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Wednesday, June 27, 2012

CFTC ORDERS BARCLAYS TO PAY $200 MILLION IN ALLEGED INTEREST MANIPULATION SCHEME

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Orders Barclays to pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates.
The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate interest rates and made related false reports to benefit its derivatives trading positions. The Order also finds that Barclays made false LIBOR reports at the direction of members of senior management to protect its reputation during the global financial crisis.

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued an Order today filing and settling charges against Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays Bank) and Barclays Capital Inc.(Barclays Capital) (collectively Barclays or the Bank). The Order finds that Barclays attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning two global benchmark interest rates, LIBOR and Euribor, on numerous occasions and sometimes on a daily basis over a four-year period, commencing as early as 2005.

According to the Order, Barclays, through its traders and employees responsible for determining the Bank’s LIBOR and Euribor submissions (submitters), attempted to manipulate and made false reports concerning both benchmark interest rates to benefit the Bank’s derivatives trading positions by either increasing its profits or minimizing its losses. This conduct occurred regularly and was pervasive. In addition, the attempts to manipulate included Barclays’ traders asking other banks to assist in manipulating Euribor, as well as Barclays aiding attempts by other banks to manipulate U.S. Dollar LIBOR and Euribor.

The Order also finds that throughout the global financial crisis in late August 2007 through early 2009, as a result of instructions from Barclays’ senior management, the Bank routinely made artificially low LIBOR submissions to protect Barclays’ reputation from negative market and media perceptions concerning Barclays’ financial condition.
The CFTC Order requires Barclays to pay a $200 million civil monetary penalty, cease and desist from further violations as charged, and take specified steps, such as making the determinations of benchmark submissions transaction-focused (as set forth in the Order), to ensure the integrity and reliability of its LIBOR and Euribor submissions and improve related internal controls.

“The American public and our markets rely upon the integrity of benchmark interest rates like LIBOR and Euribor because they form the basis for hundreds of trillions of dollars of transactions and affect nearly every corner of the global economy,” said David Meister, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement. “Banks that contribute information to those benchmarks must do so honestly. When a bank acts in its own self-interest by attempting to manipulate these rates for profit, or by submitting false reports that result from senior management orders to lower submissions to guard the bank’s reputation, the integrity of benchmark interest rates is undermined. The CFTC launched this investigation to protect the markets and the public from such illegal conduct, and today’s action demonstrates that we will bring the full force of our authority to bear as we carry out that mission.”
LIBOR and Euribor

LIBOR – the London Interbank Offered Rate – is among the most important benchmark interest rates in the world’s economy, and is a key rate in the United States. LIBOR is based on rate submissions from a relatively small and select panel of major banks, including Barclays, and is calculated and published daily for several different currencies by the British Banker’s Association (BBA). Each panel bank’s submission is also made public, and the market can therefore see each bank’s independent assessment of its own borrowing costs. LIBOR is supposed to reflect the cost of borrowing unsecured funds in the London interbank market.

Euribor, which is calculated in a similar fashion by the European Banking Federation (EBF), is another globally important rate that measures the cost of borrowing in the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.

LIBOR impacts enormous volumes of swaps and futures contracts, commercial and personal consumer loans, home mortgages and other transactions. For example, U.S. Dollar LIBOR is the basis for the settlement of the three-month Eurodollar futures contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which had a traded volume in 2011 with a notional value exceeding $564 trillion. In addition, according to the BBA, swaps with a notional value of approximately $350 trillion and loans amounting to $10 trillion are indexed to LIBOR. Euribor is also used internationally in derivatives contracts. In 2011, over-the-counter interest rate derivatives referenced to Euro rates had a notional value in excess of $220 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements. LIBOR and Euribor are relied upon by countless large and small businesses and individuals who trust that the rates are derived from candid and reliable submissions made by each of the banks on the panels.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct to Benefit Derivatives Trading Positions
As the Order shows, Barclays, in pursuit of its own self-interest, disregarded the fundamental principle that LIBOR and Euribor are supposed to reflect the costs of borrowing funds in certain markets. Barclays’ traders located at least in New York, London and Tokyo asked Barclays’ submitters to submit particular rates to benefit their derivatives trading positions, such as swaps or futures positions, which were priced on LIBOR and Euribor. Barclays’ traders made these unlawful requests routinely, and sometimes daily, from at least mid-2005 through at least the fall of 2007, and sporadically thereafter into 2009. The Order relates that, for example, one trader stated in an email to a submitter: “We have another big fixing tom[orrow] and with the market move I was hoping we could set [certain] Libors as high as possible.”

In addition, certain Barclays Euro swaps traders, led at the time by a senior trader, coordinated with and aided and abetted traders at other banks in each other’s attempts to manipulate Euribor, even scheming to impact Euribor on key standardized dates when many derivatives contracts are settled or reset.

The traders’ requests were frequently accepted by Barclays’ submitters, who emailed responses such as “always happy to help,” “for you, anything,” or “Done…for you big boy,” resulting in false submissions by Barclays to the BBA and EBF. The traders and submitters also engaged in similar conduct on fewer occasions with respect to Yen and Sterling LIBOR.

Barclays’ Unlawful Conduct at the Direction of Senior Management
The CFTC Order also finds that Barclays, acting at the direction of senior management, engaged in other serious unlawful conduct concerning LIBOR. In late 2007, Barclays was the subject of negative press reports raising questions such as, “So what the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities unit that is prompting its peers to charge it premium interest in the money market?” Such negative media speculation caused significant concern within Barclays and was discussed among high levels of management within Barclays Bank. As a result, certain senior managers within Barclays instructed the U.S. Dollar LIBOR submitters and their supervisor to lower Barclays’ LIBOR submissions to be closer to the rates submitted by other banks and not so high as to attract media attention.

According to the Order, senior managers even coined the phrase “head above the parapet” to describe high LIBOR submissions relative to other banks. Barclays’ LIBOR submitters were told not to submit at levels where Barclays was “sticking its head above the parapet.” The directive was intended to fend off negative public perceptions about Barclays’ financial condition arising from its high LIBOR submissions relative to the submissions of other panel banks, which Barclays believed were too low given the market conditions.
Despite concerns being raised by the submitters that Barclays and other banks were, for example, “being dishonest by definition” and that they were submitting “patently false” rates, the submitters followed the directive and submitted artificially lower rates. The senior management directive for low U.S. Dollar LIBOR submissions occurred on a regular basis during the global financial crisis from August 2007 through early 2009, and, at limited times, for Yen and Sterling LIBOR during the same period. As the U.S. Dollar senior submitter said in October 2008 to his supervisor at the time, “following on from my conversation with you I will reluctantly, gradually and artificially get my libors in line with the rest of the contributors as requested. I disagree with this approach as you are well aware. I will be contributing rates which are nowhere near the clearing rates for unsecured cash and therefore will not be posting honest prices.”

Barclays’ Obligations to Ensure Integrity and Reliability of Benchmark Interest Rates
In addition to the $200 million penalty, the CFTC Order requires Barclays to implement measures to ensure that its submissions are transaction-focused, based upon a rigorous and honest assessment of information and not influenced by conflicts of interest. See pages 31-44 of the CFTC’s Order. Among other things, the Order requires Barclays to:
Make its submissions based on certain specified factors, with Barclays’ transactions being given the greatest weight, subject to certain specified adjustments and considerations;
Implement firewalls to prevent improper communications including between traders and submitters;
Prepare and retain certain documents concerning submissions, and retain relevant communications;
Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures concerning its submissions and related processes;
Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning compliance with the terms of the Order;
Use best efforts to encourage the development of rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.

* * * *
The Order recognizes Barclays’ significant cooperation with the CFTC during the investigation of this matter.
In a related matter, as part of an agreement with the Fraud Section of the U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Barclays agreed to pay a $160 million penalty and to continue to cooperate with the Department. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued a Final Notice regarding its enforcement action against Barclays Bank PLC, and has imposed a penalty of £59.5 million against the Bank.

The CFTC thanks the FSA, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for their assistance in the CFTC’s investigation.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Anne M. Termine, Stephen T. Tsai, Maura M. Viehmeyer, Brian G. Mulherin, Gretchen L. Lowe and Vincent A. McGonagle, with assistance from Philip P. Tumminio, Rishi K. Gupta, Russell Battaglia, Jeremy Cusimano, Elizabeth Padgett, Terry Mayo, Jason T. Wright, Aimée Latimer-Zayets, Timothy M. Kirby, Jonathan K. Huth, Susan A. Berkowitz and staff from the Division of Market Oversight and Office of the Chief Economist.

BAY AREA HEDGE FUND MANAGER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO PAY MORE THAN $12 MILLION IN DISGORGEMENT

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
COURT FINDS BAY AREA HEDGE FUND MANAGER IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO PAY MORE THAN $12 MILLION IN DISGORGEMENT TO DEFRAUDED INVESTORS
June 25, 2012
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) announces that on June 20, 2012, an Order Finding Defendants In Civil Contempt was issued by a judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against defendants Lawrence R. Goldfarb (“Goldfarb”) and Baystar Capital Management, LLC (“Baystar Capital”) in the proceeding entitledSecurities and Exchange Commission v. Lawrence R. Goldfarb, et. al, Case No. C-11-00938-WHA. The Order found that defendants failed to pay disgorgement in compliance with the provisions of a Final Judgment entered against them on March 16, 2011 and furthermore failed to demonstrate that they reasonably attempted to comply with their disgorgement obligations.

Previously, on March 1, 2011, the Commission filed a Complaint against investment advisers Goldfarb and Baystar Capital alleging that they violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 by engaging in a fraudulent scheme with respect to their funds [15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1), (2)]. The Complaint also alleged that Goldfarb and Baystar Capital made material misstatements and omissions, and engaged in a fraudulent scheme, with respect to investors in a pooled investment vehicle in violation of Sections 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8]. These violations were based upon allegations that defendants took $12 million in proceeds from an investment under their management and misappropriated those proceeds for their own use, rather than distributing those proceeds to investors.

At the same time that it filed the Complaint, the Commission also filed the written Consents of Goldfarb and of Baystar Capital to the entry of a Final Judgment against them. Without admitting or denying the Complaint’s allegations, defendants agreed, among other things, to pay $12,112,416 in disgorgement and $1,967,371 in prejudgment interest to the court’s registry within 365 days of entry of the Final Judgment. Defendants also agreed to make four progress payments, including a $1.025 million payment due within 180 days of entry of the Final Judgment. Defendants eventually made three progress payments totaling $80,000 in disgorgement, but failed to make the $1.025 million progress payment or the final payment.

In April 2012, the Commission filed an Application with the Court for an order for defendants to show cause why they should not be found in civil contempt of the Final Judgment.

In its Order dated June 20, 2012, the Court found that the defendants were in breach of the Final Judgment by failing to pay the disgorgement amounts ordered. The Court also found that defendants had failed to establish a good faith effort to fulfill their disgorgement obligations because, among other things, they used available funds for large personal expenses such as courtside seats to Golden State Warriors games, charters of aircraft for personal trips, Goldfarb’s mortgage payment and numerous personal vacations, rather than to pay disgorgement.

In the Order, the Court also approved the appointment of a receiver over defendants’ assets and reaffirmed its prior order limiting Goldfarb’s monthly spending.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

FOREX FRAUDSTERS MADE TO PAY OVER $5.4 MILLION IN RESTITUTION

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in Texas Orders Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex Investments, LLC, and CDH Global Holdings, LLC, to Pay over $5.4 Million in Restitution and a Monetary Sanction for Forex Fraud

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it obtained a federal court order imposing more than $5.4 million in restitution and a civil monetary penalty on defendantsLinda Harris, Chance Harris and their companies, CDH Forex Investments, LLC (CDH Forex) and CDH Global Holdings, LLC (CDH Global), all of Flower Mound, Texas, for fraud in connection with the operation of a commodity pool and managed accounts trading off-exchange foreign currency (forex) contracts.

The default judgment order requires Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global jointly and severally to first pay $1,361,897 to defrauded customers as restitution for their losses and then pay $4,085,691 as a civil monetary penalty. The order also permanently prohibits them from engaging in any commodity- and forex-related activity and from registering with the CFTC.

The order, entered on June 12, 2012, by Senior Judge Royal Furgeson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, stems from a CFTC complaint filed on October 25, 2011, that charged the defendants with fraudulent solicitation, misappropriation, and misrepresentation to pool participants and regulatory organizations in a multi-million dollar forex scheme (see CFTC press release 6127-11, October 25, 2011). The CFTC complaint also charged the defendants with concealing their fraud by issuing false account statements to pool participants regarding the profitability of their investments. Linda Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global also were charged with making false statements and submitting falsified bank and account trading statements to the National Futures Association (NFA).

The order finds Linda Harris, Chance Harris, CDH Forex, and CDH Global liable as to all violations alleged in the CFTC’s complaint.

Monday, June 25, 2012

COURT HALTS ALLEGED $100 MILLION REAL ESTATE BASED PONZI SCAM

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., June 25, 2012 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today obtained a temporary restraining order and asset freeze against a Utah man and company charged with operating a real estate-based Ponzi scheme that bilked $100 million from investors nationwide.

The SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, names Wayne L. Palmer and his firm, National Note of Utah, LC, both of West Jordan, Utah. According to the complaint, Palmer told investors that their money would be used to buy mortgage notes and real estate assets, or to make real estate loans. More than 600 individuals invested, lured by promises of annual returns of 12 percent, the SEC alleged.

“Palmer promised double-digit returns at his real estate seminars, where investors learned the hard way about his lies and deceit,” said Kenneth Israel, Director of the SEC’s Salt Lake City Regional Office.

Palmer told investors that their money would be completely secure and that National Note had a perfect record, having never missed paying principal or interest on its promissory notes. Glossy marketing materials that Palmer provided to some investors showed that National Note returns did not fluctuate and stated that investors were guaranteed payment even if property owners missed payment on mortgage loans that National Note held.

Contrary to Palmer’s claims, National Note used most of the money it took in from new investors to pay earlier investors, making it a classic Ponzi scheme, the SEC alleged. It said that since 2009, National Note would not have been able survive but for the influx of new investor funds, and that its payments to investors all but stopped in October 2011. According to the SEC’s complaint, Palmer reassured investors that the money would be forthcoming, and continued to solicit new investors in National Note without disclosing the fact that it is delinquent in making payments to existing investors.

The SEC’s complaint charges National Note and Palmer with violating the anti-fraud and securities registration provisions of U.S. securities laws. Palmer also faces charges that he operated as an unregistered broker-dealer.

Scott Frost, Paul Feindt, Matthew Himes and Alison Okinaka of the SEC’s Salt Lake Regional Office conducted the investigation; Thomas Melton will lead the litigation.

FORMER EXECS FAIR FINANCIAL COMPANY CONVICTED IN $200 MILLION FRAUD SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Three Former Executives Convicted for Roles in $200 Million Fraud Scheme Involving Fair Financial Company Investors
Three former executives of Fair Financial Company, an Ohio financial services business, were found guilty for their roles in a scheme to defraud approximately 5,000 investors of more than $200 million, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; Joseph H. Hogsett, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana; and Special Agent in Charge Robert Holley of the FBI in Indiana announced today.

Following an eight-day trial, a federal jury in the Southern District of Indiana returned its verdict late yesterday.   Timothy S. Durham, 49, the former chief executive officer of Fair, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, 10 counts of wire fraud and one count of securities fraud.   James F. Cochran, 56, the former chairman of the board of Fair, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, one count of securities fraud and six counts of wire fraud.   Rick D. Snow, 48, the former chief financial officer of Fair, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, one count of securities fraud and three counts of wire fraud.

“Mr. Durham and his co-conspirators used lies and deceit as their business model,” said Assistant Attorney General Breuer.   “They duped investors into thinking they were running a legitimate financial services company and misled regulators and others about the health of their failing firm.   But all along, they were lining their pockets with other people’s money.   The jury held them accountable for their crimes, and they each now face the prospect of significant prison time.”

“No matter who you are, no matter how much money you have, no matter how powerful your friends are, no one is above the law,” U.S. Attorney Hogsett said. “The Office of the United States Attorney will not stand idly by and allow a culture of corruption to exist in this community, this state, or this country.   The decision made in this courtroom sends a powerful warning that if you sacrifice the truth in the name of greed, if you steal from another’s American dream to try and make your own, you will be caught.”

“This verdict represents a victory in the pursuit of justice,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Holley.   “I would like to commend the hard work and dedication of the prosecution team and the FBI investigative team, however, we must remember that the victims of this fraud are still suffering.  I would also like to thank Indiana State Police Superintendent Paul Whitesell for the contributions of his task force officer in this investigation.”

Durham and Cochran purchased Fair, whose headquarters were in Akron, Ohio, in 2002.  According to the evidence presented at trial, between approximately February 2005 through the end of November 2009, Durham, Cochran and Snow executed a scheme to defraud Fair’s investors by making and causing others to make false and misleading statements about Fair’s financial condition and about the manner in which they were using Fair investor money.   The evidence also established that Durham, Cochran and Snow executed the scheme to enrich themselves, to obtain millions of dollars of investors’ funds through false representations and promises, and to conceal from the investing public Fair’s true financial condition and the manner in which Fair was using investor money.

When Durham and Cochran purchased Fair in 2002, Fair reported debts to investors from the sale of investment certificates of approximately $37 million and income producing assets in the form of finance receivables of approximately $48 million.   By November 2009, after Durham and Cochran had owned the company for seven years, Fair’s debts to investors from the sale of investment certificates had grown to more than $200 million, while Fair’s income producing assets consisted only of the loans to Durham and Cochran, their associates and the businesses they owned or controlled, which they claimed were worth approximately $240 million, and finance receivables of approximately $24 million.  

After Durham and Cochran acquired Fair, they changed the manner in which the company operated and used its funds.   Rather than using the funds Fair raised from investors primarily for the purpose of purchasing finance receivables, Durham and Cochran caused Fair to extend loans to themselves, their associates and businesses they owned or controlled, which caused a steady and substantial deterioration in Fair’s financial condition.

Durham, Cochran and Snow terminated Fair’s independent accountants who, at various points during 2005 and 2006, told the defendants that many of Fair’s loans were impaired or did not have sufficient collateral.   After firing the accountants, the defendants never released audited financial statements for 2005, and never obtained or released audited financial statements for 2006 through September 2009.   With independent accountants no longer auditing Fair’s financial statements, the defendants were able to conceal from investors Fair’s true financial condition.
         
The evidence presented at trial established that Durham, Cochran and Snow falsely represented, in registration documents and offering circulars submitted to the State of Ohio Division of Securities and in offering circulars distributed to investors, that the loans on Fair’s books were assets that could support Fair’s sale of investment certificates.   The defendants knew that in reality, the loans were worthless or grossly overvalued; producing little or no cash proceeds; supported by insufficient or non-existent collateral to assure repayment; and in part advances, salaries, bonuses and lines of credit for Durham and Cochran’s personal expenses.

The defendants engaged in a variety of other fraudulent activities to conceal from the Division of Securities and from investors Fair’s true financial health and cash flow problems, including making false and misleading statements to concerned investors who either had not received principal or interest payments on their certificates from Fair or who were worried about Fair’s financial health, and directing employees of Fair not to pay investors who were owed interest or principal payments on their certificates.   Even though Fair’s financial condition had deteriorated and Fair was experiencing severe cash flow problems, Durham and Cochran continued to funnel Fair investor money to themselves for their personal expenses, to their family, friends and acquaintances, and to the struggling businesses that they owned or controlled.

This case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Winfield D. Ong and NicholasE. Surmacz of the Southern District of Indiana, Trial Attorney Henry P. Van Dyck and Senior Deputy Chief for Litigation Kathleen McGovern of the Fraud Section in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.  The investigation was led by the FBI in Indianapolis.

Durham, Cochran and Snow each face a maximum of five years in prison for the conspiracy count, 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count and 20 years in prison for the securities fraud count.   Additionally, each defendant could be fined $250,000 for each count of conviction.
         
This prosecution is part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.  The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources.  The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

Sunday, June 24, 2012

SEC APPROVES RULE DIRECTING EXCHANGES TO ADOPT LISTING STANDARDS FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND COMP. ADVISERS

FROM:  SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., June 20, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission has approved a rule that directs national securities exchanges to adopt listing standards for public company boards of directors and compensation advisers.
The new rule, required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires exchange listing standards to address:
The independence of the members on a compensation committee

The committee’s authority to retain compensation advisers

The committee’s consideration of the independence of any compensation advisers and

The committee’s responsibility for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any compensation adviser.
Once an exchange’s new listing standards are in effect, a listed company must meet the standards in order for its shares to continue trading on that exchange.
“This rule will help to enhance the board's decision-making process on executive compensation matters, particularly the selection, engagement and oversight of compensation advisers, and will provide more transparency with respect to conflicts of interest of consultants engaged by boards,” said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro.

The SEC also amended its proxy disclosure rules to require new disclosures from companies about their use of compensation consultants and conflicts of interest.

The new rule and rule amendments will take effect 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. No later than 90 days after effectiveness, each exchange that lists equity securities must propose listing standards that comply with the new rule. The new listing standards must be approved by the Commission within one year of the new rule becoming effective.

# # #

FACT SHEET
Listing Standards for Compensation Committees and Compensation Advisers
Background
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 952 of the Act addresses the issue of executive compensation by focusing on the compensation committees formed by corporate boards as well as the compensation advisers that these committees retain.
Section 952 requires the SEC to direct the exchanges to adopt certain “listing standards” relating to the independence of the members on a compensation committee, the committee’s authority to retain compensation advisers, and the committee’s responsibility for the appointment, compensation and work of any compensation adviser. Once an exchange’s new listing standards are in effect, a listed company must meet these standards in order for its shares to continue trading on that exchange.

In addition, the provision requires each company to disclose in its proxy material for an annual meeting of shareholders whether its board’s compensation committee retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant. The provision also requires a company to disclose whether the work of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed.

Requirements of the Rules 
Independence of Compensation Committee Members
Under new Rule 10C-1, the exchanges are required to adopt listing standards that require each member of a company’s compensation committee to be a member of the board of directors and to be independent. In developing a definition of independence, the exchanges will be required to consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
The source of compensation of a member of the board of directors, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the company to such director, and

Whether a member of the board of directors of a company is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the company.

Authority and Funding of the Compensation Committee
Rule 10C-1 requires the exchanges to adopt listing standards providing that the compensation committee of a listed company:
May, in its sole discretion, retain or obtain the advice of a compensation adviser

Is directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of compensation advisers, and

Must be appropriately funded by the listed company.

Compensation Adviser Selection
Rule 10C-1 also requires the exchanges to adopt listing standards providing that a compensation committee may select a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other adviser, other than in-house legal counsel, only after considering the following six independence factors:
Whether the compensation consulting company employing the compensation adviser is providing any other services to the company

How much the compensation consulting company who employs the compensation adviser has received in fees from the company, as a percentage of that person’s total revenue

What policies and procedures have been adopted by the compensation consulting company employing the compensation adviser to prevent conflicts of interest

Whether the compensation adviser has any business or personal relationship with a member of the compensation committee

Whether the compensation adviser owns any stock of the company, and

Whether the compensation adviser or the person employing the adviser has any business or personal relationship with an executive officer of the issuer.
The exchanges themselves may impose additional factors.

Oversight by Board Members Outside of a Committee
These listing standards, with limited exceptions, will also apply to members of a listed company’s board of directors who, in the absence of a board committee, oversee executive compensation matters on behalf of the board of directors.

Exemptions
Rule 10C-1 requires the exchanges to exempt the following four categories of companies from the compensation committee independence requirements:
Limited partnerships

Companies in bankruptcy proceedings 
Open-end management investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940

Any foreign private issuer that discloses in its annual report the reasons that the foreign private issuer does not have an independent compensation committee.

Rule 10C-1 authorizes the exchanges to exempt a particular relationship from the independence requirements applicable to compensation committee members.

Rule 10C-1 also exempts controlled companies and smaller reporting companies from all of the requirements of the new compensation committee listing standards and authorizes the exchanges to exempt other categories of issuers. As with all listing standards, the exchanges would need to seek the approval of the SEC before adopting any exemptions.

Compensation Consultant Conflicts of Interest Disclosure
Exchange Act registrants subject to the federal proxy rules already are required to disclose information about their use of compensation consultants, including specific information about fees paid to consultants. Under the new amendments to the proxy disclosure rules, with respect to any compensation consultant that has played a role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation and whose work has raised any conflict of interest, companies will be required to disclose the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed.