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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Sunday, October 6, 2013

COURT ORDERS DEFENDANTS TO PAY OVER $18 MILLION DISGORGEMENT, PENALTIES FOR MISCONDUCT IN SECURITIES MARKET

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Court Enters Final Judgment by Consent Against SEC Defendants Philip A. Falcone, Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C., Harbinger Capital Partners Special Situations GP, L.L.C., and Harbinger Capital Partners LLC

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that, on September 16, 2013, the Honorable Paul A. Crotty, United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, entered a final judgment by consent against Defendants Philip A. Falcone, Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C., Harbinger Capital Partners Special Situations GP, L.L.C., and Harbinger Capital Partners LLC in two related actions. No judgment was entered against Defendant Peter A. Jenson. The final judgment bars Falcone from the securities industry for at least five years. In addition, Falcone and his advisory firm Harbinger Capital Partners agreed to a settlement in which they must pay more than $18 million in disgorgement and penalties and admit wrongdoing.

The SEC filed enforcement actions in June 2012 alleging that Falcone improperly used $113 million in fund assets to pay his personal taxes, secretly favored certain customer redemption requests at the expense of other investors, and conducted an improper "short squeeze" in bonds issued by a Canadian manufacturing company. In the settlement papers filed with the court, Falcone and Harbinger admit to multiple acts of misconduct that harmed investors and interfered with the normal functioning of the securities markets.

On August 19, 2013, Falcone agreed to a settlement which requires him to pay $6,507,574 in disgorgement, $1,013,140 in prejudgment interest, and a $4 million penalty. The Harbinger entities are required to pay a $6.5 million penalty. Falcone also consented to the entry of a judgment barring him from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization with a right to reapply after five years. The bar will allow him to assist with the liquidation of his hedge funds under the supervision of an independent monitor.

Among the set of facts that Falcone and Harbinger admitted to in settlement papers filed with the court:

Falcone improperly borrowed $113.2 million from the Harbinger Capital Partners Special Situations Fund (SSF) at an interest rate less than SSF was paying to borrow money, to pay his personal tax obligation, at a time when Falcone had barred other SSF investors from making redemptions, and did not disclose the loan to investors for approximately five months.

Falcone and Harbinger granted favorable redemption and liquidity terms to certain large investors in HCP Fund I, and did not disclose certain of these arrangements to the fund's board of directors and the other fund investors.

During the summer of 2006, Falcone heard rumors that a Financial Services Firm was shorting the bonds of the Canadian manufacturer, and encouraging its customers to do the same.

In September and October 2006, Falcone retaliated against the Financial Services Firm for shorting the bonds by causing the Harbinger funds to purchase all of the remaining outstanding bonds in the open market.

Falcone and the other Defendants then demanded that the Financial Services Firm settle its outstanding transactions in the bonds and deliver the bonds that it owed. Defendants did not disclose at the time that it would be virtually impossible for the Financial Services Firm to acquire any bonds to deliver, as nearly the entire supply was locked up in the Harbinger funds' custodial account and the Harbinger funds were not offering them for sale.

Due to Falcone's and the other Defendants' improper interference with the normal interplay of supply and demand in the bonds, the bonds more than doubled in price during this period.

Saturday, October 5, 2013

SEC ANNOUNCES FRAUD CHARGES AGAINST COUPLE FOR "PATH TO RESIDENCY" INVESTOR FRAUD

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced fraud charges against a husband and wife in Texas for stealing funds from foreign investors under the guise of an investment opportunity to create U.S. jobs and a path to U.S. residency.

The SEC alleges that Marco and Bebe Ramirez and three companies they own have fraudulently raised at least $5 million from investors by falsely promising that their money would be invested as part of the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Pilot Program.  Through the program, foreign investors can earn conditional visas and eventually green cards by making investments in U.S. economic development projects that will create or preserve a minimum number of jobs for U.S. workers.  Instead of investing the money as promised, the Ramirezes routinely diverted investor funds to other undisclosed businesses and for their personal use.  In at least one instance, they used new investor funds to make Ponzi-like payments to an existing investor.

According to the SEC’s complaint unsealed today in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the Ramirezes initially targeted investors in Mexico, but more recently have solicited investors in Egypt and Nigeria.  The court has granted the SEC’s request to freeze the assets and accounts of the Ramirezes and their three companies: USA Now LLC, USA Now Energy Capital Group LP, and Now Co. Loan Services.  This effectively halts their ability to raise further money from investors or spend any remaining funds in the scheme.

“Through their investment scheme, the Ramirezes abused a program intended to attract foreign capital to create U.S. jobs,” said David R. Woodcock, Director of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office.  “The Ramirezes misappropriated investor funds for their own purposes without any regard for the harm they caused investors who were seeking an avenue to U.S. residency.”

The SEC and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) today issued a joint investor alert that provides additional information about the EB-5 program and cautions investors about fraudulent EB-5 schemes.  USCIS offered substantial assistance in the SEC’s investigation of the Ramirezes.  The EB-5 program is administered by USCIS and enables foreign investors to make their investments either directly in a business or through EB-5 “regional centers” that are private entities organized to promote economic development in specific geographic areas and industries.

According to the SEC’ s complaint, beginning in 2010, the Ramirezes sought approval from USCIS to register USA Now as an EB-5 regional center that would accept and direct investments from foreign investors into investment opportunities that would purportedly satisfy the EB-5 visa requirements.  But even before USCIS decided, the Ramirezes and other USA Now employees already had started soliciting investors with false promises about how their money would be invested.

The SEC alleges that the Ramirezes told investors that USA Now would hold their investments in escrow until they received USCIS approval.  And once the funds were released from escrow, they would be used for specific business purposes.  However, the Ramriezes failed to hold the funds in escrow as required, and instead routinely diverted the funds for other uses not described in offering materials, often on the same day the funds were received.  Among their misappropriations, the Ramirezes appear to have opened a Cajun-themed restaurant with investor funds and settled an unrelated lawsuit.  Meanwhile, none of the at least 10 investors identified by the SEC as victims of the scheme have received visas from USCIS, and none of their funds seem to remain in escrow.

“Even though investors provided the Ramirezes with at least $5 million, none of them have ever received conditional visas let alone green cards,” said David Peavler, Associate Director of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office.  “Instead, the Ramirezes opened a restaurant and purchased other assets for themselves and their employees.”

The SEC’s complaint alleges that the Ramirezes and their companies violated and aided and abetted violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The complaint seeks various relief including preliminary and permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and financial penalties.

The SEC’s investigation has been conducted by Timothy Evans, Kimberly Cain, Ty Martinez, and Jonathan Scott of the Fort Worth Regional Office.  The SEC’s litigation will be led by Mr. Evans and David Reece.  The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas.

CFTC FILES ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN REGARDS TO A COMMODITY POOL FRAUD SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges TOTE Fund LLC, MJS Capital Management LLC and their Principal, Michael J. Siegel with Commodity Pool Fraud

Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that it filed a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, charging two California firms, TOTE Fund LLC (TOTE) and MJS Capital Management LLC (MJS), and their principal, Michael J. Siegel of Northfield, New Jersey, with misappropriating funds in connection with two commodity pools.

The CFTC’s Complaint, filed on September 27, 2013, alleges that, from August 2007 through at least October 2010, TOTE, MJS, and Siegel, operated two commodity pools, the Monarch Futures Fund LLC (Monarch) and the QEP Futures Fund LLC (QEP). Pool participants placed approximately $1.375 million in the QEP and Monarch pools.

The Complaint further alleges that, from at least January 2008 through at least October 2010, the Defendants misappropriated funds totaling approximately $191,689 from Monarch and QEP pool participants by withdrawing money from the pools for non-pool expenses and taking fees to which they were not entitled. As alleged in the Complaint, despite earning incentive, management, and administrative fees of approximately $319,909 based on his trading for Monarch and QEP, Siegel transferred approximately $511,598 from bank accounts in the names of Monarch, QEP, and TOTE to his personal bank accounts, to a credit card account, and to at least one individual. Siegel used some of these funds to pay personal expenses, according to the Complaint, and MJS and Siegel also misappropriated funds by failing to return funds to at least two pool participants who sought to withdraw their funds from QEP.

As further alleged, TOTE, acting through Siegel, also failed to provide Monarch pool participants with copies of monthly statements received by TOTE from Futures Commission Merchants, as required by CFTC Regulation.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution to defrauded customers, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this case are Kara Mucha, James Garcia, Michael Solinsky, Gretchen L. Lowe, and Vincent A. McGonagle.

Friday, October 4, 2013

SEC FILES ACTION AGAINST NEW JERSEY RESIDENT IN ALLEGED PRIME BANK INVESTMENT SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

SEC Charges New Jersey Resident in Prime Bank Investment Scheme and Files Settled Charges Against California Attorney Escrow Agent

On September 27, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against New Jersey resident Brett A. Cooper and his companies Global Funding Systems LLC, Dream Holdings, LLC, Fortitude Investing, LLC, Peninsula Waterfront Development, LP and REOP Group Inc., who from at least November 2008 through about April 2012 perpetrated three fraudulent schemes and engaged in various fraudulent and deceitful acts, practices and courses of business in furtherance of those schemes.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that, in the first scheme, commonly referred to as a “Prime Bank Fraud”, Cooper raised approximately $1.4 million from investors by claiming to have special access to programs that through pooling of funds allowed individual investors to participate in this investment opportunity generally available only to Wall Street insiders. Cooper misrepresented to investors that the financial instruments are issued by the world’s largest and most financially sound banks; used vague, complex, and meaningless legal and financial terms designed to deceive the investors into believing that he offered legitimate investments; misrepresented that extraordinary returns of up to 1,000 percent within as little as 60 days were possible with little risk to principal; lied to investors that their principal would be collateralized with cash or semi-precious gemstones; and lied that their money would remain safe in escrow with attorneys pending the completion of certain steps in the transaction.

In the second scheme, also purportedly involving investment in prime bank paper, Cooper offered to participate as an investor in the purchase and trade of a $100 million bank guarantee on the condition that all investor funds were pooled in an attorney client trust account. Cooper sent a forged escrow agreement, purportedly from an attorney, containing wiring instructions for the attorney client trust account. The wire instructions, however, were for an account controlled by Cooper, not an attorney acting as escrow agent. The four investors unwittingly deposited a total of $925,000 in the phony escrow account which was, in fact, for Cooper’s company Dream Holdings, after which Cooper misappropriated the funds.

In March 2012 Cooper and his company REOP participated in a third scheme involving the sale of a purported Brazilian sovereign bond. Cooper claimed that, in exchange for a $50,000 “fee”, he would locate a buyer for the bond and open an account at a registered broker-dealer, which Cooper claimed was necessary to sell the bond. Cooper forged a letter that purported to be from the broker-dealer indicating that the bond had been “accepted” by the broker-dealer. Based upon this letter, the deceived investor paid Cooper’s $50,000 “fee”.

According to the SEC’s complaint, Cooper used the investor money to pay personal expenses, buy cars, pay associates in the scheme, and fund frequent gambling junkets to casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that, despite his offering and selling of securities, Cooper has never been registered with the SEC to sell securities.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that Cooper and his companies violated the antifraud and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal securities laws. Specifically, the complaint alleges that they each violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; that Cooper aided and abetted violations of Securities Act, Section 17(a) and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; and that Cooper also violated Exchange Act Section 15(a). The SEC seeks permanent injunctions, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest thereon, and civil penalties against each defendant.

Also on September 27, 2013, the SEC charged California attorney David H. Frederickson, a sole practitioner, and his law firm The Law Offices of David H. Frederickson, with aiding and abetting Cooper’s prime bank scheme in two transactions in 2010 and 2011.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed separately in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Frederickson served as escrow agent for two of Cooper’s prime bank transactions, and provided letters to investors stating that their investments were secured by collateral owned by Cooper’s company Global Funding Systems LLC. Frederickson did nothing to verify the value, authenticity, or ownership of the collateral, which Cooper claimed to be seven sapphires valued at $376 million. The SEC’s complaint also alleges that by the time Frederickson served as escrow agent for the second of these investors, Frederickson had learned facts indicating that Cooper had affixed Frederickson’s electronic signature to a forged escrow agreement that caused investor funds to be diverted to another Cooper company instead of being sent to Frederickson’s escrow account. Moreover, Frederickson told this second investor that he had served as escrow agent for Cooper in numerous other successful bank instrument trading transactions. In fact, none of the bank instrument trading transactions had been successful.

Frederickson earned a total of $6,790 in escrow fees for these transactions and for a transaction involving an escrow agreement Cooper forged, for which Frederickson provided no escrow services. These fees were paid from the funds of the defrauded investors.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Frederickson and his firm agreed to settle the case against them. The settlement is pending final approval by the court. Specifically, Frederickson and his firm consented to the entry of a final judgment that (1) permanently enjoins each of them from violating or aiding and abetting violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; (2) permanently enjoins each of them from providing professional legal or escrow services in connection with, or from participating directly or indirectly in, the issuance, offer, or sale of securities involving bank guarantees, medium term notes, standby letters of credit, structured notes, and similar instruments, provided, however, that such injunction shall not prevent Frederickson from purchasing or selling securities listed on a national securities exchange; and (3) orders them to pay, jointly and severally, disgorgement and prejudgment interest totaling $7,257, and a civil penalty in the amount of $25,000, for a total of $32,257.

As part of the settlement, and following the entry of the proposed final judgment, Frederickson, without admitting or denying the Commission’s findings, has consented to the entry of a Commission order pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of the Commission’s rules of practice permanently suspending him from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an attorney.
The SEC’s complaints in these matters allege fictitious investments involving so-called "bank guarantees," “stand-by letters of credit,” or foreign “trading platforms,” among other purported investment vehicles. 

SEC SETTLES WITH HEDGE FUND MANAGER IN PONZI SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
SEC Settles Action Against Oregon-Based Hedge Fund Manager Yusaf Jawed, Who Masterminded a Ponzi Scheme

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission announced that on Sept. 11, 2013, final judgments were entered against Yusaf Jawed and his two entities (Grifphon Asset Management, LLC and Grifphon Holdings, LLC), which enjoin them from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder and order them to pay disgorgement and interest of $33,909,974. The Commission's previously filed complaint alleged that Jawed through the two entities he controlled masterminded a long-running, $30-plus million Ponzi scheme that defrauded more than 100 investors in the Pacific Northwest and across the country.

Based on the final judgment against Jawed, the Commission issued today an Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions that bars Jawed from association with any investment adviser, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization.

Thursday, October 3, 2013

MARY JO WHITE'S SPEECH TO THE ANNUAL MARKET STRUCTURE CONFERENCE ON EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE

Focusing on Fundamentals: The Path to Address Equity Market Structure

 

Chair Mary Jo White

Security Traders Association 80th Annual Market Structure Conference, Washington, D.C.
Oct. 2, 2013
I am truly honored to be here, particularly at your 80th annual market structure conference, which makes your conference even older than I am – by about a decade and a half. Thank you for that as well. The much “older than I am” occasions get fewer and farther between.
As market professionals, you obviously live the U.S. equity markets first hand, day in and day out. As an association, you have used your voice to focus attention on the value of our equity markets – an all-important engine for capital formation, job creation, and economic growth.
Like you, I believe that we must constantly strive to ensure that the U.S. equity markets continue to serve the interests of all investors. That mutual challenge must come fully of age and address today’s, not yesterday’s, markets. And today, I will speak about the path forward.

Attracting Investors and Public Companies

The success or failure of capital formation in the equity markets depends on two key constituencies – investors and public companies.
Without investors willing to accept the long-term risks and rewards of ownership in public companies, the equity markets cannot exist. This is equally true whether they participate in the markets directly or indirectly through institutional investors, like mutual or pension funds.
But even interested investors will be greatly limited in their choices if the equity markets do not provide an effective and efficient way for a broad range of public companies to access capital.
Companies directly raise capital in primary offerings, but it is the secondary market that makes these offerings viable. Without a robust secondary market, companies simply cannot attract the necessary interest from investors. A good secondary market assures investors will have an efficient means of liquidating their positions if and when they choose. And a strong secondary market generates price discovery that helps efficiently allocate capital to the companies most able to put it to productive uses.
Market structure plays an essential role in attracting investors and companies to the public equity markets. Our market structure should inspire confidence in investors and companies that they will be treated fairly and that the system will work efficiently. Without this confidence, our market structure can act as a headwind that will impede capital formation.
We are fortunate that the U.S. equity markets currently operate from a position of extraordinary strength. [1] The U.S. equity markets are rightly considered the envy of the world in terms of the companies they attract and their broad investor participation.
But markets continually evolve, and there are signs that require our attention. The number of U.S.-listed companies has declined to approximately 4,900 from a high of more than 8,000 in 1997.[2] And, while estimates of equity participation reached a high of 65% of U.S. households in 2007, they have since declined each year, despite the general rise in equity price levels.[3]

Understanding the Fundamentals

It is natural to ask whether these signs reflect problems in our present equity market structure, particularly given the sweeping transformations of recent years. As traders, you are well aware that trading today is high-tech, high-speed, and widely dispersed among many different trading venues.[4] The extremely short-term strategies of high-frequency trading firms represent more than half of all trading volume.[5] A steadily increasing percentage of trading occurs in “dark” venues, which now appear to execute more than half of the orders of long-term investors.[6] And technology itself has been a transformative force, enabling previously unimaginable methods for order generation, routing, and execution.
Although some have argued otherwise, these developments are not attributable solely to regulatory choices. Competition plays a powerful role. Well before Regulation NMS, market participants were trading in dark pools and trading with highly automated strategies. Many jurisdictions around the world with different regulatory structures than ours are dealing with analogous issues related to off-exchange venues and automated trading.
The SEC, of course, must be in a position to fully understand all aspects of today’s equity market structure. I emphasized from before my first days as SEC Chair that addressing market structure issues would be one of my top priorities.
Back in 2010, the SEC took an important step when it published the Market Structure Concept Release that initiated a comprehensive review of equity market structure. Over the last year, we have intensified this effort, and I believe we should do more.
To address a difficult challenge successfully often starts with a focus on fundamentals. I am concerned that, as the complexity of our market structure has grown, so too has the complexity of the “diagnoses” offered and the “solutions” proffered. Some of those efforts and ideas may very well bear out, but, like batters in a slump who often turn to fundamental mechanics to rebuild and improve their swings, I believe we too must focus on a few important fundamentals in our review of equity market structure. Only with attention to these fundamentals can we get it right and address the issues smartly.
What are these fundamentals?
The first is that technology matters, and properly functioning markets demand it. Operational integrity was essential when markets depended on the technology of pen and paper and it is critical when they depend on sophisticated software.
The second fundamental is that we should identify and test our assumptions about market structure. In some cases, these assumptions seem almost accidental – for example, despite the marketplace’s ability, and our explicit authority, to differentiate between stocks with different trading characteristics, today’s market structure has evolved to be “one-size-fits-all.” In other cases, our assumptions seem driven by long-standing market practices, statutes, or regulations – suggesting that because it always has been a certain way, it must remain that way.
The third fundamental is that decisions should be based, to the extent possible, on empirical evidence. We recognize that the same evidence may be interpreted differently by parties with different assumptions, perspectives, and interests. But much of the current discussion around market structure seems rooted more in anecdote – and, at times, self-interest – than in evidence. If we want to make good decisions about our markets, empirical evidence provides, at the very least, a starting point for a principled dialogue about what – if anything – is to be changed in our market structure.
Let me briefly elaborate on each of these fundamentals.

Focusing on Operational Integrity

One clear, and to my mind indisputable, focus of our attention must be operational integrity. The technology systems that drive today’s markets – and what will become their successors – are here to stay.
There are clear benefits that flow from technology. It has created tremendous efficiency, and many have seen significant improvements in trading costs and access to capital due to the technological revolution in our market structure over the last 15 years. But systems can fail or operate in unexpected or unintended ways. And the risk of that naturally increases as technology systems become faster, more pervasive, and more complex.
We all recognize that some risk of failure is inherent in any technology system. But that does not mean we should not always be striving toward zero tolerance for errors and interruptions. We must address these risks by striking the right balance of reliability, functionality, and cost.
Over the last year and a half, unfortunately, the U.S. equity and options markets have experienced a spate of events that call into question whether the markets have achieved the right balance. These include systems failures at exchanges and problems at broker-dealers with order routing systems. And recently, the equity markets experienced the August 22nd disruption in the dissemination of consolidated market data, which led to a trading halt in all NASDAQ-listed stocks for several hours.
We should not confuse these events as the byproducts of high-frequency trading or activity in dark venues, as some often do. These events involved relatively basic, albeit serious, errors. Many could have happened in a less complex market structure. But the persistent recurrence of these events can undermine the confidence of investors and public companies in the integrity of the U.S. equity market structure as a whole.
In 2010, the SEC took a very important step to address operational integrity at broker-dealers when it adopted the Market Access Rule.[7] The risk management controls it requires are a critically important aspect of market integrity in a structure where orders are generated and routed by computer algorithms that, when defective, can flood the market and rapidly exhaust normal supplies of liquidity.
That rule has now been in place for three years, yet the continued occurrence of failures in order routing systems and controls clearly shows there is still work to be done in implementing effective controls at broker-dealers. And the industry must continue to work on other protections, such as kill switches at exchanges, to address mistakes that slip through a broker-dealer’s controls.
Broker-dealers, of course, are only part of our interconnected market system. Issues with operational integrity extend to exchanges, alternative trading platforms, and other systems.
The SEC and the industry are making progress in this area, but there is still much to do. For our part, this past March we proposed new Regulation SCI to bolster systems compliance and integrity.[8] I look forward to, and ask from you and other industry participants, a constructive and inclusive dialogue as we move forward.
Although we should move forward expeditiously with Regulation SCI, the shutdown of the NASDAQ consolidated data processor confirmed that we cannot wait for, nor rely solely on, this proposed regulation to address especially single points of failure where a disruption can have an impact across the entire national market system.
I met with executives of the exchanges last month and challenged them to together develop and implement the necessary steps to improve the resilience of the technology surrounding critical market infrastructures.[9] In short order, we expect to receive comprehensive action plans that address the standards necessary to establish highly resilient and robust systems for securities information processors. I have also asked the SEC staff to engage the exchanges, clearing agencies, and FINRA to conduct a “mapping” of other critical infrastructure systems and provide assessments of their robustness and resilience.
In addition, I asked the exchanges and FINRA to prioritize their efforts on a number of initiatives to assure that, when problems do occur, they are resolved promptly and in a way that maintains the confidence of investors.[10]
In all of these efforts, we must engage the full range of market participants, including broker-dealers and investors. I look forward to seeing the results of these efforts and their speedy implementation.

Challenging Our Market Structure Assumptions

We also need to rethink some of the assumptions that underlie today’s market structure.
Assumptions matter. They confine the flexibility that we believe is available to us as regulators, and they do the same for you as market participants. It is important that we identify and test these assumptions because technology and trading practices constantly evolve, and even the “perfect” trading model for today quickly becomes obsolete. Trading venues of all types should have the flexibility, and the incentives, to competitively innovate to better meet the needs of their ultimate customers – investors and public companies.
Challenging assumptions is a key part of the comprehensive review of market structure that started with the Concept Release, and I think it is the part that is often emphasized in discussions of a “holistic” review of market structure.

One-Size-Fits-All Market Structure

I believe that one unspoken assumption about our listed equity market structure has been that it must be a “one-size-fits-all” structure. For the most part, market rules and trading mechanisms are today the same regardless of wide variations in the “size” of public companies.
STA has been a leading voice for market structure rules that fit the particular needs of smaller companies. Similarly, our Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies submitted recommendations earlier this year with the goal of improving market structure for smaller companies.[11]
In 1975, Congress gave the SEC authority to facilitate the establishment of a national market system, including authority to establish subsystems for stocks with unique trading characteristics.[12] This authority permits different types of stocks to be treated differently. We should consider how we can better use the data currently available to us to inform those decisions and how we can develop empirical analytics to help us measure success or failure.
As one step in this direction, I have instructed the SEC staff to move forward on earlier efforts to work with the exchanges as they develop and, if possible, present to the Commission for its consideration a plan to implement a pilot program that would allow smaller companies to use wider tick sizes.

Exchange Competition and Self-Regulatory Model

Another set of assumptions about our current market structure is related to the nature of exchange competition and the nature of the self-regulatory model itself.
Equity exchanges today operate fully electronic, high-speed trading systems using a business model that mostly was developed by electronic communications networks, or ECNs, prior to Regulation NMS.[13] Indeed, in many ways, today’s exchanges are yesterday’s ECNs.
Exchanges differ from ECNs, however, in significant respects. Exchanges, for example, continue to exercise self-regulatory functions, even as they operate as for-profit entities.
This model for exchanges has encountered challenges. As I noted earlier, for example, the “lit” exchanges no longer attract even one-half of long-term investor orders.
From time to time, equity exchanges have adopted trading models that use different fee structures or attempt to focus on different priorities, such as order size or retail investor participation.[14] These models have been met with mixed success, which raises the question as to whether exchanges have a real opportunity to develop different trading models that preserve pricing transparency and are more attractive to investors.
As is true for all important aspects of our current market structure, the current nature of exchange competition and the self-regulatory model should be fully evaluated in light of the evolving market structure and trading practices. This evaluation should include whether the current exchange regulatory structure continues to meet the needs of investors and public companies. Does it provide sufficient flexibility for exchanges to implement transparent trading models that can effectively compete for investor orders? Does the current approach to self-regulation limit or support exchange trading models?
This evaluation should also assess how trading venues can better balance their commercial incentives and regulatory responsibilities. For example, is there an appropriate balance for exchanges in key areas, such as the maintenance of critical market infrastructure? And are off-exchange venues subject to appropriate regulatory requirements for the types of business they today conduct?

Grounding Market Structure Assessments in Empirical Evidence

The SEC’s 2010 Concept Release[15] asked some of these and other questions about the performance of the post-Regulation NMS market structure generally. It also asked commenters for data to support their responses. Strikingly, little such data was provided.
This is a significant issue. We – and you – are best positioned to assess and develop any proposed changes to market structure, whether they are initiated by us or through competition among participants, if we have meaningful empirical evidence.
Data alone, of course, will not reconcile all of the widely differing and often conflicting views on market structure. But the right data can be used to test hypotheses, identify and eliminate potential problems, and narrow and focus the debate to the real issues. Investors, companies, and markets all demand – and deserve – as much.

Developing Better Sources

For our part, we are engaging in a wide-ranging effort to seek out better sources of data to better assess today’s complex markets.
These sources include MIDAS, the market information and data analysis system that the SEC staff began operating in January. The SEC also adopted the Large Trader Reporting Rule,[16] which began last year to more efficiently collect information on most of the trading activity of key market participants, including high‑frequency traders. In addition, the SEC adopted the Consolidated Audit Trail Rule,[17] which, when implemented, should significantly enhance the ability of regulators to monitor the equity markets. In the meantime, SEC staff is using FINRA’s existing audit trail data to analyze equity trading, particularly in the off-exchange markets.
We also are paying close attention to initiatives of foreign regulators who are dealing with market structure issues analogous to ours.[18]

Engaging the Public Debate

Our next immediate step is to start making this empirical information, which we are already using extensively, publicly available to help inform the broader market structure debate. All should have an opportunity to consider the issues with the benefit of the information we have and are using.
So, today, I am pleased to announce a new initiative we are launching that is designed to promote a fuller empirical understanding of the equity markets. SEC staff has prepared and assembled resources and data on the SEC’s web site focusing exclusively on equity market structure. The new web site should be available as early as next week and will serve as a central location for us to publicly share evolving data, research, and analysis.
Part of this initiative will be to disseminate data and related observations drawn from MIDAS that address the nature and quality of displayed liquidity across the full range of U.S.-listed equities –from the life-time of quotes, to the speed of the market, to the nature of order cancellations.
Every day MIDAS collects one billion records, time-stamped to the microsecond. The information comes from the consolidated tapes and the proprietary feeds of each exchange, and includes posted orders and quotes, modifications and cancellations, and trade executions both on- and off-exchange. Typically, only sophisticated market participants have had access to all of this data, and fewer still have had the ability to process it.
The web site will allow users to explore key market metrics and trends based on aggregate analyses of tens of billions of MIDAS records over the last year. Not only are we making these analyses available, we’re making them accessible. With the click of a mouse, results will be available in clear, easy‑to‑read charts and graphs.
We expect this new tool to transform the debate on market structure by focusing it as never before on data, not anecdote.
To give an illustration, the staff has developed a data series tracking the total volume of visible orders at all the price levels sent to our public exchanges and comparing this volume to the total volume of shares actually traded. As expected, only a small percentage of orders sent to exchanges are not cancelled and actually result in trades. But perhaps less expected is that cancellation rates for orders in exchange-traded products can generally be five to ten times larger than for corporate stocks.[19] Such observations highlight how different types of equity products can vary in their effects on markets and their structure.
Staff has also used this data to compare the speed at which exchange orders are cancelled to the speed at which orders are executed. Recent data on corporate stocks shows that almost two-thirds of all orders “rest” for half a second or longer. Though we can clearly see that quotes are sometimes cancelled within a millisecond or faster, the data show that the high-speed market is not dominated by such cancellations. In fact, over a quarter of all exchange-based trades in corporate stocks are executed against orders that have rested for only half a second or less. These findings not only provide an empirical basis for measuring and tracking the speed of today’s markets, but also suggest that even short-lived quotes are generally accessible by at least some traders.
The new web site will also feature staff research papers based on a variety of data sources and staff reviews that identify and assemble information from the expanding economic literature on market structure topics. One paper, using order audit trail data on off-exchange trading, provides key metrics describing the underlying nature of off-exchange trading by the 44 alternative trading systems that trade equity securities. The staff’s primary observation is that ATS trading looks very similar in many respects to exchange trading.[20] Another paper summarizes current studies that address market fragmentation – both visible and dark. Additional research papers and reviews are already planned.
We are very excited about this new initiative and we look forward to your feedback.

Conclusion

Gathering, disseminating, and analyzing data, testing assumptions about our complex, dispersed marketplace, and ensuring the integrity of market technology are the fundamental steps that are needed to address today’s market structure concerns in a responsible manner.
Participation of STA members, other market participants, and the broader public is needed to advance these measures. In many cases, a little homework may address a concern or identify a necessary action for the SEC or the industry. In others, these measures may generate more questions and require additional analysis, providing the building blocks for more complex initiatives.
Ultimately, we must be able to show investors and companies that concerns about the current U.S. equity market structure can be properly diagnosed and, when needed, properly addressed. This is a very high priority for me. I am confident that this goal can be achieved and that the U.S. equity markets will continue to work well for investors so that they can both drive capital formation and participate in the benefits of economic growth.
Thank you.


[1] By the end of 2012, U.S. equity markets served more than 4,900 listed companies, and the market capitalization of these companies was more than $18 trillion – more than five times greater than any other jurisdiction. Source: World Federation of Exchanges (statistics available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual-query-tool). In addition, 52% of all U.S. households are estimated to have some form of equity investment. Source: Gallup (available athttp://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx).
[2] Source: World Federation of Exchanges (statistics available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual-query-tool).
[4] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61358, “Concept Release on Equity Market Structure,” 75 FR 3594, 3598 (January 21, 2010) (“Market Structure Concept Release”) (trading volume divided among many different exchanges, ATSs, and internalizing broker-dealers).
[5] Market Structure Concept Release, 75 FR at 3606.
[6] Rule 606 of Regulation NMS, 17 CFR 242.606, requires brokers to prepare quarterly reports on the trading venues to which they route customer orders. For the quarter ending June 30, 2013, these reports from large retail brokers and institutional agency brokers generally indicate that they routed a majority or more of their customer orders to off-exchange dark venues.
[7] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63241, “Risk Management Controls for Broker-Dealers with Market Access,” 75 FR 69792 (November 15, 2010).
[8] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69077, “Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity,” 78 FR 18084 (March 25, 2013).
[9] SEC Chair White Statement on Meeting With Leaders of Exchanges, September 12, 2013 (available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539804861).
[10] Id. These initiatives include improving the process of declaring and communicating trading halts, breaking erroneous trades, and reopening the market following significant market events.
[11] Letter dated March 21, 2013, from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Co-Chairs, Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, to The Honorable Elisse B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (available athttp://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-032113-emerg-co-ltr.pdf) (recommending a separate U.S. equity market that would facilitate trading in the securities of small and emerging companies); letter dated March 21, 2013, from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Co-Chairs, Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, to The Honorable Elisse B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (available athttp://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-032113-spread-tick-size.pdf) (providing recommendations regarding trading spreads for smaller exchange-listed companies).
[12] Section 11A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1.
[13] Among other things, exchanges generally are “agnostic” when it comes to their participants, at least in principle. For the most part, orders from all participants are treated alike, and market makers have both few advantages and few obligations. Exchanges also generally charge significant access fees to liquidity taking orders and then rebate nearly all of the fees to liquidity providing orders. And exchanges offer tools that facilitate short-term algorithmic trading, such as co-located servers, complex order types, and data feeds with detailed order information.
[14] The NASDAQ Philadelphia Exchange, for example, launched a trading model focused on size of orders rather than speed, but attracted little volume. The NYSE and other exchanges have launched retail investor programs that, at least thus far, also have attracted little volume. And some exchanges have adopted different fee models, charging liquidity providers instead of liquidity takers.
[15] Market Structure Concept Release, 75 FR at 3596 (“To more fully understand the effects of these and other changes in equity trading, the Commission is conducting a comprehensive review of equity market structure. It is assessing whether market structure rules have kept pace with, among other things, changes in trading technology and practices.”).
[16] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64976, “Large Trader Reporting,” 76 FR 46960 (August 3, 2011).
[17] Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67457, “Consolidated Audit Trail,” 77 FR 45722 (August 1, 2012).
[18] Market structure initiatives in other countries include regulatory steps related to high frequency trading and dark trading venues that have been implemented in Europe, Canada, and Australia, all of which may generate interesting empirical data that could help assess the considerations of similar measures in the United States.
[19] Higher cancellation rates do not suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with ETPs, and there are some well-understood reasons why cancellation rates for ETPs may, on average, be higher than for stocks. Every time an ETP component stock changes price, for example, market makers need to update their quotes – including cancelling their prior quotes – for the ETP.
[20] For example, approximately 70% of reported trades at both ATSs and exchanges are precisely 100 shares. And though five ATSs have average order sizes that exceed 1,000 shares, this volume represents only 3% of total ATS volume.