FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SEC Charges Advisers to the RAHFCO Hedge Funds with Fraud
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") filed a civil injunctive action on March 1, 2013, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York relating to the fraudulent offer and sale of limited partnership interests in two hedge funds -- RAHFCO Funds LP and RAHFCO Growth Fund LP (collectively "RAHFCO Hedge Funds"). The Commission charged RAHFCO Management Group, LLC ("RAHFCO Management"), a Delaware corporation and general partner of RAHFCO Hedge Funds; its principal, Randal Kent Hansen of Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Hudson Capital Partners Corporation (HCP), a New York corporation, the sub-adviser/portfolio manager of RAHFCO Hedge Funds; and Vincent Puma of Morganville, New Jersey, the principal of HCP, with securities fraud, among other violations of the securities laws, for engaging in a fraudulent scheme that defrauded investors out of more than $10 million.
The Commission's complaint alleges that the RAHFCO Hedge Funds raised approximately $23.5 million from over 100 investors nationwide between 2007 and the funds' collapse in about May 2011. Additionally, the complaint alleges that the primary function of the Defendants' scheme was to convince investors to invest in fraudulent pooled investments that purportedly traded in options and futures on the S&P 500 Index and in equities, then the Defendants siphoned off the invested funds for the Defendants' own purposes. The complaint also alleges that, in furtherance of their fraud, Defendants engaged in schemes to defraud investors and made material misrepresentations to investors and others.
The Commission's complaint alleges that all of the defendants violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The complaint also alleges that Hansen and RAHFCO Management violated Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8 and that Puma and HCP aided and abetted these violations. Finally, the complaint alleges that Hansen and RAHFCO Management violated Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act by acting as unregistered broker-dealers. The Commission's complaint seeks permanent injunctions, third-tier civil penalties, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, and other relief against all of the
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Mar. 7, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a California-based lawyer who has been fraudulently churning out baseless legal opinion letters for penny stocks through his website without researching and evaluating the individual stock offerings.
Legal opinion letters are issued to transfer agents on behalf of holders of restricted stock seeking to sell the stock freely in the public markets. Transfer agents typically require a lawyer’s opinion explaining the legal basis for lifting the restriction on the stock and allowing it to be freely traded.
The SEC alleges that Brian Reiss of Huntington Beach, Calif., set up 144lettera.com to promote his legal opinion letter business and advertise "volume discount" rates while noting "penny stocks not a problem." Reiss steered potential customers to his website by making bids on search terms through Google’s AdWords, and then relied on a computer-generated template to draft his opinion letters within minutes absent any true analysis of the facts behind each stock offering. The letters from Reiss ultimately made false and misleading statements and facilitated the sale of securities in violation of the registration provisions of the federal securities laws.
"Reiss flouted his responsibilities as a gatekeeper in the issuance of stock, and churned out opinion letters to make a quick buck," said Andrew M. Calamari, Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. "Attorneys who act as gatekeepers in our markets have a solemn responsibility to ensure that they provide accurate information to the marketplace."
Sanjay Wadhwa, Senior Associate Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office, added, "Reiss falsely claimed he had conducted investigations into various stocks and determined them to be exempt from registration under the securities laws. He misrepresented critical facts, and our enforcement action seeks to bring Reiss’s opinion mill to an end."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, Reiss began issuing the fraudulent legal opinion letters in 2008. He advertised a $285 rate for each letter and a "volume discount" rate of $195 per letter. Reiss routinely made inaccurate statements bearing on whether the restriction should be lifted, and failed to conduct even a token inquiry into the underlying facts. He knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that shareholders seeking his opinion letters intended to sell their stock in the public markets, and that transfer agents would rely on his opinion letters to issue stock certificates without restrictive legends.
According to the SEC’s complaint, the false and misleading statements that Reiss made in opinion letters induced transfer agents for several public companies to remove the restrictive legends from the stock certificates and permit the sale of free-trading shares to the public. Reiss provided the opinion letters to transfer agents who required assurances in the form of a legal opinion that the transactions qualified for an exemption from the registration requirements under the federal securities laws. With Reiss’s baseless assurances, the transfer agents issued stock certificates without restrictive legends and enabled the stock to be traded freely.
The SEC’s complaint charges Reiss with violating Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The SEC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest and financial penalties. The SEC seeks to bar Reiss from participating in the offering of any penny stock pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act. The SEC also seeks permanent injunctions – including an injunction prohibiting Reiss from providing legal services in connection with an unregistered offer or sale of securities.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Charles D. Riely and Amelia A. Cottrell – members of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Market Abuse Unit – along with Shannon A. Keyes and Kathy Murdocco of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. The SEC’s litigation will be led by Mr. Riely and Ms. Keyes. The New York office’s broker-dealer examination team of Richard Heaphy, Michael McAuliffe, and Simone Celio, Jr. provided assistance with the investigation.
The SEC also acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in Florida Enters Preliminary Injunction Order against Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Lloyds Commodities, LLC, and 18 Other Defendants in Connection with Operating a Multi-Million Dollar Fraudulent Precious Metals Scheme
Finding that new Dodd-Frank anti-fraud authority applies, Court freezes defendants’ assets and appoints special corporate monitor for corporate defendants
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that the Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered a Preliminary Injunction Order against Defendants Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC; Hunter Wise Services, LLC; Hunter Wise Credit, LLC; Hunter Wise Trading, LLC; Lloyds Commodities, LLC; Lloyds Commodities Credit Company, LLC; Lloyds Services, LLC; C.D. Hopkins Financial, LLC; Hard Asset Lending Group, LLC; Blackstone Metals Group, LLC; Newbridge Alliance, Inc.; United States Capital Trust, LLC; Harold Edward Martin, Jr.; Fred Jager; James Burbage; Frank Gaudino; Baris Keser; Chadewick Hopkins; John King; and David A. Moore that prohibits the Defendants from offering investments in physical metals to the retail public.
The Court’s decision stems from the CFTC’s December 5, 2012 Complaint charging the Defendants with fraudulently soliciting and accepting at least $46 million from hundreds of customers since July 2011 to invest in physical precious metals, such as gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper. (See CFTC Press Release 6447-12, December 5, 2012). According to the CFTC Complaint, the Defendants claimed to sell physical metals to customers who made a down payment on the amount of physical metals they wished to buy, usually 25 percent of the total purchase price. Defendants allegedly claimed to arrange loans for the balance of the purchase price, and advised customers that their physical metals would be stored in a secure depository. The Complaint alleges that these statements were false because the Defendants did not own, purchase or store any metal for their customers, and that the Defendants cheated and defrauded customers by charging customers interest on loans which were never made, and storage and insurance fees on metals that did not exist. In addition, the Complaint alleges that the offering of these investments in physical metals constituted illegal, off-exchange retail commodity contracts in violation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).
Following a hearing on February 22, 2013, Judge Middlebrooks found that the CFTC had shown a likelihood of success in proving the allegations of the Complaint. In the Court’s Order issued on February 25, Judge Middlebrooks described Hunter Wise as "the conductor of th[e] orchestra, with the other Defendants playing instruments at Hunter Wise’s direction." According to the Order, Hunter Wise provided reports to customers that were misleading because they created the "illusion that actual commodities are being transferred into or out of their accounts, when in reality, no real metals are being transferred as a result of the transaction." According to the Order, "Hunter Wise does not actually buy, sell, loan, store, or transfer physical metals in connection with these retail commodity transactions. Instead, Hunter Wise records and tracks customer orders and trading positions, and then manages its exposure to these retail customer trading positions by using the customer’s funds to trade derivatives – such as futures, forwards and rolling spot contracts – in its own margin trading accounts."
The Court’s Order prohibits the Defendants from trading, soliciting orders, committing fraud or engaging in business activity related to contracts or transactions regulated by the CFTC. In its continuing litigation against the Defendants, the CFTC is seeking a permanent civil injunction, in addition to other remedial relief, including restitution to customers.
The Court’s Order also froze all the defendants’ assets, and appointed Melanie Damian, Esq. as Special Corporate Monitor to assume control over the corporate defendants. The CFTC has established a website that will be updated periodically with information about the ongoing proceedings and has other relevant information for consumers and other victims, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/CaseStatusReports/hunterwise.
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the CFTC’s jurisdiction over transactions in physical metals, like these, and requires that such transactions be executed on or subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange or commodity market, according to the Complaint. This new requirement took effect on July 16, 2011. The Complaint alleges that all of the Defendants’ financed commodity transactions after July 16, 2011, were illegal. The Complaint also alleges that the Defendants defrauded customers in all of these financed commodity transactions.
In January 2012 the CFTC issued a Consumer Fraud Advisory regarding precious metals fraud, saying that it had seen an increase in the number of companies offering customers the opportunity to buy or invest in precious metals. The CFTC’s Consumer Fraud Advisory specifically warned that frequently companies do not purchase any physical metals for the customer, instead simply keep the customer’s funds. The Consumer Fraud Advisory further cautioned consumers that leveraged commodity transactions are unlawful unless executed on a regulated exchange.
The CFTC thanks the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority for their assistance in this matter.
The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff responsible for this action are Carlin Metzger, Heather Johnson, Joseph Konizeski, Jeff LeRiche, Peter Riggs, Jennifer Chapin, Steven Turley, Brigitte Weyls, Joseph Patrick, Susan Gradman, Thaddeus Glotfelty, William Janulis, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
On March 4, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah charging Canadian stock promoter Colin McCabe with disseminating false and misleading information to investors when recommending penny stocks to them.
In its complaint, the Commission alleges that, from at least early 2008 through 2011, McCabe, among other things: made false and misleading claims about how he selected recommended stocks; failed to disclose to his newsletter subscribers that he was being paid substantial sums to recommend some of the same stocks in his other publications; and made false and misleading statements about the assets of one of the issuers he recommended.
According to the complaint, McCabe falsely claimed that his publications were the result of extensive research conducted by researchers with relevant expertise and contacts, when, in fact, McCabe’s research was limited to reviewing issuers’ filings with the Commission, press releases, and issuer websites, and he did not have any assistance in researching stocks or writing his publications. The complaint alleges that while touting the quality of his stock picking research, McCabe failed to disclose to his newsletter subscribers that he was being paid substantial sums, a total of more than $16 million between early 2008 and 2011, to promote some of the same stocks he recommended to them in his other publications.
The complaint further alleges that McCabe falsely represented that Guinness Exploration Inc. ("Guinness") had acquired a mining property well before discoveries in May 2009 turned the region into "a red-hot area play," when, in fact, the property was not acquired until months later in November 2009. According to the complaint, McCabe’s claims that Guinness’ property held "an estimated recoverable resource in excess of 1 million ounces of gold" were also false and misleading.
The complaint alleges that McCabe, doing business as Elite Stock Report, The Stock Profiteer and Resource Stock Advisor, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The Commission seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining McCabe from future violations of the federal securities laws and ordering him to pay civil penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest.
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three Bay Area real estate fund managers with fraud for secretly using the assets of a new real estate fund to rescue an older, rapidly collapsing fund.
The SEC alleges that Walter Ng, his son Kelly Ng, and Bruce Horwitz lured investors into their real estate fund called Mortgage Fund '08 LLC (MF08) by claiming it was safe and secure and would replicate the success of their earlier real estate fund, R.E. Loans LLC. In reality, R.E. Loans could no longer make payouts to its investors, so the Ngs funneled millions of dollars from MF08 to prop up R.E. Loans. The Ngs and Horwitz falsely touted both funds' performance in their effort to continue raising money. They raised more than $85 million during an 18-month period from investors primarily living in the San Francisco area.
According to the SEC's complaint filed in federal court in Oakland, the Ngs and Horwitz promoted the MF08 fund in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis as a new opportunity to invest in conservatively underwritten commercial real estate loans secured by deeds of trust. But the Ngs and their advisory firm, The Mortgage Fund LLC, immediately began transferring money raised by MF08 to R.E. Loans so that they could afford distributions to investors in that fund. From December 2007 to March 2008, the Ngs transferred almost $39 million from MF08 to R.E. Loans. They later attempted to justify the transfers by claiming MF08 had purchased three loans from R.E. Loans that totaled around $39 million.
The SEC further alleges that both the Ngs and Horwitz lured investors into MF08 by making false claims about its performance and the R.E. Loans fund's performance. What investors did not know was that both R.E. Loans and MF08 began to experience significant and dramatic borrower defaults in 2008. For example, the percentage of the R.E. Loans portfolio that was either delinquent or in default increased from 19 percent in January 2008 to 48 percent in August 2008. The percentage of the MF08 portfolio that was delinquent increased from 16 percent in March 2008 to 74 percent in mid-June 2008.
The SEC alleges that despite the funds' rapidly disintegrating portfolios, the Ngs and Horwitz repeatedly assured investors that R.E. Loans and MF08 were performing well and the underlying loans were safe and secure. For example, both Walter Ng and Horwitz touted the funds' purportedly positive performance at a June 2008 investor dinner in Oakland's Chinatown. Additionally, Walter Ng and Kelly Ng in July 2008 characterized MF08 as a "fantastic success" even though more than 70 percent of its loan portfolio was delinquent by that time.
The SEC's complaint charges Walter Ng and Kelly Ng with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act"); Bruce Horwitz with violating Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder; and The Mortgage Fund with violating Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act. The Complaint seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of wrongful profits, and financial penalties against all four defendants.
FROM: COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler on Libor before the Global Financial Markets Association’s Future of Global Benchmarks Conference
February 28, 2013
Good morning. Thank you, Ken, for that kind introduction. I also want to thank the Global Financial Markets Association for the invitation to speak at your conference on the Future of Global Financial Benchmarks.
This conference comes at a critical juncture.
It comes as there has been a lot of media attention surrounding the three enforcement cases against Barclays, UBS and RBS for manipulative conduct with respect to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and other benchmark interest rate submissions.
More importantly, it comes as market participants and regulators around the globe have turned to consider the critical issue of how we reform and revise a system that has become so reliant on LIBOR and similar rates.
I believe that continuing to reference such rates diminishes market integrity and is unsustainable in the long run.
Let’s look at what we’ve learned to date.
First, the interbank, unsecured market to which LIBOR and other such rates reference has changed dramatically. Some say that it is has become essentially nonexistent. In 2008, Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England, said of LIBOR: "It is, in many ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each other."
There has been a significant structural shift in how financial market participants finance their balance sheets and trading positions. There is an increasing shift from borrowing unsecured (without posting collateral) toward borrowings that are secured by posting collateral. In particular, this shift has occurred within the funding markets between banks.
The London interbank, unsecured market used to be where banks funded themselves at a wholesale rate. But the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent events have shattered this model.
The European debt crisis that began in 2010 and the downgrading of large banks’ credit ratings have exacerbated the hesitancy of banks to lend unsecured to one another.
Other factors have played a role in this structural shift. Central banks are providing significant funding directly to banks. Banks are more closely managing demands on their balance sheets. And looking forward, recent changes to Basel capital rules will take root and will move banks even further from interbank lending.
The Basel III capital rules now include an asset correlation factor, which requires additional capital when a bank is exposed to another bank. This was included in the new standards to reduce financial system interconnectedness.
Furthermore, the rules introduce provisions for a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). For the first time, banks will have to hold a sufficient amount of high quality liquid assets to cover their projected net outflows over 30 days.
At a roundtable on financial market benchmarks held in London last week, one major bank indicated that the LCR rule alone would make it prohibitively expensive for banks to lend to each other in the interbank market for tenors greater than 30 days. Thus, this banker posited that it is unlikely that banks will return to the days when they would lend to each other for three months, six months or a year.
Second, we also have learned that LIBOR – central to borrowing, lending and hedging in our economy – has been readily and pervasively rigged.
Barclays, UBS and RBS were fined $2.5 billion for manipulative conduct by the CFTC, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Justice Department. At each bank, the misconduct spanned many years, took place in offices in several cities around the globe, included numerous people – sometimes dozens, even included senior management, and involved multiple benchmark rates and currencies. In each case, there was evidence of collusion.
In the UBS and RBS cases, one or more inter-dealer brokers painted false pictures to influence submissions of other banks, i.e., to spread the falsehoods more widely. Barclays and UBS also were reporting falsely low borrowing rates in an effort to protect their reputation.
These findings are shocking, though the lack of an interbank market made the system more vulnerable to such misconduct.
Third, we have seen a significant amount of publicly available market data that raises questions about the integrity of LIBOR today.
A comparison of LIBOR submissions to the volatilities of other short-term rates reflects that LIBOR is remarkably much more stable than any comparable rate. For instance, how is it that in 2012 – if we look at the 252 submission days for three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR – the banks didn’t change their rate 85 percent of the time?
Why is it that some banks didn’t change their submissions for three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR for upwards of 115 straight trading days? This means that one bank said the market for its funding was completely stable for 115 straight trading days or more than five months.
When comparing LIBOR submissions to the same banks’ credit default swaps spreads or to the broader markets’ currency forward rates, why is there a continuing gap between LIBOR and what those other market rates tell us?
In the fall of 2011, there was so much uncertainty in markets due to the European debt crisis and challenges here in the United States. How is it that a number of the banks were still saying they could borrow in the interbank market for one year at about 1 percent, even though the traded markets for the same institutions’ one-year credit default swaps were trading four or five times higher?
Further, there’s a well-known concept in finance called interest rate parity, basically that currency forward rates will align with interest rates in two different economies. Why is it that since the financial crisis, that has not been the case, whether looking at the dollar versus the euro, sterling or yen? Theory hasn’t been aligning with practice. The borrowing rate implied in the currency markets is quite different than LIBOR.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, whom you may know as the bestselling author of The Black Swan, has written a recent book called Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder. His main theme is: "Just as human bones get stronger when subjected to stress and tension … many things in life benefit from stress, disorder, volatility, and turmoil."
He notes that systems that are fragile succumb to stress, tension and change. Systems that are not readily able to evolve and adapt are fragile.
One of his main points is that propping up a fragile system in the interest of maintaining a sense of stability only creates more instability in the end. One can buy an artificial sense of calm for a while, but when that calm cracks, the resulting turmoil is invariably greater.
I think that the financial system’s reliance on interest rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR and Euribor, is particularly fragile.
These benchmarks basically haven’t adapted to the significant changes in the market. The interbank, unsecured lending market, particularly for longer tenors, is essentially nonexistent. LIBOR and similar benchmarks have been readily and pervasively rigged. And there is substantial market data that raises questions about LIBOR’s continuing integrity.
Thus, the challenge we face is how does the financial system adapt to this significant shift?
At the London roundtable on financial market benchmarks held last week, a man approached me to discuss a bit of the history of LIBOR in which he had personally been involved. It seems that in 1970, as a young banker, he worked on a floating rate note deal for ENEL issued by Bankers Trust that used a reference rate called LIBOR.
A lot has changed since 1970 – Nixon was President, we were in the midst of the Vietnam War, the Beatles released their final album Let It Be, and I was a kid wearing bell-bottoms.
Sixteen years later, the British Bankers Association (BBA) began publishing LIBOR as we know it today. A lot has changed since 1986 – Reagan was President, we were in the midst of the Cold War, and I was dating the wonderful woman I would marry, Francesca.
And now, I have three wonderful daughters but am a single dad. In life, one must adapt to change.
Yet LIBOR – embedded in the wiring of our financial system – largely remains the same.
This is why international regulators and market participants have begun to discuss transition. The CFTC and the FSA are co-chairing the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Task Force on financial market benchmarks. The task force is developing international principles for benchmarks and examining best mechanisms or protocols for a benchmark transition, if needed.
In January, the task force published the Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks, and a final report will be published this spring.
One of the key questions in the consultation is how do we address transition when a benchmark is no longer tied to sufficient transactions and may have become unreliable or obsolete?
The consultation seeks public input about transition in two contexts:
• Prospectively, the consultation suggests that contracts referencing a benchmark would be more resilient if those contracts had embedded in them a contingency plan for when a benchmark may become obsolete.
• And perhaps more challenging, the consultation asks what to do about existing contracts that reference a benchmark that becomes obsolete, if those contracts don’t have an effective contingency plan.
Martin Wheatley of the FSA recommended that Canadian dollar LIBOR and Australian dollar LIBOR cease to exist so a transition is necessary, at least for those reference rates.
The market has some experience with transition, albeit for smaller contracts, such as for energy and shipping rate benchmarks. The basic components of such a transition include identifying a new and reliable benchmark, one that is anchored in transactions. The new and existing benchmarks run in parallel for a period of time to allow market participants to transition.
A critical statement in the consultation report was: "The Task Force is of the view that a benchmark should as a matter of priority be anchored by observable transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers in order for it to function as a credible indicator of prices, rates or index values."
It went on to say: "However, at some point, an insufficient level of actual transaction data raises concerns as to whether the benchmark continues to reflect prices or rates that have been formed by the competitive forces of supply and demand."
I agree with both of these statements. A reference rate has to be based on facts, not fiction.
Without transactions, the situation is similar to trying to buy a house, when your realtor can’t give you comparable transaction prices in the neighborhood – because no houses were sold in the neighborhood in years.
Given what we know now, it’s critical that we move to a more robust framework for financial benchmarks, particularly those for short-term, variable interest rates. There are alternatives that market participants are considering that are grounded in real transactions. These include the overnight index swaps rate, benchmark rates based on actual short-term collateralized financings, and benchmarks based on government borrowing rates.
There are important ongoing international efforts to come up with principles for financial market benchmarks. These principles will address governance, conflicts of interest and transparency of reporting.
Nevertheless, even if we’re able to address these issues, there remains the issue of whether LIBOR and similar rates continue to reference an underlying market that is essentially nonexistent.
I recognize that moving on from LIBOR may be challenging. Today, LIBOR is the reference rate for 70 percent of the U.S. futures market, most of the swaps market and nearly half of U.S. adjustable rate mortgages.
I recognize that moving on from LIBOR may be unpopular. But as the author Nassim Taleb might suggest, it would be best not to fall prey to accepting that LIBOR or any benchmark is "too big to replace."
I believe that the best way to promote both market integrity and long-term stability is by ensuring that benchmarks are reliable and honest. And I believe it’s critical to work together to promote a smooth transition, where needed.
I recognize that change can be hard, but change is also a natural part of life.
After all, I’m sure you’re relieved I didn’t show up in bell-bottoms today.
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