FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Dec. 7, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced charges against a Florida-based securities lawyer for issuing fraudulent attorney opinion letters that resulted in more than 70 million shares of microcap stock becoming available for unrestricted trading by investors.
An attorney opinion letter is required from a licensed and duly authorized securities lawyer in order to facilitate the transfer of restricted microcap shares on the over-the-counter markets. In April 2010, the Pink Sheets (now OTC Markets Group) banned Guy M. Jean-Pierre of Pompano Beach, Fla., from issuing attorney opinion letters due to "repeated missing information and inconsistencies" about the issuers and his lack of due diligence in his past letters.
The SEC alleges that Jean-Pierre has since engaged in a scheme to continue writing and issuing attorney opinion letters in the name of his niece by applying her signature without her consent. Jean-Pierre (also known as Marcelo Dominguez de Guerra) sought to evade the ban by forming a new company called Complete Legal Solutions and misrepresenting that his niece was conducting the legal work that was allegedly performed.
"Securities lawyers are trusted gatekeepers in the issuance of stock, and it is particularly offensive when attorneys like Jean-Pierre blatantly break the rules and commit fraud," said Andrew M. Calamari, Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office. "The SEC is committed to punishing offenders like Jean-Pierre as we continue to root out the enablers of microcap fraud in our markets."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed late yesterday in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Jean-Pierre hatched a plan within two weeks of his ban to continue issuing attorney opinion letters through Complete Legal and his niece’s identity. Jean-Pierre’s niece, a licensed attorney herself, was looking for work at the time. Jean-Pierre told his niece about his work issuing attorney opinion letters and offered to pay her to assist him. He suggested they form Complete Legal and asked her to send him three copies of her signature and a copy of her driver’s license. Jean-Pierre’s niece complied with his requests with the understanding this information was needed to incorporate Complete Legal. Afterwards, Jean-Pierre never requested that his niece do any legal work at Complete Legal and she was not compensated for any such work.
Instead, the SEC alleges that Jean-Pierre used the new company and his niece’s identity to continue his prior practice of issuing attorney opinion letters. Each of these letters contained fraudulent statements and falsely represented his niece as the signatory. Jean-Pierre’s niece did not write any of the letters and did not make the representations concerning the issuers. Jean-Pierre fabricated attorney opinion letters on Complete Legal letterhead for at least 11 companies that traded publicly on the Pink Sheets. Certain letters resulted in Pink Sheet issuers being granted the improved status of having adequate current information in the public domain under Rule 144(c)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. This status kept the issuers from being tagged on the Pink Sheets’ website with a red "STOP" sign near its ticker symbol with the moniker of "OTC Pink No Information" and a large warning that the company "may not be making material information publicly available."
According to the SEC’s complaint, adequate current public information about an issuer must be available for certain selling security holders to comply with the Rule 144 safe harbor allowing companies to issue unregistered securities pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Securities Act. Jean-Pierre falsely issued letters bearing his niece’s signature to transfer agents opining that restrictive legends could be legally removed from either pre-existing stock certificates or newly issued stock certificates pursuant to Rules 144 or 504 of the Securities Act.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that Jean-Pierre violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The SEC is seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest and financial penalties, a permanent injunction, and a bar from participating in the offering of any penny stock pursuant to Section 20(g) of the Securities Act.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Megan Genet and Steven G. Rawlings in the New York Regional Office. Todd Brody, Barry Kamar, and Ms. Genet are handling the SEC’s litigation.
This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063
Sunday, December 9, 2012
COURT ORDER PERMANENTLY BARS DEFNEDANTS FROM COMMODITY INDUSTRY
FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
Federal Court in New York Orders Defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Forex Capital Trading Partners, and Highland Stone Capital Management to Pay over $1.8 Million for Fraud in Off-Exchange Foreign Currency Scheme
Court order permanently bars defendants from the commodities industry
Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment and permanent injunction order against defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Inc. (Forex Group), Forex Capital Trading Partners, Inc. (Forex Partners), both of New York, N.Y., and Highland Stone Capital Management, L.L.C. (Highland Stone) of Rutherford, N.J. The order requires these defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty of $1,352,293 and to disgorge $450,764 of ill-gotten gains for the benefit of defrauded customers. The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the defendants and prohibits them from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.
The order stems from a CFTC anti-fraud enforcement action filed on July 27, 2011 against these three companies and their principals (see CFTC Press Release 6083-11, July 28, 2011). The order finds that Forex Group, Forex Partners, and Highland Stone fraudulently solicited 106 customers who invested more than $2.8 million to trade retail foreign currency (forex). In soliciting customers, the defendants falsely claimed, on their websites and elsewhere, that their forex trading for customers was profitable for a period of several years, the order finds. The defendants’ claims included a falsely reported customer gain of 51.94 percent in 2010, a year, in fact, in which their customers lost more than $1.2 million. Overall, customers lost more than 93 percent of their total invested principal through the defendants’ forex trading, the order finds.
The order also finds that the defendants distributed false account statements to prospective customers showing profitable trading and acted in capacities requiring registration with the CFTC, but were not registered.
The CFTC’s litigation is continuing against the principals of Forex Partners and Forex Group, namely Susan G. Davis of Jersey City, N.J., and David E. Howard II, of New York, N.Y., and against the principal of Highland Stone, Joseph Burgos, of Rutherford, N.J.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.K. Financial Services Authority in this matter.
CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Susan B. Padove, Joy McCormack, Elizabeth Streit, Michael Geiser, Janine Gargiulo, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner.
Federal Court in New York Orders Defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Forex Capital Trading Partners, and Highland Stone Capital Management to Pay over $1.8 Million for Fraud in Off-Exchange Foreign Currency Scheme
Court order permanently bars defendants from the commodities industry
Washington, DC - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment and permanent injunction order against defendants Forex Capital Trading Group, Inc. (Forex Group), Forex Capital Trading Partners, Inc. (Forex Partners), both of New York, N.Y., and Highland Stone Capital Management, L.L.C. (Highland Stone) of Rutherford, N.J. The order requires these defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty of $1,352,293 and to disgorge $450,764 of ill-gotten gains for the benefit of defrauded customers. The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans against the defendants and prohibits them from violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations, as charged.
The order stems from a CFTC anti-fraud enforcement action filed on July 27, 2011 against these three companies and their principals (see CFTC Press Release 6083-11, July 28, 2011). The order finds that Forex Group, Forex Partners, and Highland Stone fraudulently solicited 106 customers who invested more than $2.8 million to trade retail foreign currency (forex). In soliciting customers, the defendants falsely claimed, on their websites and elsewhere, that their forex trading for customers was profitable for a period of several years, the order finds. The defendants’ claims included a falsely reported customer gain of 51.94 percent in 2010, a year, in fact, in which their customers lost more than $1.2 million. Overall, customers lost more than 93 percent of their total invested principal through the defendants’ forex trading, the order finds.
The order also finds that the defendants distributed false account statements to prospective customers showing profitable trading and acted in capacities requiring registration with the CFTC, but were not registered.
The CFTC’s litigation is continuing against the principals of Forex Partners and Forex Group, namely Susan G. Davis of Jersey City, N.J., and David E. Howard II, of New York, N.Y., and against the principal of Highland Stone, Joseph Burgos, of Rutherford, N.J.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the U.K. Financial Services Authority in this matter.
CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Susan B. Padove, Joy McCormack, Elizabeth Streit, Michael Geiser, Janine Gargiulo, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner.
Saturday, December 8, 2012
MAN PLEADS GUILTY IN SECURITEIS FRAUD CASE AND IS BARRED FROM SECURITIES INDUSTRY
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
December 4, 2012
Defendant in SEC Action Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges and is Barred from the Securities Industry
the Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that Arnett L. Waters of Milton, Massachusetts, a principal of a broker-dealer and investment adviser who is a defendant in a securities fraud action filed by the Commission in May 2012, has pleaded guilty to criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts and has been barred from the securities industry by the Commission. Waters' guilty plea to securities fraud and other charges occurred on November 29, 2012, and follows an earlier guilty plea by Waters in October 2012 to criminal contempt charges for violating a preliminary injunction order obtained by the Commission in its case. The Commission's Order barring Waters from the securities industry was issued on December 3, 2012.
The Commission filed an emergency enforcement action against Waters on May 1, 2012, alleging that he and two companies under his control, broker-dealer A.L. Waters Capital, LLC and investment adviser Moneta Management, LLC, defrauded investors from at least 2009-2012 by, among other things, misappropriating investor funds and spending it on personal expenses. On May 3, 2012, the Court entered a preliminary injunction order that, among other things, froze Waters' assets and required him to provide an accounting of all his assets to the Commission. On August 7, 2012, the Commission filed a civil contempt motion against Waters, alleging that he had violated the court's preliminary injunction order by establishing an undisclosed bank account, transferring funds to that account, dissipating assets, and failing to disclose the bank account to the Commission, as required by the Court's order. On August 9, 2012, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts filed a separate criminal contempt action against Waters based on the same allegations. On October 2, 2012, Waters pleaded guilty to the criminal contempt charges, and the Court ordered him detained pending sentencing.
The Commission's Order barring Waters from the securities industry was issued on December 3, 2012, and is based on his October 2, 2012 guilty plea to criminal contempt charges. The Order bars Waters from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.
The U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts also charged Waters with a broader array of securities fraud and other violations on October 17, 2012. On November 29, 2012, Waters pleaded guilty to sixteen counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice. The counts of the criminal information to which Waters pleaded guilty alleged that, from at least 2007 through 2012, he used fictitious investment-related partnerships to draw in investors, misappropriate their investment money, and spend the vast majority of it on personal and business expenses and debts. Waters raised at least $839,000 from at least thirteen investors, including $500,000 from his church in March 2012. Waters also pleaded guilty to engaging in a criminal scheme to defraud clients of his rare coin business. Under this scheme, Waters defrauded coin customers out of as much as $7.8 million by selling coins at prices inflated, on average, by 600% and by inducing coin purchasers to return coins to him, on the false representation that he would sell those coins on the customers' behalf, when, in fact, he sold most or all of the coins and kept the proceeds for himself. The criminal information to which Waters pleaded guilty further alleged that he engaged in money laundering through two transactions totaling $77,000. Finally, Waters pleaded guilty to allegations that he made multiple misrepresentations to Commission staff, including that there were no investors in his investment-related partnerships, in order to conceal the fact that investor money was misappropriated in a fraudulent scheme. Waters is charged with obstruction of justice related to this conduct.
Waters has been detained since October 2, 2012, when the Court ordered him held pending sentencing in the criminal contempt action. He is currently scheduled to be sentenced in April 2013 in connection with the guilty pleas in the two separate criminal actions against him.
December 4, 2012
Defendant in SEC Action Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges and is Barred from the Securities Industry
the Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that Arnett L. Waters of Milton, Massachusetts, a principal of a broker-dealer and investment adviser who is a defendant in a securities fraud action filed by the Commission in May 2012, has pleaded guilty to criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts and has been barred from the securities industry by the Commission. Waters' guilty plea to securities fraud and other charges occurred on November 29, 2012, and follows an earlier guilty plea by Waters in October 2012 to criminal contempt charges for violating a preliminary injunction order obtained by the Commission in its case. The Commission's Order barring Waters from the securities industry was issued on December 3, 2012.
The Commission filed an emergency enforcement action against Waters on May 1, 2012, alleging that he and two companies under his control, broker-dealer A.L. Waters Capital, LLC and investment adviser Moneta Management, LLC, defrauded investors from at least 2009-2012 by, among other things, misappropriating investor funds and spending it on personal expenses. On May 3, 2012, the Court entered a preliminary injunction order that, among other things, froze Waters' assets and required him to provide an accounting of all his assets to the Commission. On August 7, 2012, the Commission filed a civil contempt motion against Waters, alleging that he had violated the court's preliminary injunction order by establishing an undisclosed bank account, transferring funds to that account, dissipating assets, and failing to disclose the bank account to the Commission, as required by the Court's order. On August 9, 2012, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts filed a separate criminal contempt action against Waters based on the same allegations. On October 2, 2012, Waters pleaded guilty to the criminal contempt charges, and the Court ordered him detained pending sentencing.
The Commission's Order barring Waters from the securities industry was issued on December 3, 2012, and is based on his October 2, 2012 guilty plea to criminal contempt charges. The Order bars Waters from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and from participating in any offering of a penny stock, including: acting as a promoter, finder, consultant, agent or other person who engages in activities with a broker, dealer or issuer for purposes of the issuance or trading in any penny stock, or inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or sale of any penny stock.
The U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts also charged Waters with a broader array of securities fraud and other violations on October 17, 2012. On November 29, 2012, Waters pleaded guilty to sixteen counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice. The counts of the criminal information to which Waters pleaded guilty alleged that, from at least 2007 through 2012, he used fictitious investment-related partnerships to draw in investors, misappropriate their investment money, and spend the vast majority of it on personal and business expenses and debts. Waters raised at least $839,000 from at least thirteen investors, including $500,000 from his church in March 2012. Waters also pleaded guilty to engaging in a criminal scheme to defraud clients of his rare coin business. Under this scheme, Waters defrauded coin customers out of as much as $7.8 million by selling coins at prices inflated, on average, by 600% and by inducing coin purchasers to return coins to him, on the false representation that he would sell those coins on the customers' behalf, when, in fact, he sold most or all of the coins and kept the proceeds for himself. The criminal information to which Waters pleaded guilty further alleged that he engaged in money laundering through two transactions totaling $77,000. Finally, Waters pleaded guilty to allegations that he made multiple misrepresentations to Commission staff, including that there were no investors in his investment-related partnerships, in order to conceal the fact that investor money was misappropriated in a fraudulent scheme. Waters is charged with obstruction of justice related to this conduct.
Waters has been detained since October 2, 2012, when the Court ordered him held pending sentencing in the criminal contempt action. He is currently scheduled to be sentenced in April 2013 in connection with the guilty pleas in the two separate criminal actions against him.
Friday, December 7, 2012
ATTORNEY FOUND LIABLE FOR ISSUING FALSE LEGAL OPINION REGARDING A STOCK OFFERING
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSSION
Attorney Virginia K. Sourlis Found Liable for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud by Issuing False Legal Opinion in Connection with Illegal Stock Offering
On November 20, 2012, the Federal District Court in SEC v. Greenstone Holdings, Inc., et al., 10 civ. 1302 (S.D.N.Y.), granted the SEC partial summary judgment against attorney Virginia K. Sourlis, holding Sourlis liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud by issuing a false legal opinion that certain of her co-defendants used to obtain illegally more than six million shares of unrestricted stock of Greenstone Holdings, Inc.
According to the SEC's summary judgment motion, in early 2006, Sourlis intentionally authored a materially false and misleading legal opinion, which Greenstone used to illegally issue over six million shares of stock in unregistered transactions. Among other things, Sourlis falsely described promissory notes, note holders, and communications with those holders, none of which actually existed. The SEC asserted that, contrary to Sourlis' fraudulent opinion letter, the stock issuance did not qualify for an exemption from registration under the federal securities laws.
In finding Sourlis liable for fraud, at the November 16, 2012 hearing on the SEC's summary judgment motion, the District Court stated that Sourlis' opinion "represents that Ms. Sourlis spoke to note-holders which did not exist . . . And several other facts for which there was no evidentiary support." The Court further stated that Sourlis' opinion "represented as fact matters that were contrary to fact, and to me the most egregious representation was the representation that the writer of the letter had spoken to the original note-holders which is repeated in the letter."
The Court held Sourlis liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but denied the SEC summary judgment against Sourlis for primary liability under Section 10(b). The Court also reserved decision on the SEC's non-fraud claim that Sourlis violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. On the basis of the Court's November 20 liability holding, the SEC intends to seek from the Court against Sourlis injunctive relief, financial penalties, disgorgement, and a penny stock bar.
Attorney Virginia K. Sourlis Found Liable for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud by Issuing False Legal Opinion in Connection with Illegal Stock Offering
On November 20, 2012, the Federal District Court in SEC v. Greenstone Holdings, Inc., et al., 10 civ. 1302 (S.D.N.Y.), granted the SEC partial summary judgment against attorney Virginia K. Sourlis, holding Sourlis liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud by issuing a false legal opinion that certain of her co-defendants used to obtain illegally more than six million shares of unrestricted stock of Greenstone Holdings, Inc.
According to the SEC's summary judgment motion, in early 2006, Sourlis intentionally authored a materially false and misleading legal opinion, which Greenstone used to illegally issue over six million shares of stock in unregistered transactions. Among other things, Sourlis falsely described promissory notes, note holders, and communications with those holders, none of which actually existed. The SEC asserted that, contrary to Sourlis' fraudulent opinion letter, the stock issuance did not qualify for an exemption from registration under the federal securities laws.
In finding Sourlis liable for fraud, at the November 16, 2012 hearing on the SEC's summary judgment motion, the District Court stated that Sourlis' opinion "represents that Ms. Sourlis spoke to note-holders which did not exist . . . And several other facts for which there was no evidentiary support." The Court further stated that Sourlis' opinion "represented as fact matters that were contrary to fact, and to me the most egregious representation was the representation that the writer of the letter had spoken to the original note-holders which is repeated in the letter."
The Court held Sourlis liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but denied the SEC summary judgment against Sourlis for primary liability under Section 10(b). The Court also reserved decision on the SEC's non-fraud claim that Sourlis violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. On the basis of the Court's November 20 liability holding, the SEC intends to seek from the Court against Sourlis injunctive relief, financial penalties, disgorgement, and a penny stock bar.
Thursday, December 6, 2012
ACCOUNTING FIRMS ACCUSED BY SEC OF FAILURE TO PRODUCE AUDIT WORK PAPERS
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Dec. 3, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today began administrative proceedings against the China affiliates of each of the Big Four accounting firms and another large U.S. accounting firm for refusing to produce audit work papers and other documents related to China-based companies under investigation by the SEC for potential accounting fraud against U.S. investors.
The SEC charged the following firms with violating the Securities Exchange Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires foreign public accounting firms to provide the SEC upon request with audit work papers involving any company trading on U.S. markets:
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants Ltd
Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP
KPMG Huazhen (Special General Partnership)
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian CPAs Limited
According to the SEC’s order instituting the proceedings, SEC investigators have been making efforts for the past several months to obtain documents from these firms. The audit materials are being sought as part of SEC investigations into potential wrongdoing by nine China-based companies whose securities are publicly traded in the U.S. The audit firms have refused to cooperate in the investigations.
"Only with access to work papers of foreign public accounting firms can the SEC test the quality of the underlying audits and protect investors from the dangers of accounting fraud," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "Firms that conduct audits knowing they cannot comply with laws requiring access to these work papers face serious sanctions."
An administrative law judge will schedule a hearing and determine the appropriate remedial sanction against the firms. The order requires the administrative law judge to issue an initial decision no later than 300 days from the date of service of the order.
The SEC has launched an initiative to address concerns arising from reverse mergers and foreign issuers. Through the work of a Cross Border Working Group, the agency has deregistered the securities of nearly 50 companies and filed fraud cases against more than 40 foreign issuers and executives. The SEC’s Enforcement Division has taken a series of actions against China-based audit firms. Earlier this year, the SEC announced an enforcement action against Shanghai-based Deloitte Touche Tomatsu for refusing to produce documents for an SEC investigation into one of its China-based clients. That proceeding is ongoing. The SEC previously filed a subpoena enforcement action in federal court against the firm for failing to produce documents in response to a subpoena pertaining to its longtime client Longtop Financial Technologies Limited. In the separate administrative proceeding against Longtop, an administrative law judge found that Longtop was delinquent in its reporting obligations and ordered Longtop’s securities registration to be revoked.
"U.S. investors should be able to rely on the quality of audited financial statements," said Kara Brockmeyer, co-head of the SEC’s Cross Border Working Group. "Our Working Group’s actions demonstrate how the SEC is proactively identifying emerging risks to protect U.S. investors from accounting fraud."
This enforcement action was coordinated by the Cross Border Working Group and involved investigative teams in SEC offices in Washington D.C., Boston, New York, Fort Worth, and Los Angeles.
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
SEC CHARGES CHARGES BUSINESS EXECUTIVE WITH INSIDER TRADING AHEAD OF SALE OF COMPANY
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Connecticut-based business executive with insider trading ahead of the sale of Patriot Capital Funding Group based on nonpublic information he learned at the helm of a firm involved in the bidding process.
The SEC alleges that I. Joseph Massoud, who founded investment advisory firm Compass Group Management, gained access to nonpublic information contained in an online "dataroom" where bidding companies could learn more about Patriot Capital’s financial condition. For access to the data, Compass Group had to enter into a confidentiality agreement that prohibited its employees from buying Patriot Capital stock. Nonetheless, Massoud purchased shares soon after Compass Group gained access to the confidential information, and he bought even more stock after he learned that Compass Group’s bid was what he described as "waaaaay off" compared to bids from other companies. Patriot Capital’s share price more than doubled after a merger was publicly announced, and Massoud realized more than $676,000 in illegal profits.
Massoud, who lives in Westport, Conn., agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying more than $1.4 million. He also will be barred from working in the securities industry or serving as an officer or director of a public company. The settlement is subject to court approval.
"With full knowledge of a confidentiality agreement that prohibited him from buying Patriot Capital stock, Massoud abused his access to nonpublic data for what turned out to be a short-term personal gain," said John T. Dugan, Associate Director of the SEC’s Boston Regional Office. "As a result of the SEC’s action, Massoud must pay back double what he made in the scheme and he can never work in the securities industry again."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Connecticut, Patriot Capital initiated a nonpublic bidding process in 2009 to entertain proposals for strategic investments and the possible sale of the company. In May 2009, Massoud directed Compass Group to execute a confidentiality agreement with Patriot Capital so it could participate in that process. After Compass Group was provided access to the online dataroom as part of the bidding process, a Compass Group analyst accessed the dataroom and provided various reports containing material, nonpublic information to Massoud.
The SEC alleges that Massoud also learned nonpublic information about the value of bids received by Patriot Capital from other parties involved in the bidding process. On July 7, 2009, Massoud e-mailed others working on the Patriot Capital transaction at Compass Group and indicated that he had just talked with Patriot Capital’s CEO. He wrote that Compass Group was "waaaaay off" on its bid to acquire Patriot Capital, which according to the CEO had received several acquisition bids that were much higher than Compass Group’s offer. Massoud also learned from the CEO that Compass Group would have to increase its bid to match those higher proposals if it wanted to be considered.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Massoud bought 322,216 shares of Patriot Capital stock in transactions spread across 15 different trading days from May to July. Massoud purchased more than half of those shares after July 7 when Patriot Capital’s CEO confidentially told him about other higher bids to acquire Patriot Capital. On Aug. 3, 2009, Patriot Capital publicly announced a merger with Prospect Capital Corporation. On August 25, after Patriot Capital had been acquired and its stock price had increased significantly, Massoud sold all of his Patriot Capital stock.
The SEC alleges that Massoud violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 and that his profits constitute ill-gotten gains. Massoud agreed to pay disgorgement of $676,013, prejudgment interest of $80,785, and a penalty of $676,013. He agreed to be enjoined from violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the future, and he will be barred from serving as a public company officer or director and from being associated with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal adviser, transfer agent, or national recognized statistical rating organization. He also will be barred from participating in any penny stock offering.
Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Connecticut-based business executive with insider trading ahead of the sale of Patriot Capital Funding Group based on nonpublic information he learned at the helm of a firm involved in the bidding process.
The SEC alleges that I. Joseph Massoud, who founded investment advisory firm Compass Group Management, gained access to nonpublic information contained in an online "dataroom" where bidding companies could learn more about Patriot Capital’s financial condition. For access to the data, Compass Group had to enter into a confidentiality agreement that prohibited its employees from buying Patriot Capital stock. Nonetheless, Massoud purchased shares soon after Compass Group gained access to the confidential information, and he bought even more stock after he learned that Compass Group’s bid was what he described as "waaaaay off" compared to bids from other companies. Patriot Capital’s share price more than doubled after a merger was publicly announced, and Massoud realized more than $676,000 in illegal profits.
Massoud, who lives in Westport, Conn., agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying more than $1.4 million. He also will be barred from working in the securities industry or serving as an officer or director of a public company. The settlement is subject to court approval.
"With full knowledge of a confidentiality agreement that prohibited him from buying Patriot Capital stock, Massoud abused his access to nonpublic data for what turned out to be a short-term personal gain," said John T. Dugan, Associate Director of the SEC’s Boston Regional Office. "As a result of the SEC’s action, Massoud must pay back double what he made in the scheme and he can never work in the securities industry again."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Connecticut, Patriot Capital initiated a nonpublic bidding process in 2009 to entertain proposals for strategic investments and the possible sale of the company. In May 2009, Massoud directed Compass Group to execute a confidentiality agreement with Patriot Capital so it could participate in that process. After Compass Group was provided access to the online dataroom as part of the bidding process, a Compass Group analyst accessed the dataroom and provided various reports containing material, nonpublic information to Massoud.
The SEC alleges that Massoud also learned nonpublic information about the value of bids received by Patriot Capital from other parties involved in the bidding process. On July 7, 2009, Massoud e-mailed others working on the Patriot Capital transaction at Compass Group and indicated that he had just talked with Patriot Capital’s CEO. He wrote that Compass Group was "waaaaay off" on its bid to acquire Patriot Capital, which according to the CEO had received several acquisition bids that were much higher than Compass Group’s offer. Massoud also learned from the CEO that Compass Group would have to increase its bid to match those higher proposals if it wanted to be considered.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Massoud bought 322,216 shares of Patriot Capital stock in transactions spread across 15 different trading days from May to July. Massoud purchased more than half of those shares after July 7 when Patriot Capital’s CEO confidentially told him about other higher bids to acquire Patriot Capital. On Aug. 3, 2009, Patriot Capital publicly announced a merger with Prospect Capital Corporation. On August 25, after Patriot Capital had been acquired and its stock price had increased significantly, Massoud sold all of his Patriot Capital stock.
The SEC alleges that Massoud violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 and that his profits constitute ill-gotten gains. Massoud agreed to pay disgorgement of $676,013, prejudgment interest of $80,785, and a penalty of $676,013. He agreed to be enjoined from violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the future, and he will be barred from serving as a public company officer or director and from being associated with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal adviser, transfer agent, or national recognized statistical rating organization. He also will be barred from participating in any penny stock offering.
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
SEC FILES FRAUD CHARGES AGAINST CHINA NORTH EAST PETROLEUM HOLDINGS LIMITED; ITS CEO, PRESIDENT AND FORMER CHAIRMAN; ITS FOUNDER AND FORMER DIRECTOR; AND ITS VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that, on November 29, 2012, the Commission filed fraud and other related charges against China North East Petroleum Holdings (CNEP); its CEO, President and former Chairman of the Board of Directors, Wang Hongjun (Wang); its founder, former director and Wang's mother, Ju Guizhi (Ju); and its Vice President of Corporate Finance and Secretary, Jiang Chao. The Commission also named Wang's wife, Sun Jishuang (Sun), and Jiang Chao's father, Jiang Mingfu, as Relief Defendants to recover company monies that they improperly received.
The Commission alleges that CNEP, Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao diverted offering proceeds to the personal accounts of corporate insiders and their immediate family members, and also engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with at least 176 undisclosed transactions between the company and its insiders or their immediate family members, otherwise known as related-party transactions.
The Commission alleges that, in connection with its two public stock offerings in late 2009, CNEP falsely stated to investors in a registration statement and other public filings signed by Wang that the offering proceeds would be used to fund future business expansion and for general working capital purposes. Instead, consistent with a pre-existing pattern of engaging in undisclosed, related-party transactions, Jiang Chao then diverted over $900,000 of offering proceeds to his father, Jiang Mingfu, and at the direction of Ju, diverted at least $6 million dollars to her and Sun, who is her daughter-in-law and Wang's wife.
The Commission further alleges that during 2009, CNEP, Wang and Ju engaged in at least 176 undisclosed, related-party transactions. This fraudulent conduct involved approximately $28 million in transactions from CNEP to Wang or Ju; approximately $11 million purportedly loaned to CNEP or paid to third parties on behalf of CNEP by Wang or Ju; and $20 million of unusual post-year-end adjustments that purported to eliminate the remaining debts owed by Wang and Ju to CNEP. Together, these transactions totaled approximately $59 million of related-party activity during 2009. Neither the magnitude nor the volume of these related-party transactions has been fully disclosed to the investing public.
The Commission alleges that CNEP, Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5. The Commission further alleges violations of reporting, recordkeeping and internal controls provisions of the securities laws, Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) & (B), and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1, 13a-11, 13a-13 and 13b2-1. The Commission is seeking: (i) permanent injunctive relief to prevent future violations of the federal securities laws, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and civil penalties from each Defendant; (ii) officer and director bars against Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao; and (iii) disgorgement from the Relief Defendants, Sun and Jiang Mingfu, of improperly received funds.
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that, on November 29, 2012, the Commission filed fraud and other related charges against China North East Petroleum Holdings (CNEP); its CEO, President and former Chairman of the Board of Directors, Wang Hongjun (Wang); its founder, former director and Wang's mother, Ju Guizhi (Ju); and its Vice President of Corporate Finance and Secretary, Jiang Chao. The Commission also named Wang's wife, Sun Jishuang (Sun), and Jiang Chao's father, Jiang Mingfu, as Relief Defendants to recover company monies that they improperly received.
The Commission alleges that CNEP, Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao diverted offering proceeds to the personal accounts of corporate insiders and their immediate family members, and also engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with at least 176 undisclosed transactions between the company and its insiders or their immediate family members, otherwise known as related-party transactions.
The Commission alleges that, in connection with its two public stock offerings in late 2009, CNEP falsely stated to investors in a registration statement and other public filings signed by Wang that the offering proceeds would be used to fund future business expansion and for general working capital purposes. Instead, consistent with a pre-existing pattern of engaging in undisclosed, related-party transactions, Jiang Chao then diverted over $900,000 of offering proceeds to his father, Jiang Mingfu, and at the direction of Ju, diverted at least $6 million dollars to her and Sun, who is her daughter-in-law and Wang's wife.
The Commission further alleges that during 2009, CNEP, Wang and Ju engaged in at least 176 undisclosed, related-party transactions. This fraudulent conduct involved approximately $28 million in transactions from CNEP to Wang or Ju; approximately $11 million purportedly loaned to CNEP or paid to third parties on behalf of CNEP by Wang or Ju; and $20 million of unusual post-year-end adjustments that purported to eliminate the remaining debts owed by Wang and Ju to CNEP. Together, these transactions totaled approximately $59 million of related-party activity during 2009. Neither the magnitude nor the volume of these related-party transactions has been fully disclosed to the investing public.
The Commission alleges that CNEP, Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5. The Commission further alleges violations of reporting, recordkeeping and internal controls provisions of the securities laws, Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) & (B), and 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1, 13a-11, 13a-13 and 13b2-1. The Commission is seeking: (i) permanent injunctive relief to prevent future violations of the federal securities laws, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and civil penalties from each Defendant; (ii) officer and director bars against Wang, Ju and Jiang Chao; and (iii) disgorgement from the Relief Defendants, Sun and Jiang Mingfu, of improperly received funds.
Monday, December 3, 2012
TWO PLEAD GUILTY TO ROLES IN FRAUD AGAINST BNC NATIONAL BANK
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Friday, November 30, 2012
Former Director of Accounting and Outside Auditor of American Mortgage Specialists Inc. Plead Guilty to Roles in Fraud Against BNC National Bank
The former director of accounting and the former outside auditor of Arizona-based residential mortgage loan originator American Mortgage Specialists Inc. (AMS) pleaded guilty in Arizona to conspiracy to defraud BNC National Bank and obstruction of justice, respectively, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Timothy Q. Purdon of the District of North Dakota; Christy Romero, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); and Steve A. Linick, Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General (FHFA-OIG) announced today.
Lauretta Horton, 45, and David Kaufman, 69, both residents of Arizona, pleaded guilty yesterday before U.S. District Judge Daniel L. Hovland of the District of North Dakota, who took the pleas in Arizona federal court. Horton and Kaufman were charged in separate criminal informations unsealed on Oct. 2, 2012, for their roles in the fraud scheme against BNC.
"While the nation was reeling from a financial downturn, Lauetta Horton conspired with AMS executives to deceive BNC Bank about AMS’s true financial stability, and AMS auditor David Kaufman lied to federal investigators to impede their investigation," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "Horton and Kaufman’s guilty pleas reflect our continued vigilance in investigating and punishing criminal conduct relating to the financial crisis."
"Banks in North Dakota were not immune from illegal conduct related to the mortgage crisis that impacted banks all across the country," said U.S. Attorney Purdon. "These guilty pleas are the result of close collaboration with our federal investigative partners and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and should send the message that the Department of Justice is committed to prosecuting cases such as these wherever they might arise."
"As the controller and director of accounting of mortgage originator AMS, Horton sent to TARP-recipient BNC National Bank false financial statements she had prepared so that BNC would continue to fund AMS," said Special Inspector General Romero. "In a cover-up and an attempt to impede the federal grand jury investigation, AMS’s external auditor Kaufman lied to SIGTARP agents about his telling an AMS executive that he had changed the financial statements so that BNC would not discover the truth. Kaufman is the third person convicted of lying to SIGTARP agents, which shows that SIGTARP will aggressively pursue those who fail to tell the truth and impede our investigations."
"This is a significant case because it holds accountable an individual who participated in a scheme to defraud a member bank of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and another individual who lied to federal investigators," said Inspector General Linick. "This case is a reminder that there are consequences for giving investigators false information and manipulating numbers."
AMS was in the business of originating residential real estate mortgage loans to borrowers and then selling the loans to institutional investors. In 2006, AMS entered into a loan participation agreement with BNC whereby BNC provided funding for the loans issued by AMS. According to court documents, Horton, the director of accounting at AMS, conspired from February 2009 to April 2010 to defraud BNC by making false representations regarding the financial well-being of AMS in order for AMS to continue to obtain funding from BNC. Specifically, Horton admitted to inflating asset items and altering financial information in the AMS balance sheet provided to BNC to falsely reflect that AMS had substantial liquid assets when, in fact, it did not.
According to court documents, Kaufman, a certified public accountant and the outside auditor of AMS’ annual financial statements, lied to federal agents during the criminal investigation and obstructed the grand jury investigation. Specifically, Kaufman admitted denying to agents that he had a conversation with an AMS executive in which Kaufman explained to the AMS executive that Kaufman had combined two expenses on AMS’s financial statements in order to conceal the true nature and extent of AMS’s financial condition from BNC.
Although BNC’s holding company had received approximately $20 million under the TARP and had injected approximately $17 million of the TARP funds into BNC, BNC incurred losses exceeding the millions received from TARP. BNC then did not make its required TARP dividends to the Department of Treasury for nearly two years.
At sentencing, scheduled for May 6, 2013, Kaufman and Horton face a maximum penalty of 10 years and five years in prison, respectively.
The investigation was conducted by agents assigned to the Offices of the Inspector General of SIGTARP and of FHFA. The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Robert A. Zink and Senior Litigation Counsel Jack B. Patrick of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and by Assistant U.S. Attorney Clare Hochhalter of the District of North Dakota, with the assistance of Trial Attorney Jeannette Gunderson of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.
Friday, November 30, 2012
Former Director of Accounting and Outside Auditor of American Mortgage Specialists Inc. Plead Guilty to Roles in Fraud Against BNC National Bank
The former director of accounting and the former outside auditor of Arizona-based residential mortgage loan originator American Mortgage Specialists Inc. (AMS) pleaded guilty in Arizona to conspiracy to defraud BNC National Bank and obstruction of justice, respectively, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney Timothy Q. Purdon of the District of North Dakota; Christy Romero, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); and Steve A. Linick, Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General (FHFA-OIG) announced today.
Lauretta Horton, 45, and David Kaufman, 69, both residents of Arizona, pleaded guilty yesterday before U.S. District Judge Daniel L. Hovland of the District of North Dakota, who took the pleas in Arizona federal court. Horton and Kaufman were charged in separate criminal informations unsealed on Oct. 2, 2012, for their roles in the fraud scheme against BNC.
"While the nation was reeling from a financial downturn, Lauetta Horton conspired with AMS executives to deceive BNC Bank about AMS’s true financial stability, and AMS auditor David Kaufman lied to federal investigators to impede their investigation," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "Horton and Kaufman’s guilty pleas reflect our continued vigilance in investigating and punishing criminal conduct relating to the financial crisis."
"Banks in North Dakota were not immune from illegal conduct related to the mortgage crisis that impacted banks all across the country," said U.S. Attorney Purdon. "These guilty pleas are the result of close collaboration with our federal investigative partners and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and should send the message that the Department of Justice is committed to prosecuting cases such as these wherever they might arise."
"As the controller and director of accounting of mortgage originator AMS, Horton sent to TARP-recipient BNC National Bank false financial statements she had prepared so that BNC would continue to fund AMS," said Special Inspector General Romero. "In a cover-up and an attempt to impede the federal grand jury investigation, AMS’s external auditor Kaufman lied to SIGTARP agents about his telling an AMS executive that he had changed the financial statements so that BNC would not discover the truth. Kaufman is the third person convicted of lying to SIGTARP agents, which shows that SIGTARP will aggressively pursue those who fail to tell the truth and impede our investigations."
"This is a significant case because it holds accountable an individual who participated in a scheme to defraud a member bank of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and another individual who lied to federal investigators," said Inspector General Linick. "This case is a reminder that there are consequences for giving investigators false information and manipulating numbers."
AMS was in the business of originating residential real estate mortgage loans to borrowers and then selling the loans to institutional investors. In 2006, AMS entered into a loan participation agreement with BNC whereby BNC provided funding for the loans issued by AMS. According to court documents, Horton, the director of accounting at AMS, conspired from February 2009 to April 2010 to defraud BNC by making false representations regarding the financial well-being of AMS in order for AMS to continue to obtain funding from BNC. Specifically, Horton admitted to inflating asset items and altering financial information in the AMS balance sheet provided to BNC to falsely reflect that AMS had substantial liquid assets when, in fact, it did not.
According to court documents, Kaufman, a certified public accountant and the outside auditor of AMS’ annual financial statements, lied to federal agents during the criminal investigation and obstructed the grand jury investigation. Specifically, Kaufman admitted denying to agents that he had a conversation with an AMS executive in which Kaufman explained to the AMS executive that Kaufman had combined two expenses on AMS’s financial statements in order to conceal the true nature and extent of AMS’s financial condition from BNC.
Although BNC’s holding company had received approximately $20 million under the TARP and had injected approximately $17 million of the TARP funds into BNC, BNC incurred losses exceeding the millions received from TARP. BNC then did not make its required TARP dividends to the Department of Treasury for nearly two years.
At sentencing, scheduled for May 6, 2013, Kaufman and Horton face a maximum penalty of 10 years and five years in prison, respectively.
The investigation was conducted by agents assigned to the Offices of the Inspector General of SIGTARP and of FHFA. The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Robert A. Zink and Senior Litigation Counsel Jack B. Patrick of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and by Assistant U.S. Attorney Clare Hochhalter of the District of North Dakota, with the assistance of Trial Attorney Jeannette Gunderson of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.
Sunday, December 2, 2012
TWO BROKERS CHARGED WITH INSIDER TRADING REGARDING THE ACQUISITION OF SPSS INC., BY IBM CORPORATION
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged two retail brokers who formerly worked at a Connecticut-based broker-dealer with insider trading on nonpublic information ahead of IBM Corporation’s acquisition of SPSS Inc.
The SEC alleges that Thomas C. Conradt learned confidential details about the merger from his roommate, a research analyst who got the information from an attorney working on the transaction who discussed it in confidence. Conradt purchased SPSS securities and subsequently tipped his friend and fellow broker David J. Weishaus, who also traded. The insider trading yielded more than $1 million in illicit profits. The SEC’s investigation uncovered instant messages between Conradt and Weishaus where they openly discussed their illegal activity. The SEC’s investigation is continuing.
"When licensed professionals who are privileged to work in the securities industry violate legal duties and enrich themselves at investors’ expense, it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the markets," said Daniel M. Hawke, Director of the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office. "As industry professionals, Conradt and Weishaus clearly understood that what they were doing was wrong, but did so anyway while knowing the consequences they would face if caught."
In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Conradt and Weishaus, who live in Denver and Baltimore respectively.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, the scheme occurred in 2009. Conradt revealed in instant messages that he received the information from the research analyst and warned Weishaus that they needed to "keep this in the family." Weishaus agreed, typing "i don't want to go to jail." They went on to discuss other people who have been prosecuted for insider trading. In another series of instant messages, Conradt bragged that he was "makin everyone rich" by sharing the nonpublic information. Weishaus later noted, "this is gonna be sweet."
The SEC alleges that the research analyst’s attorney friend sought moral support, reassurance, and advice when he privately told the research analyst about his new assignment at work on the SPSS acquisition by IBM. In describing the magnitude of the assignment, the lawyer disclosed material, nonpublic information about the proposed transaction, including the anticipated transaction price and the identities of the acquiring and target companies. The associate expected the research analyst to maintain this information in confidence and refrain from trading on this information or disclosing it to others.
The SEC alleges that Conradt, Weishaus, and other downstream tippees purchased common stock and call options in SPSS. A call option is a security that derives its value from the underlying common stock of the issuer and gives the purchaser the right to buy the underlying stock at a specific price within a specified period of time. Typically, investors will purchase call options when they believe the stock of the underlying securities is going up. Conradt, Weishaus, and other downstream tippees invested so heavily in SPSS securities that the investments accounted for 76 percent to 100 percent of their various brokerage accounts. Conradt and Weishaus both hold law degrees. Conradt is admitted to practice law in Maryland, and he passed the Colorado bar examination administered in February 2012.
The SEC alleges that Conradt and Weishaus violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The SEC is seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest and financial penalties, and a permanent injunction against the brokers.
The SEC’s investigation is being conducted by Mary P. Hansen, A. Kristina Littman and John S. Rymas, in the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office. G. Jeffrey Boujoukos and Catherine E. Pappas in the Philadelphia office are handling the litigation. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Washington, D.C., Nov. 29, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged two retail brokers who formerly worked at a Connecticut-based broker-dealer with insider trading on nonpublic information ahead of IBM Corporation’s acquisition of SPSS Inc.
The SEC alleges that Thomas C. Conradt learned confidential details about the merger from his roommate, a research analyst who got the information from an attorney working on the transaction who discussed it in confidence. Conradt purchased SPSS securities and subsequently tipped his friend and fellow broker David J. Weishaus, who also traded. The insider trading yielded more than $1 million in illicit profits. The SEC’s investigation uncovered instant messages between Conradt and Weishaus where they openly discussed their illegal activity. The SEC’s investigation is continuing.
"When licensed professionals who are privileged to work in the securities industry violate legal duties and enrich themselves at investors’ expense, it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the markets," said Daniel M. Hawke, Director of the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office. "As industry professionals, Conradt and Weishaus clearly understood that what they were doing was wrong, but did so anyway while knowing the consequences they would face if caught."
In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York today announced criminal charges against Conradt and Weishaus, who live in Denver and Baltimore respectively.
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Manhattan, the scheme occurred in 2009. Conradt revealed in instant messages that he received the information from the research analyst and warned Weishaus that they needed to "keep this in the family." Weishaus agreed, typing "i don't want to go to jail." They went on to discuss other people who have been prosecuted for insider trading. In another series of instant messages, Conradt bragged that he was "makin everyone rich" by sharing the nonpublic information. Weishaus later noted, "this is gonna be sweet."
The SEC alleges that the research analyst’s attorney friend sought moral support, reassurance, and advice when he privately told the research analyst about his new assignment at work on the SPSS acquisition by IBM. In describing the magnitude of the assignment, the lawyer disclosed material, nonpublic information about the proposed transaction, including the anticipated transaction price and the identities of the acquiring and target companies. The associate expected the research analyst to maintain this information in confidence and refrain from trading on this information or disclosing it to others.
The SEC alleges that Conradt, Weishaus, and other downstream tippees purchased common stock and call options in SPSS. A call option is a security that derives its value from the underlying common stock of the issuer and gives the purchaser the right to buy the underlying stock at a specific price within a specified period of time. Typically, investors will purchase call options when they believe the stock of the underlying securities is going up. Conradt, Weishaus, and other downstream tippees invested so heavily in SPSS securities that the investments accounted for 76 percent to 100 percent of their various brokerage accounts. Conradt and Weishaus both hold law degrees. Conradt is admitted to practice law in Maryland, and he passed the Colorado bar examination administered in February 2012.
The SEC alleges that Conradt and Weishaus violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The SEC is seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest and financial penalties, and a permanent injunction against the brokers.
The SEC’s investigation is being conducted by Mary P. Hansen, A. Kristina Littman and John S. Rymas, in the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office. G. Jeffrey Boujoukos and Catherine E. Pappas in the Philadelphia office are handling the litigation. The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Saturday, December 1, 2012
THREE EXECUTIVES CHARGED BY SEC WITH OVERSTATING ASSETS DURING FINANCIAL CRISIS
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three top executives at a New York-based publicly-traded fund being regulated as a business development company (BDC) with overstating the fund’s assets during the financial crisis. The fund’s asset portfolio consisted primarily of corporate debt securities and investments in collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
An SEC investigation found that KCAP Financial Inc. did not account for certain market-based activity in determining the fair value of its debt securities and certain CLOs. KCAP also failed to disclose that the fund had valued its two largest CLO investments at cost. KCAP’s chief executive officer Dayl W. Pearson and chief investment officer R. Jonathan Corless had primary responsibility for calculating the fair value of KCAP’s debt securities, while KCAP’s former chief financial officer Michael I. Wirth had primary responsibility for calculating the fair value of KCAP’s CLOs. Wirth, a certified public accountant, prepared the disclosures about KCAP’s methodologies to fair value its CLOs, and Pearson reviewed those disclosures.
The three executives agreed to pay financial penalties to settle the SEC’s charges.
"When market conditions change, funds and other entities must properly take into account those changed conditions in fair valuing their assets, said Antonia Chion, Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "This is particularly important for BDCs like KCAP, whose entire business consists of the assets that it holds for investment."
This is the SEC’s first enforcement action against a public company that failed to properly fair value its assets according to the applicable financial accounting standard — FAS 157 — which became effective for KCAP in the first quarter of 2008.
According to the SEC’s order instituting administrative proceedings against the fund and the three executives, KCAP did not record and report the fair value of its assets in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and in particular FAS 157, which requires assets to be fair valued based on an "exit price" that reflects the price that would be received to sell an asset in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.
The SEC’s order found that Pearson and Corless concluded that any trades of debt securities held by KCAP in the fourth quarter of 2008 reflected distressed transactions, and therefore KCAP determined the fair value of its debt securities based solely on an enterprise value methodology. However, this methodology did not calculate or inform KCAP investors of the FAS 157 "exit price" for that security. Wirth calculated the fair value of KCAP’s two largest CLO investments to be their cost, and did not take into account the market conditions during that period.
According to the SEC’s order, in May 2010, KCAP restated the fair values for certain debt securities and CLOs whose net asset values had been overstated by approximately 27 percent as of Dec. 31, 2008. Moreover, KCAP’s internal controls over financial reporting did not adequately take into account certain market inputs and other data.
"KCAP should have accounted for market conditions in the fourth quarter of 2008 in determining the fair values of its assets," said Julie M. Riewe, Deputy Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. "FAS 157 is critically important in fair valuing illiquid securities, and funds must consider market information in making FAS 157 fair value determinations and comply with their disclosed valuation methodologies."
KCAP’s overvaluation and internal controls failures violated the reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws, namely Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Pearson, Corless, and Wirth caused KCAP’s violations and directly violated Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 by causing KCAP’s books and records to be falsified. Pearson and Wirth also directly violated Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 by falsely certifying the adequacy of KCAP’s internal controls.
Pearson and Wirth each agreed to pay $50,000 penalties and Corless agreed to pay a $25,000 penalty to settle the SEC’s charges. KCAP and the three executives, without admitting or denying the findings, consented to the SEC’s order requiring them to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or any future violations of these federal securities laws.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Adam Aderton of the Asset Management Unit, Noel Gittens, and Richard Haynes, and was supervised by Assistant Director Ricky Sachar
Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged three top executives at a New York-based publicly-traded fund being regulated as a business development company (BDC) with overstating the fund’s assets during the financial crisis. The fund’s asset portfolio consisted primarily of corporate debt securities and investments in collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
An SEC investigation found that KCAP Financial Inc. did not account for certain market-based activity in determining the fair value of its debt securities and certain CLOs. KCAP also failed to disclose that the fund had valued its two largest CLO investments at cost. KCAP’s chief executive officer Dayl W. Pearson and chief investment officer R. Jonathan Corless had primary responsibility for calculating the fair value of KCAP’s debt securities, while KCAP’s former chief financial officer Michael I. Wirth had primary responsibility for calculating the fair value of KCAP’s CLOs. Wirth, a certified public accountant, prepared the disclosures about KCAP’s methodologies to fair value its CLOs, and Pearson reviewed those disclosures.
The three executives agreed to pay financial penalties to settle the SEC’s charges.
"When market conditions change, funds and other entities must properly take into account those changed conditions in fair valuing their assets, said Antonia Chion, Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "This is particularly important for BDCs like KCAP, whose entire business consists of the assets that it holds for investment."
This is the SEC’s first enforcement action against a public company that failed to properly fair value its assets according to the applicable financial accounting standard — FAS 157 — which became effective for KCAP in the first quarter of 2008.
According to the SEC’s order instituting administrative proceedings against the fund and the three executives, KCAP did not record and report the fair value of its assets in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and in particular FAS 157, which requires assets to be fair valued based on an "exit price" that reflects the price that would be received to sell an asset in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.
The SEC’s order found that Pearson and Corless concluded that any trades of debt securities held by KCAP in the fourth quarter of 2008 reflected distressed transactions, and therefore KCAP determined the fair value of its debt securities based solely on an enterprise value methodology. However, this methodology did not calculate or inform KCAP investors of the FAS 157 "exit price" for that security. Wirth calculated the fair value of KCAP’s two largest CLO investments to be their cost, and did not take into account the market conditions during that period.
According to the SEC’s order, in May 2010, KCAP restated the fair values for certain debt securities and CLOs whose net asset values had been overstated by approximately 27 percent as of Dec. 31, 2008. Moreover, KCAP’s internal controls over financial reporting did not adequately take into account certain market inputs and other data.
"KCAP should have accounted for market conditions in the fourth quarter of 2008 in determining the fair values of its assets," said Julie M. Riewe, Deputy Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. "FAS 157 is critically important in fair valuing illiquid securities, and funds must consider market information in making FAS 157 fair value determinations and comply with their disclosed valuation methodologies."
KCAP’s overvaluation and internal controls failures violated the reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws, namely Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Pearson, Corless, and Wirth caused KCAP’s violations and directly violated Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 by causing KCAP’s books and records to be falsified. Pearson and Wirth also directly violated Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 by falsely certifying the adequacy of KCAP’s internal controls.
Pearson and Wirth each agreed to pay $50,000 penalties and Corless agreed to pay a $25,000 penalty to settle the SEC’s charges. KCAP and the three executives, without admitting or denying the findings, consented to the SEC’s order requiring them to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or any future violations of these federal securities laws.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Adam Aderton of the Asset Management Unit, Noel Gittens, and Richard Haynes, and was supervised by Assistant Director Ricky Sachar
Friday, November 30, 2012
FDIC DIRECTOR HOENIG'S SPEECH ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
FROM: FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
Remarks by Thomas M. Hoenig, Director, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - Financial Oversight: It’s Time to Improve Outcomes to the AICPA/SIFMA FSA National Conference; New York, NY
November 30, 2012
Introduction
Many remain skeptical of claims that the financial system has been reformed and that taxpayer bailouts are relics of the past. Such skepticism is understandable. For nearly a century, the public has been told repeatedly that stronger regulations and supervision, greater market discipline, and enforced resolution will ensure that financial crises will be less likely, and, should they occur, will be handled effectively.
Despite these assurances, the public remains at risk of having to pick up the pieces when the next financial setback occurs. The safety net continues to expand to cover activities and enterprises it was not intended to protect, resulting in subsidized risk taking by the largest financial firms and fueling their leverage. At the same time, the tolerance for leverage remains essentially unchanged, leaving us in a situation that is little different than before the recent crisis. We can be confident that as time passes, this leverage again will be a problem and the public again will be left holding the bag.
To change this outcome, we must change the framework and related incentives.
Defining the Problem
The structure of the system, the rules of the game, and the methods of accountability are all keys to the success or failure of any market system. They determine incentives and, of course, performance outcomes. As you would expect following this most recent crisis, various commissions attempted to sort out what went wrong and offered remedies to prevent such a crisis from recurring.
But for all this effort, incentives around risk remain mostly unchanged and leave the industry vulnerable to excesses. While there are no perfect solutions, there are actions that, taken together, can more effectively improve outcomes.
First, we must change the structure of the industry to ensure that the coverage of the safety net is narrowed to where it is needed, and stop the extension of its subsidy to an ever-greater number of firms and activities.
Second, we must simplify and strengthen capital standards to contain the impulse for excessive leverage and to provide a more useful backstop to absorb unexpected losses.
Third, we must reestablish a more rigorous examination program for the largest banks and bank holding companies to best understand the risk profile of both individual firms and financial markets.
Narrowing the Safety Net
Commercial banking in the United States has been protected for decades by a public safety net of central bank lending, deposit insurance and, more recently, direct government support. This has been done because commercial banks are thought essential to a well-functioning economy. Their operations involve providing payment services, taking short-term deposits, and making loans. In other words, conducting activities that intermediate the flow of credit from savers to borrowers, transforming short-term deposits into longer-term loans. This funding arrangement requires that the public and business have confidence that they can access their money on demand. The safety net helps provide that assurance.
The intended purpose of this government support is well understood. However, less understood is its unintended consequence: providing banks a subsidy in raising funds. As a result, they are less subject to economic or market forces, and their funding costs are less than that of firms outside the safety net. This subsidy, in turn, creates incentives to leverage their balance sheets and take on greater asset risk.
In the United States, this financial subsidy was greatly expanded in 1999 with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), which eliminated prohibitions that kept banks from affiliating with broker-dealer and securities firms. By allowing such cross ownership, the safety net and, therefore, its subsidy was expanded to more and ever-larger financial firms, conducting ever more complex and risk-oriented activities. Subsidies are valuable, and once given are hard to take away and once expanded are hard to restrict.
Despite repeated assurances following GLB that no firm would be too big to fail, the actions of governments have only confirmed that some firms -- the largest or most complex -- are simply too systemically important to be allowed to fail. Under such circumstances, market discipline breaks down since creditors are confident that they will be bailed out regardless of what the bank does. The deposit subsidy and the lack of market discipline from the consequences of failure create an incentive to take on excessive risk.
Narrowing the safety net, limiting its coverage, and realigning incentives, therefore, must be among the highest priorities following this recent crisis. Governments would be wise to limit commercial banking activities to primarily those for which the safety net’s protection was intended: stabilizing the payments system and the intermediation process between short-term lenders and long-term borrowers. That is, it should be confined to protecting our economic infrastructure.1
Trading activities do not intermediate credit. They reallocate assets and existing securities and derivatives among market participants. When they are placed within the safety net, they create incentives toward greater risk-taking and cause enormous financial distortions. Protected and subsidized by the safety net, complex firms can cover their trading positions by using insured deposits or central bank credit that comes with the commercial bank charter. Non-commercial bank trading firms have no such access and no such staying power. The safety net provides the complex organizations an enormously unfair competitive advantage. Thus, while such activities are important to the success of an economy, there is no legitimate reason to subsidize them with access to the safety net.
The mixing of commercial banking and trading activities also changes incentives and behavior within the firm. Commercial banking works within a culture of win-win, where the interests and incentives of banks and their customers are aligned. If a customer is successful, the payoff to the bank means success as well. In contrast, trading is an adversarial win-lose proposition because the trader’s gains are the counterparty’s losses -- and oftentimes the counterparty is the customer. Trading focuses on the short-term, not on longer-term relationship banking. Culture matters, and as we have seen in recent years, the mixing of banking and trading tends to drive organizations to make short-term return choices.
It is sometimes suggested that had broker-dealer and trading activity been separated from commercial banking, the recent financial crisis would have been just as severe. Lehman Brothers was not a commercial bank, and yet it brought the world to its knees. However, following GLB, just as commercial banks enjoyed the special benefit of the safety-net subsidy, firms like Lehman enjoyed the benefits from the special treatment given to money market funds and overnight repos to fund their activities. They were essentially operating as commercial banks and enjoying an implied subsidy very similar to that of commercial banks. Thus, a fundamental change needed to encourage greater accountability and stability is to correct the rules giving special treatment to money market funds and repos, thereby ending their treatment as deposits.
Market discipline works best when stockholders and creditors understand they are at risk and when the safety net is narrowly applied to the infrastructure for which it was intended.
Capital and Bank Safety
Capital is fundamental to any industry’s success, both as a source of funding and as a cushion against unforeseen events. This is especially the case for financial firms, as they are, by design, highly leveraged. But what is the right amount of capital, and how should it be measured and enforced to assure a more stable financial environment?
Basel standards have for more than two decades been the focal point of discussion in defining adequate capital for the financial industry. A new version of Basel standards is out for comment as supervisors struggle to find a system that properly defines capital, appropriately allocates it against risk, and results in a more stable financial system. However, the Basel proposal remains extremely complex and opaque as it attempts to anticipate every contingency and to assign risk weights to every conceivable asset that an institution might place on or off its balance sheet. The unfortunate consequence is ineffective capital regulation due to confusion, uncertainty about the quality of the balance sheet, and added costs imposed on a firm’s capital program.
Past attempts at defining the correct amount and distribution of capital have uniformly failed. For example, in 2007 as the financial crisis was just emerging, Basel’s measure of total capital to risk-weighted assets for the10 largest U.S. financial firms was approximately 11 percent -- a very impressive level of capital. But the ratio, using the more conservative tangible-equity-to-tangible-assets measure, was a mere 2.8 percent2. Had this been the primary capital measure in 2007, it is likely that far more questions would have been asked about the soundness of the industry, resulting in a less severe banking crisis and recession.
Today, this same tangible-equity measure for the largest U.S. banks, while double the 2.8 percent number, remains far below what history tells us is an acceptable market-determined capital level. We should learn from past experience and turn our attention from using a capital rule that gives what in the end is a false sense of security to one that is effective because of its simplicity, clarity, and enforceability. Before the safety net was in place in the United States, the market demanded that banks on average hold between 13 and 16 percent tangible equity to tangible assets -- a far cry from the 2.8 percent held by these largest firms in 2007 or the 6 percent they hold today.
Therefore, as an alternative to the unmanageably complex Basel risk-weighted standards, the emphasis should be shifted to a tangible-equity-to-tangible-asset ratio, of say 10 percent. With this simple but stronger capital base, bank management could then allocate resources in a manner that balances the drive for return on equity with the discipline of greater amounts of tangible equity. Moreover, global supervisors would have a clear benchmark to test against and enforce a minimum level. Behind this tangible measure we could use a simplified risk-weighted measure as a check against excessive off-balance sheet assets or other factors that might influence firms’ safety.
Some argue that a high minimum would be too much capital, and would impede credit growth and eventually economic growth. However, this level of capital remains well below what the market would most likely require without the safety net and its subsidy. Recall that because so little tangible capital was available to absorb loss when the last crisis emerged, the industry had to resort to a violent shedding of assets and downsizing of balance sheets as it grasped to maintain even modest capital ratios. The effect of too little capital was far more harmful in the end than the effect of a strong capital framework.
Finally, it should be noted that except for the very largest U.S. commercial banks, most banks are currently near this minimum level for tangible equity. For example, while the tangible equity capital to tangible assets for the 10 largest bank holding companies in the U.S. is 6.1 percent, for the top 10 regional banks with less than $100 billion in assets, it is 9 percent. This ratio for the 10 largest banks with less than $50 billion in assets is 9.4 percent, and for the top 10 community banks with less than $1 billion in assets it is 8.3 percent.
Only the largest, most complex banks are too big to fail as evidenced by the capital numbers presented here. When the public and the market are at risk, they demand more -- not less -- capital.
Bank Examinations and Financial Stability
Relying on a single tangible measure as a minimum capital standard begs the question of whether it will assure an adequate capital level for the industry. In other words, under a straight leverage ratio, would banks load their balance sheet with the most risky assets because all assets are weighted equally?
First, such a question fails to recognize that a system that underweights high-risk assets and overweights low-risk assets is even more dangerous. This has been the experience with the Basel system going back almost to its start. Also, a minimum tangible-equity-to-tangible-asset ratio, of 10 percent for example, would bring more tangible capital to the balance sheet than current Basel III calculations.
Second, we need to remember that Basel has three pillars: capital, market discipline, and an effective bank supervision program. Effective bank supervision requires that authorities systematically examine a bank and assess its asset quality, liquidity, operations, and risk controls, judging its risk profile and whether it is well managed. Done properly, therefore, the best way to judge a firm’s risk profile is through the audit and examination process.
If, following an exam, a bank is judged to carry a higher risk profile, then the minimum capital, it should be judged inadequate for the risk and capital required. Moreover, in this instance the bank’s dividend and capital redemption programs would be curtailed until the adjusted minimum is achieved. For example, a 10 percent minimum tangible capital ratio would be adequate for a 1-rated bank, while a bank whose risk profile is 2 rated might require a higher ratio, say 11 percent, and similarly a 3 rating might require say 13 percent. A bank rated more poorly would be under a specific supervisory action.
Such an approach would most affect the largest banks where full-scope examinations have been de-emphasized in favor of targeted reviews, financial statement monitoring, model validations, and, more recently, the use of stress tests. These activities can be useful, but they are limited in scope and have been adopted because the largest firms are judged simply too large and complex for full scope examinations. However, full exams are doable. Statisticians, for example, have long been designing sampling methodologies for auditing and examining large bank asset portfolios and other operations, providing reliable estimates of their condition, and at an affordable cost.
And finally, commissioned examiners as a rule are highly skilled professionals, able to effectively assess bank risk and to do so in a more thorough manner than a static risk-weighted program. Their success, however, is tied not only to their skills but, as always, to the leadership of the supervisory agency. The examination process, effectively conducted and effectively led, holds the best potential to identify firm-specific risks and adjust capital levels as needed. In the end, an industry with strong individual firms is a strong industry.
Conclusion
The remarks and suggestions outlined here are not new. We have long been aware of the destabilizing effects of broadening the coverage of the financial safety net to an ever-expanding list of activities. There is a long history of the danger of confusing strong capital with complex capital rules, and of confusing strong supervision with monitoring instead of full examinations.
We would be wise to think beyond added rules to fundamental change. We must narrow the safety net and confine it to the payments system, deposit taking, and the related intermediation of deposits to loans. We must simplify and strengthen the capital standards and then subject all banks to the same standard of measurement and performance. And finally, we must reintroduce meaningful examination programs for the largest firms. These steps, taken together, would do much to assure greater stability for our financial system.
Remarks by Thomas M. Hoenig, Director, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - Financial Oversight: It’s Time to Improve Outcomes to the AICPA/SIFMA FSA National Conference; New York, NY
November 30, 2012
Introduction
Many remain skeptical of claims that the financial system has been reformed and that taxpayer bailouts are relics of the past. Such skepticism is understandable. For nearly a century, the public has been told repeatedly that stronger regulations and supervision, greater market discipline, and enforced resolution will ensure that financial crises will be less likely, and, should they occur, will be handled effectively.
Despite these assurances, the public remains at risk of having to pick up the pieces when the next financial setback occurs. The safety net continues to expand to cover activities and enterprises it was not intended to protect, resulting in subsidized risk taking by the largest financial firms and fueling their leverage. At the same time, the tolerance for leverage remains essentially unchanged, leaving us in a situation that is little different than before the recent crisis. We can be confident that as time passes, this leverage again will be a problem and the public again will be left holding the bag.
To change this outcome, we must change the framework and related incentives.
Defining the Problem
The structure of the system, the rules of the game, and the methods of accountability are all keys to the success or failure of any market system. They determine incentives and, of course, performance outcomes. As you would expect following this most recent crisis, various commissions attempted to sort out what went wrong and offered remedies to prevent such a crisis from recurring.
But for all this effort, incentives around risk remain mostly unchanged and leave the industry vulnerable to excesses. While there are no perfect solutions, there are actions that, taken together, can more effectively improve outcomes.
First, we must change the structure of the industry to ensure that the coverage of the safety net is narrowed to where it is needed, and stop the extension of its subsidy to an ever-greater number of firms and activities.
Second, we must simplify and strengthen capital standards to contain the impulse for excessive leverage and to provide a more useful backstop to absorb unexpected losses.
Third, we must reestablish a more rigorous examination program for the largest banks and bank holding companies to best understand the risk profile of both individual firms and financial markets.
Narrowing the Safety Net
Commercial banking in the United States has been protected for decades by a public safety net of central bank lending, deposit insurance and, more recently, direct government support. This has been done because commercial banks are thought essential to a well-functioning economy. Their operations involve providing payment services, taking short-term deposits, and making loans. In other words, conducting activities that intermediate the flow of credit from savers to borrowers, transforming short-term deposits into longer-term loans. This funding arrangement requires that the public and business have confidence that they can access their money on demand. The safety net helps provide that assurance.
The intended purpose of this government support is well understood. However, less understood is its unintended consequence: providing banks a subsidy in raising funds. As a result, they are less subject to economic or market forces, and their funding costs are less than that of firms outside the safety net. This subsidy, in turn, creates incentives to leverage their balance sheets and take on greater asset risk.
In the United States, this financial subsidy was greatly expanded in 1999 with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), which eliminated prohibitions that kept banks from affiliating with broker-dealer and securities firms. By allowing such cross ownership, the safety net and, therefore, its subsidy was expanded to more and ever-larger financial firms, conducting ever more complex and risk-oriented activities. Subsidies are valuable, and once given are hard to take away and once expanded are hard to restrict.
Despite repeated assurances following GLB that no firm would be too big to fail, the actions of governments have only confirmed that some firms -- the largest or most complex -- are simply too systemically important to be allowed to fail. Under such circumstances, market discipline breaks down since creditors are confident that they will be bailed out regardless of what the bank does. The deposit subsidy and the lack of market discipline from the consequences of failure create an incentive to take on excessive risk.
Narrowing the safety net, limiting its coverage, and realigning incentives, therefore, must be among the highest priorities following this recent crisis. Governments would be wise to limit commercial banking activities to primarily those for which the safety net’s protection was intended: stabilizing the payments system and the intermediation process between short-term lenders and long-term borrowers. That is, it should be confined to protecting our economic infrastructure.1
Trading activities do not intermediate credit. They reallocate assets and existing securities and derivatives among market participants. When they are placed within the safety net, they create incentives toward greater risk-taking and cause enormous financial distortions. Protected and subsidized by the safety net, complex firms can cover their trading positions by using insured deposits or central bank credit that comes with the commercial bank charter. Non-commercial bank trading firms have no such access and no such staying power. The safety net provides the complex organizations an enormously unfair competitive advantage. Thus, while such activities are important to the success of an economy, there is no legitimate reason to subsidize them with access to the safety net.
The mixing of commercial banking and trading activities also changes incentives and behavior within the firm. Commercial banking works within a culture of win-win, where the interests and incentives of banks and their customers are aligned. If a customer is successful, the payoff to the bank means success as well. In contrast, trading is an adversarial win-lose proposition because the trader’s gains are the counterparty’s losses -- and oftentimes the counterparty is the customer. Trading focuses on the short-term, not on longer-term relationship banking. Culture matters, and as we have seen in recent years, the mixing of banking and trading tends to drive organizations to make short-term return choices.
It is sometimes suggested that had broker-dealer and trading activity been separated from commercial banking, the recent financial crisis would have been just as severe. Lehman Brothers was not a commercial bank, and yet it brought the world to its knees. However, following GLB, just as commercial banks enjoyed the special benefit of the safety-net subsidy, firms like Lehman enjoyed the benefits from the special treatment given to money market funds and overnight repos to fund their activities. They were essentially operating as commercial banks and enjoying an implied subsidy very similar to that of commercial banks. Thus, a fundamental change needed to encourage greater accountability and stability is to correct the rules giving special treatment to money market funds and repos, thereby ending their treatment as deposits.
Market discipline works best when stockholders and creditors understand they are at risk and when the safety net is narrowly applied to the infrastructure for which it was intended.
Capital and Bank Safety
Capital is fundamental to any industry’s success, both as a source of funding and as a cushion against unforeseen events. This is especially the case for financial firms, as they are, by design, highly leveraged. But what is the right amount of capital, and how should it be measured and enforced to assure a more stable financial environment?
Basel standards have for more than two decades been the focal point of discussion in defining adequate capital for the financial industry. A new version of Basel standards is out for comment as supervisors struggle to find a system that properly defines capital, appropriately allocates it against risk, and results in a more stable financial system. However, the Basel proposal remains extremely complex and opaque as it attempts to anticipate every contingency and to assign risk weights to every conceivable asset that an institution might place on or off its balance sheet. The unfortunate consequence is ineffective capital regulation due to confusion, uncertainty about the quality of the balance sheet, and added costs imposed on a firm’s capital program.
Past attempts at defining the correct amount and distribution of capital have uniformly failed. For example, in 2007 as the financial crisis was just emerging, Basel’s measure of total capital to risk-weighted assets for the10 largest U.S. financial firms was approximately 11 percent -- a very impressive level of capital. But the ratio, using the more conservative tangible-equity-to-tangible-assets measure, was a mere 2.8 percent2. Had this been the primary capital measure in 2007, it is likely that far more questions would have been asked about the soundness of the industry, resulting in a less severe banking crisis and recession.
Today, this same tangible-equity measure for the largest U.S. banks, while double the 2.8 percent number, remains far below what history tells us is an acceptable market-determined capital level. We should learn from past experience and turn our attention from using a capital rule that gives what in the end is a false sense of security to one that is effective because of its simplicity, clarity, and enforceability. Before the safety net was in place in the United States, the market demanded that banks on average hold between 13 and 16 percent tangible equity to tangible assets -- a far cry from the 2.8 percent held by these largest firms in 2007 or the 6 percent they hold today.
Therefore, as an alternative to the unmanageably complex Basel risk-weighted standards, the emphasis should be shifted to a tangible-equity-to-tangible-asset ratio, of say 10 percent. With this simple but stronger capital base, bank management could then allocate resources in a manner that balances the drive for return on equity with the discipline of greater amounts of tangible equity. Moreover, global supervisors would have a clear benchmark to test against and enforce a minimum level. Behind this tangible measure we could use a simplified risk-weighted measure as a check against excessive off-balance sheet assets or other factors that might influence firms’ safety.
Some argue that a high minimum would be too much capital, and would impede credit growth and eventually economic growth. However, this level of capital remains well below what the market would most likely require without the safety net and its subsidy. Recall that because so little tangible capital was available to absorb loss when the last crisis emerged, the industry had to resort to a violent shedding of assets and downsizing of balance sheets as it grasped to maintain even modest capital ratios. The effect of too little capital was far more harmful in the end than the effect of a strong capital framework.
Finally, it should be noted that except for the very largest U.S. commercial banks, most banks are currently near this minimum level for tangible equity. For example, while the tangible equity capital to tangible assets for the 10 largest bank holding companies in the U.S. is 6.1 percent, for the top 10 regional banks with less than $100 billion in assets, it is 9 percent. This ratio for the 10 largest banks with less than $50 billion in assets is 9.4 percent, and for the top 10 community banks with less than $1 billion in assets it is 8.3 percent.
Only the largest, most complex banks are too big to fail as evidenced by the capital numbers presented here. When the public and the market are at risk, they demand more -- not less -- capital.
Bank Examinations and Financial Stability
Relying on a single tangible measure as a minimum capital standard begs the question of whether it will assure an adequate capital level for the industry. In other words, under a straight leverage ratio, would banks load their balance sheet with the most risky assets because all assets are weighted equally?
First, such a question fails to recognize that a system that underweights high-risk assets and overweights low-risk assets is even more dangerous. This has been the experience with the Basel system going back almost to its start. Also, a minimum tangible-equity-to-tangible-asset ratio, of 10 percent for example, would bring more tangible capital to the balance sheet than current Basel III calculations.
Second, we need to remember that Basel has three pillars: capital, market discipline, and an effective bank supervision program. Effective bank supervision requires that authorities systematically examine a bank and assess its asset quality, liquidity, operations, and risk controls, judging its risk profile and whether it is well managed. Done properly, therefore, the best way to judge a firm’s risk profile is through the audit and examination process.
If, following an exam, a bank is judged to carry a higher risk profile, then the minimum capital, it should be judged inadequate for the risk and capital required. Moreover, in this instance the bank’s dividend and capital redemption programs would be curtailed until the adjusted minimum is achieved. For example, a 10 percent minimum tangible capital ratio would be adequate for a 1-rated bank, while a bank whose risk profile is 2 rated might require a higher ratio, say 11 percent, and similarly a 3 rating might require say 13 percent. A bank rated more poorly would be under a specific supervisory action.
Such an approach would most affect the largest banks where full-scope examinations have been de-emphasized in favor of targeted reviews, financial statement monitoring, model validations, and, more recently, the use of stress tests. These activities can be useful, but they are limited in scope and have been adopted because the largest firms are judged simply too large and complex for full scope examinations. However, full exams are doable. Statisticians, for example, have long been designing sampling methodologies for auditing and examining large bank asset portfolios and other operations, providing reliable estimates of their condition, and at an affordable cost.
And finally, commissioned examiners as a rule are highly skilled professionals, able to effectively assess bank risk and to do so in a more thorough manner than a static risk-weighted program. Their success, however, is tied not only to their skills but, as always, to the leadership of the supervisory agency. The examination process, effectively conducted and effectively led, holds the best potential to identify firm-specific risks and adjust capital levels as needed. In the end, an industry with strong individual firms is a strong industry.
Conclusion
The remarks and suggestions outlined here are not new. We have long been aware of the destabilizing effects of broadening the coverage of the financial safety net to an ever-expanding list of activities. There is a long history of the danger of confusing strong capital with complex capital rules, and of confusing strong supervision with monitoring instead of full examinations.
We would be wise to think beyond added rules to fundamental change. We must narrow the safety net and confine it to the payments system, deposit taking, and the related intermediation of deposits to loans. We must simplify and strengthen the capital standards and then subject all banks to the same standard of measurement and performance. And finally, we must reintroduce meaningful examination programs for the largest firms. These steps, taken together, would do much to assure greater stability for our financial system.
SEC BELIEVES THAT DECIMAL POINTS ARE IMPORTANT
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 20, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned two investment advisory firms for impeding examinations conducted by SEC staff.
An SEC investigation found that Evens Barthelemy and his New York-based firm Barthelemy Group LLC misled SEC examiners by inflating the firm’s claimed assets under management (AUM) ten-fold in an apparent attempt to show that the firm was eligible for SEC registration. Another SEC investigation found that Seth Richard Freeman and his San Francisco-area firm EM Capital delayed nearly 18 months in producing books and records related to the firm’s mutual fund advisory business.
Both firms agreed to settle the SEC’s charges against them.
"Barthelemy was not truthful and Freeman was not responsive during their respective interactions with SEC examiners," said Bruce Karpati, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. "We will continue to pursue enforcement actions against firms that obstruct or delay the SEC’s critical work in overseeing investment advisers."
Carlo di Florio, Director of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, added, "Examinations of SEC-registered firms play a vital role in protecting markets and investors, and we expect their candor and prompt cooperation as SEC staff works to promote compliance, monitor risk, and prevent fraud."
According to the SEC’s order against Barthelemy and his firm, when examiners asked for a list of client assets, Barthelemy misrepresented his firm’s AUM as $26.28 million instead of the actual $2.628 million. He downloaded client account balances from the firm’s online custodial platform onto a spreadsheet, and then manually moved the decimal points for each client one place to the right before providing it to the SEC staff. From July 2009 to early 2011, Barthelemy improperly registered Barthelemy Group with the SEC on the basis of the aspirational AUM that was 10 times higher than reality. Barthelemy Group, through Barthelemy’s actions as chief compliance officer, also failed to adopt reasonable compliance policies and procedures or to maintain required books and records concerning codes of ethics and providing the firm’s disclosure brochure to clients.
Barthelemy agreed to be barred from the securities industry and from associating with an investment company, with the right to reapply after two years. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Barthelemy and his firm consented to cease-and-desist orders, and the firm was censured. Barthelemy and his firm also will provide a copy of the proceeding to their clients and appropriate state securities regulators, will post a copy on the firm’s website, and will disclose the proceeding in an amended SEC Form ADV filing.
According to the SEC’s order issued today against Freeman and his firm, they failed to immediately furnish the required books and records upon request by SEC staff in December 2010. EM Capital and Freeman repeatedly promised to provide the records including financial statements, e-mails, and documents related to their management of a mutual fund. However, they did not fully comply until September 2012, months after learning that SEC staff was considering enforcement action against them.
Freeman and EM Capital agreed to pay a combined $20,000 penalty. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Freeman and EM Capital also agreed to censures and cease-and-desist orders.
The SEC’s investigation of Barthelemy Group was conducted by David Neuman and Scott Weisman of the SEC’s Asset Management Unit. The examination of Barthelemy Group was conducted by Dawn Blankenship, Kristine Geissler, Arjuman Sultana, Margaret Pottanat, and Anthony Fiduccia of the New York Regional Office’s investment adviser/investment company examination program. The SEC’s investigation of EM Capital was conducted by Sahil W. Desai and Erin E. Schneider of the San Francisco Regional Office, who are members of the SEC’s Asset Management Unit. The examination of EM Capital was conducted by Tom Dutton, Ada Chee, and Ed Haddad of the San Francisco Regional Office’s investment adviser/investment company examination program.
Washington, D.C., Nov. 20, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned two investment advisory firms for impeding examinations conducted by SEC staff.
An SEC investigation found that Evens Barthelemy and his New York-based firm Barthelemy Group LLC misled SEC examiners by inflating the firm’s claimed assets under management (AUM) ten-fold in an apparent attempt to show that the firm was eligible for SEC registration. Another SEC investigation found that Seth Richard Freeman and his San Francisco-area firm EM Capital delayed nearly 18 months in producing books and records related to the firm’s mutual fund advisory business.
Both firms agreed to settle the SEC’s charges against them.
"Barthelemy was not truthful and Freeman was not responsive during their respective interactions with SEC examiners," said Bruce Karpati, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit. "We will continue to pursue enforcement actions against firms that obstruct or delay the SEC’s critical work in overseeing investment advisers."
Carlo di Florio, Director of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, added, "Examinations of SEC-registered firms play a vital role in protecting markets and investors, and we expect their candor and prompt cooperation as SEC staff works to promote compliance, monitor risk, and prevent fraud."
According to the SEC’s order against Barthelemy and his firm, when examiners asked for a list of client assets, Barthelemy misrepresented his firm’s AUM as $26.28 million instead of the actual $2.628 million. He downloaded client account balances from the firm’s online custodial platform onto a spreadsheet, and then manually moved the decimal points for each client one place to the right before providing it to the SEC staff. From July 2009 to early 2011, Barthelemy improperly registered Barthelemy Group with the SEC on the basis of the aspirational AUM that was 10 times higher than reality. Barthelemy Group, through Barthelemy’s actions as chief compliance officer, also failed to adopt reasonable compliance policies and procedures or to maintain required books and records concerning codes of ethics and providing the firm’s disclosure brochure to clients.
Barthelemy agreed to be barred from the securities industry and from associating with an investment company, with the right to reapply after two years. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Barthelemy and his firm consented to cease-and-desist orders, and the firm was censured. Barthelemy and his firm also will provide a copy of the proceeding to their clients and appropriate state securities regulators, will post a copy on the firm’s website, and will disclose the proceeding in an amended SEC Form ADV filing.
According to the SEC’s order issued today against Freeman and his firm, they failed to immediately furnish the required books and records upon request by SEC staff in December 2010. EM Capital and Freeman repeatedly promised to provide the records including financial statements, e-mails, and documents related to their management of a mutual fund. However, they did not fully comply until September 2012, months after learning that SEC staff was considering enforcement action against them.
Freeman and EM Capital agreed to pay a combined $20,000 penalty. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Freeman and EM Capital also agreed to censures and cease-and-desist orders.
The SEC’s investigation of Barthelemy Group was conducted by David Neuman and Scott Weisman of the SEC’s Asset Management Unit. The examination of Barthelemy Group was conducted by Dawn Blankenship, Kristine Geissler, Arjuman Sultana, Margaret Pottanat, and Anthony Fiduccia of the New York Regional Office’s investment adviser/investment company examination program. The SEC’s investigation of EM Capital was conducted by Sahil W. Desai and Erin E. Schneider of the San Francisco Regional Office, who are members of the SEC’s Asset Management Unit. The examination of EM Capital was conducted by Tom Dutton, Ada Chee, and Ed Haddad of the San Francisco Regional Office’s investment adviser/investment company examination program.
Thursday, November 29, 2012
CFTC CHARGES MAN/COMPANY WITH EMBEZZLEMENT BY PONZI SCHEME
FROM: U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges North Carolina Resident Michael Anthony Jenkins and his Company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC, with Solicitation Fraud, Misappropriation, and Embezzlement in Ponzi Scheme
Defendants charged with fraudulently soliciting and accepting at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons
In a related criminal action, Jenkins was indicted for securities fraud and is in custody awaiting trial
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, charging Michael Anthony Jenkins of Raleigh, N.C., and his company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC (HLAM), with operating a Ponzi scheme for the purpose of trading E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts (E-mini futures). From at least January 2011 through January 2012, the defendants fraudulently solicited at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons, primarily located in Raleigh, N.C., in connection with the scheme, according to the complaint.
The CFTC complaint also charges Jenkins, the owner and President of HLAM, with embezzlement and failure to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant. Furthermore, Jenkins allegedly misappropriated $748,827 of investors’ funds to trade gold and oil futures, stock index futures, and E-mini futures in his personal accounts. Jenkins also used misappropriated funds to pay for charges at department and discount stores and gasoline stations, and for cellular phone bills and airline tickets, according to the complaint.
The CFTC complaint, filed on November 20, 2012, alleges that HLAM’s Investment Agreement falsely represented to investors that their investment was solely for investing in E-mini futures and that investors’ funds would be immediately wired to a specific trading account. However, according to the complaint, most of investors’ funds were misappropriated by HLAM and Jenkins. To conceal and continue the fraud, Jenkins allegedly sent trading spreadsheets and statements to investors that falsely reported trades and profits earned and inflated the value of investments. The defendants’ fraudulent conduct resulted in a loss of approximately $1.3 million in investor funds, consisting of $1.16 million in misappropriated and embezzled funds and $140,000 in trading losses, according to the complaint.
In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution, return by Jenkins and HLAM of all ill-gotten gains received, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.
In a related criminal action by the Securities Division of the North Carolina, Department of the Secretary of State, Jenkins was indicted on August 20, 2012 on three counts of securities fraud in The General Court of Justice, State of North Carolina, Wake County, and is in custody awaiting trial.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State.
CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Xavier Romeu-Matta, Nathan B. Ploener, Christopher Giglio, Manal Sultan, Lenel Hickson, Stephen J. Obie, and Vincent A. McGonagle.
CFTC Charges North Carolina Resident Michael Anthony Jenkins and his Company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC, with Solicitation Fraud, Misappropriation, and Embezzlement in Ponzi Scheme
Defendants charged with fraudulently soliciting and accepting at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons
In a related criminal action, Jenkins was indicted for securities fraud and is in custody awaiting trial
Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced the filing of a federal civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, charging Michael Anthony Jenkins of Raleigh, N.C., and his company, Harbor Light Asset Management, LLC (HLAM), with operating a Ponzi scheme for the purpose of trading E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts (E-mini futures). From at least January 2011 through January 2012, the defendants fraudulently solicited at least $1.79 million from approximately 377 persons, primarily located in Raleigh, N.C., in connection with the scheme, according to the complaint.
The CFTC complaint also charges Jenkins, the owner and President of HLAM, with embezzlement and failure to register with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant. Furthermore, Jenkins allegedly misappropriated $748,827 of investors’ funds to trade gold and oil futures, stock index futures, and E-mini futures in his personal accounts. Jenkins also used misappropriated funds to pay for charges at department and discount stores and gasoline stations, and for cellular phone bills and airline tickets, according to the complaint.
The CFTC complaint, filed on November 20, 2012, alleges that HLAM’s Investment Agreement falsely represented to investors that their investment was solely for investing in E-mini futures and that investors’ funds would be immediately wired to a specific trading account. However, according to the complaint, most of investors’ funds were misappropriated by HLAM and Jenkins. To conceal and continue the fraud, Jenkins allegedly sent trading spreadsheets and statements to investors that falsely reported trades and profits earned and inflated the value of investments. The defendants’ fraudulent conduct resulted in a loss of approximately $1.3 million in investor funds, consisting of $1.16 million in misappropriated and embezzled funds and $140,000 in trading losses, according to the complaint.
In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution, return by Jenkins and HLAM of all ill-gotten gains received, civil monetary penalties, trading and registration bans, and permanent injunctions against further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged.
In a related criminal action by the Securities Division of the North Carolina, Department of the Secretary of State, Jenkins was indicted on August 20, 2012 on three counts of securities fraud in The General Court of Justice, State of North Carolina, Wake County, and is in custody awaiting trial.
The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Securities Division of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State.
CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Xavier Romeu-Matta, Nathan B. Ploener, Christopher Giglio, Manal Sultan, Lenel Hickson, Stephen J. Obie, and Vincent A. McGonagle.
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
EXECUTIVE PLEADS GUILTY IN MAJOR MORTGAGE-DOCUMENT FRAUD SHEME
FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Former Executive at Florida-Based Lender Processing Services Inc. Admits Role in Mortgage-Related Document Fraud Scheme
Over 1 Million Documents Prepared and Filed with Forged and False Signatures, Fraudulent Notarizations
WASHINGTON – A former executive of Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) – a publicly traded company based in Jacksonville, Fla. – pleaded guilty today, admitting her participation in a six-year scheme to prepare and file more than 1 million fraudulently signed and notarized mortgage-related documents with property recorders’ offices throughout the United States.
The guilty plea of Lorraine Brown, 56, of Alpharetta, Ga., was announced by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida Robert E. O’Neill; and Michael Steinbach, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Jacksonville Field Office.
The plea, to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, was entered before U.S. Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson in Jacksonville federal court. Brown faces a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine, or twice the gross gain or loss from the crime. The date for sentencing has not yet been set.
"Lorraine Brown participated in a scheme to fabricate mortgage-related documents at the height of the financial crisis," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "She was responsible for more than a million fraudulent documents entering the system, directing company employees to forge and falsify documents relied on by property recorders, title insurers and others. Appropriately, she now faces the prospect of prison time."
"Homeownership is a huge step for American citizens," said U.S. Attorney O’Neill. "The process itself is often intimidating and lengthy. Consumers rely heavily on the integrity and due diligence of those serving as representatives throughout this process to secure their investments. When the integrity of this process is compromised, illegally, public confidence is eroded. We must work to assure the public that their investments are sound, worthy, and protected."
Special Agent in Charge Steinbach stated, "Our country is increasingly faced with more pervasive and sophisticated fraud schemes that have the potential to disrupt entire markets and the economy as a whole. The FBI, with our partners, is committed to addressing these schemes. As these schemes continue to evolve and become more sophisticated, so too will we."
Brown was the chief executive of DocX LLC, which was involved in the preparation and recordation of mortgage-related documents throughout the country since the 1990s. DocX was acquired by an LPS predecessor company, and was part of LPS’s business when LPS was formed as a stand-alone company in 2008. At that time, DocX was rebranded as "LPS Document Solutions, a Division of LPS." Brown was the president and senior managing director of LPS Document Solutions, which constituted DocX’s operations.
DocX’s main clients were residential mortgage servicers, which typically undertake certain actions for the owners of mortgage-backed promissory notes. Servicers hired DocX to, among other things, assist in creating and executing mortgage-related documents filed with recorders’ offices. Only specific personnel at DocX were authorized by the clients to sign the documents.
According to plea documents filed today, employees of DocX, at the direction of Brown and others, began forging and falsifying signatures on the mortgage-related documents that they had been hired to prepare and file with property recorders’ offices. Unbeknownst to the clients, Brown directed the authorized signers to allow other DocX employees, who were not authorized signers, to sign the mortgage-related documents and have them notarized as if actually executed by the authorized DocX employee.
Also according to plea documents, Brown implemented these signing practices at DocX to enable DocX and Brown to generate greater profit. Specifically, DocX was able to create, execute and file larger volumes of documents using these signing and notarization practices. To further increase profits, DocX also hired temporary workers to sign as authorized signers. These temporary employees worked for much lower costs and without the quality control represented by Brown to DocX’s clients. Some of these temporary workers were able to sign thousands of mortgage-related instruments a day. Between 2003 and 2009, DocX generated approximately $60 million in gross revenue.
After these documents were falsely signed and fraudulently notarized, Brown authorized DocX employees to file and record them with local county property records offices across the country. Many of these documents – particularly mortgage assignments, lost note affidavits and lost assignment affidavits – were later relied upon in court proceedings, including property foreclosures and federal bankruptcy actions. Brown admitted she understood that property recorders, courts, title insurers and homeowners relied upon the documents as genuine.
Brown also admitted that she and others also took various steps to conceal their actions from clients, LPS corporate headquarters, law enforcement authorities and others. These actions included testing new employees to ensure they could mimic signatures, lying to LPS internal audit personnel during reviews of the operation in 2009, making false exculpatory statements after being confronted by LPS corporate officials about the acts and lying to the FBI during its investigation. LPS closed DocX in early 2010.
This case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Ryan Rohlfsen and Assistant Chief Glenn S. Leon of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark B. Devereaux of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida. This case is being investigated by the FBI, with assistance from the state of Florida’s Department of Financial Services.
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Former Executive at Florida-Based Lender Processing Services Inc. Admits Role in Mortgage-Related Document Fraud Scheme
Over 1 Million Documents Prepared and Filed with Forged and False Signatures, Fraudulent Notarizations
WASHINGTON – A former executive of Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) – a publicly traded company based in Jacksonville, Fla. – pleaded guilty today, admitting her participation in a six-year scheme to prepare and file more than 1 million fraudulently signed and notarized mortgage-related documents with property recorders’ offices throughout the United States.
The guilty plea of Lorraine Brown, 56, of Alpharetta, Ga., was announced by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida Robert E. O’Neill; and Michael Steinbach, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Jacksonville Field Office.
The plea, to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, was entered before U.S. Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson in Jacksonville federal court. Brown faces a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine, or twice the gross gain or loss from the crime. The date for sentencing has not yet been set.
"Lorraine Brown participated in a scheme to fabricate mortgage-related documents at the height of the financial crisis," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "She was responsible for more than a million fraudulent documents entering the system, directing company employees to forge and falsify documents relied on by property recorders, title insurers and others. Appropriately, she now faces the prospect of prison time."
"Homeownership is a huge step for American citizens," said U.S. Attorney O’Neill. "The process itself is often intimidating and lengthy. Consumers rely heavily on the integrity and due diligence of those serving as representatives throughout this process to secure their investments. When the integrity of this process is compromised, illegally, public confidence is eroded. We must work to assure the public that their investments are sound, worthy, and protected."
Special Agent in Charge Steinbach stated, "Our country is increasingly faced with more pervasive and sophisticated fraud schemes that have the potential to disrupt entire markets and the economy as a whole. The FBI, with our partners, is committed to addressing these schemes. As these schemes continue to evolve and become more sophisticated, so too will we."
Brown was the chief executive of DocX LLC, which was involved in the preparation and recordation of mortgage-related documents throughout the country since the 1990s. DocX was acquired by an LPS predecessor company, and was part of LPS’s business when LPS was formed as a stand-alone company in 2008. At that time, DocX was rebranded as "LPS Document Solutions, a Division of LPS." Brown was the president and senior managing director of LPS Document Solutions, which constituted DocX’s operations.
DocX’s main clients were residential mortgage servicers, which typically undertake certain actions for the owners of mortgage-backed promissory notes. Servicers hired DocX to, among other things, assist in creating and executing mortgage-related documents filed with recorders’ offices. Only specific personnel at DocX were authorized by the clients to sign the documents.
According to plea documents filed today, employees of DocX, at the direction of Brown and others, began forging and falsifying signatures on the mortgage-related documents that they had been hired to prepare and file with property recorders’ offices. Unbeknownst to the clients, Brown directed the authorized signers to allow other DocX employees, who were not authorized signers, to sign the mortgage-related documents and have them notarized as if actually executed by the authorized DocX employee.
Also according to plea documents, Brown implemented these signing practices at DocX to enable DocX and Brown to generate greater profit. Specifically, DocX was able to create, execute and file larger volumes of documents using these signing and notarization practices. To further increase profits, DocX also hired temporary workers to sign as authorized signers. These temporary employees worked for much lower costs and without the quality control represented by Brown to DocX’s clients. Some of these temporary workers were able to sign thousands of mortgage-related instruments a day. Between 2003 and 2009, DocX generated approximately $60 million in gross revenue.
After these documents were falsely signed and fraudulently notarized, Brown authorized DocX employees to file and record them with local county property records offices across the country. Many of these documents – particularly mortgage assignments, lost note affidavits and lost assignment affidavits – were later relied upon in court proceedings, including property foreclosures and federal bankruptcy actions. Brown admitted she understood that property recorders, courts, title insurers and homeowners relied upon the documents as genuine.
Brown also admitted that she and others also took various steps to conceal their actions from clients, LPS corporate headquarters, law enforcement authorities and others. These actions included testing new employees to ensure they could mimic signatures, lying to LPS internal audit personnel during reviews of the operation in 2009, making false exculpatory statements after being confronted by LPS corporate officials about the acts and lying to the FBI during its investigation. LPS closed DocX in early 2010.
This case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Ryan Rohlfsen and Assistant Chief Glenn S. Leon of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark B. Devereaux of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida. This case is being investigated by the FBI, with assistance from the state of Florida’s Department of Financial Services.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
2012 YIELDS NEAR RECORD RESULTS FOR SEC ENFORCEMENTS
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2012 — Building on last year’s record results, the Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed 734 enforcement actions in the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, 2012, one shy of last year’s record of 735. Most significantly, that number included an increasing number of cases involving highly complex products, transactions, and practices, including those related to the financial crisis, trading platforms and market structure, and insider trading by market professionals. Twenty percent of the actions were filed in investigations designated as National Priority Cases, representing the Division’s most important and complex matters.
The SEC also announced that it obtained orders in fiscal year 2012 requiring the payment of more than $3 billion in penalties and disgorgement for the benefit of harmed investors. It represents an 11 percent increase over the amount ordered last year. In the past two years, the SEC has obtained orders for $5.9 billion in penalties and disgorgement.
"The record of performance is a testament to the professionalism and perseverance of the staff and the innovative reforms put in place over the past few years," said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. "We’ve now brought more enforcement actions in each of the last two years than ever before including some of the most complex cases we’ve ever seen."
Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, "It’s not simply numbers, but the increasing complexity and diversity of the cases we file that shows how successful we’ve been. The intelligence, dedication, and deep experience of our enforcement staff are, more than any other factors, responsible for the Division’s success."
The sustained high-level performance comes two years after the Division underwent its most significant reorganization since it was established in the early 1970s. The results in 2012 were aided by many of the reforms and innovations put in place in the past two years, such as increased expertise in complex and emerging financial markets, products, and transactions, including through enhanced training, the hiring of industry experts, and the creation of specialized enforcement units focused on high-priority misconduct; a flatter management structure; streamlined and centralized processes and the improved utilization of information technology; and a vastly enhanced ability to collect, process, and analyze tips and complaints.
Financial Crisis-Related Cases
Among the cases filed by the SEC in FY 2012 were 29 separate actions naming 38 individuals, including 24 CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate officers, regarding wrongdoing related to the financial crisis.
These cases included enforcement actions involving:
The former senior officers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for misleading statements regarding the extent of each company’s holdings of higher-risk mortgage loans.
Former investment bankers at Credit Suisse for fraudulently overstating the prices of $3 billion in subprime bonds.
Several bank and mortgage executives including those at United Commercial Bank, TierOne Bank, Franklin Bank, and Thornburg Mortgage for misleading investors about mounting loan losses and the deteriorating financial condition of their institutions.
The U.S. investment banking subsidiary of Japan-based Mizuho Financial Group for misleading investors in a CDO by using "dummy assets" to inflate the deal’s credit ratings.
During the last 2½ years, the agency has filed actions related to the financial crisis against 117 defendants – nearly half of whom were CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate executives, resulting in approximately $ 2.2 billion in disgorgement, penalties, and other monetary relief obtained or agreed to. The SEC brought enforcement actions against Goldman Sachs, J.P Morgan Securities, and Morgan Keegan as well as senior executives from Countrywide, New Century, and American Home Mortgage.
Insider Trading Cases
Insider trading cases also are on the upswing with 58 actions filed in FY 2012 by the SEC, an increase over last year’s total of 57 actions. The 168 total insider trading actions filed since October 2009 have been the most in SEC history for any three-year period.
In these actions, the SEC has charged approximately 400 individuals and entities for illegal trading totaling approximately $600 million in illicit profits. Among those charged in SEC insider trading cases in 2012 were:
Former McKinsey & Co. global head Rajat Gupta for illegally tipping convicted hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam.
Hedge funds Diamondback Capital and Level Global Investors and affiliated traders and analysts.
Hedge fund manager Douglas Whitman.
John Kinnucan and his expert network consulting firm Broadband Research Corporation.
A second round of charges in an insider trading case involving former professional baseball players and the former top executive at Advanced Medical Optics.
Other Enforcement Matters
In order to ensure fair trading and equal access to information in the securities markets, the SEC brought several actions involving compliance failures and rules violations relating to stock exchanges, alternative trading platforms, and other market structure participants.
These cases included:
First-of-its-kind charges against the New York Stock Exchange for compliance failures that gave certain customers an improper head start on trading information.
The first-ever action against a "dark pool" trading platform (Pipeline Trading Systems) for failing to disclose to its customers that the vast amount of orders were filled by an affiliated trading operation.
An action against Direct Edge Holdings LLC for violations at two of its electronic stock exchanges and a broker-dealer arising out of weak controls that resulted in millions of dollars in trading losses and a systems outage.
In the NYSE matter, the exchange and its parent company NYSE Euronext agreed to pay a $5 million penalty, marking the first-ever SEC financial penalty against an exchange.
Investment Advisers: The SEC filed numerous actions resulting from several risk-based, proactive measures that identify threats at an early stage so that early action to halt the misconduct can be initiated and investor harm minimized. In 2012, several actions resulted from the Division’s investment adviser compliance initiative, which looks for registered investment advisers who lack effective compliance programs designed to prevent securities laws violations.
The SEC also filed actions charging three advisory firms and six individuals as part of the Aberrational Performance Inquiry into abnormal performance returns by hedge funds. Other actions against investment advisers included cases against UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and two executives for misleading disclosures relating to certain proprietary closed-end mutual funds, Morgan Stanley Investment Management for an improper fee arrangement, and OppenheimerFunds for misleading investors in two funds suffering significant losses during the financial crisis. UBS paid more than $26 million to settle the SEC’s charges while OppenheimerFunds paid more than $35 million for its violations.
The SEC filed 147 enforcement actions in 2012 against investment advisers and investment companies, one more than the previous year’s record number.
Issuer Disclosures:
The SEC brought 79 actions in FY 2012 for financial fraud and issuer disclosure violations. Those cases included actions against Life Partners Holdings and senior executives for fraudulent disclosures related to life settlements; two executives at China-based Puda Coal for defrauding investors about the nature of the company’s assets; and an enforcement action against Shanghai-based Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu for its refusal to provide the SEC with audit work papers related to a China-based company under investigation for potential accounting fraud against U.S. investors.
Broker-Dealers:
The agency filed 134 enforcement actions related to broker-dealers, a 19 percent increase over the previous year. Broker-dealer actions included charges against a Latvian trader and electronic trading firms for their roles in an online account intrusion scheme that manipulated the prices of more than 100 NYSE and Nasdaq securities as well as charges against New York-based brokerage firm Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services and three of its executives for their roles in allowing overseas traders to access the markets and conduct manipulative trading through accounts the firm controlled. The defendants in the Hold Brothers action paid a total of $4 million to settle the SEC’s charges.
FCPA:
The SEC filed 15 actions in FY 2012 for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. FCPA actions were filed against former Siemens executives, Magyar Telekom, Biomet, Smith & Nephew, Pfizer, Tyco International, and a former executive at Morgan Stanley’s real estate investment and fund advisory business.
Municipal Securities:
The SEC filed 17 enforcement actions related to municipal securities, more than double the number filed in 2011. Among those charged in SEC municipal securities actions were the former mayor and city treasurer of Detroit in a pay-to-play scheme involving investments of the city’s pension funds, and Goldman Sachs for violations of various municipal securities rules resulting from undisclosed "in-kind" non-cash contributions that one of its investment bankers made to a Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate.
Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2012 — Building on last year’s record results, the Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed 734 enforcement actions in the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, 2012, one shy of last year’s record of 735. Most significantly, that number included an increasing number of cases involving highly complex products, transactions, and practices, including those related to the financial crisis, trading platforms and market structure, and insider trading by market professionals. Twenty percent of the actions were filed in investigations designated as National Priority Cases, representing the Division’s most important and complex matters.
The SEC also announced that it obtained orders in fiscal year 2012 requiring the payment of more than $3 billion in penalties and disgorgement for the benefit of harmed investors. It represents an 11 percent increase over the amount ordered last year. In the past two years, the SEC has obtained orders for $5.9 billion in penalties and disgorgement.
"The record of performance is a testament to the professionalism and perseverance of the staff and the innovative reforms put in place over the past few years," said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro. "We’ve now brought more enforcement actions in each of the last two years than ever before including some of the most complex cases we’ve ever seen."
Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, "It’s not simply numbers, but the increasing complexity and diversity of the cases we file that shows how successful we’ve been. The intelligence, dedication, and deep experience of our enforcement staff are, more than any other factors, responsible for the Division’s success."
The sustained high-level performance comes two years after the Division underwent its most significant reorganization since it was established in the early 1970s. The results in 2012 were aided by many of the reforms and innovations put in place in the past two years, such as increased expertise in complex and emerging financial markets, products, and transactions, including through enhanced training, the hiring of industry experts, and the creation of specialized enforcement units focused on high-priority misconduct; a flatter management structure; streamlined and centralized processes and the improved utilization of information technology; and a vastly enhanced ability to collect, process, and analyze tips and complaints.
Financial Crisis-Related Cases
Among the cases filed by the SEC in FY 2012 were 29 separate actions naming 38 individuals, including 24 CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate officers, regarding wrongdoing related to the financial crisis.
These cases included enforcement actions involving:
Former investment bankers at Credit Suisse for fraudulently overstating the prices of $3 billion in subprime bonds.
Several bank and mortgage executives including those at United Commercial Bank, TierOne Bank, Franklin Bank, and Thornburg Mortgage for misleading investors about mounting loan losses and the deteriorating financial condition of their institutions.
The U.S. investment banking subsidiary of Japan-based Mizuho Financial Group for misleading investors in a CDO by using "dummy assets" to inflate the deal’s credit ratings.
During the last 2½ years, the agency has filed actions related to the financial crisis against 117 defendants – nearly half of whom were CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate executives, resulting in approximately $ 2.2 billion in disgorgement, penalties, and other monetary relief obtained or agreed to. The SEC brought enforcement actions against Goldman Sachs, J.P Morgan Securities, and Morgan Keegan as well as senior executives from Countrywide, New Century, and American Home Mortgage.
Insider Trading Cases
Insider trading cases also are on the upswing with 58 actions filed in FY 2012 by the SEC, an increase over last year’s total of 57 actions. The 168 total insider trading actions filed since October 2009 have been the most in SEC history for any three-year period.
In these actions, the SEC has charged approximately 400 individuals and entities for illegal trading totaling approximately $600 million in illicit profits. Among those charged in SEC insider trading cases in 2012 were:
Hedge funds Diamondback Capital and Level Global Investors and affiliated traders and analysts.
Hedge fund manager Douglas Whitman.
John Kinnucan and his expert network consulting firm Broadband Research Corporation.
A second round of charges in an insider trading case involving former professional baseball players and the former top executive at Advanced Medical Optics.
Other Enforcement Matters
In order to ensure fair trading and equal access to information in the securities markets, the SEC brought several actions involving compliance failures and rules violations relating to stock exchanges, alternative trading platforms, and other market structure participants.
These cases included:
The first-ever action against a "dark pool" trading platform (Pipeline Trading Systems) for failing to disclose to its customers that the vast amount of orders were filled by an affiliated trading operation.
An action against Direct Edge Holdings LLC for violations at two of its electronic stock exchanges and a broker-dealer arising out of weak controls that resulted in millions of dollars in trading losses and a systems outage.
In the NYSE matter, the exchange and its parent company NYSE Euronext agreed to pay a $5 million penalty, marking the first-ever SEC financial penalty against an exchange.
Investment Advisers: The SEC filed numerous actions resulting from several risk-based, proactive measures that identify threats at an early stage so that early action to halt the misconduct can be initiated and investor harm minimized. In 2012, several actions resulted from the Division’s investment adviser compliance initiative, which looks for registered investment advisers who lack effective compliance programs designed to prevent securities laws violations.
The SEC also filed actions charging three advisory firms and six individuals as part of the Aberrational Performance Inquiry into abnormal performance returns by hedge funds. Other actions against investment advisers included cases against UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and two executives for misleading disclosures relating to certain proprietary closed-end mutual funds, Morgan Stanley Investment Management for an improper fee arrangement, and OppenheimerFunds for misleading investors in two funds suffering significant losses during the financial crisis. UBS paid more than $26 million to settle the SEC’s charges while OppenheimerFunds paid more than $35 million for its violations.
The SEC filed 147 enforcement actions in 2012 against investment advisers and investment companies, one more than the previous year’s record number.
Issuer Disclosures:
The SEC brought 79 actions in FY 2012 for financial fraud and issuer disclosure violations. Those cases included actions against Life Partners Holdings and senior executives for fraudulent disclosures related to life settlements; two executives at China-based Puda Coal for defrauding investors about the nature of the company’s assets; and an enforcement action against Shanghai-based Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu for its refusal to provide the SEC with audit work papers related to a China-based company under investigation for potential accounting fraud against U.S. investors.
Broker-Dealers:
The agency filed 134 enforcement actions related to broker-dealers, a 19 percent increase over the previous year. Broker-dealer actions included charges against a Latvian trader and electronic trading firms for their roles in an online account intrusion scheme that manipulated the prices of more than 100 NYSE and Nasdaq securities as well as charges against New York-based brokerage firm Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services and three of its executives for their roles in allowing overseas traders to access the markets and conduct manipulative trading through accounts the firm controlled. The defendants in the Hold Brothers action paid a total of $4 million to settle the SEC’s charges.
FCPA:
The SEC filed 15 actions in FY 2012 for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. FCPA actions were filed against former Siemens executives, Magyar Telekom, Biomet, Smith & Nephew, Pfizer, Tyco International, and a former executive at Morgan Stanley’s real estate investment and fund advisory business.
Municipal Securities:
The SEC filed 17 enforcement actions related to municipal securities, more than double the number filed in 2011. Among those charged in SEC municipal securities actions were the former mayor and city treasurer of Detroit in a pay-to-play scheme involving investments of the city’s pension funds, and Goldman Sachs for violations of various municipal securities rules resulting from undisclosed "in-kind" non-cash contributions that one of its investment bankers made to a Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate.
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