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This is a photo of the National Register of Historic Places listing with reference number 7000063

Friday, July 18, 2014

FINAL JUDGEMENT ENTERED IN MICROCAP STOCK SCALPING CASE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Court Enters Final Judgment Against Promoter in Settlement of Microcap Stock Scalping Case and Orders $3.73 Million in Sanctions

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that the Honorable Paul A. Crotty of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a final judgment on July 8, 2014, against defendant John Babikian in the Commission action styled, SEC v. John Babikian, Civil Action No. 14-CV-1740 (S.D.N.Y.). The Court entered the final judgment, to which Babikian consented without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission's Complaint. The final judgment orders Babikian to pay a total of $3,730,000, comprised of $1,915,670 in disgorgement, together with prejudgment interest in the amount of $128,073, and a civil penalty in the amount of $1,686,257. The final judgment also imposes a bar from participating in any offering of penny stock and enjoins Babikian from recommending, directly or indirectly, the purchase of any U.S. publicly traded or quoted stock without simultaneously disclosing any plans or intentions to sell such stock within 14 days of the recommendation. Finally, the final judgment permanently enjoins Babikian from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)), Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).

The Commission's complaint, filed on March 13, 2014, alleged that Babikian used AwesomePennyStocks.com and its related site PennyStocksUniverse.com, collectively "APS," to commit a brand of securities fraud known as "scalping." The APS websites disseminated e-mails to approximately 700,000 people shortly after 2:30 p.m. Eastern time on the afternoon of Feb. 23, 2012, and recommended the penny stock America West Resources Inc. (AWSRQ). What the e-mails failed to disclose among other things was that Babikian held more than 1.4 million shares of America West stock, which he had already positioned and intended to sell immediately through a Swiss bank. The APS emails immediately triggered massive increases in America West's share price and trading volume, which Babikian exploited by unloading shares of America West's stock over the remaining 90 minutes of the trading day for ill-gotten gains of more than $1.9 million.

The Commission wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Quebec Autorité des Marchés Financiers and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

Thursday, July 17, 2014

SEC COMMISSIONER O'MALIA'S ADDRESS AT QUADRILATERAL MEETING

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Keynote Address by Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia at the Quadrilateral Meeting of the European Financial Markets Lawyers Group, Financial Law Board, Financial Markets Law Committee, and Financial Markets Lawyers Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Regulators Must First Do No Harm
July 15, 2014

Good afternoon. Thank you very much for the kind introduction and invitation to speak here today. I am pleased that there are international forums like the Quadrilateral Meeting where regulatory developments in the financial markets are shared and discussed. The importance of international comity in ensuring that our modern, global markets are healthy and well-functioning cannot be overstated.

Next week marks the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Dodd-Frank Act, and this September will be the fifth anniversary of the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Leaders Summit that committed to international reform of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets.1

World leaders pledged to strengthen the international financial regulatory system by working together under common principles. The G20 principles include four areas of reform: (1) exchange or electronic platform trading for standardized contracts; (2) clearing through central counterparties (CCPs) for standardized contracts; (3) transaction reporting to trade repositories; and (4) higher capital and margin requirements for non-centrally cleared transactions.

I believe, however, that there is an even more fundamental principle that should underlie reform of the global derivatives markets—regulators must first do no harm.

Doctors safeguard their patients’ health and pledge to do no harm. So, too, should financial regulators ensure that markets are healthy and well-functioning and that regulation does not impair market resiliency or robustness.

I am deeply concerned by continuing reports of market fragmentation and fracturing of liquidity between U.S. and non-U.S. markets as a result of diverging regulatory approaches to implementation of the G20 principles.2

We have seen that lack of international harmonization results in regulatory arbitrage. When this artificial incentive causes market structures to evolve and global business to shift, we must ask ourselves: Are regulators doing more harm than good?

My answer is that I do not believe this is what the G20 envisioned when it set forth a cooperative and coordinated response to the financial crisis.

I am also concerned that CFTC regulations are negatively impacting liquidity for end-users and making hedging too costly.3 These increased costs will ultimately trickle down to consumers through higher prices for commodities.

Good regulation is balanced. The Commission must not lose sight of our twofold mission to both protect market participants and the public while also fostering transparent, open, competitive and financially sound markets.

Today, I would like to outline how we can reverse this trend and promote competitive markets that serve to best provide liquidity, price discovery, and transfer of risk. These characteristics of healthy and well-functioning markets drive economic growth and are essential to efficient markets. This will, in turn, speed recovery and fuel job creation.

First, the Commission must maintain its progress in reexamining rules that have negatively impacted the market by generating market inefficiencies, distorting market behavior, or constraining market access by end-users and other market participants.

Where our rules have proven unworkable, it is incumbent upon us to fix them. And if we don’t, we shouldn’t be surprised when Congress gets involved.

I support the Commodity Exchange Act reauthorization bill recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives that took the initiative to make customer protection and other reforms, and give end-users relief.4

Second, it is critically important that international regulators continue to work together to harmonize swap data reporting, exchange trading, and CCP clearing before market fragmentation and contraction of liquidity hardens and becomes permanent.

I believe this is best achieved through an outcomes-based approach premised on substituted compliance and mutual recognition.

Third, it is imperative that the Commission make the necessary investments in technology to transform the CFTC into a 21st-century regulator.

Only by leveraging technology can we efficiently and cost-effectively oversee the derivatives markets under our expanded mission mandated by Dodd-Frank. The CFTC must be innovative in its adoption and use of big data and market analytics in order to keep pace with today’s electronic and increasingly automated financial markets.

The Cure Should Not Be Worse than the Disease: Fixing Unworkable Rules

As you know, the Commission once again has a full complement of five Commissioners to undertake the important mission entrusted to us by Congress and the public. I would like to congratulate and welcome Chairman Timothy Massad, Commissioner Sharon Bowen, and Commissioner Christopher Giancarlo to the CFTC.

I look forward to working together collegially with them on the remaining Dodd-Frank rulemakings and implementation, including corrections to the rules when necessary. I am encouraged by the progress the Commission and CFTC staff have made so far in thoughtfully reexamining our rules in response to press reports and dialogue with market participants.

Under the leadership of then-Acting Chairman Mark Wetjen, CFTC staff held a number of roundtables to hear from the public on the impact of our Dodd-Frank rulemakings. The topics included mandatory trade execution of package transactions5; end-user issues such as Rule 1.35 recordkeeping, forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality, and the $25 million (special entity) de minimis threshold for swap dealing to public power utilities6; and position limits and aggregation7. I would like to thank the staff for the hard work they put into these roundtables.

I believe the Commission must make it a priority to address the concerns of end-users and market participants. Where our rules have been shown to be unworkable, we must find a better solution.

Doctors calibrate the right dosage of medicine for a sick patient. The Commission should calibrate its rules to minimize the side effects while we try to get it right.

As I noted earlier, we shouldn’t be surprised when Congress begins to revisit our regulation in response to public demand. When the Commission is too slow or unwilling to act, I welcome Congressional solutions.

I applaud the work of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture in putting together comprehensive legislation (H.R. 4413) that not only reauthorizes the CFTC, but also provides important market structure and Commission reforms. In recognition of the real problems we have been seeing in the markets, this legislation convincingly passed the House with a bipartisan vote of 265-144 and will now go to the U.S. Senate.

H.R. 4413 provides additional protections for customers and their funds in the event of another MF Global travesty. It also would fine-tune the Commission’s unworkable rules that make it too costly and burdensome for ordinary American companies—the engine of the U.S. economy—to comply with the letter of the law and still stay in business. Finally, the legislation would reform the internal operations of the Commission to ensure that it regulates in a manner that is open and transparent to the public.

I testified on many of these issues last year before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management hearing on the Commission’s implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and oversight of the futures and swaps markets.8

I think it is important to discuss the reforms in H.R. 4413 because the bill addresses critical areas where CFTC oversight requires additional improvements. These areas are customer protection, end-user relief, cost-benefit analysis, and further enhancements to the Commission’s internal operations.

Customer Protection

I have strongly advocated for increased customer protection in the wake of the blatant misappropriation of customer funds—totaling over $1 billion—by CFTC registrants like MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group.

I am pleased that H.R. 4413 includes provisions to require enhanced risk controls over segregated customer funds, as well as electronic fund verification and funds deficiency notices to the CFTC and the National Futures Association (NFA).

These requirements will make it harder for offenders to misuse customer funds. H.R. 4413 also includes data privacy provisions that are important to both customers and other market participants.

End-User Relief

I have also called for a careful review of the Commission’s rules implementing Dodd-Frank to ensure that they best serve the needs of end-users who use the markets to help run their businesses.

End-users are the foundation of our markets because they use futures and swaps to hedge risks and perform price discovery, like a farmer trying to bring his crop to market.

The legitimate hedging and risk mitigation activities of commercial businesses like end-users were not supposed to be impacted by the OTC derivatives reforms in Dodd-Frank because they did not contribute to the financial crisis.9

But instead of recognizing this distinction, the Commission’s 68 final and proposed rules, 206 no-action letters, 40 exemptive orders or letters, and 36 staff interpretive letters, guidance, advisories, and other written materials have made hedging more complicated and expensive for end-users.

One example of the Commission’s unworkable rules is the swap dealer definition. The Commission failed to faithfully interpret Dodd-Frank by broadly applying the swap dealer definition to all market participants and ignored the express statutory mandate to exclude end-users from its reach.

Accordingly, I am pleased that H.R. 4413 provides relief to end-users by creating a new “commercial market participant” definition. It makes it clear that end-users who use swaps to hedge and mitigate risk are not treated like banks by excluding end-users from the financial entity definition.

In addition, H.R. 4413 responds to concerns from the public power and energy sectors that the Commission’s rules did not take into account the realities of their operations and were driving up costs by treating certain contracts as swaps. These costs would have been passed on to customers through increased rates. H.R. 4413 would solve this problem by explicitly excluding forward contracts with volumetric optionality (which have built-in flexibility that is used to meet customer demand) from the swap definition.

H.R. 4413 would also exclude transactions with “utility special entities” (such as public power companies) from being counted towards the special entity de minimis threshold for purposes of registration as a swap dealer, similar to the Commission’s proposed rule.10 This will encourage more non-bank market participants to trade with municipal utilities, without having to worry that they will be forced to register as a swap dealer.

These critical reforms will provide end-users the certainty they need in order to comply with CFTC regulations in a way that does not harm American businesses.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Importantly, H.R. 4413 provides necessary legislative reform to require the Commission to perform appropriate quantitative and qualitative analysis for rulemakings. I have always advocated that the Commission’s rulemaking must include a thorough cost-benefit analysis to ensure that new rules do not impose unreasonable costs on the public.

Cost-benefit analysis is simply a common-sense tool designed to ensure that the benefits of any regulation exceed its costs and that regulators adopt the least burdensome approach to achieve the desired regulatory outcome.

This legislative reform builds on President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order No. 1286611, President Barack Obama’s Executive Orders Nos. 1356312 and 1357913, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-414 on best practices for regulatory analysis.

These initiatives for better regulation have earned bipartisan support and improve the regulatory process. All executive branch administrative agencies must comply with these executive orders—the CFTC should be held to the same standard and no less.

Increased Public Participation in Commission Business

Finally, H.R. 4413 reauthorizes the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and makes specific improvements to the Commission’s internal operations to make our rulemaking process and procedures for granting “no-action” relief more transparent, as well as involving the full Commission in critical management decisions.

The public will be better served because these reforms will help improve the Commission’s procedures to maintain consistency, ensure that public participation is a core component in our deliberations, and that decisions that significantly impact market participants happen in an open and transparent manner.

I am also pleased that H.R. 4413 recognizes the importance of technology to conducting surveillance of electronic markets by requiring the Commission to provide a strategic technology plan to Congress and requiring a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of CFTC resources. This strong oversight of the Commission by the Congress will increase our accountability and ensure that scarce taxpayer resources are being used wisely.

A Holistic Approach: Substituted Compliance and Mutual Recognition

My second topic recognizes, however, that because the derivatives markets are global in nature, it is not enough to simply look at issues domestically.

Comprehensive solutions to the negative impact on liquidity and market structure must be addressed through a holistic approach that focuses on international harmonization through substituted compliance and mutual recognition of other jurisdictions. If systemic risk is a cancer of the global financial system, then the whole body must be treated to prevent its spread.

CCP Recognition

One area where I am concerned that an uncoordinated approach to regulation would lead to greater systemic risk is clearing. As you know, the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) set forth international standards for CCPs. The CFTC finished adopting the PFMIs last year.15

Because of the G20 commitment to CCP clearing for standardized contracts and the higher margin requirements for uncleared swaps under Basel III, CCPs have more recently expanded to serve multiple markets across national borders. The interest of traders in more efficient use of collateral reinforces this trend and adds to the impetus for a coordinated approach to CCP regulation.

To that end, I hope that the European Commission (EC) will continue to work with the CFTC to find the U.S. regulatory regime equivalent under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) so that the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) may proceed with the recognition of U.S. CCPs by the December 15, 2014 deadline under the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).16

Without recognition, third country CCPs will not qualify as Qualifying CCPs (QCCPs) for purposes of the Basel III risk-weighting approach for banking institutions.

If this happens, it would be cost-prohibitive for EU banks to clear through third country CCPs. U.S. CCPs will be unable to maintain direct clearing member relationships with EU firms and would be ineligible to clear contracts subject to the EU clearing mandate next year.

This outcome would be detrimental to both U.S. and European interests because it will lead to market fragmentation and contraction of liquidity, as well as market disruption and dislocation due to the international nature of the swaps market.

I am encouraged by the recent U.S.-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement17 that reaffirmed regulators’ commitment to principles of international comity and working together to implement OTC derivatives reforms. I look forward to continued engagement by the EC with the CFTC to turn these aspirational words into action.

Decoding the Data

But as important as the cross-border CCP recognition is, we can’t lose sight of another critical area of cross-border cooperation: data sharing and harmonization.

Both the U.S. and EU should continue to engage in discussions to recognize each other’s swap trade repositories and develop a means to share the data, as well as collaborate to harmonize both the form and format of the data being reported.

The ability to compare and aggregate data across U.S. swap data repositories (SDRs) and EU trade repositories (TRs) is critical to the analysis and monitoring of threats to financial stability. Mutual recognition of SDRs and TRs would also eliminate the need for duplicative reporting.

As I have stated before, it is my firm belief that the key to effective and efficient cross-border regulation of the swaps market is through an outcomes-based approach where regulators would defer to the other jurisdiction when it is justified by the quality of their respective regulation and enforcement regimes.

All members of the G20 should strive to implement the G20 principles for OTC derivatives reform while avoiding conflicts of law, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty. By adhering to a policy of substituted compliance or mutual recognition, market regulators can prevent artificial incentives like regulatory arbitrage from disrupting the global financial markets.

Finding the Silver Bullet: Investing in Technology

Now, let me turn to my third topic—technology.

We all would like to find a silver bullet to prevent the next financial crisis. I believe that the closest we will get to that is through the application of technology to the massive amounts of data available to the CFTC.

I am pleased that the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture provided the CFTC with $52.6 million for technology investments for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015.18 Such an investment would allow the CFTC to begin making the necessary investments to keep up with technological innovation in today’s electronic and highly automated markets.

Only by establishing a 21st-century surveillance system can the CFTC effectively monitor the health of the markets we supervise and ensure that they are well-functioning. No doctor would try to diagnose a patient and prescribe treatment without performing tests and gathering sufficient data. The CFTC must do the same.

For many years now, the Commission has pointed to budget restraints and insufficient human capital as the reasons for the lack of investment in technology. Funding for the Office of Data and Technology has grown only 6.8 percent from FY 2011 to FY 2014, while the CFTC’s overall funding has grown 11.7 percent during this same period.

The Commission’s inadequate support for technology has left the CFTC with diminished automated surveillance capacity and an inability to manage the regulatory data stored in SDRs.

It is time for the CFTC to start making serious technology investments in order to meet its mission objectives of ensuring market integrity and protecting market participants. We must make automated surveillance the foundation of our oversight and compliance program.

The Commission must also fund an order message data collection and analysis system, a key tool for surveillance. Futures exchanges receive millions of order messages on a minute-by-minute basis, but according to CFTC staff, only 8 percent of all order messages result in completed trades.

The CFTC receives transaction data on a daily basis and doesn’t collect roughly 90 percent of all market activity. It is crucial to perform market surveillance at the order message level to understand the behavior of automated trading systems and identify possible violations.

If the CFTC does not act now, it will fall behind other agencies and regulators in understanding the impact of automated trading on the market.

The CFTC must also deploy cross-product and cross-market surveillance and analytical tools in order to facilitate detection of improper market conduct and systemic risks. Cross-market surveillance was recognized at the last Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) meeting as vitally important to the oversight of today’s complex markets.

In addition, the CFTC must improve its automated risk management surveillance of both clearing houses and swap dealers. This will enable the CFTC to efficiently oversee the highest risk firms, saving both time and money. Dodd-Frank clearly directed regulators to increase their ability to monitor risk in banks, intermediaries, and clearing houses.

As chair of the TAC, I have made it a priority to find the next best thing to a silver bullet for systemic risk and fraud, manipulation, and abuse in our markets. At the last TAC meeting held on June 3, 2014, we held a panel on developing a 21st-century surveillance program and heard various proposals from panelists on what such a system should include.

I have called on the public to also submit their ideas to take our surveillance program to the next level.19 Comments are due by August 4, 2014, and I hope to discuss them at a future TAC meeting.

Conclusion

It is the Commission’s responsibility to restore balance to the markets we regulate and ensure that our markets are healthy and well-functioning. We must take the time to thoughtfully reexamine our rules and mission objectives to make sure that we get it right and first do no harm.

I have now identified three critical areas where the new Commission should be focusing its energy.

First, we need to fix broken rules to ensure that they are workable and that we aren’t creating unnecessary and costly regulatory burdens for end-users. The futures and swaps markets provide two essential functions for end-users and market participants: to manage their commercial and operational risks through hedging, and to provide price discovery on the commodities that are their business inputs. We have to make sure the markets can still function the way they are supposed to.

Second, we need to resolve the regulatory differences among foreign jurisdictions in a manner that is consistent with the G20 principles. I believe this is best achieved through an outcomes-based approach. Those areas demanding immediate attention are CCP recognition and data sharing and harmonization.

Third, we need to develop a plan to maintain sustained focus on the implementation and integration of technology to support our expanded oversight mission to spot and perform systemic risk analysis, and to develop a 21st-century surveillance program.

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share with you my priorities and concerns facing the Commission, four years after the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law.

I am happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.

1 G20 Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Pittsburgh_Declaration_0.pdf.

2 Tom Osborn, Transatlantic swap liquidity split persists, Risk.net, June 3, 2014.

3 Lananh Nguyen, Oil Hedging Seen in Decline as Banks Exit Commodities, Bloomberg, July 10, 2014.

4 Customer Protection and End-User Relief Act, H.R. 4413, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://beta.congress.gov/113/bills/hr4413/BILLS-113hr4413eh.pdf.

5 CFTC Public Roundtable Regarding the Trade Execution Requirement and Package Transactions (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaevent_cftcstaff021214.

6 CFTC Public Roundtable to Discuss Dodd-Frank End-User Issues (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaevent_cftcstaff040314.

7 CFTC Public Roundtable to Discuss Position Limits for Physical Commodity Derivatives (June 19, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaevent_cftcstaff061914.

8 Testimony of Hon. Scott D. O’Malia, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Before the Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management, House Committee on Agriculture, “The Future of the CFTC: Commission Perspectives” (July 23, 2013), available at https://agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/pdf/hearings/OMalia130723.pdf.

9 Letter from U.S. Senators Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln to U.S. Representatives Barney Frank and Collin Peterson (June 30, 2010).

10 Exclusion of Utility Operations-Related Swaps With Utility Special Entities From De Minimis Threshold for Swaps With Special Entities; Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,238 (June 2, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2014-12469a.pdf.

11 Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review (Sept. 30, 1993).

12 Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Overview (Jan. 18, 2011).

13 Exec. Order No. 13,579, Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies (Jul. 14, 2011).

14 Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.

15 CFTC regulations have fully implemented the PFMIs. See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334 (Nov. 8, 2011); Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,663 (Aug. 15, 2013); Derivatives Clearing Organizations and International Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 72,476 (Dec. 2, 2013).

16 Letter from Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia, CFTC, to Commissioner Michel Barnier, European Commission (May 6, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/omailalettertobarnier050614.pdf.

17 U.S.-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement (July 11, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2564.aspx.

18 H.R. 4800, 113th Cong. (2014).

19 The comment file is available on the CFTC Technology Advisory Committee website at http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCCommittees/TechnologyAdvisory/index.htm.

Last Updated: July 15, 2014

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Remarks at AEI Conference on Financial Stability

Remarks at AEI Conference on Financial Stability

SEC CHARGES MAJOR AUDITOR WITH VIOLATING INDEPENDENCE RULES

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Ernst & Young LLP with violations of auditor independence rules that require firms to maintain their objectivity and impartiality with clients.
Ernst & Young agreed to pay more than $4 million to settle the charges.

The SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding finds that an Ernst & Young subsidiary lobbied congressional staff on behalf of two audit clients.  Such lobbying activities were impermissible under the SEC’s auditor independence rules because they put the firm in the position of being an advocate for those audit clients.  Despite providing the prohibited legislative advisory services on behalf of the clients, Ernst & Young repeatedly represented that it was “independent” in audit reports issued on the clients’ financial statements.

“Auditor independence is critical to the integrity of the financial reporting process.  When an auditor acts as an advocate for its audit client, that independence is compromised,” said Scott W. Friestad, associate director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “Ernst & Young engaged in lobbying activities that constituted improper advocacy and clearly violated the rules.”

According to the SEC’s order, Ernst & Young’s subsidiary Washington Council EY (WCEY) impaired the firm’s independence in several lobbying actions:

WCEY sent letters signed by a senior executive of an Ernst & Young audit client to congressional staff, urging passage of certain legislation.
WCEY asked congressional staff to insert language into a bill that was favorable to the business interests of an Ernst & Young audit client.
WCEY met with congressional staff in order to defeat legislation detrimental to the business interests of an Ernst & Young audit client.
WCEY asked third parties to approach a U.S. senator in order to seek support for a legislative amendment sought by an Ernst & Young audit client.
WCEY marked up a draft of a bill by inserting an Ernst & Young audit client’s language and sending it to congressional staff.
According to the SEC’s order, Ernst & Young had issued a written independence policy intended to provide guidance on the provision of legislative advisory services to audit clients.  However, Ernst & Young did not provide WCEY with formal, in-person training specifically tailored to the policy.

The SEC’s order finds that Ernst & Young committed violations of Rule 2-02(b)(1) of Regulation S-X; caused violations of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 13a-1; and engaged in improper professional conduct pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C(a)(2) and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.  The SEC’s order requires Ernst & Young to cease and desist from violating the auditor independence rules and from causing violations of the corporate periodic reporting provisions of the federal securities laws.  The SEC also censured Ernst & Young and ordered payment of $4.07 million in monetary sanctions, including disgorgement of $1.24 million, prejudgment interest of $351,925.98, and a penalty of $2.48 million.  The SEC took into consideration the remedial acts undertaken by Ernst & Young and its cooperation with SEC staff during the investigation.  For example, Ernst & Young voluntarily issued new guidance in June 2012 restricting such legislative advisory services.  The firm issued similar final guidance in May 2013.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by Jeremiah Williams, Kam H. Lee, and Robert Peak.  The case was supervised by David Frohlich.

Monday, July 14, 2014

DOJ ANNOUNCES $7 BILLION TOXIC MORTGAGES SETTLEMENT WITH CITIGROUP

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Monday, July 14, 2014
Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages
Citigroup to Pay the Largest Penalty of Its Kind - $4 Billion

The Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, today announced a $7 billion settlement with Citigroup Inc. to resolve federal and state civil claims related to Citigroup’s conduct in the packaging, securitization, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) prior to Jan. 1, 2009.  The resolution includes a $4 billion civil penalty – the largest penalty to date under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).  As part of the settlement, Citigroup acknowledged it made serious misrepresentations to the public – including the investing public – about the mortgage loans it securitized in RMBS.  The resolution also requires Citigroup to provide relief to underwater homeowners, distressed borrowers and affected communities through a variety of means including financing affordable rental housing developments for low-income families in high-cost areas.  The settlement does not absolve Citigroup or its employees from facing any possible criminal charges.

This settlement is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered $20 billion to date for American consumers and investors.

“This historic penalty is appropriate given the strength of the evidence of the wrongdoing committed by Citi,” said Attorney General Eric Holder.  “The bank's activities contributed mightily to the financial crisis that devastated our economy in 2008.  Taken together, we believe the size and scope of this resolution goes beyond what could be considered the mere cost of doing business.  Citi is not the first financial institution to be held accountable by this Justice Department, and it will certainly not be the last.”

The settlement includes an agreed upon statement of facts that describes how Citigroup made representations to RMBS investors about the quality of the mortgage loans it securitized and sold to investors.  Contrary to those representations, Citigroup securitized and sold RMBS with underlying mortgage loans that it knew had material defects.  As the statement of facts explains, on a number of occasions, Citigroup employees learned that significant percentages of the mortgage loans reviewed in due diligence had material defects.  In one instance, a Citigroup trader stated in an internal email that he “went through the Diligence Reports and think[s] [they] should start praying . . . [he] would not be surprised if half of these loans went down. . . It’s amazing that some of these loans were closed at all.”  Citigroup nevertheless securitized the loan pools containing defective loans and sold the resulting RMBS to investors for billions of dollars.  This conduct, along with similar conduct by other banks that bundled defective and toxic loans into securities and misled investors who purchased those securities, contributed to the financial crisis.
                                 
“Today, we hold Citi accountable for its contributing role in creating the financial crisis, not only by demanding the largest civil penalty in history, but also by requiring innovative consumer relief that will help rectify the harm caused by Citi's conduct,” said Associate Attorney General Tony West.  “In addition to the principal reductions and loan modifications we've built into previous resolutions, this consumer relief menu includes new measures such as $200 million in typically hard-to-obtain financing that will facilitate the construction of affordable rental housing, bringing relief to families pushed into the rental market in the wake of the financial crisis.”

Of the $7 billion resolution, $4.5 billion will be paid to settle federal and state civil claims by various entities related to RMBS: Citigroup will pay $4 billion as a civil penalty to settle the Justice Department claims under FIRREA, $208.25 million to settle federal and state securities claims by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), $102.7 million to settle claims by the state of California, $92 million to settle claims by the state of New York, $44 million to settle claims by the state of Illinois, $45.7  million to settle claims by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and $7.35 to settle claims by the state of Delaware.

Citigroup will pay out the remaining $2.5 billion in the form of relief to aid consumers harmed by the unlawful conduct of Citigroup.  That relief will take various forms, including loan modification for underwater homeowners, refinancing for distressed borrowers, down payment and closing cost assistance to homebuyers, donations to organizations assisting communities in redevelopment and affordable rental housing for low-income families in high-cost areas.  An independent monitor will be appointed to determine whether Citigroup is satisfying its obligations.  If Citigroup fails to live up to its agreement by the end of 2018,  it must pay liquidated damages in the amount of the shortfall to NeighborWorks America, a non-profit organization and leader in providing affordable housing and facilitating community development.

The U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado conducted investigations into Citigroup’s practices related to the sale and issuance of RMBS between 2006 and 2007.

“The strength of our financial markets depends on the truth of the representations that banks provide to investors and the public every day,” said U.S. Attorney John Walsh for the District of Colorado, Co-Chair of the RMBS Working Group.  “Today's $7 billion settlement is a major step toward restoring public confidence in those markets.  Due to the tireless work by the Department of Justice, Citigroup is being forced to take responsibility for its home mortgage securitization misconduct in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  As important a step as this settlement is, however, the work of the RMBS working group is far from done, we will continue to pursue our investigations and cases vigorously because many other banks have not yet taken responsibility for their misconduct in packaging and selling RMBS securities.”

“After nearly 50 subpoenas to Citigroup, Trustees, Servicers, Due Diligence providers and their employees, and after collecting nearly 25 million documents relating to every residential mortgage backed security issued or underwritten by Citigroup in 2006 and 2007, our teams found that the misconduct in Citigroup’s deals devastated the nation and the world’s economies, touching everyone,” said U.S. Attorney of the Eastern District of New York Loretta Lynch.  “The investors in Citigroup RMBS included federally-insured financial institutions, as well as a host of states, cities, public and union pension and benefit funds, universities, religious charities, and hospitals, among others.  These are our neighbors in Colorado, New York and around the country, hard-working people who saved and put away for retirement, only to see their savings decimated.”

This settlement resolves civil claims against Citigroup arising out of certain securities packaged, securitized, structured, marketed, and sold by Citigroup.  The agreement does not release individuals from civil charges, nor does it release Citigroup or any individuals from potential criminal prosecution. In addition, as part of the settlement, Citigroup has pledged to fully cooperate in investigations related to the conduct covered by the agreement.

Michael Stephens, Acting Inspector General for the Federal Housing Finance Agency said, “Citigroup securitized billions of dollars of defective mortgages, after which investors suffered enormous losses by purchasing RMBS from Citi not knowing about those defects. Today’s settlement is another significant step by FHFA-OIG and its law enforcement partners to hold accountable those who committed acts of fraud and deceit in the lead up to the financial crisis, and is a necessary step toward reviving a sound RMBS market that is crucial to the housing industry and the American economy.  We are proud to have worked with the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado. They have been great partners and we look forward to our continued work together.”

The underlying investigation was led by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Richard K. Hayes, Kevin Traskos, Lila Bateman, John Vagelatos, J. Chris Larson and Edward K. Newman, with the support of agents from the Office of the Inspector General for the Federal Housing Finance Agency, in conjunction with the President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group.

The RMBS Working Group is a federal and state law enforcement effort focused on investigating fraud and abuse in the RMBS market that helped lead to the 2008 financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group brings together more than 200 attorneys, investigators, analysts and staff from dozens of state and federal agencies including the Department of Justice, 10 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA-OIG, the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the Federal Reserve Board’s Office of Inspector General, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and more than 10 state Attorneys General offices around the country.

The RMBS Working Group is led by its Director Geoffrey Graber and its five co-chairs: Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division Stuart Delery, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie Caldwell, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney, U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado John Walsh and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.