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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Saturday, October 19, 2013

REMARKS BY CFTC COMMISSIONER O'MALIA AT CFTC COMPLIANCE FORUM

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
Keynote Address by Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia, Edison Electric Institute CFTC Compliance Forum, Washington, DC
October 17, 2013

The topic of today's conference is "Compliance and Implementation Issues." I must say such a topic gives us plenty of room to have a wide-ranging discussion, as there are so many questions and concerns regarding industry compliance and on-going implementation.

As we all know, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted following the G-20 agreement in Pittsburgh in September 2009 to undertake comprehensive financial reform. The G-20 agreement proposed four main objectives of derivatives reform. First, report all data to a data repository. Second, require that all standardized derivatives contracts be exchange traded "as appropriate." Third, require clearing to be done through central counter parties. Fourth, impose higher collateral charges for all uncleared over-the-counter (OTC) products.

Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has been busy with an aggressive schedule of rule promulgation. Today we have finalized just over 60 rules including Dodd-Frank and non-Dodd Frank rule.

This new regulatory regime has had a profound impact on market structure as it has imposed new obligations, higher levels of transparency, and higher standards for risk management. Many of these new rules will have a positive impact on financial markets.

However, I have serious concerns about the Commission’s rule making process and schedule, as well as the statutory foundation of many rules and their overall impact on end-users.

Today, I would like to discuss three topics. First, I would like to address the implementation of the rules, both in terms of compliance already under way and what we need to think about going forward. Second, I would like to discuss the regulatory impact on end-users. Finally, I would like to discuss my concerns about the Commission’s preparedness to oversee the implementation of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.

The Process: Sacrificing Transparency and Certainty for Speed

From the beginning of my time at the Commission, I have been very concerned with the Commission's rulemaking process. As you may know, I have been disappointed with the Commission’s failure to develop a transparent rulemaking schedule that would enable market participants to plan for compliance with the massive new obligations imposed by these rules. In addition, I believe the Commission has rushed the rulemaking process, prioritizing getting rules done fast over getting them done right. This approach has compromised the legal soundness and consistency of our rules.

Stark evidence of the Commission’s flawed rules, and their unachievable compliance deadlines, can be seen in the massive number of exemptions and staff no-action letters issued to provide relief from them. To date, we have issued over 130 exemptions and staff no-action letters. That amounts to more than two exemptions for every rule passed. In nearly two dozen cases, the relief provided is for an indefinite period of time – thus making them de facto rulemakings, which didn't go through the Administrative Procedure Act or proper cost-benefit analysis. It is clear that the Commission has abused the no-action relief process.

Market participants are confused regarding the application of our rules, and how or when they must be applied. Further, since the Commission doesn't vote on staff no-action letters, they don't appear in the Federal Register. And you won't find the exemptive letters in our rulebook either. This lack of transparency and consistency will drive a compliance officer crazy.

One area where the Commission has made one of its biggest process fouls is the lack of robust cost-benefit analysis. Without a doubt, the comprehensive nature of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime will have a significant cost impact on all market participants, and yet the Commission has failed to conduct appropriate and rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis of our proposed rules. Understanding whether the benefits of the rules outweigh the costs is a common sense tool to determine the least burdensome solution to the problem.

The Commission has so far been able to get away with such inadequate cost-benefit analysis because the current governing statute sets a low bar. I support Congressional efforts to revise our statutory cost-benefit obligations in order to require the Commission to undertake a more rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis, putting us on par with other federal agencies. I support Chairman Conaway's efforts (H.R. 1003) and hope the House and Senate will pass this legislation.

Implementation: What's Coming

While I have a longer list of process fouls committed by the Commission, I would like to turn to upcoming rules that will have a significant impact on end-users in particular.

The Commission is currently considering the position limit rule do-over. When I say the Commission, I mean that literally. During the shutdown there is no staff available to discuss this rule proposal. We can't make revisions. We can't ask questions about the rationale or justification. We can't even discuss with staff whether or not the proposed limits would have an appropriate impact to curb "excessive speculation."

The Commission is pursuing a dual track on position limits. Later this year, an appeals court will hear our argument urging it to overturn a federal district court’s ruling to vacate the original position limit rule. The district court found that the Commission failed to provide a finding of necessity as directed by the statute. Simultaneously, we are drafting a nearly identical rule arguing more strenuously that Congress made us do it, and that Congress really didn't want to know whether these rules are "necessary" or "appropriate."

Frankly, I find it interesting that the proposed rule will argue on one hand that Congress wanted position limits and that we aren't bound to apply an appropriateness standard – and then, on the other hand, argue in the cost-benefit analysis that these rules are well considered and will have the intended impact based on our analysis.

Another important rulemaking that will be before the Commission shortly is the application of capital and margin for all OTC trades. While I am pleased that the international community has worked together to make the standards consistent, make no mistake: these rules will increase the cost of hedging. End-users will be spared from mandatory margin exchange. However, nobody will receive a break from the new capital charges. These are new costs imposed on banks to offset the risk posed by OTC trades. Needless to say, these costs will be passed on to end-users.

I agree with Sean Owens, an economist with Woodbine Associates, who stated that under Dodd-Frank, "end users face a tradeoff between efficient, cost-effective risk transfer and the need for hedge customization. The cost implicit in this trade off include: regulatory capital, funding initial margin, market liquidity and structural factors."1

There is no doubt that these new requirements will have serious economic consequences for financial markets. And regulators should not take this lightly. In an effort to coordinate with international regulators, the Commission will re-propose its capital and margin rules. But even under the more accommodating margin requirements, the Commission must evaluate additional costs to end-users by conducting an in-depth cost-benefit analysis.

Happy Anniversary: 1st Anniversary of Futurization

It was one year ago, almost to the day, that the energy markets switched from trading swaps to futures. This huge shift was triggered by the then-impending effective date of the swap and swap dealer definitions. To avoid trading swaps and being caught in the unnecessary, costly and highly complex de minimis calculation imposed on swap dealers, energy firms shifted their trading from swaps to futures, literally overnight.

Based on the complexity of our swaps rules and the cost-efficiency of trading futures, it makes sense that participants would make this change. I'm interested to hear more from end-users like you how this shift has impacted your hedging strategies.

I must warn you that there are several more changes coming up that will continue to impact energy markets. First, the Commission is considering a draft futures block rule that will be proposed to limit the availability of block trades.

Second, as I noted before, OTC margin and capital rules will increase the cost of OTC bilateral deals. This draft rule should be published by the end of the year.

Third, the European Union (EU) is considering whether it will find acceptable the U.S. rules allowing a minimum one-day margin liquidation requirement for futures and swaps on energy products. Europe might not recognize U.S. centralized counterparties as qualified and, as a result, ban EU persons from accessing these markets. The EU is insisting on a two-day margin liquidation minimum. I am told that this would have the practical effect of increasing margin requirements for energy trades by 40 percent. I’m not sure how this will be resolved, but I suspect it will be closely tied to U.S. recognition of the European regulatory regime.

End-Users

Now let me turn to my second topic: how our rules treat end-users.

Congress was very clear about protecting end-users from Dodd-Frank's expansive regulatory reach. As a result, many end-users assumed that they wouldn't be impacted by these rules. Clearly, they are no longer under such misconceptions.

The swap dealer definition is a good example of how the Commission failed to accurately interpret Dodd-Frank and broadly applied the swap dealer definition to all market participants. The Commission ignored the express statutory mandate to exclude end-users from its reach. The swap dealer final rule requires entities to navigate through a complex set of factors on a trade-by-trade basis, rather than provide a bright line test. While I appreciate that the Commission set an $8 billion de minimis level to exclude trades from a dealer designation, it remains challenging to determine what is in and what is out from this safe harbor.

As part of the complexity of the swap dealer definition, the Commission has applied inconsistent and incoherent requirements around bona fide hedging as part of the dealer calculation. The hedge exclusion from the dealer definition applies only to physical, but not financial, transactions. The Commission should apply a consistent definition for hedging.

Another complexity that the Commission has imposed on end-users is the definition of a volumetric option. Specifically, to determine whether a volumetric option is a forward or a swap, the rule applies a seven-part test. But the real kicker is that under the seventh factor, contracts with embedded volumetric optionality may qualify for the forward contract exclusion only if exercise of the optionality is based on physical factors that are outside the control of the parties. This is in contradiction to how volumetric options have been traditionally used by market participants, makes no sense and provides absolutely no certainty for market participants.

The Commission has seemingly gone out of its way to create complex rules that generally result in an outcome of heads we win, tails you lose. We need to clean up the definition and create reliable and well-defined safe harbors. If we don't, I would encourage Congress to revisit the statute.

Commission Readiness: The Consequences of a “Ready, Fire, Aim” Approach

Let me move now to my third main topic: Commission readiness to properly oversee the implementation of its Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. There are two questions I have regarding this issue. The first question is pretty straightforward: is the Commission prepared to effectively oversee the new swaps markets? I believe the answer to this question is "no."

Take the area of registration. The Commission’s new swaps regime has created multiple new categories of Commission registrants, and in each category there has been an inconsistent and uncertain process with the bar constantly moving for applicants. For example, it has been ten months since the first swap dealer application arrived. Today, we have 89 temporarily registered applications totaling over 180,000 pages and we haven’t signed off on single application as complete or final.

With regard to swap data repository (SDR) registration, it has taken the Commission eight to ten months to register just three SDRs under temporary status. We have exceeded our own self-imposed limit of 180 days in some cases and we still haven’t issued a final SDR determination.

As for the registration of swap execution facilities (SEFs), while we have registered 18 entities under a temporary basis, I can only imagine how long it will take for a SEF to secure final approval, especially when we admit that we didn’t read the rulebooks in order to meet the arbitrary October 2 effective date. My guess is that it will be a long and painful process as we insist on evolving revisions to SEF rulebooks while trading is going on.

Another area where the Commission has not been adequately prepared to do its job is in connection with swap data being submitted under new reporting regulations. Despite imposing aggressive compliance requirements on the market, the Commission doesn't have the tools in place to effectively utilize the new data being reported to SDRs, and it doesn't have a surveillance system in either the futures or swaps market that I would regard as adequate or modern.

Today, the data we receive from SDRs requires extensive cleaning and changes to make it useful. As chairman of the Commission’s Technology Advisory Committee (TAC), I have devoted significant TAC attention and resources to aid this effort. Stemming from our TAC meeting in April, a working group including Commission staff and the SDRs has been established and is working to harmonize data fields to aid in our ability to easily aggregate and analyze data across SDR platforms. It will take time before we are able to access, aggregate and analyze data efficiently.

I am also disappointed with our current stance on the oversight of SEFs. Despite the October 2 start-up date for SEFs, the Commission relies on self-regulatory organizations to send data via Excel spreadsheet. There is no aggregation capacity and I am not aware of any plan to automate this process for the less than two thousand swap trades that occur on a daily basis.

My second question: is the Commission sufficiently familiar with the readiness of the market to adapt to our rules? The answer to this question is also "no." As I discussed earlier, evidence of this failure can be found in the Commission’s extensive use of no-action relief tied to arbitrary deadlines. The Commission needs to do a better job of understanding the significant compliance challenges facing market participants as a result of new regulations.

Pre-Trade Credit Checks: Time for the TAC to Revisit the Issue

Let me give you a brief example of one challenge we are dealing with today. The Commission has been working toward a goal of straight-through processing of trades and clearing to prevent any trade failures due to credit issues. Just recently, the Commission has started insisting that SEFs provide functionality to pre-check all trades for adequate credit at the futures commission merchant (FCM) to guarantee a trade. In general, I support this objective. However, market participants were not prepared to comply with this new requirement by October 2, the date SEFs began operation.

Consistent with the Commission’s practice of issuing last-minute ad-hoc relief, the day before the SEF start-up date, staff issued a delay of the pre-trade credit checks for one month until November 1. We are just two weeks away from this new deadline and it is clear that not all SEFs, FCMs, credit hubs and customers are fully interconnected. Without end-to-end fully tested connectivity, I suspect trades will continue to be done over the phone – stalling limit order book trading.

This is a topic that we discussed at the recent TAC meeting on September 12. It was clear at that meeting that the pieces were not in place and additional time is needed.

With the arbitrary November 1 deadline looming and the Commission yet to provide confused swap market participants with necessary guidance on a host of unresolved issues, often stemming from a lack of clarity in the SEF rules, I believe additional time is required. The Commission has not provided adequate time to complete the on-boarding process and conduct the technology testing and validation that is necessary. We should also consider phasing in participants, similar to our approach with clearing, in order to avoid a big bang integration issue.

Again, I offer to use the TAC to identify a path forward if that will be useful, but the issues identified in September still remain.

Conclusion

In many respects it is quite remarkable the work that has been accomplished – by both the Commission and the market – to put in place trade reporting, mandatory clearing, and now the first stages of swap exchange trading. However, the Commission process by which all of this was accomplished is certainly not to be replicated.

We need to continue to make sure we follow Congressional direction to protect end-users and focus more on outcomes rather than setting arbitrary timetables tied to an individual agenda. Rather than relying on the ad-hoc no-action process, the Commission should take responsibility of fixing the unworkable rules – swap data reporting and the swap dealer definition come to mind.

If we are going to impose rules, let’s make sure they are informed by data and will not interfere with the fundamental function of hedging and price discovery in the markets – I’m thinking about position limits and our proposed futures blocks.

Finally, let's keep an eye on the costs – putting these markets out of reach for commercial hedgers doesn't help anyone. Let's sharpen the pencil and consider all the options. There is no reason why we should not be able to quantify the solution as the most cost-effective rule for the market.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today.

1 See Sean Owens, Optimizing the Cost of Customization, Review of Futures Market (July 2012).

Last Updated: October 17, 2013

Friday, October 18, 2013

SEC ANNOUNCES CHARGES AGAINST OPERATORS OF WORLD-WIDE PYRAMID SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced charges and asset freezes against the operators and promoters of a worldwide pyramid scheme that falsely promises exponential, risk-free returns to investors in a venture that purportedly sells Internet-based children’s educational courses.

The SEC alleges that five entities based in Hong Kong, Canada, and the British Virgin Islands that collectively operate under business names “CKB” and “CKB168” are at the center of the scheme.  Through the efforts of three CKB executives who live overseas and several promoters living in the U.S., the scheme has ensnared at least 400 investors in New York, California, and other areas with large Asian-American communities.  These promoters have raised more than $20 million from U.S. investors, and millions of dollars more from investors in Canada, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other countries in Asia.

According to the SEC’s complaint unsealed late yesterday in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the scheme’s promotional efforts seek to exploit close connections among members of the Asian-American community.  The scheme’s operators and promoters use Internet videos, promotional materials, and seminars to create the appearance of a legitimate enterprise.  But in reality, CKB has little or no real-world retail consumer sales to generate the extraordinary returns promised to investors.  In fact, CKB has no apparent source of revenue other than money received from new investors.  Bank records show that the bulk of the money raised has been paid out to accounts controlled by CKB executives and as commissions to promoters of the pyramid scheme.

The court has granted the SEC’s request for an asset freeze against the CKB entities and the operators and promoters charged in the SEC’s complaint.

“CKB’s operators and promoters profited by abusing relationships of trust within the Asian-American community and promising investors they can earn more money by recruiting other investors instead of selling actual products,” said Antonia Chion, an associate director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “What CKB really sells is the false promise of easy wealth.”


Thursday, October 17, 2013

SEC ANNOUNCES DEFAULT JUDGEMENT AGAINST PETER MADOFF

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

The Commission announced that, on October 11, 2013, the Honorable Laura Taylor Swain, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered a default judgment against Peter Madoff, former chief compliance officer and senior managing director at Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS) from 1969 to 2008.

The Commission’s complaint alleged that Peter Madoff created stacks of compliance documents setting out supposedly robust policies and procedures over BMIS’s investment advisory operations. However, no policies and procedures were ever implemented, and none of the reviews were actually performed even though Peter Madoff represented that he personally completed the reviews.

The SEC’s complaint also alleged that in addition to creating false compliance materials, Peter Madoff created false broker-dealer and investment advisor registration applications filed by BMIS. He also failed to implement and review required policies and procedures, and falsified the firm’s books and records. Peter Madoff was richly rewarded for his misconduct, pocketing tens of millions of dollars through salary and bonuses, fake trades, sham loans, and direct, undocumented transfers of investor funds to himself from the bank account that BMIS used to perpetrate the Ponzi scheme.

Peter Madoff failed to answer, move or otherwise respond to the Commission’s complaint. The default judgment permanently enjoins Peter Madoff from violating or aiding and abetting violations of Sections 10(b), 15(b)(1), 15(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-3, 10b-5, 15b3-1 and 17a-3 thereunder, and Sections 204, 206(1), 206(2), 206(4) and 207 of the Advisers Act of 1940 and Rules 204-2 and 206(4)-7 thereunder. The default judgment orders no monetary relief in light of Peter Madoff’s criminal conviction and the $143 billion in restitution ordered in the parallel criminal proceeding United States v. Peter Madoff, 10 Crim. 228 (S.D.N.Y.) (LTS).

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

WISCONSIN RESIDENT CHARGED BY SEC WITH OPERATING A PONZI SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

SEC Charges Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin Resident with Operating a Ponzi Scheme

On October 10, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Michael R. Enea of Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin with violations of the federal securities laws for conducting fraudulent, unregistered offerings of securities and misappropriating investor funds to pay his personal expenses.

The Commission's complaint alleged that, from July 2006 through May 2013, Enea operated a Ponzi scheme through the fraudulent and unregistered offer and sale of securities to 18 investors totaling approximately $2.1 million. Enea represented to the investors that he would combine his funds with funds contributed by each investor and use the money to invest in a "credit card portfolio." Credit card portfolios, according to Enea, consisted of a group of retail merchants who pay fees to a third party credit card processor each time one of the merchants' customers makes a credit card transaction. Enea told investors that by investing in credit card portfolios the investor would receive monthly or quarterly payments. The payments to investors were purportedly generated by the payment of the transaction fees by the merchants to the credit card processors. In reality, Enea never purchased any credit card portfolios and instead used approximately $1.35 million of the investors' funds to make the monthly or quarterly payments to prior investors. Enea used the remaining approximately $760,000 he raised from investors to pay his personal and business expenses. Enea never told investors that he used their funds to make payments to previous investors or to pay his personal and business expenses. The complaint also alleged that Enea acted as an unregistered broker.

As a result of his conduct, the Commission's complaint charged Enea with violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

Enea has agreed to settle the charges against him. Specifically, Enea consented to the entry of a final judgment that, without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations against him, permanently enjoins him from future violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and requires him to pay disgorgement of $763,803, the amount of his ill-gotten gains, plus prejudgment interest of $79,317.

Monday, October 14, 2013

FRAUD CHARGES FILED BY SEC IN STOCK MANIPULATION SCHEME

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SEC Files Fraud Charges Against Lee Chi Ling and Perfect Genius Limited for Their Roles in a Wide-Ranging Stock Manipulation Scheme

The Securities and Exchange Commission filed an action related to an elaborate stock manipulation scheme involving shares of China Energy Savings Technology, Inc. against Lee Chi Ling, as a defendant, and Perfect Genius Limited, as a relief defendant. The fraudulent scheme was orchestrated by Chiu Wing Chui, Lai Fun Sim, Jun Tang Zhao (together, the Chiu Group), Lee, and others acting in concert. As discussed below, Chiu, Sim, Zhao, and others were previously charged and found liable for fraud for their roles in the scheme.

The Commission's complaint, filed on September 26, 2013 in the Eastern District of New York, alleges that Lee played a crucial role in the illegal scheme. According to the Complaint, Lee or entities that she controlled, including Perfect Genius, furthered the fraud by: (i) receiving shares of China Energy directed to her by the Chiu Group; (ii) selling some of those shares to profit from artificially high prices created by transactions directed by the Chiu Group and their dissemination of false and misleading information about China Energy to investors and the public; and (iii) acting as nominees, along with a number of other entities, which concealed the illegal trading in the shares of China Energy and masked the Chiu Group's control of China Energy.

In its complaint, the Commission alleges that Lee violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder, and Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933; and seeks disgorgement and prejudgment interest. The Commission also names Perfect Genius as a relief defendant, seeking the return of ill-gotten gains from the sales of China Energy securities in an account that Lee opened in the name of that entity for the purpose of furthering the scheme and holding the resulting illicit proceeds.

SEC v. Lee is the latest in a series of enforcement actions brought by the Commission concerning the China Energy fraud:

On December 4, 2006, the Commission filed a fraud complaint against China Energy, Chiu Wing Chiu, who was the undisclosed control person of China Energy, and several of Chiu's associates. SEC v. China Energy 06-CV-6402 (EDNY). (Press Release 2006-200; Lit. Rel. 19933; Complaint) The Commission also obtained an emergency order freezing $3.9 million in assets held in four U.S. brokerage accounts by nominees of Chiu Wing Chiu.

On December 6, 2006, the Commission issued an order revoking China Energy's stock registration statements (Admin. Proc. 34-54881). The Commission had previously issued orders suspending trading in China Energy securities on May 19, 2006 (Lit. Rel. 34-53839) and September 26, 2006 (Lit. Rel. 34-54503A).
On March 27, 2009, the Commission obtained final judgments in SEC v. China Energy against Chiu, Lai Fun "Stella" Sim, Jun Tang Zhao, Sun Li, and New Solomon Consultants, finding them liable for fraud, and ordering them to pay over $34 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. The court also imposed officer-and-director bars against Chiu, Sim, Zhao, and Li.
On July 31, 2009, the Commission obtained final judgments SEC v. China Energy against the relief defendant nominees of Chiu, ordering that the $3.9 million held in the relief defendants' U.S. brokerage accounts be turned over to the Court as proceeds of the fraud.

The Commission also obtained a final judgment against Jason Genet, finding him liable for fraud; permanently enjoining him from future violations of Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; ordering Genet to pay $2,527,745 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest and penalties; and barring him from participation in any offering of a penny stock for five years from the date of the judgment. (Lit. Rel. 34-21232)

On December 20, 2010, the Commission also issued an Order Instituting Public Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 4C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order against Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer & Torbet LLP (MSWFT) and Kerry Dean Yamagata (Admin. Proc. 3-14167/33-9166).

Sunday, October 13, 2013

FUND EMPLOYEE INDICTED FOR INSIDE TRADING IN MARVEL STOCK PRIOR TO DISNEY ACQUISITION

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

Former Investment Fund Employee Criminally Indicted On Federal Charges for Insider Trading in Marvel Stock Prior to Disney Deal

On August 11, 2011, the SEC charged Toby G. Scammell, age 28, with insider trading in a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint alleged that Scammell spent less than $5,500 on highly speculative call options in Marvel Entertainment, Inc. and reaped illegal profits of over $192,000 less than a month later when it was publicly announced that Marvel was being acquired by the Walt Disney Company. The SEC alleged that Scammell illegally traded on non-public information he misappropriated from his girlfriend, a Disney intern who worked on the acquisition. On June 6, 2012, Scammell consented to the entry of judgment against him and on June 15, 2012, the district court imposed a permanent injunction against Scammell and ordered him to pay disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties in amounts to be determined by the court.

In a separate action on October 8, 2013, a federal grand jury returned a criminal indictment charging Scammell with one count of securities fraud and one count of wire fraud based upon his trading in Marvel.