors who were promised sky-high returns on loans to a secret European trust. It also is seeking an emergency court order to freeze the operators’ assets for the benefit of investors.

The SEC alleges that Billy W. McClintock, who lives in Florida, and Dianne Alexander, a former Georgia resident who now lives in California and also is known as Linda Dianne Alexander, raised $15 million from at least 220 investors in more than 20 states, primarily Georgia. McClintock portrayed himself as the "U.S. Director" of a secret European trust that had the power to create money and claimed to have appointed Alexander as a "U.S. Regional Director" for the trust. McClintock and Alexander led investors to believe that they could receive 38 percent annual interest on loans to the trust, provided they abide by the trust’s strict rules requiring secrecy. However, investor money was instead used to merely pay other investors, the hallmark of a Ponzi scheme.

"McClintock and Alexander pitched an investment opportunity that simply did not exist. They merely reshuffled funds between investors in a modern take on a classic prime bank scheme," said William P. Hicks, Associate Director of Enforcement in the SEC’s Atlanta Regional Office.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, McClintock and Alexander began conducting the scheme by at least 2004 and misrepresented or omitted facts about investment risks, expected returns, and how investor funds would be used. The complaint charges McClintock and Alexander with violating the securities registration, broker-dealer registration, and antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws and a related SEC anti-fraud rule.

The SEC’s complaint also names as relief defendants two entities that McClintock controls — MSC Holdings USA LLC, and MSC Holdings Inc. — and another entity controlled by Alexander — MSC GA Holdings LLC. The SEC believes the three firms may have received ill-gotten assets from the fraud that should be returned to investors.

Information on how to avoid prime bank frauds is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/primebank.shtml and


http://investor.gov/investing-basics/avoiding-fraud/types-fraud/prime-bank-investments

The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Natalie M. Brunson and Lucy T. Graetz of the SEC's Atlanta Regional Office under the supervision of Aaron W. Lipson. Senior Trial Counsel Pat Huddleston II will lead the litigation. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U. S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Atlanta Division in this matter.

SEC CHARGES MAN WITH ALLEGEDLY SPENDING INVESTOR FUNDS ON DRUGS AND GAMBLING

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a purported investment adviser in New York with defrauding investors who he convinced to invest in his start-up businesses while in reality he was spending their money on illegal drugs and gambling.

The SEC alleges that Stephen A. Colangelo, Jr. repeatedly misled investors while raising $3 million in investments for four start-up companies that he created. He also persuaded three other investors to let him act as their investment adviser, and they gave him more than $1 million to invest in the markets on their behalf. Colangelo boasted a phony professional and educational background and hid his past criminal activities from potential investors, and he falsely claimed to have historically achieved extremely high returns buying and selling securities. Meanwhile, Colangelo siphoned off at least $1 million in investor funds to pay such unauthorized personal expenses as his federal income taxes, illegal narcotics, gambling, cigars, and travel for him and his family.

In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Colangelo.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Colangelo’s fraudulent scheme began in 2009 when he induced investors to invest more than $750,000 in the Brickell Fund LLC, a pooled investment vehicle that he created, advised, and controlled. In March 2009 when the Brickell Fund did not have any investors and Colangelo was not buying and selling securities on behalf of the fund, he sent numerous e-mails to potential investors boasting phony information. For instance, one e-mail claimed, "BEST TRADING DAY OF MY LIFE!!!!!!!. . . . Up over 400% and documented. Mind boggling to say the least." In reality, Colangelo did not make any trades that day.

The SEC alleges that after spending or losing all of the money invested in the Brickell Fund, Colangelo continued to fraudulently raise funds from investors for three other startup businesses he created — Hedge Community LLC, Start a Hedge Fund LLC, and Under the Radar SEO LLC. Some individuals provided Colangelo with funds directly to invest on their behalf. Colangelo continued to use investor funds for a variety of purposes that weren’t disclosed to investors, namely personal expenses and unrelated business expenses.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Colangelo created a profile on the LinkedIn website used for professional networking and misrepresented that he had studied finance at Nyack College from 1986 to 1989. Colangelo provided a link to his profile to potential and existing investors in one of his start-up companies. His representations to investors were false because he never attended Nyack College and has not graduated from high school.

The SEC’s complaint charges Colangelo with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted in the New York Regional Office by Senior Attorney Christina McGill and Assistant Regional Director Wendy B. Tepperman. The SEC’s litigation will be led by Senior Trial Counsel Kevin McGrath. The SEC thanks the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their assistance in this matter.

Thursday, November 22, 2012

CFTC COMMISSIONER CHILTON SPEECH TITLED "THE OBSERVER EFFECT"

FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

"The Observer Effect"

Commissioner Bart Chilton’s Speech to Risk USA 2012, New York, NY
November 14, 2012
Introduction

Good morning! It’s good to be with you today. Thank you for the kind invitation. Let’s do something a little unconventional this morning. Let’s talk about science as our guidepost for what’s going on with financial regulatory reform under Dodd-Frank—that is: the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. As part of that, we will of course want to talk risk—a reason you’re here at Risk USA.

As we get started, I’ll remember Albert Einstein’s quote: "You do not really understand something unless you can explain it to your grandmother." So, I’ll try to keep the science and the financial markets stuff pretty straightforward.

The Catalyst

Maybe a little review will help set the stage for where we are. We all know that in 2008, we began experiencing the most disastrous economic meltdown since the Great Depression—a colossal collapse. The catalyst for all that was two-fold, according to the congressionally established Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, or FCIC: Regulators and regulation, or lack thereof; and the captains of Wall Street who took advantage of the lax rules and regulations. Those two things together caused a reaction that created the economic chaos, our Great Recession. Institutions that were thought to be too big to fail—failed. Taxpayers were stuck with a hideous bailout. Nine million people lost their jobs and millions more their homes. It was an economic force that created havoc of which we’re still trying to pull our way out.

Fundamental Forces

That fundamental economic force led to the creation of something novel: Dodd-Frank. Now scientists, I mean regulators, are in the process of implementing that financial reform. I will be the first to admit to you that it’s been a slow process. But there were 398 rules that needed to be put into test tubes and experimented with before they were deemed appropriate. Of those 398 Dodd-Frank rules to be promulgated under the Act, only about 33 percent are complete. We at CFTC have done a little better with our experiments, having completed about two-thirds of our 60 rules. One thing is for sure, all of these rules, these different experiments, are in one way or another, inter-connected, regardless of which agency is writing them. They are not done in isolation.

The Observer Effect

Now then, maybe a little physics review is in order. No need to take notes. You won’t be tested. There’s a term in physics called the "Observer Effect." Anybody heard of it? It refers to changes that the very act of observation causes when any phenomenon is being observed. It makes sense, really. Sometimes the very instruments used to observe something create the change. Think of a really simple example. If you go to check the air pressure in your tires—at least if you’re like me—it’s almost impossible not to let a little air out first when you put the gauge on the valve stem. So do you get a perfect reading? It’s probably a very close reading but the observer effect prevents it from being perfect. The same is true when you take your temperature. The mercury in the thermometer changes ever so slightly throwing off the result in a minuscule way. It’s so small that it’s not even observable to us.

Bear with me. In financial reform too, there is an observer effect. While it may not look like it, the Dodd-Frank implementation experiment is coming together a piece at a time. And what’s going on is influenced to a large extent by an observer effect. First, the rules aren’t written in a vacuum. Public comments are collected from interested observers. Other agencies and even brethren regulators in other countries are consulted. Whenever those things occur, rules and regulations are bound to change from those originally envisioned.

So, now let me go through all 60 rules and show you how the observer effect has affected them—just joking. What we can do is to summarize the types of things we are doing and put them into three categories: Transparency, Market Integrity and Accountability.

1—Transparency: Has anyone heard of the Snellen Scale? It’s the eye chart you read when you visit the optometrist. Well, for years hundreds of trillions of dollars’ worth of trading taking place in the over-the-counter (OTC) space was totally off the chart. We regulators couldn’t see it. We needed an eye chart. Fortunately, Dodd-Frank has provided us with one. After all, it was those very markets that were a major part of the problem that caused those two catalysts (that we discussed earlier) to react.

To put it in perspective, the CFTC previously regulated around $5 trillion in annualized trading on registered exchanges. That was our universe. OTC trading, however, accounts for upwards of $650 trillion! Off the chart again! That’s globally, to be fair, but a lot of it is here in the U.S.

With Dodd-Frank, that OTC trading will be conducted on regulated exchanges—many on Swaps Execution Facilitates, or SEFs. Swap Data Repositories, or SDRs, will—guess what—collect data. Those SDRs will afford the transparency in the particular markets that got us into trouble in 2008.

2—Market Integrity: Like in scientific experiments, you can’t be sure of your results until you have integrity in your testing regime. Same is true for markets. They need integrity to be worth much. Therefore, we also want to guarantee that people don’t take risks that undermine the integrity of markets or the entire financial system.

Risk is part of markets; you guys know that better than anyone. Folks should be able to take as much risk as they’re comfortable with. But, if they give themselves too much rope and hang themselves with it, the whole economy can’t be left swinging, too. Therefore, we’re instituting new capital and margin requirements and clearing.

Most of us want markets to perform the fundamental functions originally envisioned: to manage risk and discover prices. That’s good for commercial hedgers and, ultimately, it is good for consumers—heck it’s good for scientists!

One area under market integrity I’ll just mention quickly is speculative position limits. As some of you may know, this has been a particular area that has concerned me. We suffered a little setback in court last month. All I’ll say now is that we need to appeal the court’s ruling and I expect we will do so very soon. Simultaneously, we need to propose a new, revised position limits rule. There’s no reason for a long comment period. We already received more than 13,000 comment letters so we have a good idea of what people think.

I’m convinced, as are a lot of other folks, that there can be a speculative premium in markets and that skews the price discovery tenet of them and that’s not a good thing. So yes, for my part, I’ll keep fighting for position limits.

3—Accountability: The third and final Dodd-Frank grouping is accountability. Once a scientist has demonstrated something, he or she wants to put it out for peer review. It needs to be subject to the views of others. Similarly we need to listen to others as we oversee these financial markets. Here’s a question I’ve listened to many times: why is it that nobody went to prison for what took place in 2008? Unfortunately, the answer is that nobody violated the law. Well, that’s changing with Dodd-Frank. There will now be financial firm accountability, and not a moment too soon.

Most of us can’t even keep track of all the shenanigans going on in the financial sector. We saw both Goldman Sachs and Citi establish these fake-out funds where they pressed their customers to participate, then, once the fake-out funds were populated with their own customers’ money, the banks themselves took the opposite positions. There’s something wide of the scale with that. Wells Fargo entered into a $175 million settlement with the Department of Justice for charging higher fees and rates to minority customers. Barclays attempted to manipulate Libor rates. And of course, there’s MF Global where, oops, millions-and-millions of customer bucks went missing. And, there’s Peregrine Financial Group which appears to have been a $200-plus million fraud.

There are a lot of other examples of what the financial market mad scientists have done, but I bring up those few to illustrate why accountability is the needed third leg of the stool under Dodd-Frank.

Just recently, we proposed a package of accountability and customer protection rules. I’m not going to get into the technicalities of each of those proposals due to time, but suffice it to say we need them and need them now.

Insurance

There is, however, one thing that we cannot do to help futures customers. This can only be done by Congress. That is: a futures insurance fund.

How unfair is it that MF Global security customers were paid first compared to the futures customers? How unfair is it that banking and security customers both have insurance funds, yet, if you’re a futures customer, you’re outta luck.

Up until MF Global and Peregrine, I suppose people would argue there has never been a problem and that the remedy was not needed. Well, that’s a tough argument to make now. People were really harmed and I think it is irresponsible that there is not such an insurance fund for futures customers.

So that’s the big three: transparency, market integrity and accountability.

A Culture Shift

While Dodd-Frank will go a long way toward remedying the chaos created in 2008 and beyond, it won’t address all of the ills in our financial system…unfortunately. We also need a little observer effect to change the culture of Wall Street. That may mean that people should walk with their wallets if they don’t want to do business with poor corporate citizens. That’s a hefty mandate, but one that I believe is absolutely necessary. Let me explain.

I’ve been suggesting that we engage in a culture shift conversation, a shift in focus in our financial sectors. Both the government and the private sector need to be in on the discussion. This isn’t a very scientific discussion I’m suggesting. It is more about morality and good business ethics and practices. After all, government can’t regulate morality. The cultural mindset in many financial firms is something that needs to change.

What I’m suggesting is simply an effort to improve the system and move away from the Gordon Gekko "greed is good" culture in which we appear to, on many occasions, be sliding into. It will take some time and should take place in executive suites, board rooms, lunch rooms, hearing rooms, and perhaps even in court rooms.

Compensation Systems

So, what’s to be done? Well, for one, just look at the bonuses and compensation structures of these large financial firms. Of the firms I mentioned earlier, many of their CEO’s were paid extravagant amounts in 2011—from $10 to $23 million. So, they are being rewarded for how they have been operating. Way to go.

However, it surely isn’t just the people at the top. The difficulty is more deeply-rooted at firms. Lots of times, firms have been rewarding the cowboy traders. Did you read last week about the high-flying UBS trader who lost billions in London? His compensation rose dramatically, totally based upon a bonus and compensation system of rewarding high-flying trades. The problem there was he wasn’t really making money—sort of like the London Whale with JP Morgan earlier this year. There is something called a "failure to supervise" on the part of firms. Not sure what is up with the firms on these things. But the larger point is that the traders have been propelled by a compensation and bonus system which is out of whack. The firm’s short-term profit motive has been so fantastically strong—for the next quarter or next year—that they have been risking their entire firm’s reputation and existence on short-term gain.

The irony is this belief system of "profit is everything" won't generate the long-term gains the firm shareholders seek. I’m sure the boards are smarter than to only see a few months ahead. What they want is sustainable longer-term economic business growth.

Hiring and Recruitment

Here’s another thing. Rather than hiring a lot of cowboy traders, how about getting more risk professionals—those actually good at risk management. That means recruiting and hiring strategies need to change.

There needs to be a better sense of balance between profit and risk centers. The executive suite folks need to understand and create this balance as part of the corporate culture.

Government
As I said, government can’t be culture cops and mandate morality in financial firms, but we can set the stage for avoiding bad behavior. More importantly, we can incentivize good behavior through our laws, rules and regulations. The Dodd-Frank Act goes a long way in this regard. Specifically, we can help establish an environment in which these firms operate with appropriate transparency, integrity, and standards of conduct.

And finally, in order to help spur this culture shift conversation, we need to re-focus ourselves as regulators on fines and penalties that actually mean something. Fines can’t simply be a cost of doing business. Government is strapped for funding and that means we don’t have the staff to do all that we would want. We could use more investigators and attorneys. The cost of us not having adequate resources is that we often would prefer to enter into a settlement with a firm or individual that has violated the law. That saves us scarce resources. At the same time, the nogoodniks know our deal and they continually try to low-ball on settlement amounts. They have done such a good job; executives at firms are making crude calculations about fines. When the fine is minuscule compared to what can be gained through the illegal activity, that’s not a true deterrent. Merrill Lynch, for example, over-charged their own customers for debit and over-draft fees by $32.2 million. The fine (and this was not the CFTC) was only $2.8 million. That seems like an economic no-brainier. Government needs to do better and we don’t need any scientific experiments to tell us so.

The New Frontier: SEFs
Finally, let’s discuss the Swaps Execution Facility rule.

First (my attorney always makes me say this) I’m not pre-judging what the Commission will do on this rule. I’m just going to comment on about my preferences—which, of course, happen to be correct.

This challenge is really different from just about any experiment we’ve ever conducted. It’s not like drafting regulations for the securities and futures markets that were already well-established when rules governing them were put in place. In this instance, while we had a robust swaps market in the U.S., prior to Dodd-Frank, we did not have a system making the platforms registered entities. Therefore, it’s been a challenge to design the right rules, to carry out the intent of Congress and to ensure that systems intended to be covered by the law are not over- or under-regulated.

For me, ensuring that existing systems, like appropriate voice brokerage, can continue to be used in the SEF environment, is crucial. I also want to ensure that processors—those folks who were truly just facilitating trading, not actually hosting the trading—don’t fall under the SEF umbrella. Again, that’s not what Congress intended. Finally, under the law we are not only supposed to ensure pre-trade price transparency, but at the same time we are to promote the trading of swaps on SEFs. Neither goal outweighs the other. If we pass a final rule which embodies these things, we will have done a good job in my view. And this experiment will be a success not for just a short time, but SEFs will exist for a long time. So, I’m looking forward to getting this final rule out, and moving on from there.

Conclusion
It has been a pleasure to be with you and run through all of these issues. I know it is a lot, but as you may have observed, there’s a lot going on in our markets today and a lot being done in financial regulatory reform.

Maybe you can recall another Einstein quote: "The world is a dangerous place to live; not because people are evil, but because of the people who don’t do anything about it." I’m glad you guys are here and are involved in all of this. I commend you.

We’re trying to make the implementation process as transparent—as observable—as possible. We had a financial crisis caused by those catalysts – government and Wall Street. The effect was Dodd-Frank. Our work is to ensure that the new law addresses the problems in an appropriate fashion. To use another scientific rule, that there is an equal and opposite response. As I’ve tried to illustrate, the pieces of financial reform are relative to one another and relevant to all of us. I hope that in the not too distant future, we can observe this period as having been a crucial time for improving our markets and thus, the economic engine of our democracy.

Thank you.

 

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

THE INSIDE TRADER FRIENDS

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three health care company employees and four others in a New Jersey-based insider trading ring of various high school friends generating $1.7 million in illegal profits and kickbacks by trading in advance of 11 public announcements involving mergers, a drug approval application, and quarterly earnings of pharmaceutical companies and medical technology firms.

The SEC alleges that Celgene Corporation's director of financial reporting John Lazorchak, Sanofi S.A.'s director of accounting and reporting Mark S. Cupo, and Stryker Corporation's marketing employee Mark D. Foldy each illegally tipped confidential information about their companies for the purpose of insider trading. Typically the nonpublic information involved upcoming mergers or acquisitions, but Lazorchak also tipped confidential details about Celgene's quarterly earnings and the status of a Celgene application to expand the use of its drug Revlimid. The trading was carefully orchestrated so there was usually someone acting solely as a non-trading middleman who received the nonpublic information from the insider and tipped others. They hoped to avoid detection with no direct connection between the insiders and the traders, and the insiders were later compensated for the inside information with cash payments made in installments to avoid any scrutiny of large cash withdrawals.

The SEC alleges that Cupo's friend Michael Castelli along with Lawrence Grum, who attended high school with Castelli, were the primary traders in the scheme. Among the ways that Castelli and Grum tried to hide their illegal conduct was by compiling binders of research to serve as a false basis for their trading. They actively traded in Celgene securities to create a pattern of long-standing positions in the stock. Grum reassured Cupo that discovery of the scheme and consequent legal action was unlikely due to limited government resources to police insider trading activity. Grum said, "At the end of the day, the SEC's got to pick their battle because they have a limited number of people and a huge number of investors to go after."

Daniel M. Hawke, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division's Market Abuse Unit and Director of the Philadelphia Regional Office, said, "This is yet another case where wrongdoers believed they could outsmart investigators by creating an elaborate smokescreen to hide their insider trading. Such tactics as using middlemen to pass inside information and compiling research to falsely justify illegal trades will not prevent lawbreakers from getting caught."

The other two traders charged are Lazorchak's high school friends Michael T. Pendolino and James N. Deprado, who now live in New Hampshire and Virginia respectively. The others live in New Jersey. In a parallel criminal action, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey today announced criminal charges against Lazorchak, Cupo, Foldy, Castelli, Grum, and Pendolino.

According to the SEC's complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, the scheme began in late 2007 when Lazorchak and Cupo, who were friends and colleagues at Sanofi, discussed Lazorchak's new position at Celgene where he'd have access to nonpublic information about mergers and acquisitions. Lazorchak told Cupo that he was initially working on Celgene's possible acquisition of another pharmaceutical company, Pharmion. Cupo discussed Lazorchak's position with Castelli, a friend with whom he attends winemaking club meetings. Castelli brought in Grum, who he considered a sophisticated trader with knowledge of the securities industry. Castelli and Grum devised the scheme in which Lazorchak tipped Cupo with nonpublic Celgene-related information. Cupo, as the middleman, tipped Castelli and Grum so they could illegally trade. Castelli and Grum paid Cupo for his tips, and gave Cupo money to pass along to Lazorchak for the initial tips. Lazorchak never knew the identities of Castelli or Grum, but was aware that Cupo was passing confidential Celgene information to other traders.

The SEC alleges that Lazorchak's high school friend Foldy entered the scheme in 2007, when Lazorchak tipped him with confidential details about the impending merger between Celgene and Pharmion, and Foldy illegally traded on the information prior to the public announcement of the deal. Lazorchak and Foldy devised and used code phrases while conversing to identify instances when Lazorchak was passing inside information or Foldy was seeking more details. After the illegal trading occurred and Foldy obtained illicit profits of $14,500, Lazorchak repeatedly demanded that Foldy compensate him for the inside information. Foldy ultimately paid Lazorchak at least $500 and later returned the favor with illegal tips of confidential information about a tender offer involving his employer, Stryker Corp. Lazorchak acted as a middleman and did not trade, instead tipping Pendolino so he could trade on the nonpublic information. Pendolino in turn tipped Deprado, who also traded. Lazorchak additionally tipped Cupo, who did not trade but acted as a middleman and tipped Castelli and Grum, who both traded.

The SEC alleges that Cupo began tipping inside information about his employer in late 2009, when he learned that Sanofi was planning to announce a tender offer to acquire another pharmaceutical company, Chattem Inc. Cupo learned of the imminent tender offer a few days prior to the public announcement, he tipped Castelli and Grum with the confidential details, and they both traded on the nonpublic information.

The SEC alleges that each of the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 thereunder and that Castelli and Grum violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC is seeking permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, financial penalties, and officer and director bars for Lazorchak, Cupo, and Foldy.

The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Colleen K. Lynch, David W. Snyder and John S. Rymas, who are members of the Market Abuse Unit in the SEC's Philadelphia office. G. Jeffrey Boujoukos and Catherine E. Pappas are handling the litigation.

The SEC brought this enforcement action in coordination with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey. The SEC also appreciates the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and the Options Regulatory Surveillance Authority.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

THE 3000: WHISTLEBLOWER TIPS TO THE U.S. SEC

FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2012 — Over the past year, the Securities and Exchange Commission received more than 3,000 whistleblower tips from all 50 states and from 49 countries, according to the agency's
2012 Annual Report on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program released today.

The report, which is required by the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, summarizes the activities of the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower.

"In just its first year, the whistleblower program already has proven to be a valuable tool in helping us ferret out financial fraud," said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. "When insiders provide us with high-quality road maps of fraudulent wrongdoing, it reduces the length of time we spend investigating and saves the agency substantial resources."

Among other things, the report notes:

The SEC made its first award under the new program to a whistleblower who helped the SEC stop an ongoing multi-million dollar fraud. The whistleblower received an award of 30 percent of the amount collected in the SEC's enforcement action, which is the maximum percentage payout allowed by law.
The SEC received 3,001 tips, complaints, and referrals from whistleblowers from individuals in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico as well as 49 countries outside of the United States.
The most common complaints related to corporate disclosures and financials (18.2 percent), offering fraud (15.5 percent), and manipulation (15.2 percent).
There were 143 enforcement judgments and orders issued during fiscal year 2012 that potentially qualify as eligible for a whistleblower award. The Office of the Whistleblower provided the public with notice of these actions because they involved sanctions exceeding the statutory threshold of more than $1 million.

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can pay financial awards to whistleblowers who provide high-quality, original information about a possible securities law violation that leads to a successful SEC enforcement action with more than $1 million in monetary sanctions. The SEC is authorized to pay the whistleblower 10 to 30 percent of the sanctions collected. Awards are paid from the Investor Protection Fund established by Congress to fund payments.

Information on eligibility requirements, directions on how to submit a tip or complaint, instructions on how to apply for an award, and answers to frequently asked questions are available at:
www.sec.gov/whistleblower.

Monday, November 19, 2012

SEC CHARGES MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY WITH SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS

FROM: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company with securities law violations for failing to sufficiently disclose the potential negative impact of a "cap" it placed on a complex investment product that investors were planning to use for retirement.

The SEC's investigation found that MassMutual included a cap feature in certain optional riders offered to investors, and the cap potentially affected $2.5 billion worth of MassMutual variable annuities. Neither the prospectuses nor the sales literature sufficiently explained that if the cap was reached, the guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMIB) value would no longer earn interest. MassMutual's disclosures instead implied that interest would continue to accrue after the GMIB value reached the cap, and dollar-for-dollar withdrawals would remain available to investors. A number of MassMutual's own sales agents were confused by the language in the disclosures, and investors were not sufficiently informed of the potential negative effect of taking withdrawals if they reached the cap approximately a decade from now.

MassMutual, which removed the cap after the SEC's investigation to ensure that no investors will be harmed, has agreed to settle the charges and pay a $1.625 million penalty.

"Investors shouldn't have their retirement nest eggs at risk because of undisclosed investment complexities," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Through our proactive investigative efforts, we exposed a problem with a complex variable annuity investment at least a decade before it could have harmed investors."

According to the SEC's order instituting settled administrative proceedings, MassMutual offered GMIB 5 and 6 riders from 2007 to 2009 as an optional feature on certain variable annuity products. The GMIB rider sets a minimum floor for a future amount that can be applied to an annuity option, known as the "GMIB value." Unlike the contract value of the annuity that fluctuates with the performance of the underlying investment, the GMIB value increases by a compound annual interest rate of either 5 or 6 percent and allows investors to make withdrawals any time during the annuity's accumulation phase.

According to the SEC's order, MassMutual advertised its GMIB riders as providing "Income Now" if investors elected to make withdrawals during the accumulation phase or "Income Later" if they elected to receive annuity payments. MassMutual's sales literature highlighted the guarantee provided by the riders by stating, "Even if your contract value drops to zero, you can apply your GMIB value to a fixed or variable annuity." The riders included a maximum GMIB value, and investors could not reach this cap until 2022. If the GMIB value reached the cap, every dollar withdrawn would reduce the GMIB value by a pro-rata amount tied to the percentage decrease on the contract value. After a number of such withdrawals, depending on market conditions, both the contract value and the GMIB value could decline and adversely affect the amount a customer could apply to an annuity and the future income stream.

The SEC's investigation found that a number of MassMutual sales agents and others did not understand that all withdrawals taken after the GMIB value reached the cap would result in such pro-rata reductions. After reviewing MassMutual's prospectuses and other disclosures, they believed that if the GMIB value reached the cap, investors could take withdrawals and the GMIB value would remain at the cap. Some sales agents mistakenly believed that investors could maximize their benefits by waiting until the GMIB value reaches the cap, taking annual 5 or 6 percent withdrawals, and annuitizing their contracts in order to receive an income stream tied to the maximum GMIB value. But in reality, following such an investment strategy could have had severe adverse consequences for investors. By taking withdrawals annually after the cap is reached, investors would proportionately reduce their GMIB values and in turn potentially decrease their future income streams. In a worst-case scenario, they would withdraw all of their contract value, the GMIB value would decline to zero, and they would be left with nothing to annuitize and, consequently, no future income stream.

According to the SEC's order, while MassMutual was offering GMIB riders, there were indications that sales agents and others did not understand the effect of post-cap withdrawals on the GMIB value, which should have alerted the company to the fact that its disclosures were inadequate. Beginning May 1, 2009, after it stopped offering the riders, MassMutual revised its prospectuses to better explain the consequences of taking withdrawals after the GMIB value reaches the cap. Following the SEC's investigation, MassMutual undertook the remedial step of removing the cap entirely from these riders in order to guarantee that no investor will ever reach the cap. This action contributed to the determination of the penalty amount. MassMutual consented to the SEC's order without admitting or denying the findings. In addition to the $1.625 million penalty, MassMutual agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act.

The SEC's investigation was conducted by Attorney-Advisor Daniel H. Rubenstein and supervised by Associate Director Stephen L. Cohen and Assistant Director C. Joshua Felker.